SHALL IT BE AGAIN?

JOHN KENNETH TURNER

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SHALL IT BE AGAIN?

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BY

JOHN KENNETH TURNER

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To

THE LADS WHO WILL COME
UNDER THE NEXT DRAFT

"I get a great many letters, my fellow-citizens, from important and influential men in this country; but I get a great many other letters. I get letters from unknown men, from humble women, from people whose names have never been heard and will never be recorded, and there is but one prayer in all of these letters: 'Mr. President, do not allow anybody to persuade you that the people of this country want war with anybody.' "—WOODROW WILSON, *to the New York Press Club, June 30, 1916.*

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SHALL IT BE AGAIN?

I

THE AUTHOR EXPLAINS

WERE any excuse deemed necessary for this book, it would be enough to point to the likelihood of another war. No one will dispute that, notwithstanding complete victory was accorded us, the promised goal, permanent peace, was not attained. If, indeed, we are to judge by the demands of the Executive for greater armament, the danger of future war at once became from three to five times as great as before we took up arms to repel such danger. These demands were scaled down, but our peace-time armament remained far heavier than before. Those of us who, a little while ago, were most confident in asserting that our war would end war are the same who, as soon as it was over, became most certain that we must be ready for the next one.

But if the goal was not reached, our war could not have been in every respect the glorious thing we were told it was. Nor will any one dispute that many of the other promised benefits are not forthcoming. Nearly all of us seem to be willing to assume—or to permit our neighbors to assume, which comes to the same thing—that the "reasons" justifying our war are sound. But if such "reasons" are sound how is it that the results are so disappointing?

The question cannot be dismissed simply by blaming Wilson, or the Republican party, or Lloyd George and Clemenceau. Did we not fight on the theory of the perfect

wisdom and purity of Wilson and the Entente statesmen—and, for that matter, of ourselves, which includes the Republican party?

If we have been betrayed, it is not sufficient merely to acknowledge the fact, but to determine how and why, in order that provision may be made against betrayal in the future. Nor is it sufficient to look for the secret in what happened at Paris. The great settlement—which, in the main, still stands—was the logical and almost certain result of what had gone before.

Although it will be pleasant for all who served or sacrificed in the late war always to believe the best of it, no one who really sacrificed will wish for another such experience; nor would any one wish to continue believing well of recent events if such belief were to add to the danger of a repetition.

Remember that for more than four years one side was permitted to speak and the other forced to remain silent. "The perspective that only time can give," some say, "is necessary before the true history of our war can be written, and before proper criticism can be made." But the end of the fighting saw a vast and complicated machine feverishly at work to crystallize into "history" the story of the war as it was told to us as propaganda in the heat thereof. If we wait a generation to face the whole truth we shall probably never face it.

If any of the "reasons" justifying our recent war is valid, it is not unlikely that one or more of them will again apply, and another war will become both necessary and desirable. If, on the other hand, none of such "reasons" will bear the test of scrutiny, any probable future war will be inexcusable, since all probable "causes" and "objectives" were urged for the recent one.

How, then, did it come about that America, in 1917,

found itself a partisan in a conflict which evoked only horror here in 1914—a conflict which not one in one thousand dreamed we could ever enter—which not one in a million had the temerity to advocate entering? How did it come about that America was plunging ahead in policies which not a single public man dared openly favor in 1914?

In this book are set forth the essential facts tending to prove what many people already believe, though on incomplete evidence, that ours was a war for business. If, however, any of the non-business motives mentioned in justification for our war is sound, the theory of a war for business cannot stand. Thus it is that the first parts of the book are devoted to an examination of such alleged motives.

Business, of course, was farthest from the minds of the masses of the American people. But the relationship between the masses, the government, and business becomes clear. Although millions fought and served, the millions decided absolutely nothing except the physical victory. One man chose war for America, dictated the war policies, arrogated to himself the sole power to arrange the conditions of peace. The motives of the men who fought in Europe, and of the folks who served at home, did not determine what the real motives of their war should be. The real motives of their war were the motives which Woodrow Wilson personally chose to serve, whether in public or in secret, and only those.

From this it must not be imagined that Wilson is to receive the entire blame for the delinquencies of our war and our peace. Although the responsibility lies as heavy upon Wilson as could be upon any individual, the culpability of Wilson explains only one-third of the riddle. As for ourselves, the motives that we professed are the same as the professed motives of Wilson. Is it already forgotten that the rest of us also swore allegiance to the principles

by which Wilson claimed to be guided in entering and prosecuting the war "to make the world safe for democracy"; that the propaganda of "loyal patriots" everywhere, even among his bitterest political opponents, was little more than an echo of the President's words; that "Stand Behind the President!" was the war slogan while the issue was in the balance, and trust in the President the acid test of patriotism after we were in; that it was *because of* his proclaimed war motives that we glorified Wilson beyond any other man in history?

The question of Presidential fraud is determined by the discrepancy between the motives professed and the motives served. The question of national fraud is determined by the discrepancy between the motives professed and the motives to whose service we complacently agree. For the fruit that Wilson plucked for us we still retain. Although the Republican party altered, in outward detail, the written forms of peace, it did not change the general nature of the settlement, nor attempt nor wish to do so. Although the phraseology varies at times, our foreign policies remain in principle the same. Although a Republican Congress went through motions intended to discredit Wilson, it met, in a large measure, his wishes as to "reconstruction" legislation. Regardless of the judgment of a national election, Wilson's work, on the whole, has been accepted by the "leaders of the people" and is tolerated by the country.

Although it is of importance to present in a true light the most misunderstood figure in American history, the theme is much broader than that. Instead of laying the foundations for future peace, our war set up the groundwork for more and more war. This groundwork must be cleared away or there is no hope. Only after the shams of the past war have been exploded, its true motives revealed, and its methods and results shine clear in the light

of those motives, can a beginning be made towards ways that will insure us against future horrors.

Instead of being a dead issue, therefore, our late war is the livest issue of the day, and it will remain an issue so long as future war is in the reckoning. Its lessons hold not only the secret of averting future war, but also the solution of other public questions of a pressing nature.

II

DID THE AMERICAN PEOPLE WANT WAR?

It was invariably assumed during our war against Germany, as well as afterwards—and countless times asserted—that the American people went willingly into the war. Said President Wilson, for example: "I say that the heart of the country is in this war because it would not have gone into it if its heart had not been prepared for it." (Red Cross Memorial Building dedication, May 12, 1917.) While it cannot be stated with absolute certainty whether a majority would have voted for or against war on April 6, 1917—since they were not accorded an opportunity to vote—there is a collection of circumstances which, when brought together, would seem to leave no reasonable doubt that the American people would not have chosen to enter the fight. Some of these circumstances are:

1. The Reëlection of Wilson.

Wilson, candidate of a minority party, was elected originally because of a split in the majority party. Facing a united Republican party in 1916, his only chance for victory lay in espousing a cause appealing so powerfully to the masses as to induce at least a million voters to break away from party affiliations. In choosing to make peace his paramount issue, Wilson correctly guessed the most fervent wish of the people at large. His slogan, "He kept us out of war," and his promise to continue to "keep us out of war," won him reëlection. In November, 1916, the American electorate spoke for peace and against war with

Germany, as definitely as it was possible for it to speak at that or any other time.

2. Our Stealthy Approach to War.

The successive steps by which President Wilson arrived at war were screened by voluble assurances of peaceful intention. (See Chapter VI.) The nation was almost wholly, and Congress partly, deceived by these assurances. The President continued to reiterate that he was treading the path of peace even after he broke diplomatic relations —even when he sought the consent of Congress to arm private ships with naval crews—even after that. What other interpretation is to be placed upon this except that he himself believed that the masses were still opposed to war? In his message to Congress of February 26, the President admitted: *"The American people do not desire it."* Between this date and April 2, there is no evidence that the sentiment of the masses changed. No new issue whatever arose to change it. For his *casus belli,* President Wilson himself went back to the German proclamation of Jan. 31.

3. Refusal to Submit any War Issue to the Public.

While the declaration of war was impending, and during the weeks immediately succeeding it—when President Wilson's war plans were being revealed—numerous proposals were made, usually taking the form of resolutions or amendments introduced in Congress, providing that the public be given some say in these momentous matters. Some of these proposals were: that the choice of war or peace be decided by referendum; that the question of sending an army overseas be submitted to referendum; that service overseas be limited to volunteers. That the Executive stood uncompromisingly against all such proposals furnishes a strong presumption of a conviction in his

own mind that, if afforded an opportunity, the people would have repudiated his war programme and his war.

4. Government Press Agency, War Education, and Repression.

With America's declaration of war, the government organized the most complete and expensive press agency ever seen anywhere on the globe. More money was spent for the manufacture of public opinion, and more men and women were employed, than in any previous publicity campaign in history. Of the official publicity organizations, the Bureau of Information was but one of many departments. Added to the purely government press bureaus, were the voluntary war committees, organized by the government and directed by one department or another. Every postmaster in America was forced to serve the government as a press agent. The press, as a whole, the theatres, and even the public schools, became a part of the machine. With their teachers as officers, the school-children were obliged to assist the government in the imposition of its propaganda. Every person in America was reached, in one way or another, and almost daily. Is not the existence of such a press agency a virtual admission that America went into the war unconvinced of its righteousness? Coupled with the violent suppression of all opposition to the war, is it not material evidence of a determination to force distasteful beliefs upon an unwilling people?

5. Circumstances of the "Liberty Loans."

The large number of bond purchasers was mentioned as evidence of the popularity of the war. It is no evidence of such popularity, since all Liberty Loans were floated chiefly by coercion. All the publicity, agitation, and appeals both to patriotism and cupidity, all the posters and literature,

all the personal solicitation, were not considered sufficient to sell the bonds. Coercion was resorted to as a policy. What is said of the Liberty Loan applies, in a somewhat lesser degree, to the Red Cross. Neither the large number of subscriptions to Liberty Bonds, nor those to the Red Cross are any evidence of the popularity of the war.

6. The New York Municipal Election.

After America's declaration of war, the only important election in which peace was permitted to become the issue, and in which freedom of discussion was allowed the candidates, was the election in New York, November, 1917. The Mayor, Mr. Mitchel, deliberately chose to make his fight on the issue of patriotism. He directly charged his chief opponent, Hylan, with abetting German propaganda, and "exposed" him as an associate of "paid enemies of America." Mitchel was vigorously supported by conspicuous patriots, patriotic societies, and all the "loyal" city newspapers. The latter expressly warned the public that the defeat of Mitchel would be a virtual repudiation of the war by New York. Nevertheless, Hylan achieved the most decisive victory ever given to a party in the American metropolis, while the Socialist party, which frankly attacked the war, became a factor for the first time. The Socialist candidate, Hillquit, who had announced from the platform his refusal to buy Liberty Bonds, received 93 per cent. of the vote given Mitchel, while, of the 28,937 soldiers and sailors who voted in New York, but 6,226, or less than twenty-two out of each one hundred, cast their ballot for Mitchel.

7. Circumstances of the Draft.

Of the total number called in the first draft, more than one-half (50.62 per cent.) put in formal claims for exemp-

tion. More than a quarter of a million (252,294), or eight per cent., failed to appear and succeeded in escaping arrest. The former figure, of course, does not represent all of the registrants who did not want to go to war, while the latter figure represents only a fraction of those willing to risk terms in the penitentiary rather than go, for the number evading registration is unknown.

Many thousands who failed to register, and many thousands who registered but failed to respond to the call, were arrested. In the "slacker round-ups," staged in New York City alone, in the last days of August, 1918, 16,000 men were held for offenses of this kind. So many men of draft age fled the country that it became expedient to promulgate an order forbidding the departure of such men, and to establish an elaborate system of espionage, patrol, and passports to enforce the order. In a statement issued September 3, 1918, the War Department said: "The Department of Justice has on file the names of 3000 slackers who fled to Mexico before June 5, 1917, to escape registration." So many married to avoid the draft in the early months that it became expedient to serve notice on the country that eleventh-hour marriages would save no one from service. So many had their teeth extracted to render themselves physically ineligible that the War Department issued a warning to dentists that they were liable to prosecution for complicity in this form of draft evasion.

In the ten months ending May 1, 1918, over 14,000 desertions were reported from the army. The numbers seeking dishonorable discharge were even greater. At the end of December, 1917, we were told that "for several weeks the army has been losing men at the rate of 100 to 150 a day. They chose to commit offenses which led to their dishonorable discharge." The newspapers gave us instances of suicide and self-mutilations which were resorted

to as a means to escape the draft, and of men turning to crime with the deliberate intention of getting into the penitentiary and so escaping the draft. There were a number of anti-draft riots, and so much anti-draft sentiment that it became expedient to prevent, with an iron hand, the public assembly of persons opposing the draft, and to prosecute and imprison hundreds of those most conspicuous in anti-draft agitation. There was also uncovered a thriving trade in exemption affidavits, involving the crime of perjury.

When the draft bill became a law, President Wilson told the world: "It [the draft] is in no sense a conscription of the unwilling; it is, rather, selection from a nation that has volunteered in mass" (Registration Proclamation, May 18, 1917). Thereafter, an elaborate effort was made to throw a glamor about the draft, to make it appear that submission to the draft was, on the whole, voluntary and without compulsion. The large registration was pointed to as an evidence of the patriotism of America's young men. But under the circumstances the large registration was no proof of willingness to serve; it showed, rather, that, in general, the opposition to service was overcome by fear of punishment, of which the President and patriotic leaders were careful to give repeated warning.

The fact that severe penalties faced America's young men at every turn is itself evidence that the war leaders were well aware that, without coercion, they would have been unable to raise an army. Out of the first draft of three million men, not fewer than 300,000, and probably 500,000, made themselves liable to punishment in the penitentiary in their efforts to evade service. In order to carry through our European adventure, it became necessary to subject millions to involuntary servitude, on the one hand, and to create a multitude of felons on the other.

8. Failure of Voluntary Enlistments.

It is supposed that the people can be depended on to volunteer for a people's war. But, although the army recruiting service was extremely active throughout nearly all of the war period, and although special inducements were held out for volunteers, army enlistments from the date of the war message to the date of the armistice reached only the insignificant total of 393,931.

Beginning February 3, after the severance of diplomatic relations, extraordinary efforts were put forth by the army, assisted by patriotic organizations and great business houses, to stimulate recruiting. But during February, the army received only 4,852 recruits, a figure not noticeably above the normal. From April 1 to May 14, the enlistments numbered only 67,443. A supreme effort was made during the last week of June, which the President designated as Recruiting Week. But Recruiting Week netted only 9,043 men for the army. Between April 1 and July 1, only 133,992 enlistments were received, and it is certain that many of these were prompted by the impending draft. At that rate it would have taken eighteen months to raise the first one million men. However, by July 1 recruiting had come almost to a standstill. Volunteering had been tried and proven a failure. When only one out of every one hundred men of the most courageous, adventurous, and self-sacrificing age responds to the repeated calls of his government, during the first three months of a foreign war, it is a point against the popularity of the war which no rhetoric can explain away.

The impulse for America's war certainly did not come from the common people.

III

WAS AMERICA EVER IN DANGER?

Why, my friends, we ought not to turn to those people [the nations at war] in fear, but in sympathy. We ought to realize that after this exhaustion they will need us, and that we need not fear them.—Woodrow Wilson, in speech at Cincinnati, Oct. 26, 1916.

THE American people were told that they were forced into war by the Kaiser; that America had been attacked, and that there was no other recourse except to defend itself against aggression; that the very sovereignty of the country was imperiled; even that we were threatened with actual invasion and domination by German armies.

President Wilson personally gave the signal for this particular note in the official and unofficial propaganda, as for all others. In asking for war he advised: *"That the Congress declare the recent course of the Imperial German Government to be in fact nothing less than war against the government and people of the United States; that it formally accept the status of belligerent that has thus been thrust upon it."* In his message of December 4, 1917, he asserted: *"We have been forced into it* [the war] *to save the very institutions we live under from corruption and destruction."* At Urbana, January 31, 1918, he told us: *"We are fighting, therefore, as truly for the liberty and self-government of the United States as if the war of our own Revolution had to be fought over again."*

This doctrine was preached from thousands of platforms, thousands of pulpits, thousands of movie screens, millions of posters, in the daily newspapers, and in every vehicle of

the propaganda. To carry out the idea, our war councils were called "defense councils," our private patriotic societies "defense societies." The necessity for defense against invasion and outrage became, as intended, a fixed assumption of millions of perfectly sincere and truth-loving Americans.

But what are the facts?

1. Germany had not attacked the territory of the United States, nor threatened to attack it. The only suggestion of the kind was contained in the proposal for a German-Mexican alliance, and this was expressly contingent upon America's first making war on Germany. (See Chapter XVIII.)

2. Germany had perpetrated no injury against an American not perpetrated also against neutrals generally, and such injuries as she had perpetrated were wholly incidental to the war against the Entente governments.

3. Germany had not declared war against the United States. The German government had striven to avoid war, offering every concession short of abandoning submarine operations in European waters, even making overtures for a peaceful understanding subsequently to the breaking of diplomatic relations.

4. Germany was physically incapable of invading America at the time when some of us were asserting that our war was to repel invasion.

5. Germany would have been physically incapable of invading America even had she possessed no other enemies. This was the judgment of the highest experts in the service of America, sworn to before Congressional committees while this country was neutral.

December 9, 1914, Admiral Fletcher, who was at that time the highest active officer of the navy, informed the House Naval Affairs Committee that, even were it possible

for the entire German navy to take the high seas and attack, not a single German could be landed on American soil, since the American navy, being stronger, would defeat it. In April, 1917, the relative strength of the American navy was greater than in December, 1914.

During these Congressional investigations, it was shown that, to carry a little army of 96,000 men across the sea would require 270 troop transport vessels, a greater collection of ships than had ever sailed together in the annals of naval warfare; and that an army had never been moved successfully overseas and landed under hostile guns, the Dardanelles catastrophe having been the result of the only great undertaking of that character.

Admiral Fletcher testified that the war in Europe had *"conclusively demonstrated what every military strategist knew before, that it is impossible for sea craft successfully to attack land fortifications."*

As to our land fortifications, General Weaver testified that they were already *"the best in the world."* The guns mounted and contemplated in the appropriations for our coast defenses, he said, would give us "an entirely satisfactory defense."

Admiral Knight characterized the difficulties of transporting a fleet across either the Atlantic or Pacific ocean and maintaining it in American waters—a necessary feat in a successful invasion—as "almost insuperable."

Corroborating Knight, General Miles testified:

I will suppose an unsupposable case. Suppose they could put an army on a fleet of 500 ships and move it across the Atlantic without being disturbed by any naval power, and they could land. They certainly could not go into any port. They could not go into our ports any more than they could go through the Dardanelles. That has been demonstrated. Our forts are equipped and fortified as well as the Dardanelles. Suppose they got that far—as to landing

at some remote point—if we could not gather enough men in the army and militia, and by other means, to destroy that army before they could send their ships back and get another load, I would want to move to another country.

May 1, 1917, Admiral Chocherprat of the French navy, here with the French war mission, told the newspaper correspondents: "The United States is in possession of the most powerful fleet in the world next to the British."

This disposes also of the assertion, heard so many times from 1914 on, that the United States owed its immunity from German invasion to the protection of the British navy.

Finally, when the German high seas fleet fell into Allied hands at the end of the war, it was discovered that the bunker capacity of the German battleships was extremely small, demonstrating that they had been designed for use only near the home ports. The very structure of these great ships rendered impracticable any sustained or extended operations in distant waters. Of themselves they are proof that the German government had not entertained a thought of attacking the territory of the United States.

President Wilson himself, in the period preceding war, repeatedly rejected the idea of a possible invasion of this country. In his message of December 8, 1914, he said: *"No one who speaks counsel based on facts or drawn from a just and candid interpretation of the realities can say that there is any reason to fear that from any quarter our independence or the integrity of our territory is threatened. Dread of the power of other nations we are incapable of."* To a New York audience, January 27, 1917, he declared: *"Nobody seriously supposes, gentlemen, that the United States needs to fear an invasion of its own territory."*

We find the leaders of our allies in agreement with this

view, even after our war declaration. In the speeches delivered in the British Parliament, April 18, 1917, acclaiming our participation, it was held that the United States had not been directly attacked in *any* way, much less invaded or threatened with invasion.

Mr. Asquith said that the war "was doing little appreciable harm to the material fortunes and prosperity of the American people. Nor were American interests, at home or abroad, directly imperiled, least of all the greatest interest of a democratic community, the maintenance of domestic independence and liberty."

Earl Curzon said:

> The case of America entering the war is widely differentiated from that of any of the other allied countries. All of the latter had a direct personal interest in the war, but America's interest is secondary and remote.

A month after the declaration of war, President Wilson used the words: "We have gone in with no special grievance of our own." Challenged for appearing to suggest that we had gone into the war for no cause at all, he answered that we had grievances, but none that was not shared generally by the neutral countries.

Finally, after the fighting was over, President Wilson confessed: *"America was not immediately in danger. . . . America was not directly attacked."* (At Billings, Sept. 11, 1919.)

The undeniable truth is that, in order to come to grips with the enemy, it was necessary to send our forces across a great ocean, into another hemisphere, and either hunt him down on a narrow strip of sea or attack him in his own trenches, dug in another continent. Instead of the enemy's carrying the war to us, it was we who carried the war to the enemy. Instead of being placed in the position of defend-

ing our soil against German armies, we placed the Germans in the position of defending their soil against American armies.

Where was the element of self-defense?

There was asserted a necessity for defense of the alleged rights to trade and travel through a narrow zone of sea, three thousand miles from American territory. But what has this to do with the horrible pictures of German fire and sword in American cities?

The nearest connection is found in the theory that the Kaiser and his people were inflamed with an ambition to conquer and rule the world, and that there was a possibility of their doing it at some future time. Even were there a reasonable basis for such a hypothesis (and there was not), it would not have justified war, either under existing principles of international law, the common practices of modern governments, or in common sense. For to proceed consistently upon such a principle would require us to attack every other powerful nation, and attempt at once to assert a world supremacy for ourselves.

America was never in danger even after we went to war with Germany, for we were never placed beyond the possibility of turning back without serious hurt. At all times we were in a position to make peace and withdraw without vital injury from the enemy.

After we had gone to war, the imposition of onerous terms upon the Russian Soviet Government, in the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, was seized upon as a horrible example of what would happen to America should she not put her heel upon the neck of the Kaiser. The comparison was inept; the Kaiser's armies were never in America and there was never the remotest probability of their coming to America or attempting to do so. Will any one contend that the

German government was at any time unwilling to conclude the same terms of peace that we rejected in the first months of 1917—friendship on any basis short of giving up the submarine blockade of England and her allies? (See Chapter XVI.)

The point is important; for the bludgeoning down of all domestic opposition to the war was excused only on the plea that, once we were at war, there was no choice except between victory and disaster. It was upon this assumption that so many prominent persons, who opposed war up to the declaration, became "now-that-we're-in" patriots. They were willing to support a war which they believed to be unjust, merely because it had begun. Under the circumstances that America happened to be in, there was no defensible reason why any one who opposed the war before April 6, 1917, should have favored it after that date.

Whatever the merits of the issues with the Kaiser, there was no issue of invasion, no issue of territorial integrity, no issue of domination or destruction of American institutions, no immediate and pressing danger of any kind. Self-defense was a catchword. The Hun invasion was a gigantic hoax. The scare propaganda was created out of whole cloth. These stories were told us only because the element of fear was considered necessary for patriotic purposes. The great American public had to be frightened in order to induce it to take the war programme.

IV

THE RESPONSIBILITY OF ONE MAN

Governments have gone to war with one another. Peoples, so far as I can remember, have not, and this is a government of the people, and this people is not going to choose war.—Woodrow Wilson, at Milwaukee, Jan. 31, 1916.

AMERICA's declaration of war was adopted, as it had to be, by Congress, but only after Congress had been called upon to do so by the President, who had so set the stage as to render it extremely humiliating to himself, and politically embarrassing to his party, to turn back. The declaration was carried by a vote of 373 to 50 in the House, and 82 to 6 in the Senate, a large majority for an ordinary measure, but not so large for a declaration of war, where the pressure for unanimity is always nearly overwhelming. The author sat in the Senate gallery throughout the war debate. A most frequent argument in favor of the resolution was that it was a question of standing behind the President in a controversy with a foreign power. Speakers who announced their intention of voting "yes" expressly asserted that they would vote "no," except for the fact that war had already been decided on, the resolution was going through, and opposition was useless.

President Wilson had complete control of our end of the diplomatic negotiations which failed of their professed object, peace, and by progressive steps carried the nation into belligerency.

It was Wilson who sent the "strict-accountability" note; Wilson's uncompromising attitude that caused the resignation of Secretary of State Bryan; Wilson who threatened to sever diplomatic relations in 1916, unless Germany should "now immediately declare and effect an abandonment of its present methods of warfare against passenger and freight carrying vessels."

It was Wilson who led the preparedness agitation, who oversaw the drafting of bills providing for the largest military and naval appropriations ever expended by any nation in the world in peace times, and urged these bills through Congress.

It was Wilson who omitted to hold England to the strict accountability which he exacted of Germany; Wilson who broke off diplomatic relations when Germany announced its purpose of waging submarine warfare unrestricted; Wilson who rejected Germany's offer to reopen relations looking towards a continuation of American neutrality. It was Wilson who requested from Congress the power to engage in hostilities at his own discretion; Wilson who, when that request was not acceded to, assumed the power that Congress had failed to grant, and placed public fighting men upon private ships. It was Wilson who finally demanded of Congress a declaration of war against Germany.

It may be thought that President Wilson was forced into belligerent measures, or into measures leading towards belligerency, by some other public factor. Of these other factors there existed three:

1. Congress.
2. The general public.
3. A minority of the public having an interest in belligerency.

But whenever our controversy with Germany found its way before Congress, it invariably appeared that Congress

was more pacifically inclined than was the President. During the period of diplomatic strife, the President engaged in two notable contests with Congress in which his aggressive attitude toward Germany was seriously opposed.

The first of these contests occurred early in 1916, and was occasioned by the announcement of Germany that the armed merchant vessels of its enemies would be regarded as ships of war. A strong opinion developed, both in and out of Congress, that persons taking passage on such armed ships should do so at their own risk, and the chairman of each of the Foreign Relations Committees notified the President that a clear majority of his respective committee and house favored a formal warning to American citizens against risking their lives on such vessels. Speaker Clark told the President that Congress was "three to one" in favor of such a warning.

But the President opposed warning Americans against taking passage on armed ships, and insisted that the pending resolutions asking him to warn them be voted down "to prove that there were no divided councils in Congress in regard to the foreign policy of the government."

During this struggle between the comparatively belligerent President and the comparatively pacific Congress, Senator Gore charged the President with telling various Senators and Representatives that war with Germany "might not be an evil." The testimony of Senator Gore was confirmed publicly and privately by other Senators. Following the tabling of the Gore and McLemore resolutions, three members of Mr. Wilson's party—two of whom had voted to table the resolutions "for party reasons"—announced their intention of retiring from Congress because of their belief that the President was directing the course of the country into war.[1]

[1] Representatives R. Page (N. C.), I. Sherwood (O.), and J. Eagle (Tex.).

The President's other notable contest with Congress occurred over his request for a grant of power "to supply our merchant ships with defensive arms . . . and to employ any other instrumentalities or methods that may be necessary or adequate to protect our ships and our people in their legitimate and peaceful pursuits of the seas." (Feb. 26, 1917.) A bill, the Armed Ships Bill, drawn at the White House, brought out the President's wishes a little more definitely. It authorized the Executive to supply private vessels "with arms and also the necessary ammunition and means for making use of them," and "to employ such other instrumentalities and methods as may in his judgment and discretion seem necessary and adequate to protect such vessels," as well as a grant of $100,000,000 "for the purpose of carrying into effect the foregoing provisions."

The *Congressional Record,* and the newspapers of the day, show that a large number of Senators and Representatives believed that war would inevitably result were the President permitted to carry out his plans, and that it was due chiefly to this belief that the bill was generally opposed in the beginning. Chairman Flood, of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, was sent to interview the President and induce him to modify his demands, but failed. Senator Stone, chairman of the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee, refused to handle the bill on the floor.

It was only under the President's whip that in the end the House passed the bill, but so modified that the use of "other instrumentalities" was not authorized. In the Senate, numerous amendments were offered seeking to restrict the possible belligerent action of the President. The bill failed of final passage through the opposition of twelve Senators, who pinned their hope of peace on forcing the President to call an extra session of Congress.

The tactics of the President at the time led to the conclusion, freely expressed in newspapers, friendly as well as unfriendly, that he preferred not to call an extra session for fear Congress would interfere with the vigorous measures that he had determined to take against Germany.

When, February 13, minority-leader Mann inserted in the Navy Bill an amendment, reaffirming it to be the policy of the United States "to adjust and settle its international disputes through mediation or arbitration, to the end that war may be honorably avoided," it was characterized as "a pacifist ruse," and "a slap at Wilson." Who will not recall that during the last few weeks before the declaration of war, every element that had been advocating war, including notable political opponents of the President, joined in execration of the Congressmen who were "causing delay," and of pacifism and pacifists; in a chorus of praise of Wilson, and of supplication to the nation to "stand behind the President?" What else could that mean except that those who wanted war judged that the course of the President led to war, and were fearful lest Congress might "keep us out of war," in spite of the President?

From the above, it is clear that Congress did not force the Executive into war or any of the measures that led to it. The pacific wish of the people has already been pointed out. Did any minority of the public force the President into steps that led to war?

Did Wall Street force the President into war?

The collected facts presented in later chapters will answer the question of Wall Street's part in the responsibility for war. Meanwhile, a moment's thought on the commanding position in which the President stood is sufficient to bring the conclusion that the primary responsibility cannot be shifted to the shoulders of Wall Street. Whatever

pressure Wall Street may have exerted upon the President, Wall Street did not have the power to compel action.

The President had been reëlected for a period of four years on a peace platform. He was commander-in-chief of the army and navy, which were not threatening rebellion. Had President Wilson chosen to pursue policies similar to those of Switzerland, or Holland, or Sweden, or Denmark, or Spain, which kept those countries out of war, he would have met with criticism, but no means short of revolution could have changed the course of the country. There is no evidence that Wall Street was threatening revolution, or that it would have been successful in a revolution had it started one.

Congress and every other element of influence in American life must bear its share of the responsibility for our European adventure, but the political and moral responsibility lies first upon Woodrow Wilson.

V

PRESIDENTIAL USURPATIONS TO ACHIEVE BELLIGERENCY

The provision of the Constitution giving the war-making power to Congress was dictated, as I understand it, by the following reasons: Kings had always been involving and impoverishing their people in wars, pretending generally, if not always, that the good of the people was the object. This our convention understood to be the most oppressive of all kingly oppressions, and they resolved so to frame the Constitution that no man should hold the power of bringing this oppression upon us.—Abraham Lincoln.

"THE Congress shall have power . . . to declare war," says the Constitution. Is, or is not, the power to *declare* war inclusive of the power to *make* war? And is, or is not, the Executive excluded from exercising such power?

President Wilson's own answer was given to the public a number of times during his preparedness tour. At Chicago, January 31, 1916, he said:

This war was brought on by rulers, not by the people, and I thank God that there is no man in America who has the authority to bring on war without the consent of the people.

And the following night at Des Moines:

I was saying the other night that I know of no case where one people made war upon another people. No government can make war in the United States. The people make war through their representatives. The Constitution of the United States does not give the President even a participating part in the making of war. War can be declared only by Congress, by an action which the President does not take part in, and cannot veto. I am literally, by constitutional arrangement, the mere servant of the people's representatives.

But Wilson never followed this theory in action. From the beginning of his administration, the Congressional debates frequently brought out a feeling of resentment against his assumption of all power over foreign relations, and his disinclination to take Congress into his confidence in such matters. As early as October, 1914, we find him issuing the warning: "The foreign policy of the government . . . lies outside the field of legislation." (Letter to floor-leader Underwood.)

In the dispute with Germany, we find him asserting the question of warning Americans against traveling on the armed ships of the Entente to be "clearly within the field of Executive initiative," (Letter to Representative Pou); although it was conceded at the time that this issue was likely to determine the question of peace or war. During the same period, Senator Jones of Washington introduced a resolution asking the President not to break off relations with any country, nor to place America in any other position where it could not with honor avoid war. But the resolution was not accorded the Presidential favor.

When an executive (1) sends an ultimatum to a foreign power (threatening to sever diplomatic relations) without first notifying or seeking the advice of the people's representatives; (2) breaks diplomatic relations without first notifying or seeking the advice of the people's representatives; (3) refuses mediation without notifying or seeking the advice of the people's representatives; (4) arms private ships with naval crews without the consent of the people's representatives, and sends these ships to sea with orders to the crews to fire at sight on the vessels of another nation technically at peace with us, it can hardly be maintained that he is acting as "the mere servant of the people's representatives," or that he is not exercising "even a participating part in the making of war."

In overruling Congress on the question of warning American citizens against taking passage on the armed ships of belligerent countries, President Wilson was proceeding from an assumption that Germany's use of the submarine was an offense against "the sacred and indisputable rules of international law." (Note of Apr. 18, 1916.) But as Wilson himself had substantially admitted, (Note of July 21, 1915), the legal and illegal uses of the submarine had not been adjudicated in any international court, treaty, or in any other way. The President had no right whatever to create, by Executive fiat, a new international law for the world to go by. "*Congress* shall have power . . . to define and punish . . . offenses against the law of nations." His extreme recourse would have been to go before Congress and ask that body to lay down a law on the submarine, and to direct him as to any procedure to be taken to meet its illegal use.

Again, in the debates on the Armed Ships Bill, it was repeatedly admitted that the President's request for a grant of power was a request for the war-making power, which Congress cannot constitutionally relinquish or give away. Subsequently, in explaining to his constituents his opposition to the bill, Senator LaFollette quoted two decisions of the United States Supreme Court. The first held that when Congress authorized private armed ships of the United States to defend themselves against the armed ships of France, it constituted a declaration of war, the court asserting: "Every contention by force, between two nations, in external matters, under the authority of their respective governments, is not only war, but public war." The second held: "To the legislative power alone it must belong to determine when the violence of other nations is to be met with violence."

In the same debates, it was generally conceded that the

arming or convoying of *munitions* ships would constitute an aggressive act, since munitions, being absolute contraband, were subject to seizure and destruction under all interpretations of international law. The President, nevertheless, refused to accept an amendment prohibiting the arming or convoying of ships carrying munitions.

During the week ending March 4, therefore, President Wilson violated his oath of office by asking Congress for authority which it was constitutionally precluded from granting. He planned a violation of the Constitution, by the uncontrolled exercise of the war-making power. He planned a violation of international law, in seeking to begin hostilities without a formal declaration. This record, however, was surpassed in the following week. The Armed Ships Bill failed, and the President usurped the authority which Congress had failed to grant, arming private ships with naval guns, and making no distinction between munitions ships and others.

Not only had members of the national law-making body taken the view that any armament upon munitions ships would transform such ships into ships of war, and that any use of such armament would constitute an act of war, but an examination of the American White Book discloses the fact that President Wilson had also taken this view; moreover, that the other conditions under which our armed ships put to sea—armament fore and aft, orders to fire before being fired upon, naval crews, submarine chasers—swept away all the salient distinctions which the American government and the British government had previously drawn between armed merchant ships and war vessels. (See Chapter XV.)

The conclusion must be that our war with Germany dates, not from April 6, 1917, but from March 17, when our first "armed merchantman" put to sea; that, in sending

this ship to sea, the President knowingly usurped the war-making power.

By the same act, also, the President violated definite Federal statutes which prohibit a merchant vessel of the United States, whether carrying contraband or not, from defending itself against the fighting craft of a nation with which this country is not at war. This was admitted by the President himself, March 4, in a "supplementary statement from the White House," in which the President conceded that *"there were certain old statutes as yet unrepealed which raised insuperable practical obstacles and virtually nullified his power."*

True, the President made a slight modification of this statement a few hours later, and five days later he reversed himself completely. (For quotations see Appendix, p. 435.) But the statutes to which the President referred in his "supplementary statement from the White House" are so clear that a layman can be as sure of their meaning as a Supreme Court Judge. Enacted to permit the arming of merchant vessels against pirates, in the days of pirates, they expressly prohibit the use of such armament, even for defense, against a "public armed vessel of a nation in amity with the United States." Although in March, 1917, a German submarine was certainly a "public armed vessel," and Germany under the law "a nation in amity with the United States," there appeared, from various pro-war savants, arguments upholding the right of the President to arm private ships and send them to sea. All of such arguments were based upon one or more of three theories: that (1) the statute is inapplicable, because of old age; (2) submarines are pirate ships and Germany a nation of pirates; or (3) Germany was already waging war against the United States.

The answer to the first proposition is that all statutes

are equally binding until repealed; the answer to the second that, even did the German submarine warfare correspond, in essential details, with the practice of piracy, the President did not possess the authority to act upon any judgment of his own that it was piracy. "*Congress* shall have power . . . to define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas." Congress had not defined German submarine warfare as piracy. As to the third proposition, the same answer applies. The Constitution precluded the Executive from defining the submarine operations as warfare against the United States. Had he believed the operations to be war, his only legal recourse was to go before Congress and ask for a declaration of war against Germany.

Why, then, did not President Wilson ask Congress to declare war on February 26, 1917, instead of requesting a grant of power to start war at his own discretion?

The answer is clearly revealed in the Congressional debates of that period—because Congress could not have been persuaded to declare war on that date. It was easier to procure the vote of a Senator or Congressman for a proposition to trust the Executive with extraordinary powers, than to obtain that vote for a declaration of war.

On February 26, Congress had not been sufficiently brought under control. The time was not quite ripe.

The nation had not been sufficiently excited, confused and frightened. The Armed Ships Bill, and after that, the arming of the ships, were a part of the process of preparation, as were other Presidential maneuvers that will next be recalled.

VI

OUR STEALTHY APPROACH TO WAR

"THE rupture of diplomatic relations is a serious step, which generally ends in war," says Professor Lawrence. ("Principles of International Law," p. 301.) Yet in his address to Congress announcing the rupture of relations with Germany (Feb. 3, 1917), President Wilson gave the most direct assurances of peaceful purpose:

> We do not desire any hostile conflict with the Imperial German Government. We are the sincere friends of the German people, and earnestly desire to remain at peace with the government which speaks for them.

During the following week nothing whatever happened to change the situation internationally. The German government then made an effort, through the Swiss legation, which was in charge of its affairs at Washington, to resume peaceful relations, the following being the text of the memorandum addressed to the American government:

> The Swiss government has been requested by the German government to say that the latter is now, as before, willing to negotiate, formally or informally, with the United States, provided that the commercial blockade against England will not be broken thereby.

This offer was rejected by President Wilson, whose answer contained the following words:

> The government of the United States would gladly discuss with the German government any questions it might propose for discussion were it to withdraw its proclamation of the 31st of January [an-

nouncing unrestricted submarine warfare] . . . but . . . it does not feel that it can enter into any discussion with the German government concerning the policy of submarine warfare against neutrals which it is now pursuing unless and until the German government renews its assurances of the 4th of May, and acts upon this assurance.

No issue could be clearer. Germany was determined to meet the British commercial blockade of Germany with a German commercial blockade of England, while Wilson was insisting that the German blockade be raised, after having receded from his insistence that the British blockade be raised. Until this time, any theory that the President did not yet foresee war must give him credit for a far-fetched hope that Germany would consent to abandon permanently her blockade, notwithstanding the refusal of England to abandon her blockade, which in the beginning Wilson had inveighed against on similar grounds and with almost equal vigor. After this there remained not a shadow of an excuse for such a hope. Nevertheless, while moving with deadly accuracy towards war, the President continued to assure the country that he was treading the path of peace.

His next belligerent step came in the request for a grant of power. This step was taken in spite of the virtual promise, given February 3, that no further moves would be made until Germany should commit "actual overt acts." In the speech of February 26, indeed, the President admitted that "the overt act which I have ventured to hope the German commanders would in fact avoid has not occurred." The hostile nature of the request for a grant of power was covered by another eloquent declaration of pacific purpose, as follows:

There may be no recourse but to armed neutrality, which we shall know how to maintain, and for which there is abundant American

precedent. It is devoutly to be hoped that it will not be necessary to put armed forces anywhere into action. The American people do not desire it, and our desire is not different from theirs. . . . I am a friend of peace, and mean to preserve it for America as long as I am able. I am not now proposing or contemplating war, or any steps that lead to it. . . . No course of my choosing will lead to war. . . . I believe that the people will trust me to act with restraint, with prudence, and in the true spirit of amity and good faith that they have themselves displayed throughout these trying months.

But if the President did not expect war to begin when one of his naval crews upon a munitions ship, sighting a submarine, fired upon it, what did he think would happen?

Had the fighting begun in this way, of course, the claim would have been made that the conflict had been initiated by an act of Germany. Even had this been true, it would not have changed the fact that no surer road to war could have been chosen than the one contemplated.

But it would not have been true. For the President's plans were not in any legal sense defensive. Not only was it his purpose to arm the private ships fore and aft, but he had other plans of so aggressive a nature that he attempted, guiltily, to conceal them from Congress. The plan to use submarine chasers had been confided to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee only, and when Senator Stone revealed it, there was an uproar against him from Administration supporters. It was also denied that the President intended to arm munitions ships. President Wilson could not but have known that he intended to initiate technical war against Germany; that by the very act of sending the armed ships to sea, under such conditions, he was making a belligerent attack upon a technically friendly power, as clearly so as if he had sent a fleet of battleships to bombard the German coasts.

Throughout the speech of February 26, the President

rang the changes upon the idea of American rights. But, under the circumstances planned by him, America would possess no rights whatever, no matter what the merits of the issue with the Kaiser, and would remain altogether in the wrong until a legal declaration of war should be made.

The term, "armed neutrality," itself was highly misleading. For there is no precedent, "abundant" or otherwise, for such an armed neutrality as was proposed, either in American history or in the history of other countries. An armed neutrality is an alliance of powers banded together to enforce their views of neutral rights on the high seas. In all history there have been but two, that of 1780 and that of 1800. In both cases they came into existence in an effort to curb British lawlessness. Both were failures; both were broken up and the component parts drawn into war itself. During the frantic efforts to put forth a plausible precedent for the President's scheme, the action of America in 1798 was called into comparison, and was tarred with the name, "armed neutrality." The act of Congress of 1798 was directed against France, which was seizing neutral shipping engaged in the British trade; it empowered the President to take hostile measures on behalf of American shipping. It was this very action which our Attorney-General and our courts interpreted as war, and not neutrality, armed or unarmed. The President put into effect the measures authorized, and war was actually carried on upon the seas for a considerable period. Neither of these cases furnishes a precedent upon which any sane executive would act with a view to preserving peace.

Continuing his protestations of peaceful intention, the President denounced the Senators who defeated the Armed Ships Bill, not on the ground that they had made war more difficult, but on the ground that they had made peace more difficult! In his inaugural address, March 5, he assured

the country: "We stand firm in armed neutrality." Whereupon he proceeded to the next hostile step, the arming of the ships.

The first armed ship that the President started for the barred zone was the "St. Louis," which belonged to the American Line, a subsidiary to the International Mercantile Marine Company, whose stock control was held in England, and whose financial head in the United States was J. P. Morgan, financial agent of the British government. The beautiful processes of our armed "neutrality" were pictured by Senator LaFollette in a letter explaining his opposition to the Armed Ships Bill:

> Mr. P. A. S. Franklin, whose visits to the Navy Department to secure guns for his ships, whose interviews and movements have been featured as though he were the head and front of the American merchant marine, is the active manager of these combined properties —British, Belgian, and American. When one of the American Line ships, armed with United States guns, sails out to sea, the orders to fire will be given by Mr. Franklin's master of the ship, not by the United States gunner. The English owners give orders to Franklin. The English owners take their orders from the British Admiralty. Hence we, professing to be a neutral nation, are placing American guns and American gunners practically under the orders of the British Admiralty.

By April 2, however, matters had progressed so far that President Wilson himself was ready to admit the very worst that had been said, or could be said, about his scheme to "save the nation from war." Said he on that date:

> Armed neutrality, it now appears, is impracticable . . . because . . . it is impossible to defend ships against their [submarines'] attacks as the law of nations has assumed that merchantmen would defend themselves. . . . Armed neutrality . . . is practically certain to draw us into the war.

Which is precisely what he had denounced the "wilful twelve" for saying.

What had happened to cause the President to see the light? Had anything happened to test the practicability of his "armed neutrality?" Not one of his armed ships had yet met a submarine!

The enormity of the thing can be grasped only when it is remembered that the end of the 64th Congress was near. The Armed Ships Bill reached the House and Senate sixty-eight and fifty hours, respectively, before adjournment. Meanwhile, Administration leaders had delayed many important bills, among them the great appropriation bills. What deduction is to be drawn from this except that there was a studied purpose to limit debate and rush the bill through along with necessary bills, at the last moment, to let Congress go, leaving the President in control of the situation, with the country confident of his intent for peace, while he stood clothed with the power and intent to make war? What other conclusion is possible except that the term, "armed neutrality," was chosen only because it sounded like peace, and for the moment served to cloak a belligerent purpose?

The defeat of the Armed Ships Bill prevented the plan from working in exactly that way. But the end was reached by a slightly different path. The President began by sending the armed ships to sea without authorization. Forced to call an extra session, he at first set the date for April 16, when it was to be expected that the first gun would have been fired in "defense" of an "American merchant" ship "attacked" by a submarine, and that it would then be possible to inform Congress that we were already at war by virtue of aggression on the part of Germany.

The order to our naval crews was to fire at sight. But, whether by design or accident, German submarines kept

out of sight. The arming of the ships served its purpose, nevertheless; for it rendered an ultimate clash certain. Since war was assured, to stand for peace was to stand for the enemy; to stand for war was to stand for the country; to stand behind the President was to stand for war.

The press finished the business—the press, the suddenly swarming patriotic societies, the suddenly awakened councils of defense, the suddenly omnipresent Department of Justice. It is true that the "leaders" of the people proved to be for war. The public was confused, frightened, disorganized; the cry for war deafened every other sound—until, presently, the President dared call Congress for an earlier date, dared confess his "armed neutrality" "impracticable," dared acknowledge the fraudulent nature of all of his pacific utterances, from February 3 on, *by going back for his casus belli to the German proclamation of January 31 announcing unrestricted submarine warfare.*

VII

THE 1916 ELECTION

When I have made a promise as a man I try to keep it, and I know of no other rule permissible to a nation. The most distinguished nation in the world is the nation that can and will keep its promises, even to its own hurt.—Woodrow Wilson, in address at Philadelphia, July 4, 1914.

BRITISH statesmen agree with the conclusion that the responsibility for America's participation in the war rests first upon Woodrow Wilson, even that the President plotted war long before it was possible to bring it about. Here are three quotations from leading members of the British government, made in speeches in the British Parliament, April 18, 1917, acclaiming America's participation:

A twice-elected President, representing 100,000,000 people of the most peace-loving and least aggressive nation of the earth, has summoned his people to arms with a trumpet call.—Earl Curzon.

What, then, has enabled the President, after waiting with the patience which Pitt described as the first virtue of statesmanship—to carry with him a united nation into the hazards and horrors of the greatest war in history?—Mr. Asquith.

The difficulties with which President Wilson has been confronted in the last two and one-half years have not been sufficiently appreciated in this country. He had to keep the nation united and bring it united into the war. He had to deal with a people who had a deep-seated and ineradicable hatred of war. To bring the United States into the war was to make them go against one of the deepest instincts of the soul of the race.—John Dillon.

The speech of the Honorable John Dillon is a polite suggestion that the President consciously deceived the American people for two and one-half years, with a view ultimately to bringing it into the war on the side of England.

The fact that the most emphasized war motives claimed by the Administration after April, 1917 (a crusade against German autocracy, militarism and imperialism), run far back of two and one-half years—far back even of 1914—gives ground for the Dillon theory. For any assumption that these professed motives were sincere would necessarily include an admission either that the President planned war on Germany during all the period in which he was promising peace, or that he was profoundly ignorant of what was going on in the world prior to August, 1914, as well as subsequently to that time.

During the first several months following August, 1914, however, President Wilson apparently had no idea of involving America in the European struggle. He not only declared repeatedly that the war was no business of ours, that its causes could not touch us, that America could not be endangered by it, that we had no interest in its outcome, that war was invariably futile, anyhow; not only suggested that both sides were at fault, and urged many reasons why America could best serve the world by holding aloof, but acted accordingly; he opposed preparedness, and took a high and far-seeing stand in announcing that Wall Street loans to either side would be "inconsistent with the spirit of neutrality."

It is interesting to recall that, in the Congressional campaign of 1914, President Wilson was claiming votes for his party on his stand on the war loan question. In the Democratic Congressional campaign book of that year appears an extended explanation by Secretary of State Bryan of the Wilson position. Said the Secretary in part:

It is inconsistent with the spirit of neutrality for a neutral nation to make loans to belligerent nations, for money is the worst of contrabands—it commands all other things. A very forcible illustration has been used in support of this proposition, namely, that, as a neutral government does all in its power to discourage its citizens from enlisting in the armies of other countries, it should discourage those who, by loaning money, would do more harm than they could do by enlisting. The government withdraws the protection of citizenship from those who enlist under other flags—why should it give protection to money when it enters into foreign military service? There is only one answer.

Could this argument be sound in 1914, and unsound in 1915?

President Wilson's first reversal on the war occurred when he gave his consent to the first Anglo-French loan. From this moment his war-deceptions began. In his annual message to Congress, December 7, 1915, he declared: "We have stood apart studiously neutral. It was our manifest duty to do so." But, in withdrawing his opposition to the Anglo-French loan, had he, or had he not, violated his own interpretation of neutrality? From the arrangement of that first loan, also, dates the Wilson deviation in general from equal treatment of the opposing sides, which is the essence of neutrality.

Mr. Wilson's second notable reversal on the war was, no doubt, a direct consequence of the first. In 1914 and during a part of 1915 he had been against any noticeable increase in the army or navy establishments. But when Wall Street began loaning large sums to the Entente, the President suddenly became a preparedness convert. In the early months of 1916 he toured the country on the preparedness issue.

From early in 1915, the President's diplomacy had been at variance with the pacific utterances made to his own peo-

ple. His first submarine note to Germany was a threat. But his attitude towards England was almost equally threatening. Not until the first months of 1916, when he reversed himself on essential points in the dispute with both sides, swinging into a position less out of harmony with England, and of greater hostility towards Germany, was it quite plain that he "contemplated war" with Germany. In his handling of the armed ships question, early in 1916, he notified both Germany and America that he was willing to go to war in defense of his stand upon this issue.

Shortly afterwards, the President put his preparedness programme through Congress. This programme included the National Defense Act, providing for a council of national defense in time of national "danger." It included other measures hardly conceivable by any administration not seriously contemplating war in the near future.

In a letter dated April 15, 1917, and read in the House of Representatives, Attorney-General Gregory revealed the fact that "long before we entered the war" his department, in anticipation of war, had begun "to strengthen and build up its bureau of investigation."

In spite of all such circumstances, except to a few of us, the war came like a thunderbolt out of a clear sky, with stunning and inexplicable suddenness. How did the President manage it? How (Mr. Asquith's question) did he solve the "difficulties" with which he was "confronted" in "the two and one-half years" before April, 1917? How did he "deal with" "the most peace-loving and least aggressive nation on earth," in order to "carry" it "into the hazards and horrors of the greatest war in history?"

The answer is that the tactics followed throughout were the same as those described in the preceding chapter. The President sought to create the impression that his preparedness measures were for peace, instead of war; that his

diplomacy was calculated to preserve the peace, instead of getting us into the war. Only after the fighting was over did we learn that the advisory commission of the Council of National Defense, consisting of seven men, had secretly worked out the details of the war legislation months before war was declared, and at a time when the President was still promising to keep the country out of war. (Report of Rep. W. J. Graham, chairman, Select Committee on Expenditures in War Department, July 7, 1919.)

Finally, in his September treaty tour (1919), in boasting that he "waited on" the American people a long time before calling for the war declaration, the President himself acknowledged, in effect, that he had been "contemplating" war at the very time that he was solemnly asserting the contrary.

As an incident in the Presidential policy indicated, occurred the election of 1916. President Wilson chose the issue of 1916. As is generally known, he absolutely dominated his party convention of that year. He approved the selection of ex-Governor Glynn of New York as temporary chairman, and in uttering the keynote speech Glynn was simply Wilson's mouthpiece. The paramount issue of the campaign, as laid down by Glynn, was *"that the United States is constrained by the traditions of its past, by the logic of its present, and by the promise of its future, to hold itself apart from the conflict that now devastates the nations across the seas."*

The Glynn keynote speech was nothing more nor less than a defense, an historical justification, and a glorification of the policy of American neutrality, which he asserted President Wilson had faithfully followed and would continue to follow. The Glynn speech may be found in the *Congressional Record* of June 15, 1916. It was a master-

piece of convincing eloquence and historical data. It was printed by hundreds of thousands, and distributed throughout the country. It furnished the material for thousands of campaign speeches. It furnished the basis for the Wilson campaign, and next to Wilson's personal utterances, was undoubtedly a determining factor in his election.

It ought to be obvious that an executive can hardly be credited with keeping his country out of war when a vast majority of his own people are definitely against war, when the other party to the dispute is anxious to avoid war, and when the only factors favoring war are a small minority of his own people and the influence of certain interested foreign governments. The truth is that it is doubtful whether President Wilson could have departed farther than he did from neutrality, or proceeded towards war any faster than he did, without jeopardizing his control of the country and encompassing his own defeat in the election of 1916.

Wilson's belligerent record—his insistence on courses of procedure highly calculated to embroil us in the European struggle—were well known to his political enemies in the campaign of 1916. Why, then, did they not explode the myth of his having "kept us out of war," demolish his paramount issue, and so insure the defeat of Wilson?

The answer simply is that the dominant faction in the Republican party approved of this part of the Wilson record; they and their candidate had taken a frankly belligerent position, and an exposure of Wilson's spurious pacifism would have placed them in a ridiculous situation.

Although President Wilson did not "keep us out of war," he *did* lead us into war, and with the material assistance of our leading peace advocates. Although Mr. Hughes was more frankly inclined towards belligerency than was Wilson, it is barely possible that, had Hughes

been elected, the history of America and of the world might have been somewhat different from 1917 on. For had Wilson failed of reëlection, he would have had much more difficulty in executing the various belligerent steps, taken between February 1 and March 4, which were such important factors in the attainment of war in April. Hughes, moreover, on assuming charge March 4, would have faced a decidedly less pliant Congress than did Wilson. For in his approach towards belligerency, the Democratic Senators and Representatives gave Wilson more trouble than did the Republicans. Had Wilson's demand for a declaration of war failed, it would have been a party calamity. But had the demand come from a Republican President, it is not unlikely that he would have been opposed not only by such Progressive Republicans as opposed Wilson, but by the Democratic party as a group. Again, neither the public nor Congress would ever have been misled as to the aims of Hughes, to the extent that they were misled as to the aims of Wilson. It seems certain, at least, that a longer period of preparation would have been necessary.

But had America not entered the European war in April, 1917, or very soon thereafter, it is not improbable that the war would have ended in that year. (See Chapter XXVI.) If this judgment is correct, it was by the votes of pacifists that America went to war, and by the votes of pacifists that world peace failed in 1917.

There is no intention here to reflect upon the good faith of the gentlemen who in past years were notable in their advocacy of peace. But a reflection upon their intelligence is in order, since, while assuming to be students of modern statesmanship, they overlooked the first trick in the trade of statesmen—duplicity. Our leading peace advocates took Wilson at his word. Worse than that, they paid at-

tention only to such words as pleased them. They overlooked other words that contradicted the pleasing words, as well as his action in the matter of preparedness, his maneuvers in the armed ships dispute, and, above all, his telltale diplomacy.

DEMOCRACY AND THE CONDUCT OF WAR

VIII

EXECUTIVE DUPLICITY IN IMPOSING THE WAR POLICIES

If it be contended that the war, having once commenced, the President of the United States may direct it to the accomplishment of any object he pleases, without consulting and without regard to the will of Congress, the [Constitutional] convention will have utterly failed in guarding the nation against the abuses and ambitions of a single individual. Either Congress or the President must have the right of determining upon the objects for which a war shall be prosecuted. There is no other alternative. If the President possess it . . . where is the difference between our free government and that of any other nation which may be governed by an absolute czar, emperor or king? It is the privilege of the people in their primary assemblies, and of every private man, however humble, to express an opinion in regard to the purposes for which the war should be continued.—Henry Clay, in speech on the Mexican War, Nov. 13, 1847.

THE obligation of the chief executive of a democracy, to comport his acts and policies with previous promises and pronouncements, had been many times acknowledged by President Wilson. For example, on one occasion he spoke as follows:

I set myself this very strict rule . . . that I am not at liberty to urge upon Congress, in messages, policies which have not had the organic consideration of those for whom I am spokesman. For that reason, you see, I am by my own principles shut out, in the language of the street, from 'starting anything.' I have to confine myself to those things which have been embodied as promises to the people at an election. That is the strict rule I set for myself. (Speech to delegation of suffragists, White House, Dec. 8, 1913.)

But not one of the salient war policies of Wilson ever had "the organic consideration" of those for whom he was "spokesman." Not one was embodied as a promise to the people at an election.

Nor can this be excused on the plea of sudden and unforeseen contingency. The 1916 election occurred only five months before war was declared. During the campaign the question of war was constantly before the people. It was inevitable that, in case of war, the question of conscription should arise. But the question of conscription was not given "organic consideration" in the Democratic Convention of 1916.

Do not imagine that the question of conscription was overlooked in that period. Wilson did not overlook it. *He pronounced against the policy.* Early in the year he had told the people: "Every true believer in democracy believes that it is upon the voluntary action of the men of a great nation like this that it must depend for its military force." (Milwaukee, Jan. 31, 1916.) And in his Memorial Day address: *"America does not want anything but the compulsion of the spirit."*

If the President experienced a change of mind upon this vital policy later, would not democratic ethics require him at once and publicly to acknowledge the fact? But not until the night of April 2, while in the actual delivery of the war message, did the American public, or any part thereof, learn that the President would favor conscription.

What other conclusion is possible except that the President was well aware that the idea of conscription was repugnant to the masses of the people; that a proposal, at an earlier juncture, to conscript Americans would jeopardize the plan to go into the war itself; that he purposefully kept the people and Congress in the dark, know-

ing that the longer he waited the better chance he would have to impose the policy?

After the President came out for conscription, it was still not too late, in the opinion of various members of Congress, to procure a form of "organic consideration" of the proposal. Bills were introduced providing for an advisory referendum on conscription. But the President was not for "organic consideration," now, and all such measures were smothered.

Likewise, the public was misled as to the extent to which the Administration contemplated coöperating with the Entente governments.

The President had pronounced definitely against entangling alliances, and indeed, against alliances of any kind with any nation. He had declared that we had no interest in the outcome of the European quarrel. He had even declared, in effect, that the aims and purposes of Germany were as clean as those of England. By a hundred such pronouncements he had created the assumption that, should America be drawn into the war, it would participate independently and only to a limited degree, and with the single purpose of protecting American commerce and passengers in actual transit through the zone of submarine warfare.

In the last days before the war, the Administration actually took occasion to strengthen this assumption by causing the newspaper correspondents at Washington to send out reports that the government did not intend to become an ally of the Entente, but in case of a declaration of war would, in fact, confine its warfare to naval operations directed solely towards protecting American rights on the high seas immediately menaced by Germany and her allies.

Nothing whatever was said about a vast military crusade against autocracy, or anything of that sort. Nothing was said about sending an army overseas. Not even in his war

message did the President hint at sending soldiers to France. Even in the war debates, the fact that the Administration planned to rush an army to France was hidden from the Senators and Congressmen themselves. The great American "democracy" went to war without a suspicion among the public at large that the Executive—whom they had reëlected to keep them out of war, to save them from entangling alliances, and to protect them from conscription and every war terror—had chosen to rush a great conscript army overseas and make America a partisan in the European "chaos of competing and hostile ambitions"!

No military reason can be urged as an excuse for this secrecy. The reason was political. To have admitted the truth before the declaration of war would have vastly increased public opposition to taking up the cudgels.

As with the draft, efforts were made to obtain a form of "organic consideration" of the project to send an army overseas. Bills were introduced, providing that no conscript be sent overseas without his consent. But all such bills were smothered at the dictation of the President. The President denied even the right of Congress to pronounce upon this question. American forces were sent overseas by Executive direction. Here, again, the public was misled. For, at first, the public was told that the American flag was going to France chiefly for its "moral effect," and that our army overseas would be small. Only a little at a time, as our war autocracy fixed its hold more and more firmly upon the country, was the truth permitted to reach the people of America.

Farthest from the public mind had been the thought that the wishes of any other government could influence America to go to war. It remained for Lloyd George to tell us: "We not only desired the entrance of the United States into

the war; we *solicited* it." (Interview in Paris *Matin,* July 4, 1917.)

The drafting of the State militia organizations into the national service, and the obligatory employment of the militiamen abroad, is another illustration of the President's ease at reversal and his contempt for his own interpretations of the Constitution. During his preparedness tour, while urging public support for an increase in the regular army, the President repeatedly discounted the value of the National Guard, explaining that the Constitution prohibited him from calling on it except in case of actual invasion. At New York, for example, January 27, 1916, he said:

> Under the Constitution . . . only upon occasion of actual invasion has the President of the United States the right to ask these men [members of the National Guard] to leave their respective States.

But this did not prevent him from writing into his Conscription Bill the following words:

> The President . . . is hereby authorized . . . to draft into the military service of the United States, organize and officer . . . any and all members of the National Guard and of the National Guard Reserves, and said members so drafted into the military service of the United States shall serve therein for the existing emergency.

The law was passed in this form. The President immediately, by proclamation, drafted the National Guard, *in its entirety,* and within a few weeks various units thereof were on their way, under compulsion, to France. The Constitution had not been amended, meanwhile, and no other formalities had occurred than those set forth above.

The American people had been in the habit of expressing their honest opinions freely, without persecution or

punishment. How many of us had any inkling that, after war was declared, we might speak of the war only in terms of approval?

How many had any idea that we would be suffered to mention the President of the United States only in adulation?

How many would have supposed that it would become a crime to quote our own school textbooks against England?

How many would have thought that every word spoken of our enemies must be charged with execration?

How many imagined that they would be prohibited from putting forth any efforts towards peace, or mentioning terms of peace except as a question to be determined exclusively by one man in all our hundred millions?

How many would have believed that a public endorsement of principles for which Woodrow Wilson assumed to stand before the war—and upon which he gained reëlection—would have swiftly and surely landed the offender in prison?

President Wilson's declamations on free speech, both before and after we entered the European war, are too numerous and well remembered to require quotation. While the Espionage Act was in the balance he wrote to Arthur Brisbane saying that he could *"imagine no greater disservice to the country than to establish a censorship that would deny to the people of a free republic their indisputable right to criticize their own public officials,"* and definitely promised: *"I shall not expect or permit any part of this law to apply to me or any of my official acts or in any way to be used as a shield against criticism."*

Nevertheless, under the Espionage Act, numerous persons were prosecuted and imprisoned for no other cause than criticism of President Wilson.

A study of each Presidential deception of this character reveals the fact that its aim was to concentrate all power and all discretion in the hands of one Woodrow Wilson. Here again the policy of the President is a contradiction of his stand while campaigning for reëlection:

> If I understand the life of America, the central principle is this, that no small body of persons, however influential, shall be trusted to determine . . . the policy of America.—(Address before Associated Advertising Clubs of the World, Philadelphia, June 29, 1916.)

The Constitution does not hold that this principle may be set aside in time of war. Nor do the great interpreters of democracy. Nor did Woodrow Wilson himself. On the other hand, the President particularly called attention to the democratic necessity for preventing the control in a few hands of a nation *at war;* to wit:

> I should say that it was not inconsistent with the traditions of the country that the people should know how to take care of themselves; but it is inconsistent with the traditions of the country that their knowledge of arms should be used by a governmental organization which would make and organize a great army subject to orders to do what a particular group of men might at the time think it was best to have them do.
>
> That is the militarism of Europe, where a few persons can determine what an armed nation is to do.
>
> That is what I understand militarism to be.—(Statement made to a committee from the American Union Against Militarism, White House, May 9, 1916.)

In other words, the policy which President Wilson insisted that he be allowed to follow in 1917 and 1918 is precisely the policy which he defined as militarism in 1916.

IX

"DEMOCRATIC" CZARISM IN WAR-TIME

It is important, likewise, that the habits of thinking in a free country should inspire caution in those entrusted with its adminstration, to confine themselves within their respective constitutional spheres, avoiding in the exercise of the powers of one department to encroach upon another. The spirit of encroachment tends to consolidate the powers of all the departments in one, and thus to create, whatever the form of government, a real despotism. A just estimate of the love of power and proneness to abuse it, which predominate in the human heart, is sufficient to satisfy us of the truth of this position. If, in the opinion of the people, the distribution or modification of the constitutional powers be in any particular wrong, let it be corrected by an amendment in the way in which the Constitution designates, but let there be no change by usurpation, for though this in one instance may be the instrument of good, it is the customary weapon by which free governments are destroyed. The precedent must always greatly overbalance in permanent evil any partial or transient benefit which the use can at any time yield. —George Washington, in his Farewell Address.

In the first session of the war Congress, all legislation that passed was either approved by the President or written at his direction. Although not quite all of the President's programme went through, the powers which he procured in that session—powers everywhere bristling with the most drastic repressive provisions—were far greater than those ever voted to or exercised by any previous American Executive. At the conclusion of that session, the President of the American republic—in the name of a war for democ-

racy—stood out as the most unrestrained autocrat to be found in any great country in the world.

These extraordinary powers were not procured without a constant, and sometimes bitter, struggle with Congress, in which at times the President was opposed even by his own party leaders. The struggles over conscription, the embargo, censorship, and food-control, were especially closely contested. At the beginning, the House Military Affairs Committee actually recorded an adverse vote against conscription. Chairman Dent, Speaker Clark, and majority-leader Kitchin all opposed it, and the latter informed the President that, if an immediate vote were taken, the House as a whole would reject the proposition. On behalf of this and other bills, the President made repeated visits to the Capitol, an unusual proceeding. The President was forced to put the Conscription Bill in the hands of a Republican to be piloted through; in fact, it was due to the rallying of the Republicans that the bill went over.

In a statement to the public on behalf of the Food-Control Bill, the President admitted that "these powers [which he asked for] are very great." Senator Owen offered an amendment to this bill, creating a joint committee to supervise the financial conduct of the war. The President contested the point, declaring in a letter to Mr. Lever (July 23, 1917): "I could only interpret the final adoption of Section 23 as arising from a lack of confidence in myself." Which quite astonished various of the national legislators. Said Senator Hardwick (Aug. 6):

> It is incomprehensible to me how any one anywhere could oppose a proposal to have Congress share with him [the President] responsibility for war expenditures.

Senator LaFollette introduced a resolution declaring that Congress has complete authority under the Constitu-

tion to state the objects of the war. It was smothered, with the approval of the President.

On every important point of conflict with Congress the President ultimately won, and at the end of that first session he was able to announce that what he called "the war-making branch of the government," meaning himself, "has been abundantly equipped with the powers that were necessary to make the action of the nation effective." This was an expression of satisfaction, from which it was to be expected that the Executive Department not only would confine its activities within the limits set by the legislation referred to, but also that it would refrain from demanding any notable enlargements of power at the following session.

The Executive Department, however, at once proceeded (to employ the words of Senator Hiram Johnson) to "do what it wished to do, law or no law, authority or no authority."

Moreover, when the second war session convened, it sought from Congress grants of power so sweeping as to be undefinable, except in a general way—limited neither by Congress itself, by the Constitution, by the rights of States or of individuals, nor by any other means except the will of the individual occupying the White House.

What the Administration asked of the second war session—and the manner of its asking—is the best evidence that it had been unwilling to wait for legal additions to the extraordinary powers already voted, and was then following a course of lawless usurpation in domestic affairs.

In urging the passage of the Passport Act, Attorney-General Gregory wrote (Apr. 12, 1918) that *"there is no law providing for the control of departures from or entries into the United States by persons other than those who are alien enemies."* But the Executive Department had for many months been actually preventing the departure

from the United States of not only men of draft age, but of every one else excepting persons whose business had been particularly examined into and approved by it.

During the efforts of the Administration to procure the enactment of what was in that period known as its Sedition Bill, Attorney-General Gregory declared (Official Bulletin, Apr. 19, 1918), that *"Not all unpatriotic utterances subject the author to criminal prosecution."* But "unpatriotic" utterances of every kind were at that time actually subjecting the authors thereof to criminal proceedings under the Espionage Act.

The President took over the railroads of the country, December 26, 1917. In February, 1918, we find him urging the passage of a bill to legalize this action. March 2, 1918, we discover Federal Judge Walter Evans, at Louisville, Kentucky, handing down a decision containing the words: "We can find no statute authorizing the control of the railroads under the Treasury Department nor by the Director General of the railroads." During the discussion of the Railroad Bill in Congress, it was repeatedly admitted that the President had overstepped his authority in the means by which he had assumed control of the roads.

During the second war session, efforts were made by Administration supporters, although not with the open approval of the President, to put through a law prohibiting strikes in any industrial plants holding war contracts, as had already been provided for in plants operated directly by the government. Although no such law was enacted, the President and his subordinates repeatedly prohibited strikes in such industries, and, through threats and coercion, the right to strike was in practice taken away by the Executive power.

September 13, 1918, the President addressed a letter to striking workmen at Bridgeport, Connecticut, ordering

them to return to work, threatening all with blacklisting, and threatening all of draft age with the revocation of any deferred classification based on their usefulness in war production. The strikers returned to their jobs. February 17, 1918, the President addressed a telegram to the general president of the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, telling the latter significantly that, unless he advised the men whom he represented to return to work, he was *"giving aid and comfort to the enemy."* The official advised his men to return to work. Similar tactics were employed by officials of the Fuel and Food Administrations, the President's Mediation Commission, and other subordinates of the President, as a means to preventing or breaking strikes.

I mention only a few signal instances of a policy that was generally followed. Even the legality of the "work or fight" regulations of the army was questioned, and a "work or fight" clause was placed in the new Conscription Bill, with the avowed purpose of legalizing the Executive manipulation of the existing law. The clause, however, was stricken out, but the "work or fight" policy was not abandoned. In a report on the Administration's proposals to amend the draft law, giving greater power over draft registrants, March 13, 1918, six members of the Senate Military Affairs Committee declared the powers sought for "unheard of," and argued that the proposal would subject "to the arbitrary will and authority of those in control of the nation's military power the 9,000,000 men registered"; also:

> If Congress is prepared to deliver the bodies of these 9,000,000 men into the hands of the military authorities without condition or limitation, then it should pass this joint resolution; if not, it should be defeated.

In urging the passage of the Food-Control Bill, Mr. Hoover sought to create the impression that its primary purpose was to protect both the producer and consumer from speculators. That it did not accomplish this purpose satisfactorily was virtually admitted by Hoover himself eight months later, when engaged in an effort to procure an enlargement of his powers. In a statement issued Feburary 21, 1918, Hoover admitted that "the [price] margins between the farmer and the consumer in many localities were never wider than to-day."

In a letter to the President, July 10, 1917, intended to influence Congress and the public in favor of the Food-Control Bill, Hoover wrote:

> It is absolutely vital that we shall protect the farmer from a slump in prices this year due to a glut. . . . Unless some strong and efficient government action is immediately settled and brought into play, the American producer will face a slump in wheat.

The "strong and efficient government action" was soon "settled." That is, the Food-Control Bill was passed. But, instead of preventing a slump in wheat, the passage of the bill was manipulated to cause it. One of the first steps of the President was to fix the price of wheat. The figure fixed by the President was $1.05 per bushel *lower* than it had been at the very time that the President, Hoover, and others, were asserting that a primary purpose of the bill was to protect the wheat farmer from a slump in prices!

Naturally, there was great dissatisfaction among the farmers, and so many refused to market their wheat that the great mills of the country were reported as threatened with a shut-down at the busiest season of the year.

Some of our wheat growers may be surprised, even at this late day, to know that the Administration was clothed

with no authority to seize their wheat or even to fix the price thereof. In the hearings on the Food-Control Bill, Mr. Hoover assured Congress that the bill carried no authority to fix wheat prices. Several months later, testifying before the Sugar Investigating Committee of the Senate, he was forced to admit that the price had been fixed in violation of the law. When Senator Reed suggested that Hoover had been guilty of a criminal act, his excuse was: "Whatever I have done has been done with the approval of the President." (Jan. 3, 1918.)

The Food-Control Bill carried a limited authority to fix food prices, but no authority to fix prices to the farmer. In his first public statement on behalf of that bill (May 19, 1917), the President pointed out that this limited authority was asked for "not in order to limit the profits of the farmers, but only to *guarantee them,* when necessary, *a minimum price.*"

The law gave a limited authority to seize food to prevent hoarding. But Section 6 specifically exempted farm products from seizure on such ground:

> Sec. 6. . . . Provided, however, that any accumulating or withholding by any farmer or gardener, coöperative association of farmers or gardeners, including live-stock farmers, or any other person, of the products of any farm, garden, or other land owned, leased or cultivated by him shall not be deemed to be hoarding within the meaning of this act.

September 13, 1917, Hoover admitted that he was helpless to force the farmers to sell their wheat. Nevertheless, before the 1917-18 winter was over, the Administration was seizing the wheat on the farms, as a means to breaking the wheat strike, and compelling the farmers to accept the President's price.

Hoover and his aides also repeatedly promised that the

American householder would not be put on rations. In the hearings on the Food-Control Bill, Hoover assured Congress that he did not purpose fixing consumers' rations, and that the law did not contemplate any such authority, nor should it. (June 19, 1917.) Section 10 of the bill, in fact, contained a clause intended to exempt householders from seizure of food stocks:

> Provided, that nothing in this section, or in the section that follows, shall be construed to require any natural person to furnish to the government any necessaries held by him and reasonably required for consumption or use by himself and dependents.

But many Americans will not soon forget the system of rationing put into effect by Hoover's responsible aides, the espionage, the brutal invasions of homes, the prosecutions and threats of prosecutions, and at times the seizure of stocks of flour or sugar in ridiculously small amounts.

The history of the second war session of Congress is a history of successful efforts, on the part of the Executive, to wring from the legislative branch enlargements of power wrung from it in the first war session. Nearly every piece of war legislation of the first session was amended, and always to give the Executive greater power, never to limit it. The efforts of the President were constantly directed, with success, towards taking from the legislative branch of the government its constitutional powers, and towards concentrating these powers in himself, towards shutting out Congress from any part whatever in the war policy and programme, domestic or foreign, towards reducing it to the impotent position of having nothing left to vote upon except appropriations and more appropriations—towards placing the legislative power, the military, and the civil community, completely at the mercy of the Executive bureaucracy.

Due, evidently, to a realization that too great authority had already been voted the Executive, and that this authority had been abused, the second war session began with committee investigations of various phases of the conduct of the war, and with efforts towards retaining for Congress a modicum of control.

Although the investigations brought out some scandalous truths, revealing mismanagement and graft on a large scale, the President resented them, denounced them, and finally succeeded in throttling them.

In debating the powers demanded for the President in the Railroad Bill, Senator Underwood, one of Wilson's party leaders, issued a solemn warning, declaring that *"when Congress reaches the point where it is prepared to abandon constitutional limitations, and surrender government of law for government by a man, then danger is ahead for the people of the United States."* (Feb. 20, 1918.)

In speaking on the War Finance Corporation Bill, Representative Longworth pointed out that *"No war lord in history, no kaiser, no czar, ever had such power. . . . The mere transmittal to Congress of such a bill is illustrative of a danger every day growing in menace to the institutions bequeathed to us by our fathers. I mean the continuous reaching out of the executive branch of this government for more and more power. It is a danger not to be lightly passed over."* (Mar. 16, 1918.)

The climax of the President's efforts for absolute power came with the bill introduced by Senator Overman, after floor-leader Martin and other Senators had refused to pilot it because of its autocratic features. In the beginning, the Overman Bill was hooted by both Democratic and Republican members. Even Senator Hitchcock, Wilson's most conspicuous and steady support throughout the war, asserted: *"It would mean nothing but an abdication by Con-*

gress of its law-making power. It is the most astonishing piece of legislation I've ever heard of"; while Senator Overman himself urged, on behalf of the bill: "Now let's be done with it by passing a bill that will let the President organize things the way he wants, so he won't have to ask any more legislation from us."

In spite of all predictions to the contrary, the President whipped Congress into line in the end, and the Overman Bill became a law. Only one conceivable measure remained to render the President's conduct of the war and his control of the country practically absolute. That was to widen the draft ages to include all males between boyhood and senility, and to give over to the Executive power to draw upon them at his own discretion, and in unlimited numbers. In a typical protest against Wilson's "Man Power Bill," Chairman Dent of the House Military Affairs Committee exclaimed passionately:

> I am willing to vote for an army of 5,000,000. . . . I would willingly vote for even more. But I will not vote for an indefinite proposition, a bill which says that a department may do as it wishes without check of any kind. Congress might as well be abolished.

Here, as elsewhere, the Executive's wishes, in the end, were enacted into law.

X

THE WAR TERROR

The means of defense against foreign danger have always been the instruments of tyranny at home. Among the Romans, it was a standing maxim to excite war whenever a revolt was apprehended. Throughout all Europe, the armies, kept up under the pretext of defending, have enslaved the people. It is perhaps questionable whether the best concerted system of absolute power in Europe could maintain itself in a situation where no alarms of external danger could tame the people to the domestic yoke.—James Madison.

AFTER our war declaration, the Conscription Bill embodied the first notable attack, directly involving "American liberties," upon the document towards which our patriots of 1917-1921 professed such exaggerated reverence.

Conscription had been resorted to in America before, when, however, it had been contested energetically on constitutional grounds. But the fact that it had been resorted to before established no valid precedent, inasmuch as it had not been resorted to since the adoption of the Thirteenth Amendment: *"Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as punishment for crime, whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction."*

In a test case, the United States Supreme Court (Jan. 7, 1918), declared the Wilson conscription law constitutional. Referring to the power vested in Congress to "raise and support armies," Chief Justice White argued: "As the mind cannot conceive of an army without the men to compose it, on the face of the Constitution the objection that it does

not give the power to provide for such men would seem too frivolous for further notice."

But a moment's thought is sufficient to reveal this dictum of the Chief Justice as too frivolous for further notice. The Constitution gives Congress power to raise and support armies, but only within all limits set by the other provisions of the Constitution. No power vested in Congress or any other authority under the Constitution carries with it a license to disregard any of the prohibitions thereof. Involuntary servitude is forbidden for all purposes and under all circumstances, except as punishment for crime, and if Congress cannot get sufficient men for a large army without involuntary servitude, it must be content to raise as large an army as it can within the means not forbidden it.

The decision of America's august Supreme Court is not surprising, inasmuch as Chief Justice White conspicuously led the applause on the occasion of the President's war message, and was enthusiastically seconded by his associates. The childish reasoning of these eminent gentlemen is only evidence of their own prejudiced determination to bolster up an untenable cause. Under such circumstances, the layman is justified in feeling that he understands the meaning of the words "involuntary servitude" quite as well as any sophist masquerading in the black gown of a Supreme Court Judge. (To condemn our draft law, indeed, one would not need to go farther than the President's own word that "Under the Constitution . . . only upon occasion of actual invasion has the President of the United States the right to ask these men [militiamen] to leave their respective States.")

When, near the end of the War of 1812, a conscription bill was placed before Congress, Daniel Webster, on the floor of the House (Dec. 9, 1814), denounced it as in flagrant opposition to the spirit of the Constitution, and de-

clared that the adoption of such a measure would oblige a free people to resist it even to the extent of insurrection:

That measures of this nature should be debated at all in the councils of a free government, is a cause for dismay. The question is nothing less than whether the most essential rights of personal liberty shall be surrendered, and despotism embraced in its worst form. . . . I express the sentiments here as I shall express them to my constituents. . . . With the same earnestness with which I now exhort you to forbear from these measures, I shall exhort them to exercise their unquestionable right of providing for the security of their liberty.

The first amendment to the Constitution says: "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech or of the press." But in the Wilson Sedition Law (afterwards known as the amended Espionage Act) we find the words:

. . . and whoever, when the United States is at war, shall wilfully utter, print, write, or publish any disloyal, profane, scurrilous or abusive language about the form of government of the United States, or the Constitution of the United States, or the military or naval forces of the United States, or the flag of the United States, or the uniform of the army or navy of the United States; or any language intended to bring the form of government of the United States, or the Constitution of the United States, or the military or naval forces of the United States, or the flag of the United States, or the uniform of the army or navy of the United States into contempt, scorn, contumely or disrepute . . . or . . . shall . . . *by word or act oppose the cause of the United States therein* [in the war] shall be punished by a fine of not more than $10,000, or imprisonment for not more than twenty years, or both.

Any person competent to understand the meaning of the English language is competent to judge whether or not the above law abridges the freedom of speech or of the press.

The Fifth Amendment says:

No person shall be held to answer for a capital or other infamous crime unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury; except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the militia, when in actual service . . . nor shall any person . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use without just compensation.

"Due process of law" is a legal term comprehending an adequate hearing before a judicial tribunal. The provisions of the Trading with the Enemy Act, under which the Executive confiscated alien enemy property, without due process of law, and without compensation, as well as the internment of alien enemies by Executive whim, without presentment or indictment of a grand jury and without due process of law, constitute not only an abuse of treaty obligations and of international law (see Chapter XVII) but also a gross violation of the Fifth Amendment.

Article 3 of the Constitution says:

He [the President] shall have power, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties, *provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur.*

By implication, the above words prohibit the President from making any treaty *without* the advice and consent of the Senate, expressed in a two-thirds majority vote. Nevertheless, at the outset of our war, the President entered into certain arrangements, understandings, and compacts with the various Entente governments—the terms of which are unknown because kept a profound secret—without the advice or consent of the Senate, and without even consulting that body or taking it into his confidence. Through his State Department, he entered into a *written* agreement with Japan, a version of which was published, without the advice or consent of the Senate. These arrangements,

understandings, and compacts, if not technically treaties, are substantially so. If not in technical violation of the Constitution, they are an evasion of its provisions and an offense against its spirit.

Section 8 of the Constitution, indeed, seems to vest in Congress a general authority over the affairs of state, in peace as well as in war.

Congress can impeach the President, but the President cannot impeach Congress. There is nothing in the Constitution that gives the President authority to decide whether or not the army shall be sent to fight on another continent, to decide when the fighting shall begin, or under what conditions and terms it shall cease. The President is commander-in-chief of the military forces, but apparently the Constitution-makers intended that Congress should be commander-in-chief of the President.

The purpose of President Wilson's struggle for unlimited power became more and more clear—to carry on war when, where, and how he pleased, for as long as he pleased, for such ends as pleased him; to employ the entire military power of the nation, its police power, its industrial power, every power of whatever kind possessed by it, the flesh and blood and wealth of 105,000,000 people, for objects defined and limited only by himself, changeable only by himself, known only to himself.

To attain this end it was necessary to reduce not only Congress to submission, but the masses also.

To make war in Europe as Woodrow Wilson wished to make war, it was necessary, in the words of Senator Hiram Johnson, first to *"make war on the American people."* (Speech against Sedition Bill, Apr. 24, 1918.)

It was not, of course, within the power of any one man alone to impose such a despotism upon America. But it was within the power of one man, backed by a minority

in control of the finances of the country, the press, and the public offices.

Our war Terror began during the critical weeks of March, 1917, and was unquestionably helpful in dissipating the efforts towards a united expression of real public opinion against entering the war. The Terror of those first days took the form chiefly of personal assaults, invasions of private homes, threats, mobbings, raiding of public halls, breaking up of meetings and demonstrations, by private persons or mobs, led or instigated by members of the official or semi-official bodies.

Soldiers of the regular army and of the militia, also, organized in squads, under the command of non-commissioned officers, conducted regular raids to break up public meetings, on the streets as well as in halls, wrecked offices of organizations working against war, and in a number of cases invaded private homes. This outrageous misuse of the uniform could not have been carried as far as it was carried without the approval of responsible military officers, and the tacit consent of the Federal Administration.

Except for its pursuit of alien enemies, the part of the Federal government in the Terror became more or less open only with the passage of the war legislation. In procuring the enactment of such repressive legislation as passed the first session of the war Congress, the President and his supporters had given the fullest assurances that there was no intent to override constitutional rights. At the beginning, therefore, here and there was found a judge so artless as to interpret the Constitution as it had always been interpreted, and to lay down the law strictly as it read—and here and there was found a patriotic newspaper so lacking in logic as to suggest mildly that the Constitution was still in force until abolished by the specific means set forth in the document itself.

A police judge of New York sentenced a young man to ninety days in the workhouse for distributing extracts from the Constitution and the Declaration of Independence, in which emphasis was placed upon certain passages. The case was appealed to the Supreme Court of the State, the young man was freed, and the Supreme Court Justice (Hendrick) set forth the rights of the people in part as follows:

> Aliens have the right to criticize the law the same as citizens. . . . Every one in this country has the right to criticize the government and the laws that exist, and has the right to agitate for the repeal of a law so long as those acts are not accompanied by violence or statements which might be interpreted as inciting other people to break the law. . . . We still have free speech and a free press in the United States.

But this sort of foolish honesty was frowned down. It was expedient that Terror be imposed, law or no law, Constitution or no Constitution. In a letter to Congressman Currie, April 12, 1918, Attorney-General Gregory complained that the clause in section 3 of the Espionage Act, aimed to prevent obstruction of enlistment and recruiting, "has been the only weapon with which the government could attack this dangerous evil [disloyal utterances]." This situation obtained until the so-called Sedition Act became a law, *thirteen months after the declaration of war.*

Americans are more or less aware, however, of what actually happened. "Disloyal utterances" were, *in fact,* attacked. *All* "disloyal utterances" were attacked. No utterance of "disloyalty" was permitted to pass. In the campaign against "disloyalty," every legal safeguard, Federal, State, and local, intended to protect personal liberty against official outrage, was ridden down. It may be imagined that this lawless Terror was due to an over-zealous patrio-

tism of State and local officials, or even to a spontaneous rising of popular anger against "disloyalty." It will be of importance, then, to read this description of the situation, written by Attorney-General Gregory himself:

To meet these demands [of the war upon the Department of Justice] we have been compelled to increase many fold the personnel of certain branches of the work, and to encourage the organization of patriotic bodies, and to secure the coöperation of these bodies, as well as that of national, State, county, municipal, and private organizations, on a hitherto unprecedented scale.

One patriotic association has a membership of over 200,000, with branches in over 1,100 cities and towns; it is truly national; it keeps tens of thousands of individuals under observation; it reports disloyalty and other violations of law to the official representatives of the Department; it develops the facts involved in hundreds of thousands of complaints; and it does all this and much more at its own expense, with little publicity. . . . It is but one of several such bodies, and when to their membership is added that of the various State Councils for national defense, the State, municipal and county constabulary, and the various other intelligence agencies, which are coöperating in the performance of the duties involved, the United States marshals and their deputies, the agents of the investigating-bureau of the Department of Justice, and individuals who are lending their assistance, the number of men assisting the government in this capacity aggregates several hundred thousand.

The Bureau of Investigation of the Department of Justice works in close coöperation with the Intelligence Service of the other branches of the government. If it were possible to give details, the public would be amazed at the success of the results secured. This country was never so thoroughly policed in its history, and it is doubtful if any nation in the world is to-day more carefully guarded than the United States.—(Statement in *Official Bulletin,* Apr. 19, 1918.)

From which it is clear that the Federal government was in active control of the situation in every State, city, county

and community in America; that the system of espionage was organized by it throughout; that the Federal government not only formed but directed the work of such "patriotic" bodies as were classified as unofficial; that no policy of lawlessness against "disloyalty" could have been effective in *any* community without the approval of subordinates of Mr. Gregory; that every agency of Terror, of whatever kind, even to the lynching parties of the night, *must have* worked either under the direction, or with the connivance, of Federal officials; that, therefore, Terror *must have been a policy,* planned by the Federal government, worked out by the Federal government, imposed by the Federal government, directed by the Federal government.

The President himself gave the Terror signal in his Flag Day address: *"Woe be to the man or group of men that seeks to stand in our way. . . ."* And the vast organization which Mr. Gregory describes, and which is so reminiscent of Russia in the days of the Czar, proceeded to administer the woe, "law or no law, authority or no authority."

But Mr. Gregory's list of the instruments of Terror is not complete. The courts of the country belong to the list; the Terror would have been impossible without them. America heard no more such pronouncements as that of Justice Hendrick. Judges who did not become quickly subservient were disciplined. In one case a judge was actually impeached for appearing as a character witness for a man accused of "disloyalty."

Pretending to interpret the law, we find a Federal judge announcing from the bench: *"Persons expressing opposition to policies of the government, whether aliens or not, should be indicted."* (Rose Pastor Stokes case.) We find another eminent judge advocating mob violence from the public platform.

Judges habitually made patriotic speeches from the

bench, habitually refused to listen to any argument involving the constitutional rights of persons prosecuted for "disloyalty," habitually refused to protect the rights of the accused from violation by police or mobs, habitually fixed excessive bail, habitually misrepresented the law in instructing juries, habitually incited juries against the defendants, habitually imposed harsh punishments.

A few salient acts of Mr. Gregory himself, and other cabinet heads, at the beginning, gave the cue to all Terrorists. In the month following the declaration of war, the government refused passports to a committee of Socialists who wished to attend a Socialist peace conference at Stockholm, a neutral capital—and Mr. Gregory threatened the committee with prosecution if it took part in any conference of the kind anywhere. So America received its first formal notification that terms of peace were to be left to the President alone, and were not even to be discussed except in the form of parroting the President's phrases.

On the day the Espionage Act went into effect, the Postmaster-General ordered the suspension of the greater part of the "unpatriotic" press. So America received its first formal notice that no question either of peace or of war was to be discussed through the printed page except in a manner satisfactory to the Administration.

During the first few weeks of the war, an organization known as "The People's Council on Democracy and Terms of Peace" assumed notable proportions throughout the country. On the announcement that it intended to enter the political field and to send pacifists to Congress, the Administration proceeded vigorously against it. Conventions were invaded, broken up, or prevented, by police and military, and leaders were placed under arrest. The movement was reduced to inactivity solely by the iron heel. So America was notified that the people were not to be

permitted to express their wishes even at the polls—that political liberty was to be suspended for the period of the war.

Another unpatriotic organization of national scope, the Industrial Workers of the World, was assailed in its entirety as a conspiracy to violate the Espionage Act. Thousands of members were jailed simultaneously. The simple possession of a membership card was treated as justifying the most extravagant brutalities. The avowed purpose of the hunt was to extirpate the organization, root and branch. More than one hundred leaders thereof were assembled before one court, convicted after a grossly unfair trial, and sentenced to prison terms running up to twenty years. One of the most hideous outrages of America's war despotism was the systematic destruction of the means of defense of accused Industrial Workers, through the arrest as co-conspirators of persons who attempted to hire lawyers, collect money, or in any way assist in, or prepare for, the legal defense of the accused. Scores of such persons were jailed and thousands of dollars of defense money were seized and held. So America was notified that neither laws nor constitutions were to be allowed to stand in the way of crushing out all opposition to the incumbent of the White House—even to stamping out all organizations whose principles might at some future date bring them into conflict with his plans.

Hand in hand with the policy of nipping in the bud all opposition of whatever kind, went the policy of compelling *coöperation.* Military conscription, of course, was the centre of the scheme. The power of conscription was applied with singular ruthlessness. A price of $50 was placed upon the head of each and every American within

the prescribed ages who failed to register or who evaded service at any stage. So cupidity became a motive in a country-wide "slacker hunt" which never ended.

In the beginning, it was the policy to throw every suspected "slacker" in jail for a period of days, without permitting him to communicate with his relatives or an attorney, or to procure the evidence that might free him. Later, America was presented with a spectacle of gigantic "slacker raids," in which squads of police, soldiers and citizens, violated the homes of the people and dragged them to jail by the thousands. In denouncing such raids on the floor of the Senate (Sept. 5, 1918), Senator Hiram Johnson said that it was like a chapter from the French Reign of Terror, when the "law of suspects" was in full swing and the prisons were crowded with innocent victims:

> No man would have said it were possible in our country. . . . The very purpose, according to my idea, of this kind of proceeding, is the purpose that has ever attended this kind of thing the world over —terrorism—the same sort of terrorism that makes it impossible to-day for any newspaper in this land to print what it desires; the same sort of terrorism that makes it a crime for any citizen in this nation, loyally, legitimately and honestly to speak his sentiments upon the rostrum or to his neighbors. . . . Was ever any such presentation made in any government under the sun that made a pretense of freedom?

The cruel and unusual punishments meted out by the drumhead courts were a part of the Terror also. Not all the "slackers" were sent to prison; there were too many of them. But terrible examples were frequently made. Defiant slackers were given thirty years and even life imprisonment. After the fighting was over, Senator Chamberlain revealed the fact that 15,000 of our young men had become "victims" of army courts-martial. Whole-

sale and almost unbelievable brutality visited upon young conscripts, in camps and guardhouses overseas, was admitted by responsible officers.

At home, the draft law was abused to facilitate the induction of pacifists into the military organization, where they could be better controlled. As, through Terror, the war despotism fixed its grip more and more firmly upon the throat of the nation, the law was abused again to compel workmen to concentrate in the war industries. While the purpose to conscript labor was denied, conscription of labor was put into operation on a larger and larger scale. Only the early ending of the war prevented the system from being put into general practice.

The policy of *forced coöperation* extended throughout every phase of the war activities. The law required the public to coöperate in a multitude of ways, but forced cooperation was applied as a policy even in the fields that were legally prescribed as voluntary. Federal espionage was applied to persons who refused to sign the "voluntary" food pledge cards. Federal espionage was applied to persons who refused to subscribe to "voluntary" funds. The world looked on in grim humor while the "great democracy" of the western hemisphere *compelled* the people to subscribe to its *Liberty Bonds!*

The President's dictum: "Woe be to the man or group of men who seeks to stand in our way," was echoed by persons of power and eminence in every walk of life. It was interpreted by them, unrebuked, to mean that there was to be an open season for pacifists. The Vice-President, two ex-Presidents, Senators, governors of States, presidents of famous colleges, ministers of the gospel, and eminent judges, joined in violent denunciations of every form of "disloyalty," and voiced suggestions of punishment that can only be interpreted as deliberate incitement to lawless

proceedings. The heads of the President's departments themselves gave the cue; their immediate subordinates set the styles. The hundreds of thousands of members of the propaganda machine and the Terror machine passed the word.

And the open season for pacifists came to pass. Cowards were in clover. Gangs of self-constituted police, prosecutors, judges, and executioners, were let loose in every State. Murder became heroism, if only patriotism was named as the motive. To dissent in any regard from the programme of the Administration meant to suffer as a pro-German and a traitor. It became impossible even to protest against the Terror itself. An opposition political party became as much a practical impossibility as it was in Mexico in the days of Diaz. Socialist candidates who dared appear before the people were indicted under the Espionage Act. Councils of defense terrorized farmers to stop the spread of a political organization known as the Non-partisan League. Even the right to choose one's own vocation was denied. When the work-or-fight regulation could not be applied, and where no special State law had been enacted, councils of defense at times undertook to tell citizens what work they should engage in.

They were not councils of defense, but councils of terror. In the newspapers, from day to day, were paraded a long list of outrages, perpetrated by members of these bodies, or at their instigation. Even freedom of conscience, enjoyed in silence, was not tolerated; for those who failed to proclaim their "loyalty" in words, and to back those words with "voluntary" contributions, were listed and persecuted in their business relations or private lives. The Terror extended to the halls of Congress. The rights of a Senator were so far forgotten that he was officially threatened with expulsion, and unofficially with hanging. It became

dangerous and inexpedient for him or for any other Senator or Representative to express any general opposition to the policies of the ex-college-professor who had termed himself "a mere servant of the people's representatives."

It is impossible here to present an adequate picture of the American war Terror. The present effort is to point out merely the responsibility, the purpose, and the effects. The primary responsibility of the Federal government cannot be evaded. The final item of proof is the fact that crimes of Terror were never punished. After an outrage, if the authorities put any one in jail, it was almost invariably the victim, not the criminals. The bands of masked assassins themselves were the agents of the American autocracy as directly as the Russian Black Hundreds were the agents of the Czar.[1]

But the President issued a magnificent manifesto against mob violence. Yes, after looking passively on for seventeen months! When the President issued his manifesto (July 26, 1918), the Terror *had accomplished its purpose.* The people had been reduced to submission. The country was under control. Congress was also under control.

"This disgraceful evil [mob violence]," said the President in his manifesto, "cannot live where the community does not countenance it." Under the circumstances that existed, it could not possibly have lived where the Federal government did not countenance it. But by July, 1918, the President was ready to pretend that he had never approved of it, and to order it discontinued. The President now held in his hands every power that he coveted. Having made successful war on the American people, he was in a

[1] This lawlessness, inspired and stimulated by our government and our "best people" for war purposes in 1817 and 1918, was a major cause of the long period of civil violence following the war, so solemnly and gravely deprecated under the name of "the spirit of lawlessness" by some of the very eminent persons who were responsible for it.

position to make war as he wished in Europe. So disorderly terror gave place to orderly absolutism.

Apologists for America's situation at the end of 1918 will suggest that similar conditions obtained in the other countries at war. If it were true, that would be no justification. But it was not true. In England, France, and other countries, extra war-time powers were exercised, not by a single man, holding office for four years, regardless of the approval of the country or of Congress, but by a cabinet, whose existence from day to day depended upon the continued support of the legislative body.

In no European country were free speech and a free press so ruthlessly stamped under foot. The writings of Lichnowsky, Harden, and the press attacks upon the Kaiser, prove that freedom of discussion in the enemy countries existed to an extent unknown in the United States.

For the autocracy that was imposed upon America in 1917 and 1918 there is no palliation in the fact that the President was elected, that the Congress which yielded to him was elected. Since they were elected on their promise to do the diametrically opposite thing, their offense is as great as if they had overturned an existing Constitutional government by a military coup, and installed themselves in power to carry out policies which the people had pronounced against.

In no modern country can autocracy sit in the saddle as autocracy. It must masquerade as democracy. So the machinery of deceit is set up. And for those who cannot be deceived there must be Terror.

No one had the temerity to defend the system under which America found itself at the end of 1918 on any other ground than that the end justified the means. The means themselves tend to throw suspicion upon the ends. What are the ends?

OUR WAR "CAUSES"

XI

MOTIVES CLAIMED FOR BELLIGERENCY

In examining our excuses for war, the first noticeable circumstance is their great number and variety. The number rendered it easy for our propagandists to shift, to leap about from one point to another, to dodge about in a maze of affirmation and denunciation; while the variety was calculated to raise some consideration appealing to every class, temperament, and type of mind.

On many occasions we proclaimed the utter unselfishness of our motives. Yet on other occasions we urged motives as selfish as can well be imagined. Where selfish motives are acknowledged, however justifiable they may be, common decency would seem to require that no profession of unselfishness be made.

In his message of December 4, 1917, President Wilson divided our claimed war motives into two classes, *causes* and *objectives;* the *causes* comprising the motives mentioned in the pre-war disputes, the *objectives* comprising those which were brought forward only after we were in. Since the former were urged exclusively before the American people and the American Congress, in defense of each and every step towards belligerency, it would be only just to test our sincerity strictly by them. These were the only motives of which America was officially told, and of which Germany was told.

Wars are always preceded—and always ought to be—by disputes, recitals of specific grievances, or ultimatums setting forth the course which the offending government may pursue in order to avoid war. But our official spokesman did not demand that Germany get out of Belgium; he did not demand that the Kaiser resign or reorganize his government along more democratic lines; he did not demand that Germany cede France Alsace-Lorraine, he did not demand that Italy be given parts of Austria; he did not demand that Germany renounce her alliance with Austria, Turkey, and Bulgaria, or that Germany abandon imperialism. His quarrel was concerned entirely with Germany's use of the submarine, and almost entirely with America's rights involved therewith. Not a single complaint was offered that was not professedly based upon some specific injury to American lives, or trade, or danger thereto. On several occasions, the President did assume to stand as the champion of the rights of neutral nations in general, or as the defender of international law as such, but on every such occasion his complaints proceeded from alleged injury to selfish interests of certain Americans, and were scrupulously confined to submarine issues.

In strict justice, our *objectives* are invalidated at the beginning by the very fact that they are *after-thought reasons*. They will not, however, be so treated here.

America having ridden into war on the submarine issue, that issue will be examined first. The motives urged in the submarine dispute were:

1. Protection of American commerce.
2. Preservation of American lives.
3. Championship of international law.
4. Maintenance of American honor.

On a number of occasions, both before and after April, 1917, our spokesman proclaimed the sufficiency of these

causes. For example, at Urbana (Jan. 31, 1918), he told his audience:

> You will not need to be convinced that it was necessary for us as a free people to take part in this war. It had raised its evil hand against us. The rulers of Germany had sought to exercise their power in such a way as to shut off our economic life, so far as our intercourse with Europe was concerned.

And in a letter to Congressman Heflin, May 22, 1917, he wrote:

> I have again and again stated the very serious and long continued wrongs which the Imperial German Government has perpetrated against the rights, the commerce, and the citizens of the United States. The list is long and overwhelming. No nation that respected itself or the rights of humanity could have borne these wrongs any longer.

Previously, in each successive step towards belligerency, the President had hinted that he was willing to go to war strictly on the submarine issue. As far back as February, 1915, he uttered this threat to Germany, conditioned wholly upon the protection of selfish American rights:

> The government of the United States would be constrained to hold the Imperial German Government to a strict accountability for such acts of their naval authorities, and to take any steps it might be necessary to take to safeguard American lives and property, and to secure to American citizens the full enjoyment of their acknowledged rights on the high seas. (Strict-accountability note.)

Looking over his preparedness-tour speeches, we find that the President presented the following propositions, to each of his audiences, practically in the same terms:

1. He asked the country to prepare for war.
2. He promised to keep the country out of war.

3. He hinted at danger of war.

4. In promising to keep the country out of war, he left a loophole—war for the maintenance of American honor.

5. He made it plain that, by American honor, he meant the obligation to protect American rights to trade and travel upon the high seas, as these rights are defined by international law.

Here is the argument in typical quotations:

Country Must Prepare.

I should feel that I was guilty of an unpardonable omission if I did not go out and tell my fellow-countrymen that new circumstances have arisen which make it absolutely necessary that this country should prepare herself. (Pittsburgh speech)

Yet He Will Keep Us Out of War.

I pledge you that, God helping me, I will keep you out of war. (Milwaukee speech)

Still, There May Be Trouble.

I cannot tell twenty-four hours at a time whether there is going to be trouble or not. (Kansas City speech)

For Honor May Require War.

You have laid upon me this double obligation: 'We are relying upon you, Mr. President, to keep us out of this war, but we are relying upon you, Mr. President, to keep the honor of the nation unstained.' Do you not see that a time may come when it is impossible to do both of these things? (Cleveland speech)

Although There is No Danger of Invasion.

Nobody seriously supposes, gentlemen, that the United States needs to fear an invasion of its own territory. (New York speech)

Rights Abroad Must be Protected, by Force, if Necessary.

It may be necessary to use the forces of the United States to vindicate the rights of American citizens everywhere to enjoy the rights of international law. (Topeka speech)

For We are Morally Obliged to Protect Commerce.

There is a moral obligation laid upon us to keep free the courses of our commerce and our finance, and I believe that America stands ready to vindicate those rights. (Topeka speech)

The Destruction of Even One American Cargo May Mean War.

One commander of a submarine . . . might set the world on fire. . . . There are cargoes of cotton on the seas; there are cargoes of wheat on the seas; there are cargoes of manufactured articles on the seas; and any one of those cargoes may be the point of ignition. (St. Louis speech)

For We Must Maintain Our Right to Ship Products Abroad.

There is one thing Kansas ought to be interested in, and that is that we must maintain our rights to sell our products to any neutral country anywhere in the world. We should be allowed to send the wheat that grows on the Kansas fields and the cotton in our southern states to neutrals who need them, without interference from any of the warring nations. (Topeka speech)

And See that Americans Everywhere are Respected.

Americans have gone to all quarters of the world. Americans are serving the business of the world . . . and every one of these men . . . is our ward and we must see to his rights and that they are respected. (Cleveland speech)

That the true import of the President's preparedness speeches was not grasped by his audiences was due only to his policy of mixing such remarks with sentiments that seemed to lead to a diametrically opposite conclusion.

Growing directly out of the President's determination to champion the *interests* of certain Americans was his assertion of those interests as *rights* under international law. Growing directly out of his determination to champion these specified American "rights" was his assumption of the championship of law *on principle.* Growing out of this position was his assumption of the championship of the

rights of neutrals in general, although neutral nations were not asking for his peculiar kind of championship. Growing out of this position was his championship of that all-embracing thing, "humanity."

The apparently contradictory rôle of champion of others and champion of ourselves, apostle of unselfishness and apostle of selfishness, our Executive played throughout the pre-war disputes. It would appear, therefore, that the best means of testing the validity of our professed motives is to segregate and examine them one by one.

XII

PROTECTION OF AMERICAN COMMERCE

CAN the protection of American commerce from U-boat attacks be defended as a valid cause—as one of the causes —for our war with Germany?

Our war represents an infinitely greater expense than the gross value of American commerce concerned in the dispute.

Compare the cost of war with the value of the commerce that we entered the arena to protect. Forget the blood-cost and every other cost except in immediate dollars and cents. The gross value of all exports from the United States to Great Britain and France, for the record-breaking year of 1916, was only $2,155,537,090, or but one-ninth of the appropriations of the first session of the war Congress.

Consider the volume of commerce at issue, in comparison with the entire volume of America's commerce. In a speech at Cincinnati, October 26, 1916—less than one hundred days before he broke relations with Germany—President Wilson said:

> If you take the figures of our commerce, domestic and foreign included, you will find that the foreign commerce, even upon the modest reckoning of our domestic commerce, does not include four per cent. of the total, and the exports in munitions—and not merely in munitions, but in everything that goes to supply armies—draft animals, automobile trucks, food directly intended for that purpose, shoes, clothes, everything that is needed by the commissary of an

army, that all of these things put together do not constitute one per cent. of the total of our commerce.

And only a fraction of this very small portion of America's total commerce passed through the submarine zone. The great increase in America's foreign commerce between 1913 and 1916 was due only in part to the war trade with the Entente countries. A portion of it was represented by an inflation of neutral trade, due to the disappearance of competition for world trade on the part of some of the warring nations. For his "modest reckoning of our domestic commerce" the President took the New York *Annalist* figures for the year ending June 30, 1916—five hundred billion dollars. American exports to England and France, during the same period, represented less than one-half of one per cent. of this sum.

And even that one-half of one per cent. represents a great deal more than the fraction of America's export trade covered by American representations to Germany on behalf of American commerce. In making such representations, the government of the United States concerned itself only with the safety of American *ships* and their cargoes. Where ships flying other flags came into the dispute, the theme was not commerce, but lives. The ships which carried American goods through the U-boat zone were, more than ten to one, of foreign registry, sailing under foreign flags. The "American commerce" at issue as such was less than *one-twentieth of one per cent.* of the total commerce of America.

American commerce thrived and expanded without war, and its growth, even through the war area, was never endangered by the enemy.

The entire loss of one-twentieth of one per cent. of a

country's commerce could hardly be a staggering blow to that country as a whole. Such a loss, however, never occurred. America's trade with England and France was not destroyed by the submarine. It was never in danger of destruction as a whole. Interference with it was never so serious as to prevent its steady growth.

In February, 1917, following the breaking of relations with Germany, the National Association of Manufacturers issued a special bulletin characterizing the submarine warfare, up to the intensified period, as a "failure."

And, from the beginning of the intensified period, it was the same kind of a failure. Although the trade of February fell off from that of January, this was not due to any increased destruction on the part of the submarine, but to a conspiracy of certain shipping and financial interests, allied with the British government, to coerce America into more war-like action. (See Chapter XXVII.)

But even then, the value of February exports was greater than that of the same month of the previous year, and the recovery in succeeding months—before America began to assist in combating the submarine—was complete.

In an interview in the New York *Times,* February 18, 1917, the editor of *Export American Industries,* organ of the National Association of Manufacturers, said:

> Our regular export trade has suffered but little from the new German blockade. Without any possibility of interruption, the lines to the great neutral markets and to the colonies of the warring nations are open to our shipments. It is too bad the steamship news and the sailings cannot have a prominent place in the papers, as it would go far in offsetting the idea that our export trade is killed by the new submarine zone. Every day, from New York harbor alone, there are sailings of dozens of big cargo carriers that leave for Latin America, the West Indies, Australia, South Africa, and the Orient, and these are not mentioned in the newspapers. And this

does not include the shipments going out from Boston, Baltimore, Savannah, and our other Atlantic ports, or from the Pacific Coast.

The trade routes from our different ports spread out like the delta of a great river. The most aggressive submarine warfare may dam some of these channels, but the current of our export trade will seek other outlets, and the result will be a deepening and broadening of the channels that cannot be obstructed. The coast line of the United States is too extensive, the ports are too widely separated, to make any submarine blockade effective in the slightest degree.

Consider what England has done in continuing her export trade since the war. Hampered by an ebbing labor market and the highest insurance rates, and surrounded by the submarine zone, her foreign sales have steadily increased until her exports stand at approximately the same figure as in 1913. If Germany could not retard this foreign trade of England, then how little have we to fear for the interruption of our export trade!

In spite of all the hullaballoo that was raised, up to America's declaration of war but seventeen ships flying the American flag were attacked by U-boats. (State Department figures presented during war debates by Representative Rogers of Massachusetts.)

Actually, our war protection did not protect. Destruction of "our" merchant ships in war became immediately greater than it had been in peace.

Over against the seventeen American merchant ships attacked by Germany in nearly three years before our declaration of war, we find sixty-three American merchant ships sunk in the ten months following.

During the first two months of Germany's intensified campaign—which were the last two before America went to war—six ships were attacked, or three per month. But in the following ten months—the first ten months of our war "protection"—Germany sank an average of six and

one-half per month. (Department of Commerce figures published Jan. 30, 1918.)

The war trade was of no value whatever to America as a whole, but an injury per se, and the nation would have lost nothing by its disappearance.

Not only were the ships which sailed the U-boat zone, in overwhelming majority, of foreign registry, but the ships flying the American flag belonged, in a great part, to foreigners, including the seventeen ships attacked by Germany.

The majority stock of the organization sometimes known as the "Shipping Trust"—the International Mercantile Marine Company and its subsidiaries—was owned in England. Although its American head was an American citizen, J. P. Morgan, a large share of the profits of this organization went to foreigners.

To what extent were the American people interested in the shipping profits of Mr. Morgan and his partners, foreign and American? President Wilson on at least two occasions gave a partial answer to this question—once in the early days of the war trade, and again after America became a belligerent. In a speech at Indianapolis, January 8, 1915, the President told his audience:

> Do you know that the ocean freight rates have gone up in some instances to ten times their ordinary figures? And that the farmers of the United States, those who raise grain and those who raise cotton, cannot get any profit out of the great prices that the world is willing to pay for these things, because the whole profit is eaten up by the extortionate charges for ocean carriage?

And in his statement to American business interests, July 11, 1917, the President said:

> The ship owners of the United States . . . are doing everything that high freight charges can do to make the war a failure, to make it impossible. . . . The fact is that those who have fixed the war

freight rates have taken the most effective means in their power to defeat the armies engaged against Germany.

Yet the protection of the business of these very people was one of the President's excuses for our war!

Not only was the American public as a whole precluded from sharing in any degree in the war-trade profits of Morgan and his partners, but that war trade actually put the American public out of pocket. This is proven by a comparison of the increase in the prices of the necessaries of life, with the increase in returns to the numerically large classes that constitute the American public.

There were some notable increases in wages, and some considerable increases in the returns for certain farm products, but millions of Americans had been unable to add a penny to their incomes. In general, the rise in prices was not offset by corresponding increases in wages, in prices of farm products, and in the returns to the other numerically large classes.

It can be conceded that a certain measure of foreign commerce is beneficial to the country at large, that when such commerce falls below a certain point it may be injurious to the body politic generally; and at the same time it may be proven that when foreign trade rises beyond a certain level it does so at the expense of the public at home, though the few directly participating in such trade may be reaping tremendous profits. Especially did that part of America's foreign trade classed as war trade react unfavorably upon the public pocketbook. The chief reason is that the greater part of such trade—far exceeding even the trade in munitions—consisted of food and other necessaries of the American people.

The result was the high prices which caused wide-spread suffering and numerous food riots during the weeks just preceding America's declaration of war.

We did not think it necessary to go to war with England, although the latter interfered with American commerce to a much greater degree than did Germany.

England's interference with American commerce represented infinitely greater sums in dollars and cents than Germany's interference with American commerce.

Moreover, while American trade with England continued to grow in the face of the submarine peril, American trade with Germany completely disappeared in the face of the mine and cruiser peril.

While Germany's interference with American trade was confined altogether to trade with Germany's enemies, England's interference with American trade extended to our trade with neutral countries. In the first eleven months of the European war, England seized 2,000 ships with American cargoes bound for Europe. (State Department figures quoted by Prof. Edwin J. Clapp, "Economic Aspects of the War," p. 53.)

Practical means were open to the United States for the protection of American commerce from all belligerents without war.

From the beginning of the European conflict in August, 1914, until America herself became an enemy, Germany made repeated efforts to bring about *practicable* arrangements for the protection of *all* American commerce from interference by *any* belligerent.

Immediately after the initiation of hostilities, the American government, on behalf of American commercial interests, proposed that all belligerents agree to conduct their naval warfare in conformity with the Declaration of London. Germany assented unconditionally to the proposal; her enemies refused to do so.

When Germany established a military area on the high

seas, in retaliation for England's military area on the high seas, although England was already intercepting nearly all neutral commerce to Germany, the latter announced that *"the German navy has received instructions to abstain from all violence against neutral vessels recognizable as such."* (German memorial, Feb. 4, 1915.) At the same time it recommended that the American government convoy American ships to insure their recognition, in order that they might proceed unharmed.

The German memorial establishing a war zone was answered by our "strict-accountability note." (Feb. 10.) This marked the beginning of the dispute with Germany. Replying to the "strict-accountability note," the German government offered definitely to withdraw its war-zone decree if the United States should succeed in bringing about an acceptance of the Declaration of London, on the part of its enemies. Furthermore, it declared:

> The German government is prepared to accord, in conjunction with the American government, the most earnest consideration to *any* measure that might be calculated to insure the safety of legitimate shipping of neutrals within the seat of war. (Note of Feb. 16, 1915.)

Proceeding on the above suggestion, the American government proposed to the belligerents (Feb. 20, 1915), "a basis of agreement" to safeguard neutral shipping, and obviate disputes between neutrals and belligerents. Replying (Feb. 28), Germany characterized the proposal as *"a suitable basis for the practical solution of the questions which have arisen."* Taking up the American points seriatim, it agreed in essentials, declaring: "The German government would undertake not to use its submarines to attack mercantile of any flag except when necessary to enforce the right of visit and search." Which is all that

the American government was at the time contending for regarding submarines.

These negotiations fell through only because the British reply was a peremptory rejection. (Note of Mar. 1.)

Nevertheless, thereafter the German government continued to try to meet the demands of the American government in its undersea warfare. In its note of May 9, 1915, it disclaimed any intention of attacking neutral ships, declared that it had given orders to the contrary, and promised to pay for all damages to American ships caused by mistakes of submarine commanders. In its note of September 1, 1915, it quoted its orders to submarine commanders, instructing them to follow the rules of cruiser warfare in dealing with neutrals. That these orders were sincerely given and carried out is evidenced by the fact that, in the two years of submarine activity up to the beginning of the "intensified" period, of the many hundreds of vessels attacked by submarines, but eleven were American, and a majority of these were sunk in conformity with the rules of cruiser warfare, against which the United States government could make no complaint and did not do so.

In fact, so little fault was found with the German policy, so far as its effect upon American commerce was concerned, that the United States practically changed the basis of the dispute. A relatively greater stress was laid upon complaints on behalf of American rights to travel on belligerent ships, and greater emphasis upon its assumption of championship of neutral rights in general and "the sacred and indisputable rules of international law."

Following the German announcement of intensified warfare, the protection of American commerce again came to the fore as an acknowledged motive for our successive steps towards belligerency. The German announcement of in-

tensified warfare was made only after two years of negotiations in which Germany sought to arrive at an understanding that would safeguard American commerce within the zone of warfare. It was made only after Germany had every reason to despair of obtaining impartial and neutral treatment from this country. It was the direct and logical result of the German failure to obtain such treatment from the Wilson Government.

The responsibility for the intensified policy lies, therefore, largely upon ourselves. For throughout the entire dispute, another course lay open and clear for America—an impartial and feasible course that would have assured the safety of American commerce from *all* belligerents, without the abandonment of neutrality, and without war. That course was to stand by the Declaration of London, to accept Germany's consent to conform to it, to *compel* England to conform to it—to compel, not by war or threats of war, or any hostile, unneutral, or dishonorable act, but by the simple pressure of economic force, the application of the sovereign right of embargo, which would have been sufficient, *as every American government official knew at the time.*

What is the answer to all this?

When it becomes evident that the war cannot be justified on any basis of immediate dollars and cents, is the answer that future dollars and cents will make it worth while?

When it is shown that the nation was not profiting but was losing by the war trade, is the answer that we had to fight for that trade, nevertheless, in order to protect the "right" of such trade to pass unmolested, on the theory that in some future war the trade of this class might become nationally profitable? Will any one dare contend that the American people stood to reap financial benefits from our

war, in this or any future generation, sufficient to compensate it for the blood and treasure that it proceeded to pour out?

Or is the answer that it was a question of honor? But if a question of honor, why mention commerce unless honor is in some way involved with commerce? In what manner are commerce and honor related in the dispute that carried America into the most terrible war in history?

Commerce was one immediate subject of contention in the submarine dispute; the other was American lives.

XIII

PRESERVATION OF AMERICAN LIVES

CAN the preservation of American lives be defended as a cause for our war with Germany?

This point is disposed of on grounds similar to those applied to commerce. Our war, of course, represents an expenditure of many more American lives than were concerned in the dispute.

Our war protection did not even protect from the particular kind of danger from which the obligation to protect was alleged. Before April, 1917, but 226 American lives were lost on all ships, American and foreign, as a result of Germany's action; this includes the 114 American lives lost on the "Lusitania." (State Department figures presented during war debates by Representative Rogers of Massachusetts.) But in the first ten months of American belligerency, more than 300 American lives were lost as a result of Germany's operations upon the seas. (Department of Commerce figures published Feb. 1, 1918.)

Moreover, practicable means were always open to the United States for the preservation of American lives from any of the incidents of the European conflict. Had the preservation of American lives been at any time a real consideration our government would have taken one or the other of two courses:

1. It would have notified American citizens to travel within the barred zone only at their own risk.

2. It would have accepted the means offered by Germany

for safe travel for American citizens through the barred zone.

Many Americans have no doubt forgotten that the German government repeatedly expressed a willingness to enter into any arrangements whatever—short of abandoning her commercial blockade—looking towards the preservation of the lives of neutrals.

In its note of July 8, 1915, the German government offered to give its submarine commanders instructions *"to permit the free and safe passage of American passenger steamers when made recognizable by special markings and notified a reasonable time in advance."* It proposed that an arrangement be entered into covering details. It went farther and expressed a willingness to agree to "the installation in the passenger service of *neutral* steamers, the exact number to be agreed upon, under the American flag under the same conditions as the American steamers above mentioned." It even offered:

> If, however, it should not be possible for the American government to acquire an adequate number of neutral passenger steamers, the Imperial Government is prepared to interpose no objections to the placing under the American flag by the American government of four *enemy* passenger steamers for the passenger traffic between America and England. The assurances of free and safe passage for American passenger steamers would then be extended to apply under the identical pre-conditions to these formerly hostile passenger ships.

In the note of May 4, 1916, the German government pointed out that it had made "several proposals to the government of the United States in order to reduce to a minimum for American travelers the inherent dangers of naval warfare," all of which proposals we had declined; nevertheless it declared that "the German government still stands by its offer to come to an agreement along these lines."

Finally, in announcing the intensified commercial blockade—which furnished the occasion for President Wilson to break diplomatic relations and move rapidly towards war—Germany *laid down conditions under which American passengers could still travel.* (See annex to note of Jan. 31, 1917.)

We had a dispute with England, as well as with Germany. In comparing the wrongs which we suffered from each, a great point was made of the fact that, while England may have interfered with American commerce quite as flagrantly as did Germany, our grievance against the latter was very much greater by reason of the fact that Germany's interference involved the sacrifice of American lives, while that of England did not.

It was pointed out at the time that this contention was not true, American lives having been lost from British mines in at least two instances, in the sinking of the American ships "Evelyn" and "Carib." Supposing, however, it *were* true, the answer would be that, if the German sea warfare resulted in the sacrifice of American lives and the British warfare did not, it was not because of any difference in goodwill between Germany and England, *but it was wholly due to the choice of Americans.*

No informed persons will seriously contend that Germany wished to kill Americans—any more than that England wished to kill Americans. The blockade on each side was aimed solely at commerce. Both wished to avoid causing the loss of neutral lives, but both were determined to hurt the commerce of the other, even though it cost the lives of neutrals. Both laid down conditions for neutral commerce which, if disregarded, would result in the loss of neutral lives, and, if obeyed, would mean that no neutral lives would be lost. Had Americans persisted in sailing the

North Sea in defiance of British orders they would surely have been sunk by mines; or if they avoided mines they would have been pursued by cruisers, and if they attempted to escape they would have been fired upon. The sole reason why Americans were killed by Germans and not by Britons was that they persisted in disregarding the German orders, while carefully complying with the British orders.

American citizens took such a course for several reasons. First, the chances of successfully evading the German orders were greater. Second, the American government encouraged them to attempt to evade the German orders while not encouraging them to attempt to evade the British orders.

For not only did our government unconditionally reject all German offers for the safeguarding of American lives, but it used American lives as pawns in the dispute. It deliberately encouraged Americans to go into danger. In this it coöperated with England, whose policy could have been dictated only by a desire to embroil the United States with Germany.

Great Britain placed restrictions upon the travel of British women and children through the barred zone. In this policy it was acting out of consideration for British lives. But it had no such consideration for American lives. Nor did our own government. Great Britain was quite willing for American citizens to be killed, if that would only pave the way to American hostility to Germany. And the Wilson Administration played into the hands of England. Meanwhile, Germany was begging the United States not to send its citizens into danger. Germany was showing more consideration for American lives than was the American government. Of course it was doing this in the hope

of avoiding war with us. But what was the motive for our peculiar policy?

President Wilson was so willing for our citizens to risk their lives that he permitted them to do so even in violation of our own statutes. A notable case is that of the "Lusitania." In the words of Senator LaFollette:

> Four days before the 'Lusitania' sailed, President Wilson was warned in person by Secretary of State Bryan that the 'Lusitania' had six million rounds of ammunition aboard, besides explosives, and that the passengers who proposed to sail on that vessel were sailing in violation of a statute of this country, that no passenger shall travel upon a railroad train or sail upon a vessel that carries dangerous explosives. And Mr. Bryan appealed to President Wilson to stop passengers from sailing upon the 'Lusitania.' (Speech at St. Paul, Sept. 20, 1917.)

Two weeks before the "Lusitania" sailed, the passengers had been warned also from German sources. Who, then, was primarily responsible for the loss of American lives on the "Lusitania"?

A year later the issue was even more clearly defined. In opposition to the view of Congress, the President insisted on the "right" of American citizens to travel as passengers upon the fighting "merchant" ships of the warring countries, encouraging them to risk their lives in this manner.

From all this it is obvious that the preservation of American lives was only a pretext. Did the President deliberately seek to use American lives to protect the munitions trade as such? Certainly he used American lives for some other purpose than for the preservation of American lives, for the way to protect life is to protect it, and not send it into danger.

In its note of July 8, 1915, the German government de-

clared itself "unable to admit that American citizens can protect an enemy ship through the mere fact of their presence on board." If President Wilson's willingness to sacrifice American life in opposition to this view was not due to a determination to protect the American war trade, even that carried in belligerent ships, what *was* the motive?

Again—as with commerce—was it a question of honor?

In what manner are trade and travel within the barred zone related with honor, in the dispute that carried America into the most terrible war in history?

We find Wilson's own answer in his famous letter to Senator Stone, opposing a warning to American citizens against traveling as passengers on the armed ships of the Entente allies. Here is the most complete existing amplification of President Wilson's position as the professed champion of international law, and his most connected exposition of the relationship which this professed championship bears to the selfish American interests of trade and travel; the relationship which these selfish interests bear to American honor, and the relationship between the supposedly unselfish championship of neutral rights generally, and the obviously selfish interest of American sovereignty. Said President Wilson to Senator Stone (Feb. 24, 1916):

> I cannot consent to any abridgement of the rights of American citizens in any respect. The honor and self-respect of the nation is involved. We covet peace and shall preserve it at any cost but the loss of honor. To forbid our people to exercise their rights for fear we might be called upon to vindicate them would be . . . an implicit, all but explicit, acquiescence in the violation of the rights of mankind everywhere and of whatever nation or allegiance. It would be a deliberate abdication of our hitherto proud position as spokesman even amidst the turmoil of war for the law and the right. . . . It is important to reflect that, if in this instance we allowed expediency

to take the place of principle, the door would inevitably be opened to still further concessions. Once accept a single abatement of right, and many other humiliations would certainly follow and the whole fine fabric of international law would crumble under our hands, piece by piece. What we are contending for in this matter is of the the very essence of the things that have made America a sovereign nation. She cannot yield them without conceding her own impotency as a nation and making vital surrender of her independent position among the nations of the world.

If you follow this, you get the official theory almost clear. Honor is involved with trade and travel because trade and travel are involved with international law, and international law is involved with sovereignty. For our own sakes we must maintain our proud position as champion of neutral rights and of humanity.

We do not pretend that Americans must be left to trade and travel under all circumstances. It is not the actual interference with commerce and lives that obliges us to fight; it is the *method*—and the method stands or falls by the rules of international law. Of such overshadowing importance is international law, indeed, that we must stand prepared to sacrifice both commerce and lives to it. We must stand prepared to spend even "our last man and our last dollar" in order to maintain the simple right, under international law, of any American to ship the food we need to other countries, or the simple right of the same American to travel anywhere upon the high seas, in pursuit of the patriotic business of causing a scarcity of food and high prices within his own country.

Very well, all motives of the submarine dispute are reduced to terms of international law.

XIV

WAR FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW

In view of the universally admitted fact that international law had largely gone by the board, as a result of the war measures of both belligerents, and the universal belief that after the war, a new and more definite code would be drawn up, was it not a bit ridiculous to pretend to go to war to save the existing code from the scrap-heap?

In the British note of February 10, 1915, appears the following: *"No war has yet been waged in which neutral individuals have not occasionally suffered from unjustifiable action."* Supposing America had not gone to war with Germany, there is no ground whatever for the theory that Germany would then have gone out of her way to violate other American "rights" than those involved in the submarine dispute, or would in any way have assailed the independence of this country.

It would seem to be obvious that, under the circumstances, expediency should have been the guide. It would seem to have been expedient to keep out of the war except for some *interest* immediately vital to sovereignty, or for some practicable *ideal* impossible to arrive at through any alternative course.

Every one surely knows that governments do not habitually rush into war on any such principle as that enunciated by Wilson. Nor had America in the past followed any such policy. Justification of a diametrically opposite course was the main thesis of the campaign upon which Wilson was reëlected in 1916, although at that very time he had given enunciation to his war-for-the-championship-of-interna-

tional-law theory. In the keynote speech, at the St. Louis convention, Governor Glynn sought to show that his chief was following the *course of expediency,* wisely pursued by his illustrious predecessors. In support of his argument, Glynn gave a long list of instances from our history, in which America had suffered grievous injury, chiefly from England and France,[1] during the presidential terms of Washington, Adams, Jefferson, Van Buren, Pierce, Lincoln, Harrison, and Grant, in which our disputes had been settled by negotiation, without resort to war.

Do not forget that the expedient course was always open to our Executive, that it was made easily possible by the conciliatory attitude of Germany, and that a numerous group within his own party urged it from the start, and continued to urge it down to the very verge of war.

In support of his resolution seeking to warn American citizens against traveling as passengers in armed belligerent ships, Senator Gore had argued (Mar. 2, 1916):

The progress of civilization consists of the withdrawal of individual rights when they become incompatible with the paramount in-

[1] Among other things, Mr. Glynn referred to the efforts of the French minister during Washington's administration, to "rally this country to the support of France in return for the help France gave us in the revolutionary war." "Our debt to France" was a special reason frequently proclaimed by our war propagandists for American intervention against Germany. On one occasion President Wilson asserted that the American people had been waiting for more than a century an opportunity to repay the alleged debt. President Harding expressed himself in similar terms in a speech, October 19, 1921. On arriving in France, General Pershing shouted loudly, "Lafayette, we are here!" The gesture was not without its sentimental effect. But for more than a century the prevailing American view had been that we owed France nothing, as the French official help to the colonies in the Revolutionary War was given selfishly, as an incident in the French war with England, which happened at the time to be more "democratic" than France. The "opportunity" mentioned by Wilson had come to President Washington himself, who rejected it. Had there been any debt to France, moreover, it would have been wiped off the slate generations ago by the unfriendly acts mentioned by Wilson's spokesman at St. Louis.

terests of organized society. It is perhaps true that any one of the 100,000,000 American citizens has a right to travel on an armed merchant ship. He has the right to run the risk of losing his life and engulfing this republic in a sea of carnage and blood, but I believe that the 100,000,000 citizens have a right to be protected against his recklessness. The right of 100,000,000 to be protected from butchery is not to be weighed in the balance with the sacred and inherited right to imperil his own life.

A few days earlier, Senator Stone, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, had argued with the President as follows:

I find it difficult for my sense of duty and responsibility to consent to plunge this nation into the vortex of this world war because of the unreasonable obstinacy of any of the powers, upon the one hand, or upon the other hand, of foolhardiness, amounting to a sort of moral treason against the republic, of our people recklessly risking their lives on armed belligerent ships. I cannot escape the conviction that such would be so monstrous as to be indefensible. I insist that neither a private citizen nor the President nor the Congress of the United States can be justified in driving this nation into war or endangering its peace by any such false sense of courage or national prestige or dignity. (Letter of Feb. 24, 1916.)

A similar position was taken by many Republicans, a large proportion of whom held to it even after the President had broken diplomatic relations, and almost down to the day when he had practically embroiled us. Had the President himself taken this position, it would have been difficult for him to have found grounds for a serious quarrel. Moreover, there is no evidence that he would have lost his leadership by doing so.[2]

[2] According to Joseph P. Tumulty, President Wilson's secretary ("Woodrow Wilson as I Know Him," Chapter XXIV.), the members of Wilson's own cabinet advised him against the belligerent position which he took

In the keynote speech previously referred to, President Wilson's mouthpiece accused the political opposition of urging the very theory that "a single abatement of right" would require America to plunge into the war, and pointed where such a policy, if carried out, would inevitably lead:

> Fighting for every degree of injury would mean perpetual war, and this is the policy of our opponents, deny it how they will. It would not allow the United States to keep the sword in the scabbard as long as there remains an unrighted wrong or an unsatisfied hope between the snowy wastes of Siberia or the jungled hills of Borneo. . . . It would give us a war abroad each time the fighting cock of the European weather vane shifted with the breeze. It would make America the cockpit of the world. It would mean the reversal of our traditional policy of government. It would mean the adoption of imperialistic doctrines which we have denounced for over a century. . . . In a word, this policy of our opponents would make the United States the policeman of the world. Rome tried to be policeman of the world, and went down; Portugal tried to be policeman of the world, and went down; Spain tried, and went down; and the United States proposes to profit by the experience of the ages and avoid ambitions whose reward is sorrow and whose crown is death.

upon this crucial occasion, *on the very ground that he might thereby suffer defeat and lose his leadership.*

XV

INTERNATIONAL LAW—OUR REVERSALS ON THE LAW IN 1915 AND 1916

Our dispute with Germany hinged upon three legal points: the law of the submarine, the law of the armed merchantman, and the principle of equal treatment as an attribute of neutrality. On all three of these points, the Administration at Washington flagrantly reversed itself during the course of the controversy.

At one time our spokesman virtually admitted that the law of the submarine had never been fixed, in the following words:

> The government of the United States is not unmindful of the extraordinary conditions created by this war, or of the radical alterations of circumstances and methods of attack produced by the use of instrumentalities of warfare which the nations of the world cannot have had in view when the existing rules of international law were formulated, and it is ready to make every reasonable allowance for these novel and unexpected aspects of war at sea. (Note to Germany, July 21, 1915.)

Notwithstanding this admission, he proceeded to formulate rules of submarine procedure and to put forth these rules as a part of "the fine fabric of international law!"

In doing so, far from holding the submarine to be an outlaw, he conceded it to be a proper weapon of warfare, and at times conceded that it could properly be employed in operations against commerce. On one occasion he declared:

The events of the past two months have clearly indicated that it is possible and practicable to conduct such submarine operations as have characterized the activity of the Imperial German Navy within the so-called zone in substantial accord with the accepted practices of regulated warfare. (Note of July 21, 1915, to Germany.)

On another occasion he declared:

I do not feel that a belligerent should be deprived of the proper use of submarines in the interruption of enemy commerce. (Letter of Secretary Lansing to British ambassador, Jan. 18, 1916.)

But at another time he held:

Manifestly submarines cannot be used against merchantmen . . . without an inevitable violation of many sacred principles of justice and humanity. (Note of May 13, 1915, to Germany.)

And at another time he held:

The use of submarines for the destruction of an enemy's commerce is . . . utterly incompatible with the principles of humanity, the long-established and incontrovertible rights of neutrals, and the sacred immunities of non-combatants. (Note of Apr. 18, 1916, to Germany.)

A comparison of these four quotations shows that, in attempting to lay down the law of the submarine, we flatly reversed ourselves, first in 1915, and again in 1916, on the legality of the submarine for the destruction of commerce.

The law of the armed merchantman was of prime importance in the dispute with Germany because it involved the question of the right of attack without warning. The most unfavorable view ever held of the submarine by our government was that it must not be employed at all against bona fide merchant vessels; at no time did we hold that its unrestricted use against war vessels was not legitimate.

We never, of course, claimed that American citizens had

any right to protection when found upon enemy war vessels. The question was, therefore, when does a merchant ship become a warship? May a merchant vessel arm purely for defense and fight defensively? And if so, what procedure must it follow in order to retain its character as a merchantman, and continue in the enjoyment of the immunities of a merchantman?

On this point our reversal was even more flagrant than upon the law of the submarine. In the beginning (Memorandum of Sept. 19, 1914) we held that the mere presence of *any* armament on board a merchant vessel would create a presumption of offensive purpose, and that this presumption could be overcome only by the marshalling of concrete evidence to prove that the armament was intended "solely for defense." Such evidence, we held, must include the facts *"that no guns are mounted on the forward part of the vessel"; "that the calibre of the guns carried does not exceed six inches"; "that the guns and small arms carried are few in number"; "that the quantity of ammunition carried is small"; "that the speed of the ship is slow";* that the vessel is manned only by its usual crew, follows the usual route of a merchant vessel, engages in regular trade, etc. etc.

This position was concurred in by the British government. In a memorandum dated August 25, 1914, the British ambassador notified us that he had been instructed to give *"the fullest assurances that British merchant vessels will never be used for purposes of attack . . . that they will never fire unless fired upon, and that they will never under any circumstances attack any vessel."* In a memorandum dated September 7, he admitted the impropriety of an armed merchantman's carrying war material or military forces. And in a memorandum dated September 9, he defined defensively armed craft as "merchant ves-

sels which are bona fide engaged in commerce and *carry guns at the stern only.*"

For a brief period, indeed, we took the position that no armament whatever could be considered defensive, and that the so-called armed merchantman was never a merchantman at all, but always a ship of war:

> The placing of guns on merchantmen at the present day of submarine warfare can be explained only on the ground of a purpose to render merchantmen superior in force to submarines, and to prevent warning and visit and search by them. Any armament, therefore, on a merchant vessel, would seem to have the character of an offensive armament. . . . I should add that my government is impressed with the reasonableness of the argument that a merchant vessel carrying an armament of any sort, in view of the character of submarine warfare and the weakness of undersea craft, should be held to be an auxiliary cruiser and so treated by a neutral as well as by a belligerent government, and is seriously considering instructing its officials accordingly. (Letter of the Secretary of State to the British Ambassador. Jan. 18, 1916.)

A complete reversal from this position came only sixty-seven days later. In a memorandum dated March 25, 1916, we not only abandoned our stand of January 18, but conceded to armed merchant vessels greater freedom of action than we had conceded them originally, greater freedom even than the British government had dared to ask. From holding that merchantmen could not arm against submarines at all we faced squarely about to the position that merchantmen might not only arm against submarines, but might fire before being fired upon; that, in effect, while the armed merchantman was entitled to attack without warning, the submarine was not entitled to do so; that neutral persons traveling as passengers upon such armed ships were entitled to the same immunities as if traveling upon peaceful passenger-vessels.

On the question of the presumption to be drawn from the presence of armament, the two memoranda present a perfect deadly parallel. (See appendix, p. 433.) The new ruling, indeed, would not permit the submarine to fire upon the "merchantman" under *any* circumstances, until after it had been attacked by the latter.

It was in support of this reversal, and no other, that Wilson threatened to break diplomatic relations with Germany in 1916. It was this kind of law that Wilson characterized as "sacred and indisputable." It was this kind of championship of "immutable" principles by which the President sought to explain our alliance with England and our war with Germany.

In the diplomatic controversies which preceded war, our official spokesman unfitted us for the rôle of knightly crusader for international law, not only by disputing and changing his own position on essential questions of principle, but by presenting an unequally inflexible front toward different offenders against his various positions upon such questions.

When a neutral nation fails to maintain its claimed rights against one belligerent, only to quarrel with another belligerent over rights of a similar character, and finally go to war with it, becoming an ally of the first, its course cannot be justified on any ground of championship for international right.

At the beginning of the European war our government observed this principle in action, and at times also proclaimed it in words. For example, in the note of February 20, 1915, to England, we find:

> To admit (any) claim on the part of Great Britain of justification for interfering with these clear rights of the United States and

its citizens as neutrals . . . would be to assume an attitude of unneutrality toward the present enemies of Great Britain, which would be obviously inconsistent with the solemn obligations of this government.

Fifteen months later, however, we find President Wilson putting forth this astonishing proposition:

In order, however, to avoid any possible misunderstanding, the government of the United States notifies the Imperial Government that it cannot for a moment entertain, much less discuss, a suggestion that respect by German naval authorities for the rights of citizens of the United States upon the high seas should in any way or in the slightest degree be made contingent upon the conduct of any other government affecting the rights of neutrals and non-combatants. Responsibility in such matters is single, not joint; absolute, not relative. (Note of May 8, 1916.)

Even the British government, which profited so greatly by this reversal, had expressed the opposite view. In pleading justification of its own violations of international law, on the ground that Germany had violated international law, it urged (Note of Feb. 10, 1915):

It is impossible for one belligerent to depart from rules and precedents and for the other to remain bound by them.

Neither then nor at any other time did President Wilson contend against this plea of England, although contending against the self-same plea by Germany, *and ultimately maneuvering America into the European war by means of such contention.*

President Wilson's reversal on this point would seem to constitute nothing less than a confession of a conscious abandonment of a single standard of international morality, and the application of a double standard, in favor of the enemies of Germany; a confession, therefore, of a depar-

ture from neutrality, although for nearly a year longer he continued telling his own people and the world that we were neutral.[1]

[1] The account of Joseph P. Tumulty, Wilson's secretary, although self-contradictory at times, bears out the view that the President was deliberately unneutral almost from the beginning. ("Woodrow Wilson as I Know Him," Chapters XXIII to XXVI.)

XVI

INTERNATIONAL LAW—BRITISH AND GERMAN VIOLATIONS COMPARED

Now what led to our remarkable reversals on the points of law involved in the dispute with Germany?

Was it principle—or expediency?

Were England's violations of international law, in relation to American rights, any less clear or pervasive than those of Germany? Were they less reprehensible, either in number or degree, or by any other material or moral measure?

On the other hand, in the beginning we characterized the British offenses in quite as emphatic terms as we did those of Germany; we asserted the same obligation to resist them. Here are some notable quotations:

Protest against seizures and detentions, December 26, 1914:

> The present policy of His Majesty's Government toward neutral ships and cargoes . . . constitutes restrictions upon the rights of American citizens on the high seas which are not justified by the rules of international law or required under the principles of self-preservation.

Blockade note, March 30, 1915:

> The Order in Council of the 15th of March would constitute, were its provisions to be actually carried into effect as they stand, a practical assertion of unlimited belligerent rights over neutral commerce within the whole European area, and an almost unqualified denial of the sovereign rights of the nations now at peace. . . . It is manifest that such limitations, risks and liabilities, placed upon

the ships of a neutral power on the high seas . . . are a distinct invasion of the sovereign rights of the nation whose ships, trade, or commerce, is interfered with . . . . [The] course of action [of the British government] is without precedent in modern warfare . . . [and] clearly subversive of the rights of neutral nations on the high seas.

Protest against prize-court confiscations, July 14, 1915:

Insofar as the interests of American citizens are concerned, the government of the United States will insist upon their rights under the principles and rules of international law as hitherto established, governing neutral trade in time of war, without limitation or impairment by Orders in Council or other municipal legislation by the British government, and will not recognize the validity of prize-court proceedings taken under restraints imposed by British municipal law in derogation of the rights of American citizens under international law.

Blockade note, October 21, 1915:

It has been conclusively shown that the methods sought to be employed by Great Britain to obtain and use evidence of enemy destination of cargoes bound for neutral ports, and to impose a contraband character upon such cargoes, are without justification; that the blockade, upon which such methods are partly founded, is ineffective, illegal and indefensible; that the judicial procedure offered as a means of reparation for an international injury is inherently defective for the purpose, and that in many cases jurisdiction is asserted in violation of the law of nations. The United States, therefore, cannot submit to the curtailment of its neutral rights by these measures. . . . The United States . . . cannot with complacence suffer subordination of its rights and interests to the plea that the exceptional geographical position of the enemies of Great Britain requires or justifies oppressive and illegal practices. . . . It is of the highest importance to neutrals not only of the present day but of the future that the principles of international law be maintained unimpaired.

This task of championing the integrity of neutral rights, which have received the sanction of the civilized world against the lawless conduct of belligerents arising out of the bitterness of the great conflict which is now wasting the countries of Europe, the United States unhesitatingly assumes, and to the accomplishment of that task it will devote its energies, exercising always that impartiality which from the outbreak of the war it has sought to exercise in its relations with the warring nations.

Note of May 24, 1916:

The present practice [of seizing ships on high seas, taking them into port, and there confiscating mail] is a violation of . . . the Hague convention . . . The government of the United States . . . can no longer tolerate the wrongs which citizens have suffered and continue to suffer through these methods. . . . Manifestly, a neutral nation cannot permit its rights on the high seas to be determined by belligerents, or the exercise of those rights to be permitted or denied arbitrarily by the government of a warring nation. The rights of neutrals are as sacred as the rights of belligerents and must be as strictly observed. . . . Only a radical change in the present British and French policy, restoring to the United States its full rights as a neutral power, will satisfy this government.

The arguments upon which these denunciations of England are based are infinitely better reasoned and supported than the arguments upon which the denunciations of Germany are based. Against England, we were able to cite copiously from authority and precedent, to quote British statesmen against Britain, to call up England's record with telling effect; while against Germany, we were forced to lay down new principles, which we dubbed international law, bolstering them up with rhetoric; and even upon these we put ourselves out of court by reversals on essential points.

The only fair conclusion to be drawn from a study of this pre-war correspondence is that the record of England,

in trampling upon American rights, is not only as vulnerable and reprehensible as that of Germany, but far more so. The very points of law which America alleged against Germany could be brought against England with greater reason.

Our complaints against England specified violations in definition of contraband; seizures and detentions, instead of visit and search upon the high seas; practices of British prize courts in condemning ships and cargoes; hovering of British warships off American coasts; misuse of the neutral flag; confiscation of American mail from ships illegally detained; the blacklist; and the so-called blockade; while the single complaint against Germany was that at times she failed to conduct her submarine operations in conformity with the accepted practices of cruiser warfare.

But England also failed to conduct her operations in conformity with the accepted practices of cruiser warfare. Moreover, England, operating with cruisers, could not urge the extenuating circumstances which America had (at times) admitted applied to submarines. When America complained to England—on precisely the same grounds under international law upon which *all* of the complaints against Germany were based—England's only defense was convenience. Said England complacently to America:

> To do so [bring ships into port without evidence] is not to be looked upon as a belligerent right, but as an adaptation of the existing right to the modern conditions of commerce. (British note of Feb. 10, 1915.)

Germany could have used precisely the same words, with better justice, in excusing her submarine policy. England never gave up the practice which she here admits is illegal. But our President claimed justification for war in the fact

that Germany finally refused to yield on exactly the same principle.

To allege a difference, it was necessary to shift from questions of principle to questions of *effect*. "How about the 'Lusitania'?" But the question of effect is irrelevant, since the effect, as has been pointed out, was not chosen by the offending party. As Senator Norris demanded, in the debate on the Armed Ships Bill:

> Why have we kept out of the North Sea? . . . Simply because it is altogether more dangerous for ships to go through a mine field than it is for ships to go through a submarine field. Mining the high seas is incomparably more inhuman and ruthless than warfare by means of submarines.

In the matter of warning, Germany invariably showed greater concern for preventing injuries to neutrals than did England. England gave the world but three days' notice of the establishment of her military area upon the high seas. Her "blockade" went into effect on the day of its announcement, and was applied retroactively upon all ships which had left their ports later than two weeks previously. Many enlargements in England's contraband lists, and new "wrinkles" in her aggressions upon neutrals, were not announced at all until after she had put them into practice and made neutrals suffer from them.

On the other hand, Germany gave the world fourteen days' notice of the establishment of her military area upon the high seas, and twenty-one days' notice of her determination to deal with all armed merchant ships as ships of war. Of her "unrestricted warfare," only one day's notice was given, but, in practice, action against neutral ships was withheld for a reasonable period, as was promised in the notification.

In its effort to retain the friendship of the United States (Note of Mar. 6, 1917), Austria-Hungary argued that the submarines of the Teutonic powers had never really attacked any merchant vessel without adequate warning. As it was suicidal—because of the vulnerability of undersea craft—for the submarine to attempt always to give warning immediately before an attack, the governments of the Central Powers took great pains to give general warning beforehand. Austria-Hungary pointed out that such warning was more humane and considerate if given before the embarkation of the passengers, than if reserved until immediately before the destruction of the vessel, as was the practice in cruiser warfare. The note pointed out that, under the latter circumstances, it is impossible absolutely to guarantee the lives of passengers, since the best thing that can be done is to take the passengers aboard the warship, which is subject to fire in case of meeting an enemy before reaching port.

American war propagandists, during the first few months after our declaration of war, habitually worked themselves into a great heat over the proposition that Germany broke some very solemn promises which she had made to the United States. This accusation originated with the President, who, in announcing to Congress his break with Germany (Feb. 3, 1917), asserted that the declaration of Germany, initiating unrestricted submarine warfare *"withdraws the solemn assurance given in the Imperial Government's note of the 4th of May, 1916."*

Taking the cue, Secretary Lansing was found declaring a little later: *"Of course, the immediate cause of our war against Germany was the announced purpose of the German government to break its promise as to indiscriminate warfare."* (*War-Information Series*, No. 5, p. 3.)

This alleged action he further characterized as a *"deliberate breach of faith"* and an *"act of perfidy,"* even declaring it to be *"in itself sufficient to force us to enter the war if we would preserve our self-respect."*

What are the facts?

Here is the alleged "solemn promise" of May 4, exactly as it was made:

As the German government repeatedly declared, it cannot dispense with the use of the submarine weapon in the conduct of warfare against enemy trade. The German government, however, has now decided to make a further concession, adapting methods of submarine warfare to the interests of neutrals. . . . The German government, guided by this idea, notifies the government of the United States that German naval forces have received the following order:

'In accordance with the general principles of visit and search and the destruction of merchant vessels recognized by international law, such vessels, both within and without the area declared a naval war zone, shall not be sunk without warning and without safeguarding human lives, unless the ship attempt to escape or offer resistance.'

But neutrals cannot expect that Germany, forced to fight for existence, shall for the sake of neutral interests restrict the use of an effective weapon, if the enemy is permitted to continue to apply at will methods of warfare violating rules of international law. Such a demand would be incompatible with the character of neutrality. . . . Accordingly, the German government does not doubt that the government of the United States will now demand and insist that the British government shall forthwith observe the rules of international law universally recognized before the war, as are laid down in the notes presented by the government of the United States to the British government December 28, 1914, and November 5, 1915.

Should steps taken by the government of the United States not attain the object it desires, to have the laws of humanity followed by

all belligerent nations, the German government would then be facing a new situation in which it must reserve to itself complete liberty of decision.

Gottlieb von Jagow.

This was the last of a long series of appeals to the United States for the equal and impartial treatment which neutrality requires. When, after nine months of waiting, in which the equal and impartial treatment was not forthcoming, Germany announced the unrestricted use of her submarines, she pointed out distinctly the situation which, to use her own words, *"gives back to Germany the freedom of action which she reserved in her note addressed to the government of the United States on May 4, 1916."*

Where is the "breach of faith?" Where is the "perfidy?" Where are the "broken promises?"

Nothing could be more eloquent of the weakness of the case against Germany than this stock charge, known by every American government official and every student of the war to be baseless.

Did the breaking of promises, with regard to the conduct of warfare affecting American rights, require us to go to war "if we would preserve our self-respect," then America would have been at war with England before the end of 1914. For in the note of October 21, 1915, we find America protesting against the breaking of two promises, made and broken in 1914: the first that England would not "interfere with trade with the countries contiguous to the territories of the enemies of Great Britain"; the second, that "inconvenience would be minimized by the discretion left to the courts in the application of the Order in Council, and by the instructions which it was said would be issued [as to the execution of the blockade of Germany]."

The promise of August 25, 1914, that "British mer-

chant vessels .... will never fire unless fired upon, and that they will never under any circumstances attack any vessel," was also habitually broken, and by express orders from the British government, as is shown by the "confidential instructions" reproduced in the American White Book, (vol. III, p. 181).

Regarding the Declaration of London, England commenced breaking promises during the first days of the war, and broke them repeatedly thereafter.

Much was made of the fact, by apologists for England, that the latter country never ratified the Declaration of London. Even were this strictly true, it would be scant extenuation for British violations thereof; for the Declaration of London was not a new code of laws, but simply *"an agreement as to what are the generally recognized rules of international law"*—to employ the words of the document itself. The fact is that, at the outbreak of the war, the British government *did* agree to abide by the Declaration of London, with certain specified amendments, then and there set down. We were so notified in the note of August 22, 1914. In the Order in Council of August 20, 1914, the thing was put in this way:

> Whereas, the governments of France and Russia have informed His Majesty's Government that during the present hostilities it is their intention to act in accordance with the provisions of the convention known as the Declaration of London, signed on the 26th day of February, 1909, so far as may be practicable.
>
> Now, therefore, His Majesty, by and with the advice of his Privy Council, is pleased to order, and it is hereby ordered, that during the present hostilities the convention known as the Declaration of London shall, subject to the following additions and modifications, be adopted as if the same had been ratified by His Majesty.

But the promise was broken by further "modifications," which followed, one after another—all dictated purely by British convenience—until it became too ridiculous to pretend any regard whatever for the document in question.

The first violations of American rights in the European war consisted in the sowing of mines upon the high seas. The question as to whether England or Germany sowed the first of these mines is a matter of dispute, the merits of which may never be determined. But the point is not essential in determining to which side belongs the defense of retaliation. The essential question is not who perpetrated the original violation of international law, but (1) who perpetrated the violations against which America first protested, and (2) who held most tenaciously to the course which America contended against as unlawful.

An examination of the American White Book shows that, until February 10, 1915, America had no complaint whatever against Germany on grounds of international law, while she was at variance with England on questions of international law from the first week of the war.

When, February 4, Germany issued her military-area proclamation, frankly defending it as a retaliatory measure, she had America's own condemnation of her adversary's measures in support of her stand. But when, February 10, England for the first time advanced retaliation as a defense for her own violations of international law, she had no American protests whatever upon which to base her claim—no argument that was admissible from the American point of view.

The evidence of the relative tractability of Germany is no less overwhelming. In the early months of the war the United States was continually striving to procure for neutrals *"a standard by which to measure their rights or*

to avoid danger to their ships and cargoes." (Note of Mar. 5, 1915.) Germany was continually trying to do the same. England was continually refusing.

England's military area upon the high seas was established November 5, 1914; Germany's was established February 18, 1915. But even then Germany showed a greater regard for neutral rights, since Germany's war was declared only against *enemy* vessels. England's war, however, was declared against *neutral* vessels.

In its note of May 4, 1916, Germany pointed out:

> The German government will only state that it has imposed far-reaching restraints upon the use of the submarine weapon, solely in consideration of neutrals' interests, in spite of the fact that these restrictions are necessarily of advantage to Germany's enemies. No such consideration has ever been shown neutrals by Great Britain and her allies.

Three months previously, President Wilson had publicly admitted that the instructions given to commanders of German submarines "*are consistent for the most part with the law of nations.*" (Speech at St. Louis, Feb. 3, 1916.)

One cannot read the diplomatic correspondence between America and England, and between America and Germany, without reaching the conclusion that the Wilson Administration was fully aware that it was closer to Germany than to England, in matters of principle. This fact was at times even acknowledged in words. For example:

> The government of the United States and the Imperial German Government are contending for the same great object; have long stood together in urging the very principles upon which the government of the United States now so solemnly insists. They are both contending for the freedom of the seas. (American note to Germany, July 21, 1915.)

Not at any time, nor for any period, until February 1,

1917, did Germany stand as squarely against America's contentions as England stood from November 5, 1914. Germany's unrestricted warfare against merchant vessels, within a certain area upon the high seas, began February 1, 1917. England's began November 5, 1914. There is not an iota of difference in principle between these two decrees—and to Germany belongs the defense of retaliation.

Why did not America break diplomatic relations with England, November 5, 1914, and move rapidly toward war? Why did not the United States insist, as it repeatedly told England that it would, "that the relations between it and His Majesty's Government be governed, not by a policy of expediency, but by those established rules of international conduct upon which Great Britain in the past has held the United States to account when the latter nation was engaged in a struggle for national existence?" (Note of Oct. 21, 1915.)

Why did America reverse itself suddenly on the status of armed merchant ships, on the use of the submarine for operations against commerce, and on the single standard as a condition of neutrality, thus swinging itself around into less glaring inharmony with the British position, and squarely against the German position?

We happen to have the answer of President Wilson himself, as given by his State Department to the United States Senate, which had propounded similar questions to the above:

> The fact that the commerce of the United States is interrupted by Great Britain is consequent upon the superiority of her navy upon the high seas. History shows that whenever a country has possessed that superiority, our trade has been interrupted, and that few articles essential to the prosecution of the war have been allowed to

reach its enemy from this country. (Answer of American Secretary of State to U. S. Senate, Jan. 20, 1915—American White Book, vol. II. p. 59.)

In a word, we are guided, *not* by principle, but by—*expediency*. We yield to superior force, and fight the inferior—*on the same principle.*

The fact stands out, dodge as one may, that the only cause in dispute between the United States and Germany, was the right to ship supplies and passengers to the enemies of Germany, in the face of having given up the right to ship supplies and passengers to Germany itself.

Our own record puts us out of court. The British proclamation of November, 1914, establishing a military area upon the high seas, was not included in the American White Book. So important a paper could hardly have been omitted without deliberate intent. The purpose must have been to conceal, in a measure, our diplomatic inconsistencies. But, in spite of the suppression, the official record is completely self-convicting. Our own White Book forever disposes of any claim to championship of international law as a cause for America's war.

XVII

INTERNATIONAL LAW—AMERICA'S OFFENSES AS A BELLIGERENT

If offenses against the law of nations required the American people, in honor, to go to war with the offender, then we would have gone to war not only with Germany and her allies, but with England and her allies, and with our own government as well.

In his war message, President Wilson made this solemn promise: "We shall . . . as belligerents . . . observe with proud punctilio the principles of right and of fair play we profess to be fighting for."

In actual practice he perpetrated many infractions of these principles not only in relation to our enemies, but in relation to the world of neutrals. Far from championing the rights of neutrals, if the standards which we ourselves laid down in our pre-war disputes had been accepted and applied by the neutral nations of the earth, every neutral flying a flag upon the high seas would have been compelled to go to war against us.

So far as our declared enemies were concerned, our President began to offend, under "the principles of right and fair play," long before we formally entered war. He began to offend on the day he withdrew his opposition to the loaning of money by American bankers to belligerent governments, and so departed from his own interpretation of strict neutrality.

Against the *letter* of the law, he began to offend when he ceased to preserve an equally inflexible front toward violations of American rights, respectively, by Germany and England, and—in order to conceal this offense—he set up the ridiculous "single, not joint; absolute, not relative" theory of responsibility.

Quotations from the letter of international law in this chapter are taken from Professor T. J. Lawrence, whose writings are used as textbooks both by the English Admiralty and the American navy. Dealing with the *law of neutrality,* Professor Lawrence lays down as a primary duty of a nation to *"refrain from giving to one side, in matters connected with hostilities, privileges which it denies to others."*

The same position had been taken by George Washington more than a century before. When, in the eighteenth century, England attempted to stop all American commerce with France, just as in 1915 she attempted to stop all American commerce with Germany, Thomas Jefferson, Washington's Secretary of State, wrote into his protest to England (Sept. 7, 1793): *"Were we to withhold from her* [France] *supplies of provisions we should in like manner be bound to withhold them from her enemies also."*

As to the deliberate plan of President Wilson to begin hostilities without first declaring war, the third convention of the Hague Conference of 1907, signed by both the United States and Germany, laid down the principle that hostilities *"must not commence without previous and explicit warning, in the form either of a declaration of war with the reasons assigned for it, or of an ultimatum with conditional declaration of war."*

America has her scraps of paper, as well as other countries. Our Treaty of 1828 with the Kingdom of Prussia

is one of them. In a note to Germany dated May 13, 1915, the Wilson Government admitted that the Treaty of 1828 was still in force:

> The United States and Germany are bound together not only by special ties of friendship, but also by the explicit stipulations of the Treaty of 1828 between the United States and the Kingdom of Prussia.

But the Treaty of 1828 revives parts of the Treaty of 1799 with the Kingdom of Prussia, including the whole of Articles 23 and 24. Article 23 reads:

> If war should arise between the two contracting parties, the merchants of either country then residing in the other shall be allowed to remain nine months to collect their debts and settle their affairs, and may depart freely, carrying off all their effects without molestation or hindrance; and all the women and children, scholars of every faculty, cultivators of the earth, artisans, manufacturers and fishermen, unarmed and inhabiting unfortified towns, villages or places, and, in general, all others whose occupations are for the common subsistence and benefit of mankind, shall be allowed to continue their respective employments, and shall not be molested in their persons, nor shall their houses or goods be burnt or otherwise destroyed, nor their fields wasted by the armed force of the enemy into whose power by the events of war they may happen to fall; but if anything is necessary to be taken from them for the use of such armed force the same shall be paid for at a reasonable price.

But upon declaring war, we prohibited the departure of any German subject from the territory of the United States. We placed German subjects under restriction. We seized more than one hundred ships belonging to German subjects, in American harbors, and used them in the war against Germany. We confiscated many millions of dollars' worth of property of German subjects, of all kinds and in all parts of the United States. We sold many millions of dol-

lars' worth of this property, and used the money to fight Germany. We so arranged the circumstances of such sales that the owners will probably never be able to recover their possessions. Not a dollar of compensation was given, and there was no pretense that adequate compensation would ever be given.

President Wilson offered, at the time, what may be termed an excuse for tearing up the Treaty of 1828. It was that Germany had violated American rights.[1] The point is irrelevant, since the stipulation in question was framed exclusively for a state of war; by its very provisions it begins to operate only when war begins, and pre-war differences cannot call its validity into question. *This is acknowledged in the treaty, itself;* Article 24 concludes with the following words:

> And it is declared that neither the pretense that war dissolves treaties, nor any other whatever, shall be considered as annulling or suspending this and the next preceding article; but on the contrary, that the state of war is precisely that for which they are provided, and during which they are to be as sacredly observed as the most acknowledged articles in the law of nations.

Such stipulations as those quoted above, providing for the safety of alien enemies, are to be found in almost innumerable treaties between governments. In discussing them, Lawrence says:

> Such stipulations are hardly needed now; for the old right of arrest has been rendered obsolete by the continuous contrary custom of nearly a hundred and fifty years. The only case of detention to be found in modern times occurred in 1803, when Napoleon arrested the British subjects found in France after the rupture of the Treaty of Amiens; but this was placed on the ground of reprisal, and has almost always been regarded as a violent proceeding in defiance of right. ("Principles of International Law," p. 388.)

[1] Reply to German protocol, Mar. 20, 1917.

Regarding the rightful policy to be pursued toward enemy property in general, he says:

In modern times, the real property of enemy subjects has not been interfered with by the belligerent states in whose territory it was situated, *even when the owners resided in their own or neutral states,* the one exception being an act of the Confederate Congress passed in 1861 for the appropriation of all enemy property, found within the Confederacy, except public stocks and securities. This proceeding was deemed unwarrantably severe; and contrary usage has been so uniform that we may safely regard the old right to confiscate or sequestrate as having become obsolete through disuse. . . . What is done by a weaker party in a bitter civil war is hardly a guide for ordinary belligerents in a struggle between independent states. If it is right to argue from the practice of nations to the law of nations, we may join the great majority of continental publicists, in the assertion that the international law of our own times does not permit of the confiscation of the private property of enemy subjects found on the land territory of the state, at the outbreak of war. (pp. 424-426.)

Regarding merchantmen which are found in an enemy port at the commencement of hostilities, in the sixth Hague convention of 1907, appear the following clauses:

(a) When a merchant ship belonging to one of the belligerent powers is at the commencement of hostilities in an enemy port, it is desirable that it should be allowed to depart freely, either immediately, or after a reasonable number of days of grace, and to proceed, after being furnished with a pass, direct to its port of destination or any other port indicated. . . .

(b) A merchant ship unable, owing to circumstances of force majeure, to leave the enemy port within the period contemplated in the above article, or which was not allowed to leave, cannot be confiscated.

When war was declared against Spain in 1898, a Presidential proclamation allowed Spanish ships thirty days in

which to depart from our harbors and reach home. Enemy aliens were disturbed neither in their persons nor in their property.

By one who holds the extreme theory that the German people are a race of savages, bent on the destruction of the world, that they had to be exterminated or brought to their knees at all costs, it may be that any offense under international law against these people will be condoned, but what excuse can be given for our offenses against the world of neutrals?

The President's own answer, on July 24, 1915, was that there can be no excuse:

> Illegal and inhuman acts, however justifiable they may be thought to be against an enemy who is believed to have acted in contravention of law and humanity, are manifestly indefensible when they deprive neutrals of their acknowledged rights. (Note to Germany.)

Before April, 1917, we professed to be guided by consideration for the rights of neutrals in general. We notified the world that we stood ready to go to war in defense of neutral rights. We even professed to go to war as a champion of neutral rights. But after April, 1917, what treatment did neutral rights receive at our hands?

After April, 1917, England did not abate in a single detail her violations of neutral rights; yet we became an ally of England and joined heartily in trampling upon the very rights which we had so loftily promised to defend. We even carried our own aggressions upon neutral rights to greater extremes than they had ever been carried against us.

We had signed the Declaration of London ourselves. We had asked the belligerents to abide by it. Germany and her allies had at all times been willing to abide by it, pro-

vided their enemies would abide by it, also. When we became an ally of Germany's enemies, did we again propose that all belligerents abide by the Declaration of London? Would we have accepted such a proposal made by Germany? When we went to war we paid no heed whatever to the provisions of the Declaration of London. It was an offense against Germany for which retaliation cannot be offered as an excuse. It was an offense against neutrals absolutely indefensible, when judged either by our own previously professed standards of international conduct, or by the letter of the law itself.

Again, in January, 1916, England announced her Trading with the Enemy Act, which contemplated a blacklist. After the act had been in force for six months, America denounced it in the following terms:

> It is evident that they [the blacklist measures] are inevitably and essentially inconsistent with the rights of the citizens of all the nations not involved in war . . . [and] . . . inconsistent with that true justice, sincere amity, and impartial fairness which should characterize the dealings of friendly governments with one another. (Note of July 26, 1916, to England.)

Yet our own Trading with the Enemy Act, including the blacklist features, was a copy of England's, and we applied it to neutrals more severely than England ever applied it to us.

In its protest of December 26, 1914, to England, America quoted a pronouncement of the British Premier, Lord Salisbury, during the South African war, as follows:

> Foodstuffs, though they have a hostile destination, can be considered as contraband of war only if they are for the enemy's forces; it is not sufficient that they are capable of being so used; it must be shown that this was in fact their destination at the time of their seizure.

In reply England admitted:

No country has maintained more stoutly than Great Britain, in modern times, the principle that a belligerent should abstain from interference with the foodstuffs intended for the civil population. (Note of Feb. 10, 1915.)

Yet England only made more and more stringent her measures of starvation against Germany; while America, on becoming an ally of England, took drastic action to make the system of starvation absolutely complete. Not only did we offend against Germany, but we offended against the entire neutral world in precisely the same manner as England had offended against us.

Our blockade note to England, of October 21, 1915, ought to be read by every patriot who *really* cares for his country's honor. That note is unanswerable. It outlaws the British paper blockade on half a dozen counts. The British precedent, which America quotes, alone constitutes an overwhelming case.

"Blockades," says the Declaration of Paris, which Britain signed, *"in order to be binding, must be effective; that is to say, maintained by force sufficient really to prevent access to the coasts of the enemy."* But America pointed out that the coasts of Germany had always been open to Scandinavian trade.

"There is no better settled principle of the law of nations than that which forbids the blockade of neutral ports in time of war," urged America. Against the blockade of Scandinavian ports, we quoted the instructions of Sir Edward Grey to the British delegates to the London conference, "setting out the views of His Majesty's Government, founded on the decisions of the British courts," as follows: *"A blockade must be confined to the ports and coasts of the enemy,"* and *"Where the ship does not intend to*

proceed to the blockaded port, the fact that goods are to be sent by sea, or inland transport, is no ground for condemnation."

We showed that the blockade of Scandinavian ports was intentionally not applied by England to her own ships, doubly condemning it under a decision of England during the Crimean War, that *"if belligerents themselves traded with blockaded ports they cannot be regarded as effectively blockaded."*

It was on grounds like these that President Wilson based his conclusion that the British blockade was "ineffective, illegal, and indefensible," and announced his high decision to devote the energies of America to the vindication of neutral rights. Yet when we went to war, we devoted our energies largely to making more completely operative this very "indefensible" aggression upon such rights.

One of the most remarkable offenses ever perpetrated against a neutral nation was our seizure of a large fraction of the merchant fleet of Holland, and our employment of these vessels in the war against Germany. Previously to our becoming her ally, England had confiscated a number of American ships, but she had made no wholesale grabs of shipping, and in each case she had offered a specific pretext, against which America had protested under the rules of international law. But when President Wilson took the merchant vessels of Holland, he gathered in all he could lay his hands on—sixty-eight ships, totaling in round numbers, half a million tons.

If, in confiscating the merchant vessels of German subjects found in our harbors at the outbreak of the war, we trampled upon international law, how much more flagrantly must we have trampled upon international law in confiscating ships of neutrals whom we had invited to trade with us!

True, the President professed to act "in accordance with

international law and practice." (Proclamation taking over Dutch ships, Mar. 20, 1918.) And the newspapers, day after day, referred to the action as being within our rights under international law, and mentioned the "law of angary," as if it were a common and accepted course of belligerents in time of war.

It may be that this particular deception did not pass discerning laymen as successfully as certain others. It may be that the inconsistency, not to say rank injustice, of our proceeding was sensed by many. We confiscate outright many millions of dollars' worth of the property of neutral peoples, whose conduct toward us is without reproach, whose vessels enjoy a certain guarantee of safety in our ports under commercial treaty. We strike a staggering blow at that nation's foreign commerce, which happens to be of very much greater importance to it than our own foreign commerce ever was to us. We do this with no other excuse than that we can use these foreign ships to our own advantage, and we defend our action under the pretense that we are within our rights under international law!

Discerning laymen may also remember that, in all the official and press camouflage connected with the taking over of the Dutch ships, only one international precedent for the action was mentioned, and that precedent came from Germany, against whom we were making the most exaggerated charges of lawlessness!

The "law of angary!" Is it a law? Here is what Lawrence has to say of the grabbing of neutral ships by countries at war, of the "law of angary," and the "German precedent," which we refer to in defense of our own action:

> No recent case of such a high-handed proceeding is to be found. Treaty after treaty forbids it. . . . We may imagine how fiercely it might be resented if we contemplate for a moment what would

be the consequences of, say, the seizure by the United States government of all the liners in the port of New York, in order to carry to its destination an expedition against a Central American republic hastily planned in a sudden emergency. Half the civilized world would suffer, and the other half would make common cause with it. Even the milder manifestations of the power to seize are looked on askance, and provoke so much controversy that belligerent states will be unwilling to resort to them in the future. The last instance bears out this view. In 1870, the Germans sank six English colliers in the Seine at Duclair to stop the advance up the river of some French gunboats. Compensation was demanded, and after some hesitation given; and the act was excused on the ground that the danger was pressing and could not be met in any other way. . . . The practice . . . is so indefensible that it is now scarcely defended. Belligerents must make war with their own resources, and what they can capture from the enemy, not with neutral property which is unfortunate enough to be for the moment in their power. . . . In the vigorous words of Dana, ' "angary" is not a right at all, but an act resorted to from necessity, for which apology and compensation must be made at the peril of war.' (pp. 626-628.)

We cannot defend the seizure of the Dutch ships on the ground of immediate necessity. We did not apologize for their seizure; we preferred hypocritically to pretend that our wrong was a right. We promised compensation, "at the end of the war," but it is easy to understand that such compensation, based on the assessed value of the ships, in view of the existing need of the Dutch nation, could not be satisfactory.

XVIII

OTHER "INTOLERABLE WRONGS"

"I SHALL not go back to debate the causes of the war," said President Wilson, in his message to Congress, December 4, 1917. *"The intolerable wrongs done and planned against us by the sinister masters of Germany have long since become too grossly obvious and odious to every true American to need to be rehearsed."*

We have disposed of the "intolerable wrongs" involved in the submarine dispute. What others appear in the official list of America's war causes?

The President's most complete statement of them appears in his Flag Day address, June 14, 1917:

> It is plain how we were forced into the war. The extraordinary insults and aggressions of the Imperial German Government left us no self-respecting choice but to take up arms in defense of our rights as a free people and of our honor as a sovereign government. The military masters of Germany denied us the right to be neutral. They filled our unsuspecting communities with vicious spies and conspirators and sought to corrupt the opinion of our people in their own behalf. When they found that they could not do that, their agents diligently spread sedition amongst us and sought to draw our own citizens from their allegiance. . . . They sought by violence to destroy our industries and arrest our commerce. They tried to incite Mexico to take up arms against us and draw Japan into a hostile alliance with her. . . . They impudently denied us the use of the high seas, and repeatedly executed their threat that they would send to their death any of our people who ventured to approach the coasts of Europe. . . . What great nation, in such circumstances, would not have taken up arms?

Stripped of rhetoric, the "intolerable wrongs," the "extraordinary insults and aggressions"—aside from those pertaining to the submarine issue—are reduced to the following terms:

1. Spies in America.
2. Pro-German propaganda.
3. Bomb plots against munition works and ships supplying Germany's enemies.
4. Conspiracy to cause Mexico and Japan to become enemies of America.

If the maintenance of spies in a foreign country be a cause for war, then every neutral nation on earth has a cause for war against America; since we maintain spies all over the world, and especially in the countries directly south of us. Whether German spies may be termed vicious, or whether American spies may be termed vicious, depends, obviously, not upon their being spies, but upon their acts and purposes as such.

And what acts and purposes were alleged against the "vicious" German spies and conspirators? First, that they *"sought to corrupt the opinion of our own people in their behalf!"* A terrible crime, surely, inasmuch as Germany's enemies were doing exactly the same thing in America, and as America proceeded to do exactly the same thing in every neutral country.

Everybody knows that Wilson's Bureau of Information sent propagandists all over the world, and that all consular officers, Secret Service men, and government agents of all kinds abroad, engaged, more or less, in "corrupting the opinion" of the neutral peoples in our behalf—quite naturally. When they found that they could not "corrupt the opinion of our people in their behalf," what did they do, these vicious spies and conspirators? They *"diligently*

spread sedition amongst us and sought to draw our own citizens from their allegiance."

It sounds quite terrible. But the President could not have been thinking of anything more heinous than the peaceful and lawful efforts of Germans within the United States to avert war with Germany; for nothing more heinous than that occurred. Everybody knows that there was no actual seditious uprising against the government for the purpose of forcing America to become a vassal of Germany, or any attempt at anything of the kind.

The President possibly had in mind the "Bernstorff peace plot." On January 22, 1917, Mr. Bernstorff, the German ambassador, wrote to his government asking for $50,000 to assist peace societies in the United States to spread propaganda intended to keep America out of war. The Bernstorff letter, published the following September, was put out by the Administration as proof of a heinous German plot directed against the peace and security of the United States, and was so treated by the newspapers. It happens that, on January 22, President Wilson's own professed purposes were precisely those for which Bernstorff wanted his $50,000. Wherefore, if the interpretation placed upon the Bernstorff letter is just, the President himself was implicated in a German plot directed against the peace and security of the United States!

Third, there were the bomb plots against munitions works and ships supplying Germany's enemies. But Wilson never brought the bomb plots diplomatically to the attention of the Kaiser, claiming them as offenses requiring reparation, with war as the alternative. Wilson's government did obtain some evidence of unneutral activities on the part of a number of acknowledged representatives of Germany and Austria. But its manner of dealing with these

cases proves that it did not consider that war was required as an answer to them. Bomb plots and offenses of that sort were, in general, dealt with as crimes of individuals; if the government had actual evidence of guilt, it sent the individual to prison, and that was the end of it.

In the cases of Ambassador Dumba, of Austria, and Captains Von Papen and Boy-Ed, German military and naval attachés, diplomatic representations were made. Against Dumba it was alleged that he had "admitted that he had proposed to his government plans to instigate strikes in American manufacturing plants"; Von Papen and Boy-Ed were accused of having connection "with the illegal and questionable acts of certain persons within the United States." America asked reparation in the recall of the offending officials. That reparation was given. No further reparation of any kind was asked, and the incident was closed. To bring such matters up again, and list them among our official war causes, is only additional evidence of the frantic extremities to which the President was driven in the effort to justify the war.

While German spies, German propaganda, and bomb plots were never officially suggested as a possible cause for war until the war message, what was known as the "German-Mexican plot" was brought forward during the debate on the Armed Ships Bill, and was adroitly used to manufacture belligerent sentiment, and to coerce Congress into permitting one of the unconstitutional steps by which the President achieved belligerency for America. During the debate on the Armed Ships Bill, Senator Works of California charged that the Zimmermann letter had been produced to influence votes and secure the passage of the bill; that it had been used to line up both Democrats and Republicans, and had lined them up; that, although a half-dozen

votes could not be mustered in the Senate for a declaration of war, the Senate was being persuaded, under cover of the excitement stirred up by the Zimmermann letter, "to do something that will lead us just as surely and certainly to war as if we had openly declared it." The newspaper reports of the day tell the same story. The Washington dispatch to the New York *Tribune* on February 28, 1917, said:

> It was a disheartening spectacle that was presented in Congress to-day before the news of the German-Mexican plot came. In the Capitol, the pro-Germans and the pacifists were making all the noise and there seemed no possibility of a declaration of war by Congress. There was not even a chance to vote upon the legislation conferring upon the President authority to arm merchant ships . . . The coming of the news of the plot changed all this, and it seems now that real action will be taken almost by acclamation.

Although the Armed Ships Bill barely failed to pass, in spite of the Zimmermann letter, that missive greatly assisted in reaching the end for which it was employed. Many Senators and Representatives who had not yet dared to go against the peace spirit of their constituencies, now dared to go against it. President Wilson, his hand greatly strengthened, dared embark upon his misnamed policy of armed neutrality, even without express authority from Congress. The path to war became far less thorny.

After we were at war, our propagandists continued passionately to ring the changes upon the horrible "German-Mexican plot." Said President Wilson in the message of December 4, 1917: "Their [the Germans'] sinister and secret diplomacy has sought to take the very territory away from us, and disrupt the union of our States."

What are the merits of the charge?

Here is the famous Zimmermann letter in full, as the Wilson Administration gave it to the press:

BERLIN, January 19, 1917.

On the first of February, we intend to begin submarine warfare unrestricted. In spite of this, it is our intention to keep neutral the United States of America.

If this attempt is not successful, we propose an alliance on the following basis with Mexico: That we shall make war together and together make peace. We shall give general financial support, and it is understood that Mexico is to reconquer the lost territory in New Mexico, Texas, and Arizona. The details are left to you for settlement.

You are instructed to inform the President of Mexico of the above in the greatest confidence, as soon as it is certain that there will be an outbreak of war with the United States, and suggest that the President of Mexico, on his own initiative, should communicate with Japan suggesting adherence at once to this plan. At the same time, offer to mediate between Germany and Japan.

Please call to the attention of the President of Mexico that the employment of ruthless submarine warfare now promises to compel England to make peace in a few months.

(Signed)
Zimmermann.

The letter is from the German Foreign Secretary at Berlin to the German ambassador at Mexico. It is seen that the proposal of an alliance is *conditional* on the United States' declaring war on Germany, and that the matter is not to be broached at all, unless it becomes "certain that there will be an outbreak of war with the United States" —a thing that the German government will try to avoid.

How did this precautionary measure of the German government differ from the efforts that governments habitually put forth to procure the assistance of as many other countries as possible on the eve of a serious conflict? How did

it differ from the effort that the Entente governments habitually and frankly made from the beginning to draw in as large a fraction of the world as possible against their enemies? How did it differ from the efforts that President Wilson himself put forth to turn as many of the neutrals as possible against the Central Powers?

Compare the Zimmermann letter with the message that President Wilson sent to all the neutral governments in the world, on severing diplomatic relations with Germany. In that message, the President flatly requested all other neutrals to follow the example of America, and break relations with Germany. While it is theoretically conceivable that America might have broken relations and kept out of war, it is not conceivable that such a course would have been possible for Holland, Switzerland, or any other neutral on the borders of Germany. Practically, then, the President was asking these countries to go to war, although at the time, and for nearly two months afterwards, he was disclaiming any intention of going to war himself.

Moreover, while the German government merely requested Mexico to join her, in the event of war, we employed coercion in the effort to compel other nations to go in against the Central Powers. By various means we induced China and some Latin American countries to join us. The most flagrant example of such coercion, however, is found in our manner of applying the embargo to the European neutrals.

The domestic right of a country to prohibit exports of its products, either in peace or war, is unquestionable. The international right or wrong of such a procedure depends upon its purpose and effects.

When a country at peace resorts to an embargo either to conserve its products for its own use, to maintain its neutrality, or to compel another country to respect its commercial

or other prerogatives under international law, it is clearly within its rights. When a country at war resorts to embargo to conserve its own products for its own use, it is clearly within its rights.

But when a country at war resorts to embargo in pursuance of a general policy of violation of the rights of neutral countries, and employs the embargo as a means to destroying neutral rights, to punishing neutrals for being neutral, and to bribing or coercing them into unneutrality—seeking to range them on its own side, whether they will or no—the offense can never be condoned.

No serious criticism can be made of the purposes acknowledged in President Wilson's statement explaining the American embargo. (July 8, 1917.) But the embargo was not limited to its acknowledged purposes. At the very time that the President's statement was issued, neutral ships in American ports were refused clearance, and conditions were laid down to neutrals requiring them to submit to and aid the blockade of Germany—the same blockade that America had characterized as "ineffective, illegal, and indefensible," "a practical assertion of unlimited belligerent rights over neutral commerce," "an almost unqualified denial of the sovereign rights of the nation whose ships, trade, or commerce, is interfered with."

Not only that, but we proceeded to erect an illegal blockade upon the land, as well as upon the sea; to compel the neutral nations to surrender their right to trade with our enemies by sea or land, and to compel them to trade with us instead, and on our own terms.

That the chief purpose of our embargo was to coerce unwilling neutrals into the war was admitted, behind closed doors, by the Administration itself. On May 9, 1917, after what the newspapers described as a stormy secret session of the Senate, Senator Townsend insisted on debating

the subject matter of the secret session in the open. In the course of his remarks on the Senate floor, Senator Townsend said:

> I am not willing to vote for the very German methods we have condemned. I understand that this provision now before us is not to be used for the protection of American products, or to protect the American supply, but to coerce neutral countries.
>
> We stood for neutrality, and urged the nations of the world to support neutrality. Now that we are engaged in the war, we ought not to coerce other nations and force them to enter the struggle. I can't believe that a war of this sort would result in good to the world. If this is the purpose of the United States, we have abandoned the high ideal we set as our reason for going to war.
>
> I don't want to seem antagonistic to the President or to the government in their prosecution of this war. But it seems to me that this measure will intensify the war. Even though I subject myself to criticism I cannot vote for something that is unjust. I am not willing to force war upon those neutral countries—especially little countries—by methods we have condemned. If there is a God in Heaven, whose aid we are invoking, we will hardly get His aid by these measures, which are unjust, unfair, and uncivilized.

Although we did not succeed in bringing the European neutrals formally into the war on our side, we did push them into a position of unneutrality, and forced them to support our illegal blockade. We accomplished this through our control, in conjunction with our allies, of the available food supplies of the earth, and of the ships upon the seas. We refused to allow any of the food under our control to go to the neutral countries in question, or any of the ships under our control to carry food to the neutral countries in question. We refused to allow any of the coal under our control to bunker any ships whatever intending to carry food to the neutral countries in question.

But this was not enough. We refused to allow these

countries to use their own ships and their own coal to carry their own food to one another, or to themselves. To insure the attainment of this purpose we held the merchant ships of these neutral countries in our ports.

Our terms specifically were, that these neutral countries lease the greater part of their merchant fleets to us for the period of the war, turn over their commerce to us and the control of their trade, submit to a system of rationing for themselves, formally surrender their right to trade with Germany in all commodities carried in our ships or theirs, and deliver their own surplus products to us, under terms and conditions which we laid down.

What President Wilson asked these neutral nations to "agree" to was the same thing in principle as, though more offensive in effect than, the thing which he himself had characterized as "an attitude of unneutrality toward the present enemies of Great Britain which would be obviously inconsistent with the solemn obligations of this government." It was on this ground that the European neutrals all refused, at first, to enter into any such "agreement."

But we held the whip hand—we had their ships. Our action compelled these neutrals to choose between four courses: war on the side of the Entente; war on the side of Germany; national starvation; or a perilous unneutrality favorable to the Entente and an offense against Germany.

At no time had either Germany or England so contemptuously ridden over the rights of America. The "negotiations" continued for months. Norway, Sweden, and Denmark surrendered only when face to face with starvation. Holland held out, and its ships were confiscated without the formality of an "agreement." The neutrals yielded because they were intent on avoiding war at all costs. They had suffered from Germany, but Germany

had never demanded of them any such surrender of their neutral rights as did we.

America's offenses against the neutral world come out in their most unlovely proportions only when it is remembered with what self-righteousness they were perpetrated. Through our spokesman, President Wilson, we declared ourselves *"the trustees of the moral judgments of the world,"* proclaimed *"our proud position even amidst the turmoil of war for the law and the right,"* pledged our country to the golden rule in international affairs, asserting the "basis of honor" as *"the treatment of others as we would be treated ourselves."*

For ourselves we declared that *"the first and primary obligation is the maintenance of our own sovereignty."* Yet we violated the sovereignty of others. *"The territory of a neutral power is inviolable,"* said the second Hague convention. We signed it, and we professed to go to war *"to assert the principles of law in a world in which the principles of law have broken down."*

Yet we violated the territory of a neutral, Russia. We proclaimed the international code: "First, that every people has the right to choose the sovereignty under which they live." Yet we intervened in Russia, hoping to overthrow the constituted government and to replace it with one that would serve our interests better.

While killing Russians, we disclaimed intervention, disclaimed wrong, and spoke of aid. "Any intervention in an internal struggle," says Lawrence, "is an attempt to prevent the people of a state from settling their own affairs in their own way. . . . It is an attack upon independence . . . and consequently a gross violation of international law." ("Principles of International Law," pp. 134-135.)

With our embargo we make Mexico feel the pinch of

hunger; our embargo is our right. At the same time we let Mexico understand that we will permit no Mexican embargo on oil; Mexico has no right to an embargo.

We confiscate the Dutch ships, asserting: "By exercising in this crisis our admitted right to control all property within our territory we do no wrong to Holland." At the same time we threaten Mexico with intervention, asserting that certain taxes are "confiscatory."

The other "intolerable wrongs" justify our war as inadequately as the wrongs of the submarine dispute. As for American honor, instead of being maintained, it was debased exactly to the extent that principle was outraged, pledges were broken, and high professions proven a mockery.

OUR "OBJECTIVES"

XIX

WAR FOR DEMOCRACY

Our professed objectives, as voiced by President Wilson, and echoed by all "loyal patriots" who "stood behind" him, do not admit of dispute as to their nature, *so long as they were expressed in abstract terms.* From the beginning of the war to its finish, all declarations of aim were put forward as leading to the same ends—democracy—permanent peace. Permanent peace was laid down as essential to the safety of democracy—and a certain measure of democracy was laid down as essential to permanent peace. Absolute equality among nations, great and small; equal and absolute independence in domestic affairs; freedom of the seas for all, upon terms of equality, in peace and in war; the self-determination of peoples; some international understanding for the enforcement of these principles; open diplomacy, the abolition of militarism and autocracy—these were put forward simply as conditions of that measure of democracy which a permanent peace requires.

These principles of a permanent peace were not new. They are not Wilson creations or discoveries. They were urged upon the world by a few men in all countries before the outbreak of the war, and during the war they were accepted—in words—by the leading statesmen of both sides.

We have the word of President Wilson himself that: "The objects which the statesmen of the belligerents on both sides have in mind in this war are virtually the same,

as stated in general terms to their own people and to the world." (Dec. 18, 1916.) What governments, if any, in fact went to war for democracy? It is obvious that the answer is to be found, not in the abstract professions of statesmen, but in the record of concrete performances.

Even had President Wilson been sincere in his professed regard for the principles of democracy and permanent peace, that alone would not have justified him in leading America into war. He would still have been under the obligation to arrive at war through constitutional and honest means. Furthermore, the practicability of reaching the desired ends through war would have had to be overwhelmingly clear.

It happens that we have Wilson's own word on the inexpediency of going to war for democracy, permanent peace, or for almost any other end, however desirable. Although, from the beginning of his tenure of office, the President proclaimed adherence to the same principles of international conduct as he later translated into war objectives, until April, 1917, he not only refrained from going to war for their attainment, but argued copiously and eloquently upon the futility of such a course. *"There is nothing that the United States wants that it has to get by war. . . . Force will not accomplish anything that is permanent. . . . We are not interested in seeing one group of nations prevail over another. . . . I challenge you to cite me an instance in the history of the world where liberty was handed down from above."* Even after April, 1917, President Wilson, at times, pronounced against a crusade at arms to impose democracy upon other countries, as we shall soon see.

Even were a government to be found unselfish enough to

assume the fearful cost of war, simply for the sake of extending democracy, the very attempt to impose democracy upon another nation would constitute a violation of sovereignty, which happens to be one of the conditions of democracy which President Wilson laid down as a prerequisite to permanent peace.

How, for that matter, can autocracy and militarism be banished from the earth, by opposing the autocracy and militarism of one country, with autocracy and militarism set up in other countries? During the fighting, the beauties in the so-called German system were urged upon us, notably in the President's proclamation of May 18, 1917, and frequently by such men as James W. Gerard, ex-ambassador to Germany, and one of the President's most trusted propagandists. But if the system is so fine, why should we wish to destroy it, in Germany or anywhere else? If it be desirable for us, why not for our neighbors? For the very gentlemen who shouted most violently for the overthrow of German militarism advocated the same system for America, not merely as a temporary measure for the overthrow of German militarism; after German militarism was overthrown they continued to advocate it as a permanent feature of American "democracy"!

One of the most universally accepted principles of the international law for which we professed to fight was that one country may not attempt to dictate the form of government of another, or any of its internal affairs, or find a basis for dispute in any of its policies except where the latter may involve either a direct infringement of the sovereignty of the first country, or an attack upon its vital interests. The principle of self-determination precludes any government from attempting to serve democracy abroad by force, except as that might be possible in the adjustment of the

external affairs of nations. The question of reform within any country must be left strictly to be worked out by the population of that country. The very term, "a war for democracy," carries a contradiction within itself; for the act destroys the aim.

XX

PEACE WITHOUT VICTORY VERSUS PEACE FROM VICTORY

PRESIDENT WILSON'S first formal and comprehensive statement of the terms requisite for a permanent peace, and the means for attaining such a peace, was made January 22, 1917, in the famous Senate address in which originated the phrase, "peace without victory." On going to war he did not repudiate his peace-without-victory speech as such, nor at any time confess himself wrong in the basic principles there laid down. On the contrary, in the war message he assured us: "I have exactly the same thing in mind now that I had in mind when I addressed the Senate on the 22nd of January last." In the message of December 4, of the same year, he again referred to the January address, asserting positively: "Our entrance into the war has not altered our attitude toward the settlement that must come when it is over."

Accordingly, here and there among the President's later pronouncements appear declarations that prove to be strictly in harmony with the original formula. Yet, side by side with these, appear others of a flatly contradictory nature.

The principle of first importance in the President's original formula related, not to the actual conditions of a democratic and permanent peace, but to the *means* for attaining it, and was expressed by the phrase itself, "peace without victory":

> It must be a peace without victory. . . . Victory would mean peace forced upon the loser, a victor's terms imposed upon the van-

quished. It would be accepted in humiliation, under duress, at an intolerable sacrifice, and would leave a sting, a resentment, a bitter memory, upon which terms of peace would rest, not permanently, but only as upon quicksand.

Yet, in the war message, the President advised that Congress *"exert all its power and employ all its resources to bring the government of the German Empire to terms";* and thereafter he repeated the sentiment innumerable times.

Did the President change his convictions as to the means for attaining a permanent peace after January, 1917? Why, then, did he continue to affirm his allegiance to that original formula? How great the inconsistency, is seen from the President's elaboration of this article of his original book of faith:

> Fortunately . . . the statesmen of both of the groups of nations now arrayed against one another have said, in terms that could not be misinterpreted, that it was no part of the purpose they had in mind to crush their opponents.

Yet, in the message of December 4, we find this declaration, characteristic of later utterances:

> The German power . . . must be crushed.

Why should it be fortunate, at the beginning of 1917, that England, France, and their allies did not wish to crush Germany? The President answered as follows:

> Only a peace between equals can last; only a peace the very principle of which is equality and a common participation in a common benefit. . . . The equality of nations upon which peace must be founded, if it is to last, must be an equality of rights.

If this and previous quotations from the same address mean anything at all, they mean that the primary condition for the attainment of a permanent and democratic peace is that the various belligerents shall meet at the peace table

on terms of absolute equality, that neither shall hold a military advantage over the other, that neither shall be in a position to dictate to the other. The corollary of this is that, should circumstances require America to enter the war, we would not be justified in continuing until victory, but only until such a time as the enemy became willing to meet us at the peace table on terms of equality.

But, throughout the war addresses, the military advantages of victory were frequently urged, even for the specific purpose of dictating a permanent and democratic peace. "We are . . . seeking to make conquest of peace by arms," said the President, in the December 4 address. And in the Buffalo speech (Nov. 12, 1917), he proclaimed that "the way to get peace, if you want it for more than a few minutes," would be to win the war.

It was on this opposite theory that President Wilson acted in dealing with the enemy's overtures for peace. In the note of October 5, 1918, he demanded that, as one of the conditions precedent to talking peace, the Germans withdraw from Allied soil. This demand would have been perfectly consistent with the permanent peace formula, had compliance with it equalized the position of the opposing sides; but it happened that it made for greater *in*equality. So long as the powers associated with us occupied more German territory—to-wit, the German colonies—than the Allied territory occupied by Germany, and so long as the demand that Germany withdraw was not accompanied by an offer of the Allies to withdraw, the principle of "equality of rights" was flagrantly violated.

Moreover, in subsequent notes, replying to Germany's consent to withdraw from invaded territory—and other concessions of Germany—the President acknowledged that *in*equality was the very thing he was seeking, and that, unless Germany would accept inequality at the peace

table, there would be no armistice and no peace. In the note of October 14, he insisted upon *"absolutely satisfactory safeguards and guarantees of the maintenance of the present military supremacy of the United States and the Allies in the field";* and in the note of October 23, upon a situation *"which would leave the United States and the powers associated with her in a position to enforce any arrangements that may be entered into."*

The President's position in action, therefore, was that only a peace *with* victory would be considered, only a peace between *un*equals, only such a peace as "would rest, not permanently, but only as upon quicksand." It was in accordance with this formula that the armistice terms were framed and imposed.

In spite of all this, during his exhortations to victory, President Wilson at times showed that he was fully aware that "peace without victory" signifies equality in the field as a means to arriving at equality in the terms—particularly in the reply to the Pope, and in the Baltimore speech (Apr. 6, 1918). At the same time, he was advancing an argument forecasting a refusal of equality for the Kaiser. This argument was that the word of the German government could not be trusted. "They observe no covenants," said he, September 27, 1918. "We cannot 'come to terms' with them. They have made it impossible."

In the course of such denunciations, however, it was always made clear that the application was to the then existing German government. Far from suggesting that the word of the German people was less trustworthy than the word of any other people, Wilson gave the world to understand that the word of a reformed German government would be worth as much as that of other governments. When it is remembered that the President did not, at any time, advance any other argument why a peace between

*un*equals should be imposed upon Germany, except that the word of the Kaiser's government was worthless, his war speeches have to be taken as embodying a most unequivocal *pledge* to the German people that, on the day they overturned the Kaiser, they would be acceptable as equals at the peace table.

As late as October 23, 1918, we find the President refusing peace on the ground that "the nations of the world do not and cannot trust the word of those who have hitherto been the masters of German policy." With this proposition held before them, in their desperate need for peace, the German people overthrew the Kaiser and his entire circle in a manner so emphatic that its genuineness was not questioned.

What, then, became of the President's promises? What became of his eloquent differentiations between the Kaiser's government and the German people? Did he accord the reformed German government equality at the peace table? Did he exert any effort in that direction? Did the German revolution make any difference whatever in his course of action? Were the armistice terms one whit less crushing than they would have been had the Kaiser himself remained at Potsdam? Just how much was the word of Woodrow Wilson worth?

The truth is that all of the President's utterances about the worthless word of the Kaiser standing as a bar to a democratic peace are answered by other utterances of the President. His original peace formula does not require that the word of *any* government whatever be taken as a means to guaranteeing the peace covenants. Fully recognizing that the peace of the world in the past has been disturbed by governments dishonoring their word—not the German government alone, but governments in general—it fully provides for means to *compel* all to keep their word,

in spite of any possible lapses of conscience. Here is the provision:

> It will be absolutely necessary that a force be created, as a guarantor of the permanency of the settlement, so much greater than the force of any nation now engaged, or any alliance hitherto formed or projected, that no nation, no probable combination of nations, could face or withstand it. If the peace presently made is to endure, it must be a peace made secure *by the organized major force of mankind.*

This scheme is either efficacious or it is not. If it *is* efficacious, then the question of the untrustworthiness of the word of the German government is irrelevant. If it is *not* efficacious, then it is ridiculous to continue advocating it. Nevertheless, along with his advocacy of a peace between unequals because of the moral incapacity of our enemies, the President continued his advocacy of a scheme to enforce a peace between *equals, regardless of moral incapacities, wherever found.* Here is the form which this advocacy took as late as June 7, 1918:

> Very well, let us make an arrangement by which we will *give bonds.* Let us have a *common guarantee* that all of us will sign a declaration of political independence and territorial integrity. Let us agree that if any one of us, the United States included, violates the political independence or territorial integrity of any of the others, all others will jump on her. . . . Now that is the kind of an agreement that will have to be the foundation of the future life of the nations of the world, gentlemen. The whole family of nations will have to guarantee to each nation that no nation shall violate its political independence or its territorial integrity. That is the basis —the only conceivable basis—for the future peace of the world. (Address to Mexican editors.)

So much for the *means* requisite for attaining a permanent and democratic peace. Contradictions quite as re-

markable appear in the *terms* themselves, as soon as they begin to be stated in concrete form.

As "equality of rights" is the vital principle of both the *means* and the *terms* of the President's original peace creed, so equality of sovereignty is the primary essential of the terms. In the peace-without-victory address, the proposition was put in the following words:

> I am proposing . . . that all nations should henceforth with one accord adopt the doctrine . . . that no nation should seek to extend its polity over any other nation or people, but that every people should be left free to determine its own polity, its own way of development, unhindered, unthreatened, unafraid.

This is a principle to which the President had frequently professed allegiance from the beginning of his tenure of office. That it means that one government may not attempt to abolish another government, however pernicious the latter may be—and however pure the former—is obvious, and it was so interpreted on almost innumerable occasions in pre-war days by the President himself. It was even interpreted by him as imposing *"upon each nation the duty of seeing to it that all influences proceeding from its own citizens meant to encourage or assist revolution in other states shall be sternly and effectually suppressed and prevented."* (Inaugural address, 1917.)

After we entered the war, he pledged himself to apply the principle to our enemies, as a matter of course. In the message of December 4, 1917, he made this sweeping commitment:

> We owe it, however, to ourselves to say that we do not wish in any way to impair or rearrange the Austro-Hungarian Empire. It is no affair of ours what they do with their own life, either industrially or politically. We do not propose or desire to dictate to them in any way. We only desire to see that their affairs are left

in their own hands in all matters, great or small. . . . And our attitude and purpose with regard to Germany herself are of a like kind. We intend no wrong against the German Empire, no interference with her internal affairs. We should deem either the one or the other absolutely unjustifiable, absolutely contrary to the principles we have professed to live by and to hold most sacred throughout our life as a nation. . . . No one is threatening the existence or the independence of the German Empire. . . .

In the speech of the Fourteen Points, Jan. 8, 1918, these promises were reaffirmed, both to Germany and to Austria.

Presidential pronouncements alternating with these, in point of time, and flatly contradicting them, begin with the war message and do not cease. The war message is, in considerable part, an argument that America is justified in going to war to reform the German government, as well as other governments: "We shall fight . . . for the right of those who submit to authority to have a voice in their own governments." He even proceeded to make revolution in Germany an objective in war, and a condition of peace. In the note of October 14, 1918, he insisted that the German people "alter" their government. In the note of October 23 he laid down the ultimatum:

> The President deems it his duty to point out that, in concluding peace . . . the government of the United States cannot deal with any but veritable representatives of the German people who have been assured of a genuine constitutional standing as the real rulers of Germany.

Dismemberment itself became, in actual practice, a war aim of America, although it had been pronounced against, in one form or another, all the way from the peace-without-victory address, to the address of February 11, 1918, and even afterwards. "The dismemberment of empires," the President told the Pope, "we deem inexpedient and in

the end worse than futile, no proper basis for a peace of any kind, least of all for an enduring peace," while in the message of December 4, 1917, he quoted the phrase, "no annexations, no contributions, no indemnities," asserting that they expressed his own thought. Yet as early as his message to Russia (May 26, 1917) he was, at times, shuffling on the whole matter. He was saying: "The status quo must be altered." Also:

> No territory must change hands *except* for the purpose of securing those who inhabit it a fair chance of life and liberty. No indemnities must be insisted upon *except* those that constitute payment for manifest wrongs done. No readjustments of power must be made *except* such as will tend to secure the future peace of the world, and the future welfare and happiness of its peoples.

We soon find that the President himself intends to determine upon the exceptions, and that they are always to be at the expense of our enemies, never of our allies. Although in the message of February 11, 1918, the President disclaimed any "desire to interfere in European affairs or to act as arbiter of European territorial disputes," he had already put forward his Fourteen Points, three of which forecasted the process of dismemberment. Germany must cede France Alsace-Lorraine. Austria must surrender to Italy territory that had never belonged to the kingdom of Italy. An independent Poland must be created, in part, out of territory long recognized as belonging to our enemies. In the message of December 4, the President had even announced the dissolution of the Quadruple Alliance as a war objective. Finally, in October, 1918, he notified Austria-Hungary that the first condition of a cessation of hostilities must be a recognition of the Czecho-Slovak and Jugo-Slav "peoples" as "members of the family of nations."

So, side by side, coming from the mouth of the same man, not separated by time, and reflected throughout our entire war propaganda, we find two distinct statements of war objectives and peace terms, absolutely inconsistent one with the other, diametrically opposed; two formulas covering both the *terms* of a democratic and permanent peace, and the *means* for attaining it; two theories utterly irreconcilable.

The first can only be based upon the assumption of the approximate moral equality of the opposing sides, not merely of the opposing peoples, but of the opposing governments—on the assumption that the character, motives, aims, ambitions, purposes, and methods of the opposing sides were never essentially different. Necessarily, it rejects the theory that the responsibility for the war lies wholly in any one quarter, or that the liberty of the world is or was particularly imperiled by the power and ambitions of any one or any group. It rests, instead, upon the theory that the great war was caused by *things,* by *systems,* by *methods of action* common to all; specifically, by the *general* practice of secret diplomacy, by a *general* lack of respect for the sovereignty of weaker peoples, by the *general* practice of backing up private investments in weaker countries with armies and navies, by the inadequacy of existing international law, by the *general* practice of violating international covenants at will, by the *common* jealousies and hatreds growing out of former peaces from victory, by the absence of an effective concert of power to prevent war.

The second is based upon the diametrically opposite assumption, that the character, ambitions, and methods of the German government were vitally different from those of her enemies; that the former governments of Germany and Austria are solely responsible for the great war; that the Germans literally plotted world domination by might of

the sword; that the covenanted word of the enemies of the Kaiser was of distinctly greater value than the covenanted word of the Kaiser; that the German world peril was a fact; that world conquest by Germany was reasonably possible; that Germany represented the principle of autocracy in world affairs, and that her enemies represented the principle of democracy.

To each of these theories the President pledged allegiance upon alternate occasions, even in alternate phrases. If the first is the correct one, then our war was a crime. If the second is the correct one, then our neutrality for nearly three years was a crime. Of the first the President declared:

> I feel confident that I have said what the people of the United States would wish me to say. . . . These are American principles, American policies. We can stand for no others. . . . They are the principles of mankind and must prevail. (Peace-without-victory speech.)

But he stood for the other theory whenever it came to action. We shall now examine the premises upon which that theory is based.

XXI

THE GERMAN WORLD PERIL BUGABOO

ALTHOUGH, in the official propaganda, our motives, causes, and objectives, were stated in forms remarkably numerous and diverse, no theme was more frequently played upon than the German peril. No exhortation to patriotism in the years 1917 or 1918 was complete without its horrible picture of German domination. Every invocation to personal sacrifice, to loyalty, to courage, to hatred, was accompanied by an appeal to fear. Fear!

Was the fear justified? Did the youth of America pour out its blood in a fight against a reality, or against a man of straw?

It is obvious that not absolute, but relative, depravity must be the point of inquiry; that the force of any indictment of a government or a nation can be gauged only by comparing it, on the same counts, with its neighbors. For it must be apparent that if the character, the methods, and the aims of the governments with which we associated ourselves in war, do not stand upon a distinctly higher plane than the character, the methods, and the aims of the governments they opposed, then a victory of the former and a humiliation of the latter must be absolutely futile. The causes of world war will not be abolished or abated. Humanity will not be benefited in any respect or degree. Civilization will go on exactly as it has gone before, serenely traversing a cycle that will bring it inevitably around to another vast catastrophe of steel and blood.

Insofar as they relate to the conduct of the Kaiser's

government toward America, the accusations of special depravity have already been exploded. If the German peril was ever a reality, therefore, it must have been so only in the *remote* sense—and if a reality in the remote sense, the evidence of the fact must be found exclusively in those issues which the President himself, up to the delivery of his war message, had a hundred times assured his people did not concern them.

A brief but sufficient glance will now be given these issues.

Democracy versus Autocracy.

"We stand," said President Wilson to President Poincaré (Apr. 8, 1917), "as partners of the noble democracies whose acts and aims make for the perpetuation of rights and freedom of man, and for the safeguarding of the true principles of human liberties."

But whether we and our "noble" allies are, on the whole, more democratic than were our enemies, is a debatable question. Whether our most powerful ally is more democratic than was our most powerful enemy, even, is a debatable question.

If to possess the more clearly defined leisure class be the measure of democracy, then England is more democratic than was the Kaiser's Germany.

If the size of such leisure class—the proportion of the population that never does any useful thing, from the cradle to the grave, but draws its sustenance wholly from others —be the measure of democracy, then England is the most democratic of all modern nations.

If the volume of unearned income drawn from overseas be the measure of the democracy of a country, then England is the most democratic country in the world.

If the control and exploitation of the largest number of

subject peoples be the measure of democracy, then England is the most democratic nation on earth.

If to have fought more wars of spoliation; to have taken by conquest, and held by force, the largest areas of the earth's surface; to have destroyed or overridden the largest number of small nations; to have interfered in the affairs of other peoples, great and small, the most flagrantly and the largest number of times; to have broken the most treaties; to have led the way in secret diplomacy; to have claimed the seas as its own; to have asserted its God-given right to rule the world—if any of these be the measure of democracy, then England is the most brilliant example of a noble democracy the world has ever seen.

The government of England was slightly more democratic in some respects—slightly, very slightly—at the beginning of the war than was Germany's. But the particular realm in which it excelled is of secondary importance. Governments are a menace to the peace and freedom of the world only as they are autocratic in their *foreign relations.*

Who—and how many—hold in their hands the power to choose war for a given people? That is the pertinent question. What is the measure of the given government's *responsibility* to its people in the particular affairs which involve nations in war with one another? In this vital respect did Germany differ distinctly from its enemies?

Responsibility versus Irresponsibility.

We frequently pronounced against the right of the German "autocracy" to exist, expressly because of its irresponsibility to its people in its foreign relations. In the war message we find these words:

> We act . . . only in opposition to an irresponsible government. . . . We have no quarrel with the German people. We have no

feeling toward them but one of sympathy and friendship. It was not upon their impulse that their government acted in entering this war. It was not with their previous knowledge or approval. It was a war determined upon as wars used to be determined upon in the old, unhappy days when peoples were nowhere consulted by their rulers and wars were provoked and waged in the interests of dynasties or of little groups of ambitious men who were accustomed to use their fellow-men as pawns and tools.

At Mt. Vernon, July 4, 1918, President Wilson put it this way:

These are the ends for which the associated peoples of the world are fighting, and which must be conceded them before there can be peace:

1. The destruction of every arbitrary power anywhere that can separately, secretly and of its single choice disturb the peace of the world; or if it cannot be presently destroyed, at least its reduction to virtual impotence.

The President presented this clause to Germany, on October 14, as one of the conditions which must be fulfilled contingent on the granting of an armistice. And when the German Foreign Secretary, in reply, outlined the constitutional reforms then being initiated, the President argued the matter, in part, as follows:

It does not appear that the heart of the present difficulty has been reached. It may be that future wars have been brought under the control of the German people, but the present war has not been. . . . It is evident . . . that the determining initiative still remains with those who have hitherto been the masters of Germany. (Note of Oct. 23.)

But it happens that the responsibility of the Kaiser's government in this particular realm had, at all times, been greater, in law, than the responsibility of its most powerful

enemy, and fully equal, in practice, to the average responsibility found among the entire body of its enemies, including the United States.

While the assent of the Reichstag was not required for a declaration of war, the assent of the Bundesrath was. The assent of Parliament was not required; no check existed in England equal to the Bundesrath.

As a matter of practice, all the belligerent governments entered war without any adequate consultation of the will of their various peoples. Although the Congress of the United States had to declare war, it was an empty formality. As has been shown, America was legally at war, by illegal action of the President, and Congress was practically forced to go through the motions of legalizing an accomplished fact. In electing the President, the American people had pronounced *against* war, not for it, and the President was able to arrive at war only through a series of deceptions and usurpations, in which his "single choice" was pitted against the choice of both the public and of Congress.

Our pronouncements on the irresponsibility of the German government imply responsibility on the part of the opposing governments. There was—and is—no such responsibility.

Secret Diplomacy.

The decisive importance of secret diplomacy as a cause of the European war was frequently asserted by our official spokesman. In an address before the League to Enforce Peace, May 27, 1916, he said:

> It is plain that this war could have only come as it did, suddenly and out of secret counsels. . . . The lesson . . . is that the peace of the world must henceforth depend upon a new and more wholesome diplomacy.

In his war message he said:

> Plans of aggression can be worked out and kept from the light only within the privacy of courts, or behind the carefully guarded confidences of a narrow and privileged class. They are happily impossible where public opinion commands, and where it insists upon full information concerning all the nation's affairs.

But was the secret diplomacy of the Kaiser any different from that of his enemies? Legally, "democratic" England is more autocratic, irresponsible, and secret in its diplomacy than was "autocratic" Germany. A treaty entered into by the Kaiser was not a legal document until ratified by the Reichstag. But in England the most vital engagements may be undertaken without the consent of any legislative body, and these engagements are binding upon successive governments. Theoretically, the King and the Foreign Secretary make these international contracts, with the consent of the cabinet. In practice, the Foreign Secretary makes them, frequently without the consent or even knowledge of the cabinet.

The classic example in modern times of secret diplomacy being carried to the limit of its possibilities—in secrecy, in irresponsibility, in autocracy—was furnished by the British Foreign Secretary, Viscount Grey, in July and August, 1914. One man shaped and conducted the conversations, correspondence, and negotiations with the other powers, wholly uncontrolled by "democratic" England, wholly uncontrolled by Parliament, uncontrolled by the cabinet as a body, and in secret. He not only withheld the essential facts as to what had been going on, and what he was doing, from the Parliament and England, but, as Neilson has shown ("How Diplomats Make War"), he deceived them both, as well as a part of the cabinet. The truth became known, only after war was an accomplished

fact. "Separately," "secretly," and by his "single choice," Foreign Secretary Grey steered his country into war—as nearly so as such a thing is conceivable for any one human being to do in modern times.

Secret diplomacy, as a means for achieving autocracy in foreign affairs, is as firmly established in the United States as elsewhere. Treaties are not binding unless ratified by the Senate, but the part which the Senate plays is nearly always perfunctory. The President arrogates to himself full power to conduct negotiations in secret, and, through his State Department, to frame treaties in secret. As in all other countries, more or less diplomatic correspondence is printed, but whenever the President chooses he suppresses these documents. A fraction of the diplomatic correspondence preceding war was never published and is still unknown outside of the State Department. The Senate may ask the Executive for diplomatic correspondence, but the latter can—and frequently does—refuse on the ground that it is "incompatible with the public interest."

While pronouncing for open diplomacy, President Wilson employed secret diplomacy in precisely the same manner as our allies and our enemies employed it. Many of the Wilson diplomatic moves in relation to Mexico are still shrouded in secrecy, and to this secrecy is partly due the almost universal misapprehension as to the true nature of his Mexican policy. Who knows the real circumstances of our acquisition of the Virgin Islands from Denmark, or of our military operations in Nicaragua? How many Americans were afforded an inkling of the real motives behind the Nicaraguan, the Haitian, and the Santo Domingan conventions, and the means by which these conventions were imposed upon the inhabitants of these little countries? Did public opinion "command" in any of these matters? Did

it insist upon full information? Did it get any information from Wilson or his subordinates?

The acquisition of new territory is a matter of grave import in the affairs of a nation, but in the "purchase" of the Virgin Islands, President Wilson took the American public into his confidence exactly to the extent that he would have taken it had he been buying a corner lot for a grandchild—and he took the Senate into his confidence only to the extent that the naked forms of law required him to do.

The very existence of the deal was unknown to the Senate itself, until the bill of sale was signed and in the hands of the Committee on Foreign Affairs. In transmitting the document, the State Department expressly asked that its terms be kept secret. The committee considered the document in secret, and the Senate ratified it in secret. Except for the bare purchase price, the only disclosure to reach the public regarding this important matter reached it through the "indiscretion" of a Senator, and was contained in a single sentence in the letter of transmissal, viz: *"The government of the United States will not object to the Danish government's extending its political and economic interests in the whole of Greenland."*

Except for these simple but significant words, all that ever reached the American people on the true inwardness of their real-estate deal in the West Indies is contained in admissions which members of the Danish cabinet made at the time to the Danish parliamentary houses. (See Chapter XXXIII.)

Regarding our adventures in Nicaragua, Haiti, and Santo Domingo, we have for public consumption three brief documents known as the Nicaraguan, Haitian, and Santo Domingan conventions. These conventions *followed* a military occupation in each case; they did not *precede* it.

The function of each is to *legalize* acts of war and civil control, in each instance planned and initiated by the Executive Department in secret, and in violation of the clause of the Constitution which vests in Congress the war-making power.

The conventions themselves were prepared in secret by the Executive Department, and considered in secret by the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee, and ratified altogether "on faith" by the Senate. In each instance the Senate committee conducted a hearing, in secret, in which it examined witnesses. In the case of Nicaragua, the testimony was printed. One copy of this testimony was allotted each member of the committee. No one else could obtain one, not even a member of the Senate. In the cases of Haiti and Santo Domingo, the testimony was not even printed, but remains a State Department secret. Through the machinery of secret diplomacy, the essential facts of record regarding the circumstances and purposes of the military occupations of Nicaragua, Haiti and Santo Domingo, were completely withheld from the American people and their duly elected representatives.

Sometimes we even disdain to go through the forms of Senatorial supervision, inadequate as that is. A formal treaty with Japan, recognizing the special interests of Japan in China, might have caused unpleasant discussion in the Senate and might have failed of ratification. So the President circumvents the Constitution; a State Department "agreement" is signed, of which nothing need be known until a version of it is ready for public consumption.

The act of coöperating with the Entente governments in the prosecution of the war necessarily involved understandings on war and peace problems of vast moment. But the President snaps his fingers at the Constitution, ignores the

Senate, and achieves absolute secrecy and absolute irresponsibility in matters of unbounded importance to America. In the realm of greatest importance to the public welfare —in the realm of war and the policies that lead to war— the public commands as little here as in Germany, Austria, Turkey, England, or Japan; the President of the United States is as irresponsible an autocrat as the ruling monarch of the German Empire could ever have hoped to be.

Militarism.

At one time, President Wilson defined militarism as a monster whose essence is *size,* at another time as a monster whose essence is *form,* at still another time as a monster whose essence is *purpose.*

Here are the various quotations:

1. Militarism consists in this, gentlemen: it consists in preparing a great machine whose only use is for war. (Speech at New York, Jan. 27, 1916.)

2. It is inconsistent with the traditions of the country that their [the people's] knowledge of arms should be used by a governmental organization which would make and organize a great army subject to orders to do what a particular group of men might at the time think it best for it to do. That is the militarism of Europe, where a few persons can determine what an armed nation is to do. That is what I understand militarism to be. (Statement to Committee from American Union Against Militarism, White House, May 9, 1916.)

3. Militarism does not consist in the existence of an army, nor even in the existence of a very great army. Militarism is a spirit. It is a point of view. It is a system. It is a purpose. The purpose of militarism is to use armies for aggression. (Speech at West Point, June 13, 1916.)

But in size the Kaiser's army was smaller than that of

Russia, and smaller in proportion to population than that of France. His navy was barely over half the size of England's, and only slightly larger than that of France.

In form the Kaiser's army was, in 1914, in every respect except one—conscription—the same as all modern armies, and in every respect the same as that of the majority of its enemies. Every army of every powerful government is organized from the top down, not from the bottom up; every one is a perfect autocracy. All are now based upon conscription, as were the majority when the war began in 1914.

The system of discipline is the same in all—military law, courts-martial, cruel and unusual punishments. Each has its officer caste, and the power and arrogance of the officer caste within the organization itself is not different in one country from another.

Outside the military establishment itself, the influence of the officer caste is invariably towards reaction, and the best measure of that influence is nothing more nor less than the *size* of the military establishment. In "democratic" England the navy has always been a power for reaction in the affairs of the nation. In France the political machinations of the officer caste—as exemplified in the Dreyfus affair—have been a constant threat to the existence of the republic.

The essential question of form—we are told—is whether a few persons can determine what an armed nation is to do. In every great country a few persons can determine that thing, and during the late war a few persons determined it in every country, including the United States of America.

If German militarism was actually different from the militarism of Germany's enemies, therefore, the difference must be found in its purpose. How is the purpose of a military establishment revealed?

"Prepared for Forty Years."

The ultimate purpose of every military establishment is, of course, war, either of defense or aggression. The purpose of a large military organization in times of peace is to be ready for war, either of defense or aggression. When two neighboring countries both have armies of large size, both built on the same model—when both are spending large sums in order to be ready for war—the relative readiness and efficiency of one can hardly be taken as evidence of a relatively aggressive purpose. It is, rather, evidence of graft, incompetence, or laziness, on the part of the one that is less ready and efficient.

If either the efficiency of a great fighting machine, or the period during which it has been built up is any evidence, in itself, of aggressive purpose, then by this test England stands thrice convicted of the charge that is made against Germany. In size and effectiveness, the British navy stands so far ahead of the other navies of the world that the relative size and effectiveness of the Kaiser's army is not to be compared with it. The British navy reached its commanding position, not in forty years, but in a period covering centuries; and not alone by large expenditures and careful training at home, but by a policy of opposing, by threats of war, the growth of other navies, even by seeking out and destroying in war all other navies that seemed to threaten its supremacy.

In August, 1914, the German war machine was not distinct in any essential from the war machines of its enemies. German diplomacy was not more secret than any other diplomacy. The German government was not more irresponsible to its people in the conduct of international relations. It was no more autocratic in the affairs of war or the policies that lead to war.

In other words, in the *means* of aggression the Kaiser

stood on the same footing as his enemies. So far as possession of the *means* of aggression reveal a *purpose* of aggression, the charge of special depravity against Germany fails.

Confessed Ambition to Dominate the World.

In August, 1914, the American public for the first time heard of a retired officer of the German army named Bernhardi. It also heard, for the first time, of a German professor named Treitschke. Nietzsche, of whom it had heard before, went through a lightning change, to be introduced in a different garb. Before us were paraded all the bombastic sayings to which the Kaiser had ever given expression, with annotations to show that he meant something very, very sinister. By courtesy of the British propaganda machine a great plot was suddenly revealed to us—world dominion by might of the sword, long planned, secretly prepared for, timed for a chosen moment, initiated by an unprovoked attack upon unsuspecting, unprepared, peace-loving, lamblike neighbors, keepers of the holy urn of democracy.

President Wilson, at the beginning and for a long time afterwards, told us, in effect, that it was all a hoax. Only when it became necessary to put fear into the hearts of the American people, as a means to accomplishing his own purposes, did he embrace this doctrine.

Now how did we suddenly discover that the German government planned to dominate the world? Was it because the Kaiser, or some member of his government, hinted at something of that sort?

It is doubtful if anyone can produce a single avowal of any responsible German from which can be fairly deduced a dream, even on the part of that individual, of the sort of

world domination which the German-peril theory presupposes as a dream of the Kaiser, of all of his sons, all of his military chiefs, and a great number of his professors, editors, and prominent men besides.

On the other hand, the extreme result hoped for even by Bernhardi, from the war which he believed England, France, and Russia were determined to force upon Germany, was for his country to *"attain a position as a world power by the side of, and in spite of, England."* ("Germany and the Next War," p. 164.)

Said Bernhardi, continuing (p. 165), *"We shall, in this struggle, as so often before, represent the common interests of the world, for it will be fought not only to win recognition for ourselves, but for the freedom of the seas."*

Disgusting as is the worst of the German jingoistic and chauvinistic literature of the Kaiser's day, it cannot be taken as evidence of especially aggressive purpose, *so long as it is matched by a similar literature in all other great countries.*

Before August, 1914, Americans heard a great deal more of this sort of thing from England than from Germany. "Germany had a Bernhardi," declared a member of the British Parliament in 1915 (Francis Neilson, in "How Diplomats Make War," p. 134), "but Britain had a Bernhardi *class,* which lived and moved and had its being in war. It thought of nothing else but war, and it was recruited from all sections of society."

Every vain effusion upon German destiny can be matched by similar effusions upon British destiny, Russian destiny, Italian destiny, French destiny, and even American destiny. The phrase "Deutschland uber alles" is matched by "Rule, Britannia, rule the waves." German naval officers drank to "The Day" when the German fleet would be powerful

enough to challenge Britain's mastership of the seas. British naval officers drank to the existing mastership and to its perpetuation at all costs.

Who can quote anything from an influential German more nearly approaching a propaganda for world dominion than the will of Cecil Rhodes, who directed that his great fortune be expended for the establishment of a secret society whose aim "shall be the extension of British rule throughout the world . . . and especially the occupation by British settlers of the entire continent of Africa, the Holy Land, the Valley of the Euphrates, the islands of Cyprus and Candia, the whole of South America, the islands of the Pacific not heretofore possessed by Great Britain, the whole of the Malay archipelago, the seaboard of China and Japan, the ultimate recovery of the United States of America as an integral part of the British Empire"?

When Americans were kindly told by Britons that the Germans thought themselves superior to other peoples, we were shocked and angered, because we had been taught that we ourselves were superior to other peoples. Self-praise is not peculiar to any people. It is one of the evidences of national egotism, as wide as the world. Has any German writer, asks Georg Brandes ("The World at War," p. 209) gone farther in this kind of thing than one Leon Bloy, in the *Mercure de France?* Brandes then quotes Monsieur Bloy as follows:

> After Israel, who were called God's people by special favor, God has loved no nation on earth as much as France. Explain it whoever can. To call this nation the most noble of all nations—which it undoubtedly is—serves no purpose, since such divine prerogatives are the reward of the chosen one. . . . France is so far ahead of other peoples that, no matter who they be, they should feel honored at being allowed to eat crumbs destined for her dogs.

We ourselves are not free from this kind of talk. We do not need to go beyond President Wilson himself to find out that we are extraordinarily endowed, strangely unselfish, singularly righteous, that our history is peculiarly pure and white, that we are especially chosen to carry the torch of civilization and democracy to the world, even on the point of the sword. It may be worth while to set down half a dozen quotations of this sort:

We are Trustees of World's Morality.

I need not tell my fellow-citizens that we have not held off from this struggle from motives of self-interest, unless it be considered self-interest to maintain our position as trustees of the moral judgments of the world. (Speech at Chicago, Jan. 31, 1916.)

We Fight the First Unselfish War in History.

The glory of this war, my fellow-citizens, so far as we are concerned, is that it is, perhaps for the first time in history, an unselfish war. (Speech at New York, May 18, 1918.)

Our Fine Example has Thrilled Two Continents.

Do you never stop to reflect what it is that America stands for? . . . It is for the sovereignty of self-governing peoples, and her example, her assistance, her encouragement, have thrilled two continents in this western world. (Speech at Pittsburgh, Jan. 29, 1916.)

Just Think of Cuba!

The world sneered when we set out for the liberation of Cuba, but the world does not sneer any longer. The world knows now what it was then loth to believe, that a nation can sacrifice its own interests and its own blood for the sake of the liberty and happiness of another people. (Speech at New York, Jan. 27, 1916.)

We are the Flower of Mankind.

We are the flower of mankind, so far as civilization is concerned. (Speech at Billings, Sept. 11, 1919.)

"Me und Gott."

We are to be an instrument in the hands of God to see that lib-

erty is made secure for mankind. (Speech at Confederate veterans' reunion, June 5, 1917.)

Our aggressions have invariably been for the good of the victims. In this we are not different from our powerful neighbors—if you take the word of their statesmen for it.

But it is not true either that two continents have been thrilled by our disinterested example, or that the world has stopped sneering about our Cuban pretensions. The truth is that the menacing picture of Pan-Germanism, as painted by Wilson in his Flag Day address, is a counterpart of the menacing picture of Pan-Americanism, as it appears to a great many Latin Americans.

Why? Partly because of American boasts of superiority and declarations of purpose to bend the weaker American countries to our will. The propaganda for German imperial expansion, at its worst, is not one whit more cold-blooded and subversive of the principles for which we pretended to fight Germany than, for example, the propaganda that has been carried on for some years for American domination of Mexico.

Is there a valid basis for the German-peril theory, then, in the *acts* of the Kaiser's government?

XXII

OUR MYTH OF THE WAR'S BEGINNING

In President Wilson's message to the Pope occurs the following passage:

> The object of this war is to deliver the free peoples of the world from the menace and the actual power of a vast military establishment controlled by an irresponsible government, which, having secretly planned to dominate the world, proceeded to carry the plan out without regard either to the sacred obligations of treaty, or the long-established practices and long-cherished principles of international action and honor; which chose its own time for the war; delivered its blow fiercely and suddenly; stopped at no barrier either of law or of mercy; swept a whole continent within the tide of blood—not the blood of soldiers only, but the blood of innocent women and children also and of the helpless poor; and now stands balked, but not defeated, the enemy of four-fifths of the world. This power is not the German people. It is the ruthless master of the German people.

This is as complete an endorsement of the German-peril theory as can well be expressed in a few words. It even lends color to the proposition so sedulously disseminated by the Allied war propagandists and our own, that Germany's "attack" of August, 1914, was timed at a chosen moment and delivered upon unprepared, unsuspecting, and lamb-like neighbors.

That Unsuspected and Premeditated Attack.

But every one knows that a war between the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente, or between members thereof,

had been expected for years, and prepared for for years; that such a war had been expected, talked about, and prepared for no less in France, England, and Russia, than in Germany and Austria; that several times, within a period of ten years, Europe had trembled on the verge of a general war.

During the forty years in which Germany was accused of preparing for a war of aggression upon "heroic France," the "revanche" cry—for a war of revenge against Germany —was periodically dinned in the ears of the French people. In England, from 1905 to 1914, the respectable press carried on an almost constant propaganda of hatred against Germany. The question of war was repeatedly raised in Parliament. Cabinet officers presented exaggerated figures as to German naval increases in order to obtain even greater appropriations for the British navy. It was admittedly in contemplation of war with Germany, that such leaders of the empire as General Lord Roberts devoted themselves to a serious campaign to commit England to peace-time conscription. Meanwhile, the Czar was spending huge sums in rebuilding his navy, under the direction of British experts; in perfecting his army, under the direction of French officers; and in constructing a system of strategic railways to the German border.

Neilson has shown ("How Diplomats Make War," p. 146), that the German appropriations for new naval construction were lower in 1912 than in 1911, lower in 1913, than in 1912, lower in 1914 than in 1913; that the British, French, and Russian appropriations for new naval construction were all *higher* in each of those successive years; that the 1914 appropriation of each was higher than that of Germany; that for 1914 the combined appropriations for new naval construction of England, France, and Russia

were two and one-half times as large as the combined appropriations of Germany, Austria, and Italy.

Morel, another Englishman, has shown, ("Truth and the War"), that the expenditures for both military and naval purposes of the French-Russian combination were very much larger than the expenditures of the German-Austrian combination; that the French-Russian expenditures increased much more rapidly in the decade preceding 1914 than the German-Austrian expenditures; that by 1913 the peace strength of the French-Russian armies was nearly double that of the German-Austrian armies.

During the very period in which the terrible Bernhardi was informing his readers that, for England *"to come to terms with Germany, instead of fighting, would be a most desirable course for us"*; and that *"we cannot contemplate attacking England, as such an attack would be hopeless,"* ("Germany and the Next War," pp. 98 and 155), General Lord Roberts himself, the greatest military hero of the times, was publicly advocating a surprise attack upon Germany. Lord Fisher, England's First Sea Lord in those days, boasts in his "Memories" that he also had recommended such an attack as far back as 1908, as a drastic means to disposing of a trade rival.

In 1912, the secret understanding for French and British coöperation against Germany, for six years a subject of conversation between the general staffs of the two countries, was put into writing. In the same year the Franco-Russian naval convention was signed, and, as the Bolsheviki have revealed to us through the publication of the secret treaties, the Czar procured a definite pledge from both M. Poincaré and Foreign Secretary Grey of French and British support, in case trouble in the Balkans should involve Germany on the side of Austria.

As the year 1914 drew on, it became generally known that the British fleet was concentrated in the North Sea, the French in the Mediterranean. As Neilson points out, if there was no understanding that the French coasts were under the protection of England, and British Mediterranean interests under the protection of France, then the general staffs of the two countries, under military law, ought to have been shot. ("How Diplomats Make War," p. 305.) At about this time, our own Admiral Mahan called attention to the fact, in an article in the *Scientific American,* that "Eighty-eight per cent. of England's guns are pointed at Germany." March 10, 1914, the British Minister of War told the House of Commons: "We stand well for the purpose of immediate war on any basis you may consider," while the First Lord of the Admiralty announced the arming of forty merchant ships. ("How Diplomats Make War," p. 228.) In our own White Book (vol. III, p. 169), appears a reference to a notification from the British Admiralty, dated May 26, 1913, of the arming of British merchant vessels at the expense of the British government.

Finally, the opening of the diplomatic confab of the last week of July, 1914, found the British fleet completely mobilized and the German navy all but bottled up.

Even Belgium was not surprised. Whether the Belgian understanding with France and England was—or was not—definite enough to vitiate her position as a neutral, Neilson recalls the fact that, in November, 1912, a month full of preparation in the Entente countries, the Belgian Parliament, after a secret sitting, increased the war strength of its army from 180,000 to 340,000 men—so constructing a stupendous military machine for a country the size of Belgium, and especially for one which professed to depend upon ancient neutrality guarantees.

The German "attack" was not unsuspected in any quar-

ter, not unprepared for in any quarter. The comparative tables upon preparedness prove that, in sheer weight of arms, the lambs were stronger than the wolves, and were relatively in a better position to be "attacked" than they had ever been before. They were also better prepared diplomatically; for they had made sure of at least the neutrality of Italy.

If not unsuspected or unprepared for, was the German "attack," nevertheless, premeditated? Did the German government plan and plot beforehand to precipitate the long expected war at a given moment, namely, the first days of August, 1914?

Any such hypothesis would have to show that Germany not only had made the same military preparations that her enemies had made, but that she had made other far-reaching preparations which any country would make with war certain in a given period, but which otherwise would be impracticable.

The German lack of such preparations was notorious. The crisis of the summer of 1914 found German shipping in all parts of the world, including the harbors of her enemies. On July 28, the North German Lloyd steamship "Kronprinzessin Cecile" sailed from New York with $10,000,000 gold on board, consigned one-half to London and one-half to Paris. Halted by a wireless in mid-ocean, she made a sensational race back to port to avoid capture by British cruisers. Had the Kaiser's irresponsible government, even as late as July 28, "chosen its own time for the war," had it determined to deliver its "sudden blow" within half a week, the great German liner would hardly have been permitted to sail out of a safe port.

The more one examines the circumstances of the German "attack" the more clearly it appears that, for the Triple Entente, it could not have been better timed had the En-

tente chosen the date itself. Leading Britons have, on occasion, gleefully proclaimed this very fact.

Morel points out—although not, in his case, gleefully—that had the Kaiser long plotted to "subjugate Europe," and had he bided his time for the most favorable moment to do so, he would have chosen any other moment than the summer of 1914:

> How comes it that Germany did not wage war upon her neighbors when she could have done so with every guarantee of military success? She could have smashed France easily in 1887, and our official classes, judging from statements in such papers as the *Standard* and the *Spectator,* would have been rather pleased than otherwise. . . . Germany could have smashed France with equal ease when Russia, exhausted by the Japanese war, was incapable of stirring a finger against her. Germany could have smashed France with equal ease when we were engaged in annexing the South African republics. . . . Why, if Germany desired to 'subjugate Europe,' did she wait until August, 1914, when her military supremacy, as I shall show later on, was less assured than at any period during the previous thirty years? ("Truth and the War," p. 64).

Morel also points out that even *before* the adoption of the Three Years Military Service Law in 1913, France had become more militarized than Germany or any of the other great powers. ("Truth and the War," p. 148.) He also adduces evidence to prove that the adoption of that law forced the French government to make an early choice between foreign war and revolution at home.

In a speech at New York, February 12, 1920, our Admiral Sims said:

> In December, 1910, I submitted a report to the admiral commanding my division, which stated that, having discussed the subject with military men of Great Britain and France, the consensus of opinion was that war would come within four years.

By whose choice? French jingoistic glee over coming events is typified in the following from the *Nouvelle Revue,* in 1912, and reproduced in Neilson's book (p. 206):

> We intend to have war. After forty years of a heavily armed peace, we can at last utter this opinion. . . . France is ready to strike and to conquer, as she was not ready forty years ago, and as she will not be in four or five years, owing to the annual divergent numbers of the birth rate in each country. . . . We, the attacking party, will have arranged with England that their fleet . . . will have followed . . . the remains of the whole German navy into German waters.

Another confession of British Sea Lord Fisher, set down in his "Memories," is that as far back as 1905 he also prophesied war with Germany, *in the very month of August, 1914.*

Turn to the immediate circumstances of the outbreak. "The war was begun by the military masters of Germany," asserted President Wilson, in his Flag Day address. But eight months previously (at Cincinnati, Oct. 26, 1916) he had said:

> Have you ever heard what started the present war? If you have, I wish you would publish it, because nobody else has. So far as I can gather, nothing in particular started it, but everything in general. There had been growing up in Europe a mutual suspicion, an interchange of conjectures about what this government or that government was going to do, an interlacing of alliances and understandings, a complex web of intrigue and spying, that presently was sure to entangle the whole family of mankind in its meshes.

Some millions of words have been printed to prove that the immediate responsibility for the outbreak of 1914 rests in this or that quarter. The arguments seem to resolve

themselves largely into two questions: first, the extent to which evidence unfavorable to a given government has been suppressed or mutilated by it; second, the relative value of the professions of a will to peace, for which all the governments claimed to be working.

If you begin by crediting one side with honesty and the other with dishonesty, it will be easy enough to prove the responsibility as you wish to prove it. But if you begin with an equal measure of confidence in all—or an equal lack of confidence—then the case assumes a different aspect. It is not necessary to grapple with the mass of conflicting evidence of the "war guilt" controversialists; for it happens that, even among the most violent partisans, there is sufficient agreement on questions of fact to make it appear quite plain that not one of the great powers immediately concerned can escape a share of the responsibility.

If you date your survey, say, from July 28, you find that Austria was determined to chastise Serbia; that Russia was determined to interfere with Austria; that Germany was determined that Austria should not be interfered with; that France stood ready to fight Germany if Germany struck Russia; that England, though involved with France and Russia, was professing to be free, and was playing the rôle of peaceful, neutral mediator.

All professed to wish to avoid a general war, but all except England were frankly willing to go into such a war under certain circumstances.

For the moment, Austria stood in the position of an aggressor toward Serbia; Russia as aggressor toward Austria; Germany as aggressor toward Russia; France as aggressor toward Germany; England as an uncertain quantity.

Each of these great countries was in a position to prevent a general war, provided it cared sufficiently to do so. Austria could have prevented war by backing down on

Serbia, Russia by letting Austria go ahead, Germany by abandoning Austria, France by abandoning Russia, England by declaring her solidarity with France and Russia.

Although any of the four countries, Austria, Germany, Russia, or France, could have dispelled the crisis, it would have been at the cost of backing down. There was just one country that had the power to disperse the war-cloud by not backing down—England. A preponderance of force was the only thing that would induce any of the others to back down—and England was in a position to wield that force. One Edward Grey knew where England's force was going to be exerted. France and Russia knew. Germany and Austria did not know. It is universally admitted that this was a determining factor in the incidents of the summer of 1914.

The German government tried hard to find out whether England would intervene. The German ambassador asked Grey whether, in the event of war between Germany and Austria and France and Russia, England would remain neutral provided Germany would not violate Belgium. Grey's refusal, alone, would be enough to dispose of the self-righteous claim the British government proceeded to make to its people, that the violation of Belgium was the sole cause of British belligerency.

The German ambassador inquired whether England would remain neutral, provided the integrity of both France and her colonies was guaranteed. Grey refused to tell him. Grey declined to state the conditions under which England would remain neutral; declined to state whether or not, in any event, England would remain neutral; at the same time declining to say that England would stand with France and Russia, but leading Germany on to hope that she would not. Meanwhile, the war web was spinning fast. The knowledge that England was bound to them

stiffened the backs of France and Russia; the hope that England would stay out stiffened the backs of Germany and Austria. When at last Grey did let the German ambassador know the truth, the latter's government took the first steps toward backing down, forcing Austria to reconsider her decision not to negotiate with Russia over the Serbian dispute. Too late—the Russian mobilization was already under way, and the Czar refused to halt it. Germany then sent the twelve-hour ultimatum to Russia. The Czar paid no heed; Germany declared war upon Russia and the huge armies of Europe began to move.

The Czar, it is true, assured the Kaiser that mobilization did not necessarily mean war, but the post-war revelations of the Bolsheviki show this to have been a falsehood. Even had Russian mobilization not meant war, it would have meant Russian dictation of the matter in hand. For Russia had the numbers, and for Germany to have waited would have been for Germany to invite humiliation. Under the circumstances, the dates of the various declarations of war tell nothing. Nor do actual troop movements. Since France was bound to fight the Czar's battles, no matter on which front the fighting began, it was only a question of speed as to whether German armies would first reach French soil or French armies would first reach German soil.

If the peruser of white, orange, and yellow books starts with July 30, Russia is seen as the original aggressor. But if he starts a week earlier he decides that Austria was the original aggressor. But were hostility, intrigue, and aggression born into the world as late as July 23, 1914? Why was Austria determined to chastise Serbia? Was Serbia entirely blameless? Why was the Czar determined that Serbia should not be chastised? Was it because he felt

himself appointed by God to defend democracy throughout the world?

Why, above all, did Foreign Secretary Grey conceal his intentions from Germany? Was Germany "lured to attack," as Bernard Shaw declared?

Even Britons, who approved of the action of their government, have cheerfully held, with Shaw, that it was Grey—none other—that chose the fatal hour. President Wilson repeatedly expressed what is, in effect, the same opinion. For example, in his Columbus speech (Sept. 4, 1919), he said: *"I did not meet a single public man who did not admit these things, that Germany would not have gone into this war if she had thought Great Britain was going into it."*

This amounts to an abandonment of the theory that Germany "chose its own time" for the war, and is a virtual admission that England chose *its* own time.

If Grey could have prevented war by letting Germany know that England would intervene, why did he not let Germany know?

What other motive could he have had for leading Germany on except that he had decided that the summer of 1914 was a propitious time to "have it out" with the Central Powers?

The action of Grey, indeed, was openly excused on the theory that the war was bound to come anyhow some day, by the choice of the Kaiser, that Britain chose the time righteously, since the wicked mad-dog of Europe had run amuck long enough, and the hour had struck for the "free peoples" of the world to unite and scotch it.

Why, then, mention the incidents of July and August? Why continue to picture Germany leaping upon its adversaries from behind?

Where, also, had the Kaiser run amuck?

If the view expressed at Columbus be correct—and few will now dispute it—it is sufficient answer to the millions of words that have been printed to prove the "war guilt" of the Central Powers in the diplomatic correspondence and incidents of the summer of 1914.

Hang the plot theory on the ultimatum to Serbia, if you will, and the answer still is that England was always in a position to frustrate such a plot by the simple act of speaking out.

The "German plot" of 1914, so far as it was a reality, was simply a determination of Austria, with the knowledge and approval of Germany, to chastise Serbia, even at the risk of war with Russia and her allies. The motive for this determination, far from insane dreams of world conquest, is easily discernible in the previous relations between Serbia and Austria.

The assassination of the Austrian archduke, stated as baldly as it usually is, would not seem to excuse a humiliation of Serbia. But supposing that this assassination, whether perpetrated with or without the knowledge of responsible Serbian officials, was the logical outcome of an agitation, encouraged and assisted by the Serbian government, to acquire new territory for the kingdom of Serbia through the dismemberment of the Austro-Hungarian Empire by means of revolution within that empire?

We were once informed by President Wilson—just at a time when we were all being adjured to stand behind him—that it was the duty of every government to see to it *"that all influences proceeding from its own citizens meant to encourage or assist revolution in other states should be sternly and effectually suppressed and prevented."* (Inaugural address, 1917.) According to this view, Austria had a bona fide grievance against Serbia. If you begin

looking for the original aggressor of the world war any time within a twelve-month before June, 1914, you are as likely to lay your finger upon "poor little Serbia" as any other. [1]

Go back several years, and Serbia and Austria are found to be on friendly terms. That situation obtained until the Serbian king and queen were murdered in their palace, at the instigation—so it was generally believed—of the Russian legation at the Serbian capital. Anyhow, the king who acquired the Serbian throne, as a result of the murder, proved to be pro-Czar and anti-Josef. From that time, the friction between Serbia and Austria began. Start with the murder of the Serbian king and queen, and perhaps you will decide that Russia was the original aggressor.

Very early, after gaining her independence from Turkey, the reactionary little kingdom of Serbia had developed "legitimate ambitions" to acquire the territory of her neighbors. While under the influence of Austria, she had signed a secret treaty agreeing not to plot to acquire Austrian territory, or even Bosnia or Herzegovina, nominally Turkish but under the control of Austria since 1878. But immediately Serbia fell under the influence of the Czar, this treaty became a "scrap of paper"; the "manifest destiny" of Serbia was directed, in a large measure, toward Bosnia and Herzegovina. When, in 1908, Francis Josef annexed these provinces, to prevent their recovery by Turkey, the Serbian king was peeved, but only because he wanted them for himself. He appealed to the Czar, and one of the periodical European crises resulted.

Austria succeeded in retaining Bosnia and Herzegovina, but the "manifest destiny" of Serbia continued to find its outlet in the so-called Pan-Serb propaganda, the chief aim

[1] It now appears, according to information published in the London *Nation*, June 21, 1919, that the Sarajevo murderers have been acknowledged as Serbian officers.

of which was to break up the Austrian Empire for the benefit of a greater Serbia. Trace the quarrels of Austria and Serbia through two Balkan wars, down to 1914, and you will have to agree that the July ultimatum, peremptory and violent though it be, was only the logical and almost certain result of what had gone on in the years before.

To hold that Austria should not have resisted the Serbian-Russian conspiracy would be to hold that the United States should not resist a conspiracy of Canada to acquire New York with the assistance of Japan. The Serbian excuse was that the peoples of the territories which it coveted were of the same race and spoke a similar language, but Serbia went after territory to which this consideration did not apply. Moreover, the blood of the Balkan peoples is bewilderingly mixed. To hold it desirable that all peoples closely akin in race and language should be under a single flag is one thing; to determine under what flag they shall be, and how they shall arrive there, is another thing. The principle which Serbia pretended to be guided by, if applied equally by Russia, would perhaps have resulted in the gobbling up of Serbia by Russia. If applied equally by all countries, it would at once set the whole world at war. It would do so to-day.

There was no clear-cut issue of purity versus depravity in the relations between Serbia and Austria, nor any issue that would justify America in taking sides. The folly of going to war for another country's irredentism was thrice demonstrated by the world war; it was plain enough before that. Nor is the verdict different if the Serbian-Austrian struggle be viewed as a Russian-German struggle. The Czar, for the time being, played the rôle of protector of Serbia, prompted by the same motive that had been the motive of Russian czars for generations—to push southward, and ultimately acquire Constantinople and the Straits,

and to extend their hegemony over the entire Balkan peninsula. Credit Austria and Germany with the same ambition. It becomes a conflict between "manifest destinies" —Pan-Slavism versus Pan-Germanism. Which was more inimical to the interests of civilization? Until 1907, when the British bread was buttered on the Pan-Slav side, there was no doubt about the answer among our British cousins. "Before the Entente of 1907," says Bullard, "the British newspapers were horrified at the Russian intrigues in the Balkans. Since that date they have denounced the activity of the Austrians." ("Diplomacy of the Great War," p. 138.)

If you are still looking for the original responsibility for the great war in or near the Balkan peninsula, you will find it, not in any one country, but in the *general situation* in the Balkans. If you would name as the original aggressor the government most responsible for the general situation in the Balkans, you would perhaps again lay your finger upon England. For generations, the keynote of British foreign policy was to protect the Turk from Russia. For this purpose England fought the Crimean War, and for this purpose England, backed by Austria, intervened in the Russo-Turkish war of '77, and through the Congress of Berlin, established that *general situation* in the Balkans; that status quo, which all swore to uphold; which not one, probably, intended to uphold; which, in fact, took so scantily into consideration any principle of international equity that it was not worthy of upholding; which nearly all proceeded to try to change in their favor; which carried the seeds of a great war—out of which grew the particular dispute which occasioned the firing of the first gun of 1914.

It happens that there is no clear-cut issue of purity versus depravity anywhere in that quarter of the world. It is clear that our allies and our enemies were equally engaged

in a despicable, cowardly, selfish business; that the official Allied and American version of the origin of the world war is a myth; that whoever goes to the official white, yellow, and orange books, expecting there to find the real responsibility, knows nothing of what was going on in the world previously to 1914; that these government books merely tell the story of the feinting before the final grapple; that if one government or group is more responsible than another, the fact is to be found, not in the perpetration of any one act, but in many acts perpetrated in pursuance of a *policy;* that if the German world peril was a reality, its reality will have to be established by a *general record* of conduct, policy, and motive, on the part of the Kaiser's government, distinctly and radically different from the record of the governments which took up the sword against Germany.

So we pass to the question of relative depravity as revealed by such international outlawry as treaty-breaking, atrocities, aggressions upon weaker peoples, and general imperialistic activities.

XXIII

THE NOBLE DEMOCRACIES—SCRAPS OF PAPER; ATROCITIES

THE German violation of Belgium was from the first the leading topic in the fear-propaganda of ourselves and our allies. The lesson sought to be drawn from it was that the Kaiser's government was particularly untrustworthy and dishonorable, and that the Germans—either the German people, the German government, or the German military clique—were particularly savage, ruthless, and inhuman. By its breach of the Treaty of 1839, the Kaiser's government had proved that its word could never be trusted. By the atrocities incident to the military occupation, the German had proved himself a Hun. Therefore, those governments that were incapable of profaning their pledged word, those nations whose military forces were incapable of outrage upon civil populations, those great powers which were incapable of transgressing the sovereignty of their weaker neighbors, must, for their own ultimate safety—but especially for the sake of humanity—band themselves into a League of Honor to crush the offending government and to humiliate, punish, and reform the offending people.

But where is the nation that has proven itself morally fit to reform the Hun? Where is the League of Honor? Where is the material for any such league? Where is the government so without sin that it can claim the right to cast the first stone?

To some it may seem superfluous to discuss the point farther. But the peace settlement is based upon the purity-versus-depravity theory, and is defensible only under it.

Moreover, notwithstanding admissions as to the imperfections of the peace settlement, every effort has been put forth to perpetuate the purity-versus-depravity theory in the popular mind as an axiom, never to be questioned or reëxamined. So intensive was the work of the fear-propagandists that, after every other excuse for America's war has lost its force, there is danger that millions of Americans may still remain under the misapprehension that we saved America and humanity from a power of singular wickedness, which actually entertained a scheme of world conquest and stood in a fair way to realize it.

England, Prussia, and other countries united in a treaty guaranteeing the neutrality of Belgium. Prussia violated the treaty and England declared war, claiming to do so purely on principle, in defense of the sacredness of treaties and the rights of weak nations. But England, France, Russia, and Japan united in treaties guaranteeing the neutrality of Korea. Japan invaded Korea, as Germany invaded Belgium, compelled Korea to declare war on Russia, and afterwards made Korea a permanent dependency of Japan. The king of Korea objected, appealed to both England and France—and, for that matter, to one Theodore Roosevelt, then President of the United States—to intervene to preserve the integrity of Korea. Not one of the three gave any help to Korea. The principle was exactly the same as in the case of Belgium. Why, then, did England not go to war on principle against Japan?

England, France, and other countries united in a treaty guaranteeing the integrity and independence of the Turkish Empire. But England invaded Egypt, an integral part of the Turkish Empire, against the wishes of the Turkish government, conquered Egypt, and ultimately annexed it, bribing France with Morocco to keep still about the matter.

During the Boer War, the British government insisted on violating the neutrality of Portugal, by marching troops across Portuguese East Africa, over the protest of the Portuguese government, in precisely the same way that Germany violated the neutrality of Belgium in 1914.

England, France, America, Germany, and other countries united in a treaty, in 1906, known as the Act of Algeciras, guaranteeing the neutrality and integrity of the empire of Morocco. Meanwhile, England, France, and Spain, had entered into secret agreements for the partition of Morocco between France and Spain. In 1907, France sent an army into Morocco, which was never withdrawn. France destroyed the neutrality and integrity of Morocco by armed force, ultimately dividing the country with Spain. Instead of declaring war on France and Spain, England gave them her support and protection. Nor did America protest against the tearing up of the Moroccan *scrap of paper.* The only government to protest was the government of the Kaiser, whose word, President Wilson solemnly informed us, "we cannot take as . . . a guarantee of anything that is to endure," because, forsooth, "They observe no covenants!"

England and Russia, in the Entente of 1907, united to guarantee the integrity and independence of Persia. At the same time, they secretly bargained to divide Persia between them. With the consent and support of England, Russia sent an army into Persia, overturned the existing government, destroyed the integrity and independence of Persia, and was still in control of Persia by means of an army of occupation when noble England declared war upon Germany for violating the neutrality of Belgium.

America and England, in 1850, united in a treaty—the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty—agreeing never, either of them, to *"assume or exercise any dominion over Nicaragua, Costa*

Rica, the Mosquito Coast, or any part of Central America." But England violated this treaty at the beginning, by refusing to give up her protectorate over the Mosquito Coast. This was also in violation of the Monroe Doctrine. Two years later, England again violated both the treaty and the Monroe Doctrine, as well as the sovereignty of the republic of Honduras, by declaring the Bay Islands a British colony, after a military occupation of those islands. Later, England again violated both the treaty and the Monroe Doctrine by asserting sovereignty over British Honduras, which was formally made a British colony in 1862. In 1859, England relinquished control over the Mosquito Coast and the Bay Islands, but the retention of British Honduras remains a permanent violation both of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty and of the Monroe Doctrine. In due course, America also violated the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, by the assumption and exercise of dominion over Panama, the permanent occupation of Nicaragua, the control of its government, and the acquisition from Nicaragua of the Corn Islands.

Even Belgium—irony of history!—has a *scrap of paper* in its closet. In 1885, England, France, Germany, and other countries, united in a treaty, known as the Berlin Act, guaranteeing the neutrality and integrity of the Congo Free State. The kingdom of Belgium also promised to observe this treaty. But in 1908, Belgium formally annexed the Congo Free State, without the consent of any of the signatory powers, and over the protest of some of them. Why did not the British government declare war upon Belgium in defense of the sacredness of treaties?

The same righteous government which, in 1914, told the world it declared war against Germany "solely" on principle, because Germany tore up the Treaty of 1839, was in power in England in 1908, when Belgium tore up the Treaty

of 1885—the same party, the same cabinet, largely, the same Foreign Secretary. It was also in power in England when France tore up the Treaty of 1906, when England and Russia together tore up the Treaty of 1907, and when the British government completed the mutilation of the Treaty of 1878 by the formal annexation of Egypt.

Every powerful government which, at one time or another, virtuously proclaimed its duty to assist in crushing Germany because of the German scrap of paper, had its own scraps of paper, not one, but many, and at least one scrap of paper paralleling in all essentials the German scrap of paper. Every one, even, acquired scraps of paper during the very war whose purpose, in part, was asserted to be to mete out punishment for the German scrap of paper.

International law, as it was known at the beginning of 1914, had, in toto, either been fabricated in treaties or acknowledged in treaties. In large part, these treaties were thrown overboard by the belligerents, not merely as they applied to enemies but as they applied to neutrals. Between 1914 and 1918, every belligerent assisted in tearing up international law and the treaties acknowledging international law. The accumulation of this great collection of paper scraps did not in every case involve, as in Belgium, violation of the territorial integrity of a neutral. But in at least three notable cases it did, those of China, Greece and Russia.

The territory of every country on earth, strong or weak, is guaranteed by some treaty, convention, or paper, to which every great government associated in the war against Germany has put its signature. An article that was generally adopted at the second Hague Conference, for example, reads: "The territory of neutral powers is inviolable." Another reads: "Belligerents are forbidden to move troops or convoys of either munitions of war or supplies across

the territory of a neutral power." These had already become commonplaces of international law. Every nation on earth not at war with China, Greece and Russia was, therefore, under precisely the same obligation to respect the territory of China, Greece, and Russia as Germany was, to respect the territory of Belgium.

But Japan violated the territory of China, over the protest of the Chinese government, marching its forces through China in order to get at the German dependency of Kiao-Chau, exactly as Germany violated the territory of Belgium in order to get at France. England, France, Russia and Italy violated the territory of Greece, over the protest of the Greek government, and by a series of military and naval aggressions, overturned the Greek government, and installed a new government, forcing Greece to declare war against Germany. And, after Russia became a neutral, England, France, Japan and the United States violated the territory of Russia, over the protest of the Russian government, made war on the Russian government, and attempted to assist to power in Russia a political aggregation more favorable to the Allied cause.

Much was made of the fact that the German government, when about to violate Belgium, admitted to the world that it was about to commit a wrong. We commit exactly the same wrong, but pretend that we are doing right. We double our own crime by hypocrisy.

Atrocities.

By the very nature of things, nothing is more certain of embellishment, from their source to their final appearance in the form of hate-propaganda, than stories of war atrocities. The high state of excitement of the victims, their passion, fear, and resentment, render exaggeration inevitable, even though it may be unconscious. Passion and self-interest,

with the certainty that disproof is next to impossible, furnish the most powerful conceivable incentive to outright fabrication.

I do not wish to be understood as suggesting that there were no atrocities whatever in Belgium. I do wish to be understood as holding that nothing occurred revealing singular depravity on the part of the Germans. The history of our allies, recent and remote, is burdened with atrocities.

British historians frequently refer to the practice of binding Sepoys to the mouths of cannon and blowing them to fragments, indulged in by British officers in the early days of the subjugation of India. Mass murder, wholesale hangings, extermination of entire communities, starvation on a large scale—these were but commonplaces in the conquest of India, which is not yet completed.

Much of the same can be said of Egypt. The bombardment of Alexandria, in 1882, like the bombardment of Canton, China, in 1885, was a cold-blooded atrocity perpetrated upon an unoffending and practically defenseless people. The British control is studded with British atrocities, which continue to this writing.

In Bloemfontein, South Africa, the subjugated Boers erected a monument in memory of 26,663 women and children who died in British concentration camps in the two years of the Boer War—murdered by deliberate starvation and neglect. The British in South Africa could not urge the extenuating circumstances which existed in the occupied zone of France, where non-combatants were underfed by the Germans; they were not themselves subject to a starvation blockade.

In 1907, in the sovereign state of Morocco, the population of the town of Casablanca resisted the efforts of a French-Spanish syndicate to build a railroad line through the local cemetery. A collision occurred between the population and

the workmen, and the latter were driven away. Whereupon French troops bombarded the defenseless town with artillery, killing thousands of men, women, and children. This outrage served the French purpose to penetrate farther and farther into Morocco, under the pretense of "protecting French lives and property," with the ultimate view of annexing the country.

Even Belgium had its own particular and special Belgium. Under the Belgian rule in the Congo Free State, according to a report published in 1904 by the British Foreign Office, in one district the population was reduced in six years from five thousand to six hundred. "In six months on the Momboya River the lowest estimate of people killed or mutilated by having their right hand cut off was six thousand, and this did not include the women and children, whom the soldiers were instructed to kill with the butt of their rifles so as not to waste cartridges." ("The New Map of Africa," by Herbert Adams Gibbons, p. 152.)

Interested Belgians, at the time, held that the various investigations of the Congo atrocities were either conducted or inspired by the British government, as a means to preparing the way for taking over the Congo Free State, and its rich rubber resources, for the benefit of British gentlemen. The aforementioned official British report was published with an air of great sanctity. Eight years later the world learned, from other and equally reliable reports, that Britons were employing similar methods in the rubber harvests of Putamayo, Peru.

Concurrently, similar atrocities were being perpetrated by Frenchmen in the French Congo. The same author recounts an incident related by a French investigation commission:

At Bangui, the commission found that the foremen of the com-

panies exercised pressure upon the blacks to bring in rubber by seizing their women and children, and holding them as hostages until the allotted quota was brought to the company's compound. In 1904, at Bangui, one concessions company, which made a practice of this barbarous hostage system, shut up in a small hut sixty-eight women and children, without air and water and food enough to keep them alive. The crime happened to be discovered by a young French physician. He demanded their release. Forty-five women and two children were found dead. Only thirteen women and eight children were still alive. Some of them died in spite of all the exertions of their liberator. The case could not have been unique. It was discovered only because it happened to be on the path of travelers.

In none of these cases did the government of the "noble democracy" concerned take action against the perpetrators of these deeds.

We also have our black pages of atrocity. How many Americans remember that Sherman's march to the sea was for the avowed purpose of starving the Confederacy, including the civil population? In the Philippines we at times wiped out whole villages, without regard to age or sex. As late as 1913, it was reported that, in the campaign against the Moros, General Pershing's soldiers killed 196 women and 340 children in one day's fighting. In 1920 we learned from official sources that, in Haiti, our marines had killed 3,250 natives, while losing only thirteen of their number. The figures justify the term "indiscriminate killings," employed by an American major general. This is not war, but massacre.

Not only were opponents of the American occupation hunted down and killed, but scores were murdered after being taken prisoner. Scores of Haitians who had not resisted the occupation in a military way were killed by our marines for trying to escape from enforced labor upon the public roads. Gatherings of Haitians were bombed from

airplanes, and Haitian and Santo Domingan prisoners were subjected to tortures of the most savage and revolting nature, according to testimony given to a Senate committee in the fall of 1921.

As for Nicaragua, the "Confidential Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations of the United States Senate, 63rd Congress, Second Session," reveals a number of atrocities which, if generally known, ought to shame into whispers any mention we may need to make of unpleasant events in Belgium.

October 3, 1912, Colonel J. H. Pendleton, U. S. N., in command of 2,000 marines, stormed the heights of Coyotepe, killing fifty Nicaraguan Liberals under command of General Benjamin F. Zeledon. Having reduced by this assault the defenses of the city of Masaya, Colonel Pendleton stood by while the Diaz contingent, for whom he was fighting, proceeded to execute Zeledon and then to stage a massacre in the undefended city. This massacre of unarmed men, women and children, which Pendleton permitted and for which the great government of the United States must forever stand responsible, is described by an eye-witness, page 420, of the secret government document, as follows:

I took a photograph of Colonel Pendleton standing on top of the hill with his men. When this happened the Nicaraguan soldiers, who had been standing by . . . sailed into the town of Masaya, which lies under the brow of the hill. They massacred everybody they could lay their hands on, and the women and children of the town fled into the church of Masaya, and these Nicaraguans, or government soldiers, brought up a field piece, and they fired the door of the church down, and they brought up two machine guns and fired into these people. There must have been 300 or 400 people all crowded into that church. . . . They killed about 250 people right there in the church. They simply mowed them down with the machine gun. Then they fell upon the rest of the inhabi-

tants. They looted everything there, and they simply tore that town to pieces. It was the worst looking horrible wreck I ever saw, and the dead were littered all over it.

The Belgians, at least, had formal warning of the German invasion. But the population of Vera Cruz, Mexico, had no warning whatever. The government of the United States had not declared war on Mexico, nor upon the city of Vera Cruz. In Europe a desperate struggle of nations was going on. But on April 21, 1914, the United States was in no danger of attack. The life of no American was at stake. Nevertheless, we made an aggressive war upon a practically defenseless city, and entirely without warning to the population thereof. Not a civilian in Vera Cruz had any idea that the Americans were going to attack. When the booming of the guns began, the children were let out of school, and ran panic-stricken for their homes. By that time the invaders were running amuck through the city. At least ten children and six women were shot to death in the streets by our gallant lads.

The Mexicans consider our attack upon, and occupation of, Vera Cruz an American "Lusitania" and an American Belgium rolled into one. Our punitive expedition they remember with little less horror. During that expedition, according to our own official reports and our own newspaper correspondents, our heroic soldiers, on one occasion, "surprised," and massacred sixty Mexicans, without giving them an opportunity to surrender. On another occasion they surprised, and massacred, forty *unarmed* Mexicans, some of whom were asleep and some of whom were naked, swimming in a pool. On a third occasion, they fired into a civilian mob, killing forty.

Meanwhile, on the American side of the line, unoffending and defenseless Mexicans were murdered by border rangers, local police officers, or others intent upon "making the

Mexicans pay for Villa's raid," or "making this a white man's country." According to a report [1] of an investigator appointed by Colonel H. J. Slocum, U. S. A., rendered February 12, 1918, *"the number of victims thus sacrificed in southwest Texas by such peace officers assuming the powers of a court of justice will probably never be known, though I understand that attorney F. C. Pierce holds a list of names of nearly three hundred."*

Coming down to the great war, the absence of Allied atrocities upon a civilian population upon the western front is explained by the fact that the Allies had no enemy population to deal with. Atrocities upon enemy combatants were perpetrated on both sides. On returning from Europe, Herbert L. Pratt, vice-president of the Standard Oil Company and a Y. M. C. A. worker, declared in a published interview (June 2, 1918) that: "The Americans no longer are bringing in prisoners in small groups. They are shooting the Germans down like rats."

Atrocities of this kind were defended on the ground that the Germans had committed atrocities quite as bad. The hate-propaganda was necessary not only at home, but on the battle front also. We had to sermonize our soldiers on hatred before they entered the trenches, for fear they might consider the Germans fellow creatures—for fear they might not take sufficient pleasure in mutilating the Germans. We had to put our own brave boys in the savage state that we told them the Germans were in. We had to repeat to them the old lie that is told in all wars, that the enemy take no prisoners.

Upon the battlefield, stories of mutilation and outrage were readily believed and held to justify any outrage. We excused our poisoned gas and our air raids on open towns

[1] This report is printed in full in the April, 1918, *Mexican Review*, published at Washington, D. C.

only on the ground that our enemies had employed such means of warfare first. But British aviators bombed non-combatants both of India and Afghanistan, where no pretense of retaliation could be offered,and this after German "savagery" had been crushed.[2]

For Germans to rejoice over the sinking of the "Lusitania," of greater value to Britain than any warship, was savagery, but for Britons to rejoice at the stunting of German babies, of no use whatever in that particular war, was patriotism. In an interview published in the Chicago *Tribune,* February 14, 1917, Sir Gilbert Parker was reported as saying: "German boys and girls of to-day, who are to be the future manhood and womanhood of Germany, are being deprived of those foods necessary to proper growth and sustenance. And I am glad of it."

In speaking to the House of Commons, December 20, 1917, Lloyd George exulted thus:

> We must not imagine that the enemy has not had his difficulties. We had proof of that the other day, when facts were given to us as to the deteriorated physical quality of the German workers as a result of the blockade imposed by the British navy. The German workers have so deteriorated that the output of Germany per man has gone down by something like thirty-three per cent., compared with the first year of the war.

In an interview with the Associated Press, May 1, 1919, Professor Abderhalden, a noted physiologist who had been making an investigation of German health conditions, asserted that to date a million persons, chiefly children, were dead as a result of the Allied hunger blockade, and that the survivors averaged a loss of twenty per cent. in weight.

Our hunger blockade, even while the war went on, was

[2] The Glasgow *Forward* seems to have proven that the Entente Allies were first both in the use of poison gas and in bombing civilian populations from the sky.

an atrocity against our enemies beside which the "submarine atrocity" is not to be mentioned. How much greater an atrocity it was after our enemies were no longer resisting us! And how much greater an atrocity against neutrals, who never wished to fight us. First, our noble allies starved Greece—the entire population, civil and military, old and young, male and female—as a means to compelling that country to abandon neutrality and assist them in the war. Afterwards we starved Russia and Hungary.

We starved hundreds of thousands of Russians, especially women and children, and for no other reason than that our government did not approve of the Soviet Government. We had expressed horror at the enforced labor of Belgians behind the German lines, but at Archangel we forced unwilling Russians to labor behind the Allied lines. More than that, we conscripted them for service against their own people, and, on occasion, murdered them in cold blood when they refused to fight.

The effect of our starvation blockade was even more disastrous upon the population of Hungary. Testifying before the House Ways and Means Committee, January 15, 1920, Secretary of War Baker presented a summary of infantile death rates per thousand in the city of Budapest, for the first six months of 1919, as follows: January, 812; February, 966; March, 784; April, 577; May, 567; June, 635. For this mass murder of babies we share responsibility with our allies.

Whatever may be said of military heroism, war also brings out the worst in human nature, which is everywhere approximately the same. But even in peace times, atrocities are constantly occurring in every large community. America lynched 67 persons in 1918, of whom four were white men and five colored women, and in 1919 this record was surpassed. If all the brutal assaults, arsons, murders,

rapes, unlawful imprisonments, and tortures, perpetrated upon defenseless persons in the United States of America, by men in the uniform of the United States, by State militiamen, by the police, and others wearing the badge of authority, by private detectives, by corporation gunmen, and by individuals, during the same period in which Germany occupied Belgium—if all these were brought together and set forth in their most revolting details, it may be that they would fill a book upon American atrocities in peace time, not so vastly different from our books upon German atrocities in war time.

The only atrocity alleged against the Germans that is not equalled or surpassed by the atrocities of ourselves and our allies is found in the "rape squad" stories, which depict the violation of womanhood as an official part of the German warfare. But Sir Philip Gibbs, the celebrated British correspondent ("Now It Can Be Told," p. 456), says:

> On the whole it seemed that they [the Germans] had not misused the women. I heard no tales of actual atrocity, though some of brutal passion. But many women shrugged their shoulders when I questioned them about this and said: 'They [the Germans] had no need to use violence in their way of love-making. There were many volunteers.'

With many Americans the "rape squad" stories have no doubt long since gone into the same class as our official "exposé" of Lenin as an agent of the German autocracy, and our yarn about the nationalization of women by the Soviet Government. To those who are still inclined to credit them there is just one thing to say: *If our official propagandists, beginning with the President and the Secretary of State, had the effrontery to put forward deliberate, malicious, monstrous, and easily provable distortions—such as the story of Germany's "broken submarine promises," the*

tale of a "German-Mexican plot to attack America," the allegation of "our right under international law" to confiscate the Dutch ships—to what extent can we credit the dictum of these gentlemen upon matters which are largely incapable of proof or disproof?

When the armistice was signed, a good many Americans expressed disappointment. Several million Germans had been killed, but that was not enough to satisfy them. Rather than give immediate peace to a people that was seeking peace on our terms, they were willing to sacrifice a few thousand more Americans, for the sake of a final massacre of Germans. The lesson of the war's atrocities is that war makes savages of men of whatever blood or nation, and of whatever degree of culture. The lesson is that war atrocities cannot be banished from the earth by exterminating or punishing Germans, but only by banishing war itself.

XXIV

THE NOBLE DEMOCRACIES AND SMALL NATIONS

BELGIUM was the most vulnerable spot in Germany's moral armor, and the enemies of Germany were quick to take full advantage of it. In Belgium the British government found the casus belli that it was bound to find somewhere, and around Belgium was built its entire scheme of war propaganda. The *scrap of paper* incident involved not only the principle of the sacredness of treaties, but the more fundamental principle of the equal and absolute sovereignty of all nations. So England, in entering the arena professedly in defense of the sacredness of treaties, also proclaimed itself the world's heavyweight champion of weak nations. The psychological step to the issue of democracy versus autocracy was short. Soon, every government associated in the war against Germany, with the possible exception of that of the Czar—even Rumania, the most feudal country in Europe; even Japan—was informing the world in thunderous tones that it had unsheathed the sword in defense of world democracy, and the rights of weak nations.

In due course, our own government, as soon as it had succeeded in bringing us to the certainty of war on the submarine issue, raised the cry quite as loudly as any of its allies. In the war message, the President announced that we would fight *"for the privilege of men everywhere to choose their own way of life and obedience . . . for democracy . . . for the rights and liberties of small nations."* And thereafter a large share of our own propaganda was

devoted to inculcating the notion that the only way to do this was to destroy the existing government of Germany; that we had thrown in our lot with England, France, Italy, and Japan, because they, like ourselves, were protectors of small nations; that our "League of Honor" actually represented "the privilege of men everywhere to choose their own way of life and obedience," while Germany represented aggression, conquest, and exploitation in the world's affairs.

"By their works ye shall know them." In *works* our League of Honor was a distinctly greater offender against the principles which it professed to champion than was the government that it destroyed, even during the war itself, as has been pointed out, while before the war the preponderance of its offenses against world democracy is overwhelming.

The supremacy of our most powerful ally in the world's affairs is based upon supremacy in sea power. That supremacy was attained only after a long series of aggressive wars extending over a century and a half, in which the Spanish, Dutch, and French navies were swept from the seas. To these, in 1807, the Danish navy was added in a single stroke. On a mere suspicion that Denmark intended to join with France and Russia against England and Sweden, the British fleet was sent into the Baltic Sea, under specific assurance that it was not intended as a menace to Denmark. Once there, the British government suddenly demanded the surrender of the entire Danish fleet. On receipt of a refusal, a British force was landed, Copenhagen was bombarded and burned, and the Danish fleet became by conquest the property of Great Britain.

The boast that the sun never sets on the British flag is as true as the other boast that Britannia rules the waves. The British Empire, even before its latest vast acquisitions,

embraced nearly one-fourth of the land surface of the earth, fully one-fourth of its productive surface, the best harbors overseas, and the most commanding positions, commercially and strategically. Nearly all of this vast empire was acquired by war, either upon England's European neighbors, or upon the native peoples, or upon both.

The Portuguese and the Dutch were the first Europeans in India. England acquired India by war, first upon the Dutch, second upon the French, third upon the native peoples.

The Dutch were first in South Africa. England took Cape Colony in war from Holland, abolished by force the republic of Natal, and completed the conquest in the twentieth century by cutting down those two small nations, the republics of the Transvaal and the Orange Free State.

France colonized Canada. Holland colonized New York. Both fell to England as spoils of war. Later, France sold its Louisiana territory to the young republic of the United States to prevent it from being taken in war by Britain. The large island of Malta was taken from the French. Gibraltar, Spain, was taken and kept simply because the British liked its commanding position. Jamaica was wrested from Spain. Other British possessions in the western hemisphere were either taken, by conquest, from Spain or held in defiance of the claims of the American republics.

The foundations of British world empire were laid, in other centuries, upon aggression. But in the enlightened twentieth century, "democratic" England has been quite as ready to increase her dominion by war as in what we are wont to pretend was a more immoral age.

In building up the myth that England represents the principle of democracy, great emphasis was laid upon the degree of self-government existing in certain British colo-

nies, such as Canada and Australia. But this sort of self-government is enjoyed by less than five per cent. of the people living under the British flag outside of the British Isles. The other ninety-five per cent. are governed by an official bureaucracy that imposes its will everywhere by force. More than 300,000,000 British subjects enjoy no self-government worthy of the name, and are kept under the British flag only by the constant exercise of military power.

The British ruling class has as little regard for democracy, self-determination, the rights of small nations, the sovereignty of weak peoples, without the British Empire as within. Where England has appeared to champion a small nation against a larger, a selfish British purpose has almost invariably been evident, usually the purpose to save the victim for ultimate British consumption, or to be parceled out among other consumers of small nations at some later date for favors rendered.

This is exemplified in England's dealings with Turkey and Russia. The British imagination created the German peril. The British have always had a bugaboo. When the French bugaboo was laid, early in the nineteenth century, Russia became the British bugaboo. As the main feature of British foreign policy in the twentieth century was to isolate Germany, so the main feature of British foreign policy throughout most of the nineteenth century was to curb Russia. Any enlargement of Russian power was an affront to England. Any Russian ambition for expansion was an ambition of autocracy to conquer the world. British opposition to Russian expansion was unselfish championship of world democracy and the rights of small nations. It was Britain's duty, as the world's trustee of liberty, to thwart the Russian desire for a warm seaport, even to resist Russian expansion in the direction of such a seaport.

If war resulted, very well, the Czar would be the aggressor; England would be fighting in self-defense.

So immaculate England became the protector of the Turk. In relation to Russia, Turkey was a small nation; England was championing a small nation. But in relation to Turkey, Bulgaria, Armenia, and the other Christian peoples, struggling for independence from Moslem rule, were small nations. In championing Turkey, England effectively stood between these subject peoples and independence. "Democratic" England became a coöppressor with the Turk of the most oppressed peoples in Europe, a responsible party to the periodical massacres in Turkey's Christian provinces. At the Congress of Berlin, it was the British government that insisted that two-thirds of "bleeding Bulgaria" be handed back to Moslem oppression.

As the price of protecting the Turk, England took the island of Cyprus. Had racial demands been considered, Cyprus would have gone to Greece. England was now ready to begin the acquisition of Egypt also. In the 30's Egypt had won its independence from the Sultan and established sovereignty over Syria besides. But in accordance with its policy of protecting the Turk, England had driven the Egyptian forces out of Syria and compelled Egypt to acknowledge the suzerainty of the Sultan and pay the latter an annual tribute. In 1875, by a species of treachery, we find England nosing France out of control of the Suez Canal. After this, England shouldered France out of the way and into Egypt.

British control over both entrances to the Mediterranean being doubly secured by the occupation of Egypt, "democracy" no longer so pressingly required either that the Turk be protected or that the Czar be curbed. England's ally in the east, Japan, beat Russia in a quarrel over Manchuria,

and the Czar turned about to face a revolution at home. It was a promising day for democracy. The world's greatest autocracy was tottering. The Russian world peril, so far as it was a reality, was about to be laid in the only way that perils of the sort can be permanently laid—by fundamental reforms brought about from within.

But, unfortunately, England had meanwhile forgotten the Russian peril and discovered the German peril. So, over the frantic appeals of the revolutionary leaders, England and France loaned the Czar the cash which alone enabled him to stamp out the revolution. Thus was the Russian autocracy kept alive long enough to assist England and France in the great war that was even then preparing—the war *"for the privilege of men everywhere to choose their own way of life and obedience!"*

While protecting the Turk, England had also stood forth as protector of the small nation, Persia. But suddenly (in 1907), world democracy of the British flavor no longer required that Persia have rights or even existence. The time had arrived for another good British bargain. So Persia went upon the block, and with Persia another small nation which England had been protecting against Russia, Afghanistan. Foreign Secretary Grey divided Persia with his good friend, the Czar, giving the Czar the larger portion, while the latter acknowledged England's "right" to "choose the way of life and obedience" of the inhabitants of Afghanistan.

When the Czar was trying to work his way south in the 70's, England and Austria had stood together against him. England and Austria were comrades in the good cause of democracy. Even as late as October 8, 1912, in spite of waning friendship for the Turk, and warming friendship for the Czar, the integrity of the Turkish Empire was of more importance to England than self-determination of Turkey's

subject peoples. On that date a note, signed by all the powers, but emanating from the British Foreign Office, was delivered to the various members of the Balkan alliance, warning them against a war with Turkey, declaring that:

> If, in spite of this note, war does break out between the Balkan states and the Ottoman Empire, the powers will not admit, at the end of the conflict, any modification of the territorial status quo in European Turkey.

But, by 1914, the rights of the small nation, Serbia, had suddenly become of vast importance to "democracy." British treachery had driven Turkey into the arms of Germany. Wherefore, "democracy" not only no longer required the protection of the Turk, but was ready to look on complacently while the Czar proceeded on his way to Constantinople. So it happened that, while virtuous England found her casus belli in the scrapping of the Treaty of 1839, she agreed to the final pulverization of the Treaty of 1878; Constantinople was promised the Russian autocracy as its share of the spoils in the great world struggle for the rights of weak nations and the sacredness of treaties!

Africa, the second largest continent, has been divided up like a great English plum pudding, most of it since the beginning of the twentieth century. The division was accomplished by the tearing up of treaties, by the profanation of official pledges, by deliberate deception of home electorates, by mass murder, and by assassination of small nations upon their own doorsteps.

By the year 1914, but two small nations had survived the cannibal invasion from Europe; insignificant Liberia, greatly shrunken, not really independent, but an unacknowledged protectorate of the United States; Abyssinia, which had successfully resisted Italy, and whose continued exist-

ence was due to mutual jealousies among her would-be-butcherers. Between them Liberia and Abyssinia held less than three and one-half per cent. of the area and but two and one-half per cent. of the population of the great continent of Africa.

England, France, Italy, Spain, and to a lesser degree, Germany, had all engaged in wars of conquest, sometimes very bloody and prolonged, upon the weak nations of Africa. Among these European aggressors there had been disputes innumerable. Italy had fought another European power, Turkey. There had been bad blood all around. At least once, England and France were on the verge of war with one another. At least twice, a crisis between England and France, on one side, and Germany on the other, brought all Europe to the verge of war.

In the division of the African plum pudding, England received one-third, France one-fourth. England got the best and juiciest plums, France the second best. Italy was blessed with the third best portion. Spain got a plum or two. Germany was served some underdone portions, with the plums carefully removed. In the spilling of human blood, democratic France divided honors with England. Italy was third, Spain fourth. "The Hun" killed least of all.

Over a longer period, a similar division to that of Africa has been going on in the largest continent, Asia, although it is not yet as nearly completed. Here, as in Africa, England acquired the choicest plums. Not far behind England are Russia and Japan, though "democratic" France is not without her Asiatic tidbits. The partition of Asia has been going on more rapidly in the twentieth century than ever before. At China, the great powers have been picking like vultures. The year 1914 found England dominant in Asia, as in Africa—supreme in the middle east, joining

control with Japan in the far east, partner with the Czar in the near east, disputing German entrance into affairs in that quarter.

The garroting of small nations by large ones has proceeded more rapidly during the past quarter of a century than at any previous period in the world's history. Within a single generation, England, France, Russia, Italy, Germany, and Japan acquired new territory aggregating more than both the North and South American continents. According to Rear-Admiral French E. Chadwick, U. S. N., retired, (Speech before Lawyers' Club of New York, February, 1917), in that period Great Britain expanded to the extent of 6,750,000 miles; France, 3,500,000; Russia, 2,000,000; Germany, 1,000,000. Every mile of this 13,250,000 was acquired by some form of aggression.

In the forty-four years previous to 1914—throughout the entire period of the activity and influence of the men who, we were told, plotted world conquest by war—Germany engaged in war less than any of the other countries named, including our own.

Do, then, the German aggressions reveal a more depraved purpose than the aggressions of her enemies? What is the purpose of aggression in modern times?

XXV

WHAT REALLY STARTED IT

In 1840-1, England fought what has since become known as the Opium War, to break down the barriers of China against the importation of opium from British India. China, defeated, was compelled not only to open five harbors to the British trade, but to pay $22,500,000 to cover the cost of the war, $6,250,000 for opium seized and burned on Chinese soil, and to hand over Hong Kong to England for good measure.

England's Opium War is a classic in its clear simplicity as a war for business. But every war fought by England within the present generation, as well as by every other great power, although not always as plainly so on the surface, was also a war for business.

Most modern wars for business, however, unlike the Opium War, are not motived upon a desire to crowd trade down the throat of an unwilling people. The mere exchange of goods is a secondary consideration. Nor is conquest in the present day carried on for so legitimate a purpose as that of providing homes for surplus populations. European powers make no serious effort to colonize their African and Asiatic possessions, as a rule. France, the world's second greatest grabber of new territory, has a stationary population.

What is sought is access to the natural resources of the weak nation in question, opportunity to exploit these resources with cheap labor and without any adequate return for the privilege, and favorable concessions for railroads

with which to get away with the loot. The usual process is to get a "stake" in the country, concessions for mines, lumber, or oil, often through bribery, and then to begin coercion, leading usually to armed intervention, on behalf of the particular interest involved.

This process has been termed "the new imperialism." It was first enunciated as a policy in the year 1850 by the British government, and the first example of its practice on a large scale is furnished by Egypt. Intervention on behalf of investments is a denial of the equality of nations, and the grossest possible violation of international law. Nevertheless, France, Germany, Russia, Italy, and Japan, followed the example of England, and intervention on behalf of investments became the most serviceable maneuver in the partition of Africa and Asia. It is not always necessary to resort to actual war to accomplish the end sought, or even to hoist the flag over the coveted spoils. Threats, more or less veiled, often accomplish the desired result. China furnishes one example. Spheres of influence fly the flag of the exploited, not the exploiter, though control by the latter is no less effective for his purpose.

Where the business motive of a given war is not evident at the beginning, it invariably appears later, in the conditions imposed upon the beaten nation. Having persuaded the Boers by cannon-shot to yield to British mine-owners what they wanted, England conceded to South Africa a measure of self-government approaching that of Canada and Australia. Because the spirit of the Boers could not be completely broken, it happened to be good business to do so. But nowhere else in the British dominion in Africa or Asia is Home Rule in operation. Throughout these vast dominions, government is by and for British bondholders, British concessionaires, and British officeholders.

A result of British imperialism is that the inhabitants

of the richest spots of the earth live and die in the most abject poverty. The famines of India have been shown to be due, not so much to overpopulation or failures of crops, as to appropriation of crops by British gentlemen. The voracious demands of British bondholders and concessionaires, made good by British bayonets, are responsible for wholesale starvation of Egyptians in past decades, and for the present misery of the Egyptian population.

Such is the result, on the one hand, of British imperialism. The result, on the other, is that England has a leisure class larger in proportion to population than any other country —and at the bottom of the social scale a most pronounced destitution. By virtue of her "glorious" empire, England lives more largely upon forced tribute from "weak nations" than any other power. By virtue of aggression, treaty-breaking, atrocity, and conquest, London became the financial centre of the world, England the "world's banker."

No fact is more significant than that the British nation does not share, in any degree, in British imperial prosperity. The standard of living of the masses in England is no higher than that in neighboring countries that possess no empire. The wage of the British trade unionist depends, not one iota upon the bursting banks of London, the expanse of the empire, or the supremacy of the fleet, but solely upon the strength of his union. The British common laborer is no better paid than the Dutch, the Belgian, the Norwegian, or the Dane. The British slums are the most notorious in the world. This could not be true were "democratic" England a real democracy. It is true because the empire, and all it means, is for the upper classes.

More space is devoted here to British imperialism than to French, German, Italian, Russian, or Japanese imperialism, only because Britain led the way, set the styles, has profited most—and is supreme. France is the world's sec-

ond greatest imperial power. We have heard much of French democracy, but French "democracy" is of little value to the world so long as democracy does not extend to France's foreign relations. The bankers of Paris wield the same measure of control over the French Foreign Office as the London bankers enjoy over theirs, while the control of the French press by the Paris bankers is reputed to be even more complete than similar control exercised in England. While the French army was gradually extending dominion over Morocco, the Chamber of Deputies repeatedly adopted resolutions reaffirming the adherence of France to the Act of Algeciras, promising that the army would be withdrawn. These resolutions were probably sincere. But the French bankers had their way. As the great war drew on, the desire of the French people was unquestionably pacific, as was the desire of the peoples of all countries. Nevertheless, the same factors were dominant in France as in Germany, Russia, Austria, and England, and they worked the same way.

German militarism existed for several decades before it was discovered by British gentlemen. German militarism and the German peril were discovered only when Germany began to compete for foreign trade, to look for colonies, and to build a navy. Imperial Germany's crime against democracy was to imitate imperial England, and to do it with disturbing energy and efficiency.

Britons informed us that the Kaiser's speech at the beginning of the war, to the effect that Germany would now have her place in the sun, meant that Germany would now proceed to conquer the world. There is no ground whatever for such an interpretation. The term, "places in the sun," had long been employed to mean rich tropical colonies. What the Kaiser literally meant was that he intended to

acquire some new colonies in the war. This is a brazen confession of depravity—until one remembers that all the great governments that took up the sword against the Kaiser, had been doing the very thing the Kaiser confessed he intended to do.

All had been acquiring colonies by war. Not by a world war; but they were not far behind the Kaiser in letting it be known that they, also, intended to acquire new territory in the world war itself.

The world war, indeed, was the logical and almost inevitable outcome of the rivalries and enmities of the preceding years, which were kept alive, sharpened, and rendered malignant by the competition for "places in the sun." While contributing causes can be found which run back to the very beginnings of some of the nations involved, the preponderating and decisive cause was the clash of rival imperialisms within the previous ten years.

While, for example, the German acquisition of Alsace-Lorraine was a persistent factor in French enmity against Germany, it would never of itself have caused another war. French and British enmity had been more bitter and of longer standing, British humiliation of France more recent. Britain was the "traditional enemy." Yet for imperialistic reasons, France joined forces with Britain, who in former decades had scarcely known a dispute with Germany, and the latter became the common foe.

Partly because the Kaiser had come late into the field of spoliation, and partly because when he came the other despoilers united and bargained to keep him out, the German acquisitions of "places in the sun" were meagre. They not only bargained and divided among themselves, and conspired to keep out the Kaiser, but on occasion they made it plain that they were determined to keep him out, even at the cost of war.

The threat of armed force was a constant and decisive factor in the competition of the great powers for "places in the sun." England, possessing the greatest force, everywhere took the lion's share. But England's force was never great enough to take all. To make sure of the lion's share, England not only had to threaten, but to bargain, to divide, to throw sops. By occasional exercise of force, and, more frequently, displays of force, England brought Russia, France, and the greater part of the world to accept the fact of British supremacy, to be content with the crumbs that fell from the British table. Germany remained the one likely challenge to British supremacy. So Germany became the world peril.

Says H. N. Brailsford, an Englishman ("War of Steel and Gold," pp. 42–3):

> The difficulty between Britain and Germany was not so much Bagdad or even Morocco, as the general sense that a powerful diplomatic combination and a naval preponderance were being used to frustrate German purposes and to exclude her from 'places in the sun'. . . . First, we excluded Germany from Morocco, and then we constructed a general league which hemmed her in on all sides. We 'debauched' her ally, Italy, we brought Spain into our 'orbit'. . . . The 'balance of power' had been violently adjusted in our favor, and in Prince von Buelow's phrase, Germany felt herself 'penned in'. . . . It can hardly be doubted that, for some years at least, the Triple Entente was really inspired by the aims which German alarm ascribed to it. Its real architects were M. Delcassé and King Edward, and the former, at least, made no secret of his ambitions.

Look at a political map of Africa in 1914, and you find seven-tenths of this great continent in the hands of British and French—the best and most productive seven-tenths. Germany is credited with several colonies, mostly jungle. Where this jungle abuts upon the sea, we discover the harbor to be in the hands of some other power, usually Eng-

land. In Togoland, points out Herbert Adams Gibbons, an American ("New Map of Africa," p. 276), "as elsewhere in Africa, the Germans are shut off from a logical and natural portion of their coast line by a projection of British territory." Also (p. 232):

> Zanzibar stands to German East Africa as Walfish Bay to German Southwest Africa, the mouth of the Volta and Cape St. Paul to Togoland, and the Niger Delta to Kamerun, an everlasting command—*Thou shalt not!*

Says Frederic C. Howe, an American ("Why War?", p. 240-1):

> The Mediterranean is, in effect, a British sea. This is secured through the command of the western and eastern entrances at Gibraltar and the Suez Canal. The fortresses at Gibraltar are impregnable. The great guns command the narrow straits through which all commerce to and from the Atlantic must pass, as completely as the entrance to a harbor. This, with the Suez Canal, gives Great Britain control of the Mediterranean, which is the greatest trade route of the world. It enables her to menace the commerce of all European countries and to close the door at will upon all ships passing through it to the outside world. By reason of this fact, all the Mediterranean states are under the potential control of Great Britain. This is one of Germany's complaints, for so long as Great Britain controls the gateways and trade routes to the Orient, the commerce of other nations is not really free.

Neutral, American, and even British writers agree that German imperialism turned its eyes toward Turkey because of the success of the policy of isolation elsewhere. In time, no doubt, the sword would have been employed to insure German control and exploitation of the Turks. It happens that German imperialism in Turkey never progressed beyond the stage of persuasion and peaceful bargaining. Germany's best argument with the Turks was the

record of her competitors. To Turkey, the British peril was a reality. To Germany, the Bagdad Railway was a means for extending power and influence without war with her powerful neighbors.

The German scheme happened, however, to conflict with British ambitions to acquire control of the same territory. A much talked of British plan was to colonize southern Mesopotamia with Egyptian peasants, then grab it as Egypt was grabbed, penetrate into southern Arabia as the Sudan was penetrated, connect Persia with Egypt, and so complete the encirclement of Germany.

In pursuance of this purpose, the British press was inspired to raise the cry of a German peril to India and Egypt. German peaceful penetration of Turkey must be halted at all costs. The Bagdad Railway as a German project must be smashed; by diplomacy, if possible; by war, if diplomacy would not do the trick.

In the end it was smashed. Throughout, it is a story of sordid intrigue. The governments of France and England disputed every mile of the road in some way. The knockout was finally delivered by England. The Sheik of Koweit was persuaded to disavow the rule of the Sultan and accept the protection of the King of England. So the Gulf of Koweit, the sea terminus of the road, fell into British hands. So, to complete the Bagdad Railway as a German project, it would have been necessary for Germany to back the Sultan in subduing the Sheik of Koweit. That would have meant war with England. As the German government had backed down in Morocco, so again it backed down in Turkey. In "agreements" signed with England, France, and Russia, German imperialism yielded up control of the Bagdad Railway to Entente imperialism. When the Germans were slow to back down still again—in the Serbian crisis—the world war began.

President Wilson boldly held up the German activities in Turkey as a cause for war by the United States upon the Imperial German Government. "Government after government," said he (to Russia, May 26, 1917), had "without open conquest of territory, been linked together in a net of intrigue." The governments were those of Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey. There was none other.

This horrible net of intrigue, spread by four governments which had voluntarily associated themselves together, was directed "against nothing less than the peace and liberty of the world," said Wilson. But when he begins to go into details, we discover that the intrigue is, rather, against a collection of states which happened to have been linked together *with* "open conquest of territory," and at the time were held together only by iron links of force. The startled phrases of Wilson name India, Egypt, and Persia, as objects of German ambition!

Supposing there *were* lurking ambitions ultimately to free these states from British rule—even to impose upon them German rule—of what concern was that to America? Supposing there were an immediate possibility of the success of such designs, what difference could it make to democracy?

The President, for that matter, admitted that the immediate hopes of German imperialism did not fly as far as Egypt, India, or Persia. To Russia he asserted that Germany was suing for peace "only to *preserve*" the very questionable advantages already gained (May 26, 1917). It was after this that the American sacrifices were made!

A year later he declared the German purpose to be merely to erect "an empire that will *ultimately* master Persia, India, and the peoples of the Far East." (Apr. 6, 1918.)

Ultimately!

A stronger Germany, the President told us, indulging in prophecy (same speech) would "overawe" Europe, and —after a while—America would somehow be threatened.

Supposing Germany *were* placed in a position to "overawe" Europe, what then?

We have to go back only a few years to find the "Hun" in the very position so darkly painted. Brailsford tells us ("War of Steel and Gold," p. 34):

> Europe had a long experience of German 'hegemony' during the quarter of a century which elapsed between the fall of the French Empire and the creation of the Franco-Russian alliance. Nothing disastrous happened. No little states were overrun, no neighbors' landmarks removed, no thrones overturned, no national or religious liberties menaced. Not even if the Kaiser wielded a military power as great as that of Louis XIV can we conceive of his acting as the Grand Monarch acted.

This from an Englishman.

Why spend one hundred thousand American lives and fifty billion American dollars to place France and England in a position to "overawe Europe," instead of leaving them to fight it out with Germany? Where is the special German depravity that called for the American sacrifice?

Is it to be found in the blood of the Germans? But racially the English are nearer the Germans than the French, the Italians, or the Japanese; and as for the Kaiser, that gentleman was blessed with a British mother.

Supposing we permit the peril theory to stand or fall on the sole test of capacity. No country could imperil the world, much less conquer it, without first conquering the seas. In dominant sea power alone resides the possibility of world aggression. If Germany ever exhibited the remotest capacity to wrest the control of the seas from England,

then the naval experts of the Entente lied and lied again. Here is a typical declaration of a British statesman:

> If Germany had never built a dreadnought, or if all the German dreadnoughts had been sunk, the control and authority of the British navy could not have been more effective [than now]. (Winston Spencer Churchill, *Collier's Weekly,* Sept. 30, 1916.)

And here is a typical statement from one of England's foremost naval writers:

> Great Britain's seas command has not been less, but infinitely greater, than in any previous human experience. And the result is that a German victory has been made impossible. (Arthur Pollen, in *Metropolitian Magazine,* May 1917.)

"Look at the picture," said Wilson himself (at New York, May 18, 1918); "in the centre of the picture four nations, . . . and against them twenty-three governments, representing the greater part of the population of the world." Isn't it a bit ridiculous—not to say cowardly—to draw this picture, and then, in the next breath, to pretend that the twenty-three are actually in danger of being conquered and governed by the four?

What supermen the seventy million Germans would have to be, if they were reasonably to be feared by two billion others! And how fired would each and every one of them have to be with the worst ambitions imputed to their former rulers!

Of course, the enemies of the Germans will be the last to contend that they are supermen, while no one will seriously claim that the German people were entirely passive tools of the Kaiser. In the war message, the President himself absolved the German masses from complicity in the schemes of German imperialism. This view he reiterated from time to time during the period of the fighting, and even after his treaty had been signed. In spite of the

execrations heaped upon the German socialists, they were a constant embarrassment to the Kaiser, and in July, 1917, they were strong enough to pledge the Reichstag against "forced acquisitions of territory, and political, economic, and financial violations"; against "economic blockades and the stirring up of enmity of the peoples after the war"; for the freedom of the seas; for "international juridical organizations"; for "an economic peace," for "mutual understanding and lasting reconciliation among the nations."

No pronouncement from the British government, or any branch of it, or from any branch of any of the Allied governments, so nearly endorsed in the concrete the very principles for which Wilson professed to be fighting.

So far as threatening the nationality of others is concerned, the Kaiser never went as far as his enemies, even at the height of his successes. No responsible spokesman of the German government ever announced that Lloyd George, or the House of Lords, or the King, or President Wilson, must be overthrown as a condition of peace, as Wilson announced that the Kaiser and his Junkers must be overthrown. The determination to conquer was far more evident on our side than on the side of our enemies.

Even had the Kaiser by some means succeeded in wresting control of the seas from England, or even in capturing the entire British fleet, there is no tenable ground for the belief that he would have abused the power any more than the British government has abused its power. The Wilson exposition of the German peril is nothing more nor less than a paraphrase of the nursery tale that the British press and the French press had been telling the British and French people for the past decade—for a purpose.

The German peril to the other great powers, so far as it was a reality, was simply a threat to rival imperialisms, exactly as the rival imperialisms were a threat to German

imperialism. The German "threat to the world" was nothing more nor less than a danger that Germany might succeed in compelling England and France to make a re-division, on more equal terms, of "places in the sun." Imperialism is the only real peril, but it is not a peril to great states except insofar as they themselves choose to play the game. It *is* a real peril, however, to weak states that happen to be rich in undeveloped resources.

World conquest for any nation has so far been an impossibility and is likely to remain so. Wars of conquest are never profitable to a nation as a whole. When undertaken on a gigantic scale, the cost is so severe that domestic unrest invariably undermines the strength of the offending government. The impulse of all peoples is toward peace. The British Empire has traveled farther toward world conquest, probably, than any other country can ever go again.

There was nothing in the history of the Central Powers, in their form of government, in their political leadership, or in their people, that justified our striking at them rather than at their enemies. There was no reason to believe that a victory of Germany over England, if that had been possible, would have been worse for America or the world than a victory of England over Germany. There was no defensible reason why we should not have continued as good friends of the Imperial German Government as of the French bourgeois republic or King George.

On the other hand, the interest of the American people called for a peace without victory. The safety of the weak nations would have been best subserved by an indecisive contest. Democracy within what President Wilson termed "the great fighting nations" would have had a better chance if none of them had been victor. American participation in the European war was a crime against democracy and permanent peace.

XXVI

PROMISE AND PERFORMANCE

If there remained any doubt of the soundness of the conclusions of the previous chapters, it would be dissipated by a cold review of the "peace" that was actually framed and sought to be imposed.

First, a peace without victory was in sight in 1917. Wilson frustrated it by dragging America into the war.

The notion that America saved the Entente from decisive defeat has been carefully fostered in this country. But before America entered the war, Allied statesmen and publicists had, a thousand times, proved to their own satisfaction that an ultimate German victory was impossible. At no time did there exist a reasonable probability of the submarine blockade's becoming sufficiently effective to score a knockout. Germany might have gained effective land victories, but that would have placed her in a position only to negotiate, not to dictate.

The best evidence on this point is found in the German peace overtures themselves. No one will accuse the Kaiser of preferring an indecisive peace to a victorious peace. Why, then, did he seek an indecisive peace before the end of 1916? It could only have been because he shared the judgment of his enemies as to his own incapacity for victory.

It will be remembered that the German overtures were invariably denounced as wicked insincerities, "peace offensives," war maneuvers; that all peace talk was decried in America and in the Allied countries, on the ground that immediate peace would mean a "German peace," which

implied German victory and conquest. The fact remains that the German proposals were taken by Allied statesmen as an offer to return to the status quo ante, and they were so taken by Wilson himself. In his reply to the Pope appear the following words:

> Of course, the Imperial German Government and those whom it is using for their own undoing are seeking to obtain pledges that the war will end in the restoration of the status quo ante.

The Allied statesmen, of course, did not want a peace without victory. They rejected the German overtures. But, by the middle of 1917, they were virtually confessing to us that they would have been constrained to look favorably upon such a peace, *had America not come to their assistance.*

Which means that America, at the beginning of 1917, stood in a position seldom vouchsafed to a neutral nation in any war. It stood in a position to bring about an immediate peace, not by going to war, not by abandoning neutrality, but by withholding its hand, by smoothing the way.

It is too much to say that America stood in a position to impose in full the peace programme which it had just announced as its own. But it stood in a position to see the acceptance of the primary principle of that programme, and in an infinitely better position to urge the remainder of the programme than it could possibly stand by taking sides.

The opportunity to compel the acceptance of the details of the peace-without-victory formula—through the operation, if necessary, of justifiable economic pressure, and encouragement to the democratic forces working in all countries for the overthrow of imperialism—probably will never again be paralleled in the world's history.

But, having pronounced for a peace without victory in

January, Wilson went to war in April to destroy the opportunity for such a peace, and to postpone for two years the realization of a peace of any kind.

Although America did not save the Entente from defeat, it did determine the Entente victory. Upon America must fall the weight of the responsibility for the continuation of the world travail after 1917, as well as a large share of the responsibility for the character of the "peace" that was ultimately imposed.

A favorite theory of apologists for Wilson is that the President hoped and expected to procure a democratic peace by going to war, and that his failure to realize the promised formula was because he was deceived and finally "beaten" at Paris by the Entente statesmen.

But Wilson had the past records of the Entente governments before him. His arguments for neutrality in 1916, 1915, and 1914 indicate that he was fully aware that democracy could not be served by America's joining what he termed "this chaos of hostile and competing ambitions."

And if the previous record of the Entente governments was not enough, Wilson had before him, also, ample evidence of the aims of the very Entente statesmen with whom he was about to ally himself.

Although the secret treaties had not yet been published, the concrete aims of the Entente had been sufficiently acknowledged to make it quite clear that they were as far as possible from the peace-without-victory formula. The British Colonial Secretary and the Japanese Foreign Minister had both announced that the German colonies would not be returned. The Entente reply to the German overtures, dated December 30, 1916, had declared for general reparation. At the Paris Economic Conference, the Entente governments had agreed to prosecute a relentless trade war after the war was ended. In his speech reply-

ing to Wilson's December peace note, Lloyd George had told Parliament: "We have to exact damages." Finally, in the joint Allied notes replying to the Wilson note, the Entente had acknowledged a purpose not only to exact damages from the enemy countries, but to dismember them —to wrest territory from Germany, from Austria and from Turkey.

Wilson could not have been deceived. He must have known, furthermore, that once he threw in his lot with the Entente Allies, he placed himself in a less strategic position effectively to persuade or compel them to adopt the programme to which he had proclaimed allegiance.

Did Wilson, indeed, ever attempt to persuade or compel his allies to adopt that programme? On the contrary, the "Wilson principles," in the hands of Wilson, became a strikingly serviceable instrument for assisting the Entente to realize to the full its programme of conquest and spoliation through a dictated and crushing peace—*and the more closely we examine the Wilson maneuvers, the more we are forced to conclude that this was their sole purpose.*

They served to deceive the American public, and, to a considerable extent, the democratic elements in the Allied countries, as to the character of the peace that was intended, and so contributed vitally to the ability of our coalition to carry forward the war to a victorious conclusion. They served also to deceive the public of the enemy countries, and to some extent, the enemy statesmen, and so persuaded them ultimately to place themselves in our hands.

What caused the Germans to sue for an immediate peace in October, 1918? Military reverses, in part, but only in part. The immediately decisive factor was the German revolution. And a decisive cause of the German revolution unquestionably was a faith of the German people that

the expulsion of the Kaiser and his party would open the way for an immediate peace on a tolerable basis.

The Germans did not appeal to any of the Allied governments for peace. Nor did the Austrians. And they made clear the reason why—that the Entente terms, so far as they were revealed, were unacceptable. They appealed to Wilson, in the name of the "Wilson principles," as voiced not merely in the peace-without-victory address, but in the war message, and on numerous occasions, down to only eight days before the German offer. They specified the Wilson terms laid down on January 8, and in subsequent addresses, offering to conclude an immediate peace on those terms *and no others*. They quit fighting only when Wilson and the Allied governments had expressly accepted the offer to conclude peace on the specified terms, subject only to two amendments; first, a reservation upon the point of the freedom of the seas; second, a qualification that Germany should make compensation for damage done to the civilian population of the Allies.

We have seen how Wilson, in laying down the general armistice terms, violated his promises to the Germans, of equality in the field and at the peace table, provided only they would reform their government. Under the most solemn assurances, however, that the actual settlement would be as agreed upon, the Germans accepted the armistice conditions, surrendered their fleet, gave up their rolling stock, and bowed to other conditions which placed them in a position where they had to depend upon our good faith and our plighted word.

Can any circumstances be imagined that would carry a weightier moral obligation to hold to a stipulated bargain?

Under these circumstances, every departure from the

Fourteen Points, or the principles laid down in the subsequent addresses—subject only to the amendments referred to—would seem to constitute a breach of international faith at least as obliquitous as the German violation of the Treaty of 1839.

Indeed, the Belgian *scrap of paper* would appear insignificant in comparision, inasmuch as in the present case was involved not merely a compact with a given nation, but a pledge to all the world, including the peoples of the Entente countries, including ourselves—a pledge to apply certain principles to the conclusion of a certain peace, not merely as a matter of justice to an enemy nation, but *primarily* in order that the peace of *all* peoples might be made secure, and a lasting service rendered to the cause of democracy.

It may be that the two amendments, and especially the second one, were inserted intentionally to provide a loophole for repudiating the entire "Wilson programme," but nothing of the sort was suggested at the time.

On the other hand, Wilson himself, on a number of occasions, expressly held that they did not vitiate it. In announcing the armistice terms to Congress, he said: "The Allied governments have accepted the bases of peace which I outlined to Congress on the 8th of January last, as the Central Empires also have." And in his Christmas speech to the American expeditionary forces: "It happened that it was the privilege of America to present the chart for peace, and now the process of settlement has been rendered comparatively simple by the fact that all nations concerned have accepted that chart."

Under these circumstances, was not Wilson obligated, by every consideration of personal and national honor, to hold to the specified "chart," even if his allies went back on it, to make a separate peace, if need be; and if he were tricked,

deceived, or beaten, by the Entente statesmen, not to make a secret of it, but to proclaim the fact to all the world? Could he do less and keep the faith?

No one, having read the secret treaties, will maintain that the Entente governments ever intended to carry out their agreement to make peace on the "Wilson terms." It happens that there is no evidence that Wilson had any more intention of keeping the faith in this matter than did they. A number of the secret treaties were published a year before the armistice was signed. Though he continued his pledges of a peace of equality, Wilson did not require their repudiation. The salient fact of the whole matter is that, having lured the Germans into the net with the "Wilson terms," Wilson promptly threw the "Wilson terms" into the wastebasket, forgot every promise he had made of equality to the German people provided they should reform their government, agreed to a peace based on the secret treaties, placed his hand and seal upon almost the entire Entente programme of murder and robbery, and in the end defended this course to his own people as an act of justice and of honor. (See Chapter XXXVI.)

No one else could have done the thing except Wilson, for no one else had so wormed his way into the confidence of the peoples of the earth. Wilson's work at Paris and Versailles must go down in history as a gigantic treachery, not only to the German, Austro-Hungarian, Bulgarian, and Turkish governments, and the peoples under them, but to all the rest of us; treachery to all the subject peoples under the heel of the Entente, to whom he had promised self-determination; treachery to all the independent small states of the world, to whom he had promised freedom from fears of aggression; treachery to the American people and the people of the Entente countries, to whom he had promised deliverance from future wars and preparations for war.

How vast the betrayal can be realized only by glancing again at the "Wilson terms" and comparing them with the terms written into the treaty.

As has been seen, the Fourteen Points do not harmonize in every respect with the original Wilson formula as to the terms of a democratic and permanent peace. (Chapter XX.) There are several variations in concrete detail, in the direction of a peace of conquest. Yet if honestly applied, in the light of the principles laid down in the subsequent addresses, they would have realized, at least, a share of the Wilson promises. They would have given Germany and the other enemy countries a tolerable peace. They would have gone a long way toward finding the permanent and democratic peace which all the peoples of the world had been led to hope for from the Messiah, Wilson, and which all governments of the world professed to desire.

Of the Fourteen Points, only two were genuinely embodied in the peace arrangements, the one providing for the restoration of Belgium, the other for an independent Poland. If the reference to Alsace-Lorraine be taken as requiring unconditional cession of this territory to France, then it can be said that three of the Fourteen Points were embodied in the settlement.

The first point, providing for the abolition of secret diplomacy, was made a huge mockery throughout the conference, and continues so. The second point, providing for the freedom of the seas, was abandoned before Wilson's ship touched a European port. The third point, providing for the removal of all economic barriers and the establishment of an equality of trade conditions, was reversed. Trade handicaps were placed upon Germany, and elaborate provisions were made to hold that country in economic subjection to the governments dictating the peace.

The fourth point, promising a reduction of armaments, was flouted. The defeated governments were compelled to agree to arbitrary reduction of armaments, while the victors were left free. Article 8 of the so-called covenant, which purports to cover this point, does not provide for compulsory reduction of armaments, or limitations thereon, either immediately or at any time.

The fifth point, relating to the adjustment of colonial claims, would require all colonies, by whomever claimed, to be disposed of either by plebiscites or restoration to their former "owners." No action of any kind was taken on behalf of the colonies "owned" by the enemies of Germany, while the German colonies were parceled out, more or less unequally, among the governments dictating the peace.

The sixth point, providing for the evacuation of all Russian territory and "the independent determination of her own political development and national policy," and "a sincere welcome into the society of free nations under institutions of her own choosing" was not adopted on paper, and was reversed in action. The governments dictating the peace invaded Russian territory in larger numbers and made war on the existing Russian government, seeking to set up another government not of the choosing of the Russian people. They did not invite Russia to join their league. They parceled out bits of Russian territory among their protégés.

The ninth point, providing for a readjustment of the frontiers of Italy "along clearly recognizable lines of nationality" was violated insofar as Italy's new frontiers took in Germans, Slavs, or other nationalities.

The tenth point, promising to safeguard the place of Austria-Hungary among the nations, was abandoned. Austria-Hungary was dismembered, in accordance with the

secret treaties, and to the advantage of the governments dictating the peace and their smaller protégés.

The eleventh point, promising that the relations of the several Balkan states to one another should be "determined by friendly counsel along historically established lines of allegiance and nationality," was not complied with. The relations between these states were determined, instead, by the selfish interests of the governments dictating the peace, and the bribes secretly promised to Greece and Rumania for participation on the side of the Entente.

The twelfth point, providing that "the Turkish portions of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty," was reversed. The victors proceeded to launch one new war after another in an effort to conquer and divide the Turkish provinces.

The fourteenth point, holding out a promise of a genuine league of nations, was not fulfilled. No "general association of nations" was formed, and no effort was made to form one. Article 10, of the so-called covenant of the League of Nations purporting to guarantee members thereof against aggression, does not meet the implied promise for a mutual guarantee for *all* states against aggression.

That the Fourteen Points were not to be interpreted as justifying, in any respect, a departure from the pledge to Germany of justice through equality, provided only that country should be brought under the control of a parliamentary government, is seen in these words from the address of the Fourteen Points:

> We have no jealousy of German greatness, and there is nothing in this programme that impairs it. We grudge her no achievement or distinction of learning, or of pacific enterprise such as have made her record very bright and enviable. We do not wish to injure her or to block in any way her legitimate influence or power. We do not wish to fight her, either with arms or with hostile arrange-

ments of trade, if she is willing to associate herself with us and the other peace-loving nations of the world in covenants of justice and law and fair dealing.

We wish her only to accept a place of equality among the peoples of the world—the new world in which we now live, instead of a place of mastery.

Neither do we presume to suggest to her any alteration or modification of her institutions. But it is necessary, we must frankly say, and necessary as a preliminary to any intelligent dealing with her on our part, that we should know whom her spokesmen speak for when they speak to us, whether for the Reichstag majority or for the military party and the men whose creed is imperial domination.

In the message to Congress the previous December, after the most sweeping promises of a peace without victory to our enemies, provided only they should effect internal reforms, the President declared that the very "worst thing that can happen to the detriment of the German people," provided they should not effect internal reforms, was exclusion from the League of Nations, and a peaceful boycott. In the speech of the Fourteen Points, referring to the principle of equality, he declared that *"unless this principle be made its foundation,* [the foundation of the peace] *no part of the structure of international justice can stand."* To the vindication of this principle, said he, the people of the United States, *"are ready to devote their lives, their honor, and everything they possess."* Finally, in the speech of September 27, he assured us that, *"No peace shall be obtained by any kind of compromise or abatement of the principles we have avowed as the principles for which we are fighting."*

Yet the settlement the world was asked to approve, instead of being "to the exclusion of selfish advantage even on the part of the victors," turned out to be to the exclusion of everything *except* the selfish advantage of the victors.

The victors realized every item of material gain that their might made possible. The vanquished were condemned to pay "to the full limit of their capacity."

What other "peace" in the history of civilization was so contemptuously and imperiously dictated? Where before was a nation commanded to agree to pay indefinite sums, and to abide by treaties, arrangements, and territorial changes, to be determined by the victors in the future? Where was a great people in modern times compelled to agree to a protracted supervision of its affairs so broad as practically to amount to an abolition of sovereignty? How could the terms have been made harsher without reacting to the financial disadvantage of the victors?

On the contrary, the terms were found so to react upon the victors that they were impelled almost immediately to begin revising them. The victors were placed in the ridiculous position of having spent the blood and the treasure of their people in order to prostrate a business rival, only to find that, for selfish reasons purely, they had to set him up in business again, loan him money, and start him once more toward the position that he had held before.[1]

In the face of the immediate scrapping of all prescribed conditions of a permanent and democratic peace, the so-called League of Nations was brought forward as promising to realize such conditions at some future time.

But the Wilson league failed as signally to meet the Wilson specifications of a genuine peace league as his actual terms fell below his promised terms.

Any bona fide peace league, the President made it plain

[1] Years ago Norman Angell informed us, in "The Great Illusion," that this is what would happen. The minority in each country who were responsible for the war were well aware that the masses, even of the victor nations, could never profit by it. The point that Angell did not bring out in "The Great Illusion" is that war *is* profitable to a powerful few, and it is to serve this few, regardless of the many, that modern governments go to war.

at every turn, must be a league of *all* nations *from the start;* a league of *equals,* a pure democracy. Since inner circles are a contradiction of equality, inner circles are expressly barred. As a guarantee against *clandestine* inner circles, all secrecy is barred. For America, a pledge is offered in advance that it shall be a party to no inner circle, whether open or secret. As to the obligations, one stands out above all others: "Mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity"; not for some states, but for all. There is to be an absence of special privilege upon the seas, and no trade hostilities. Finally, as a guarantee against the violent upset of our genuine peace league, or any of its fundamentals, by a minority, every state, however virtuous, must render itself physically incapable of aggression.

But the association which Wilson actually offered us excludes all former enemies and many neutrals. Even within itself, it is a league of unequals. It has an inner circle, the Council; an inner circle within the Council, the Big Five; an inner circle within the Big Five, England-France-America; probably other inner circles. No outside state is guaranteed against aggression. Economic hostilities are a part of its bone and sinew. Not *one* of the fundamental requirements is complied with.

Time, we were told, would correct all shortcomings. But the five old gentlemen who framed the League in secret, and who determined upon the charter members, took every precaution against time's correcting anything. The covenant cannot be amended without the unanimous consent of the Council. The Assembly can never overrule the Council. New members are to be received, not on general terms open to all applicants, but on special terms laid down to a given applicant. It turns out that nobody may have anything to say in the affairs of any of the Big Five. They even protect themselves from one another. For this rea-

son, the "safeguards," of which we heard so much from Wilson's political opponents, are not of as great importance as asserted. It turns out that practically nothing can be done without unanimous consent of the Council. Which means that any contemplated undertaking can be blocked forever by a single member. Which also means that the League will be forever at the mercy of the most reactionary member. The covenant of the Wilson League of Nations would make it safe from democracy.

For the Wilson peace of victory and his league of victors there is only one conceivable defense, the official defense —purity versus depravity. Nothing is defensible except on the theory of the utter righteousness of the Big Five, the utter depravity of the Central Powers, and the inferiority of the other governments and peoples of the world. Everything that the Big Five did or could do is defensible under this theory. It is a convenient theory. Purity can do no wrong—no wrong can be done to depravity.

"The object of the war is attained," Wilson told Congress, November 11, 1918, "and attained with a sweeping completeness which even now we do not realize. Armed imperialism . . . is at an end, its illicit ambitions engulfed in black disaster. . . . The arbitrary power of the military caste of Germany is discredited and destroyed."

Yet in a speech before the French Senate, January 20, 1919, he mentioned the German peril as still existent, saying: "It [the awakened world] knows that not only France must organize against this peril, *but that the world must organize against it.*"

Did our President profess to believe still in the German peril only because he was even then planning a settlement defensible under no other theory?

The practical value of the German-peril theory can be appreciated only when it is seen how it is applied to the details of the great settlement.

The victor wishes to strip the vanquished naked, appropriate his possessions, and chain him to a rock-pile. But sentence to fine and hard labor is defensible only if imposed upon the guilty by and for the righteous. So the Kaiser must be tried by an impartial jury of his virtuous enemies, who have already determined upon a settlement indefensible except on the theory of his utter guilt!

But the Kaiser is no longer in a position to pay. The German people can pay. So the distinction between the German people and the Kaiser is set aside. The delegates of the reformed German government, recalling the Wilson pledges, protest against being forced to pay for offenses formerly imputed only to the Kaiser. Clemenceau replies that the German people must be regarded as the accomplices of the German government. Wilson acquiesces. The victors must have their pay!

Even the German people are unable to satisfy the victors' lust for pay. So the other defeated states, for whose emancipation from the German power we professed to fight, must pay also. Even the oppressed peoples whom we liberated from these states, and who are now to form small states under our tutelage, must pay—all to the limit of their capacity.

The victors want pay, not in money alone, in goods, and in ships, but in land and its resources. Where self-determination or nationality can be pleaded as an excuse for taking this kind of pay, self-determination or nationality is duly pleaded. Where these principles are notoriously violated, some other principle is invoked. Where all principles are violated, there is always the peril theory to fall

back upon. "Precautions" must be taken against the beast, even though he has already submitted to the removal of his claws.

The victors want the German colonies. Purity administers colonies for the benefit of the inhabitants. The Germans, having exploited their colonies, have abused a sacred trust of civilization. The victors unselfishly assume the burden—haggling a good deal about the matter. In order to make it doubly clear that there is nothing sordid in the transaction, the burdens are assumed under the name of "mandatories." The "mandatory" theory serves another purpose still; it saves the value of the colonies from being charged on the credit side of the indemnity. Self-determination is a sacred principle, but it is not for "inferior" peoples. Dictatorships of the pure must be imposed upon the weak to "assist" them "until such a time as they shall be able to stand alone."

Was it an oversight that certain neutral nations were not invited to join the Wilson league—that universal self-determination was nowhere mentioned—that the freedom of the seas was forgotten—and all other essentials of a genuine peace league were lacking?

The answer is found in another line of questions: Would Lloyd George have been willing for his League of Nations to guarantee Persia against aggression by England?—Orlando for his league to guarantee Abyssinia against aggression by Italy?—Makino for his league to guarantee Siberia against aggression by Japan? Would Wilson himself have been willing for his league to guarantee Mexico against aggression by the United States?

Who is simple enough to imagine that Wilson ever expected to persuade England to grant self-determination to India, or Egypt; Japan to Korea; France to Morocco;

Italy to Tripoli? Or that Wilson himself intended to grant self-determination to Santo Domingo or Nicaragua? At a time when the largest number of subject peoples were actually in revolution to realize the freedom which Wilson had promised them, at a time when a greater number of subject peoples under one flag, the British flag, were fighting for self-determination than ever before in the world's history, Wilson not only turned a deaf ear to these subject peoples, but he approved of a "peace" handing over a large number of new subject populations to England, her allies and protégés.

As late as February 3, 1919, Wilson announced:

> The nations of the world are about to consummate a brotherhood which will make it unnecessary in the future to maintain those crushing armaments which make the peoples suffer almost as much in peace as they suffered in war. (Speech before French Chamber of Deputies.)

Yet, just before sailing for France, Wilson had urged upon Congress *"the uninterrupted pursuit"* of the policy of *"adhering to a definite method of development for the navy."*

It is plain enough why Wilson did not insist that the "Wilson terms" be put into practice. They were never intended for anything except propaganda.

The original Wilson theory, that victory could not bring peace out of the European mess, is supported not only by past realities, but by the immediate results of the victory that was gained. Seven months after the signing of the armistice, a British cabinet member informed us that twenty-three separate and distinct wars were then raging in Europe. We won victory, but not peace nor the probability of peace. It is because we fought not for peace but for the spoils of

war. We continued fighting only in order to collect the spoils of war.

After they were under our heel, we heard a great deal about the unrepentance of our enemies. Nothing could more emphatically demonstrate the unrepentance of our allies than our settlement and the secret treaties upon which it was based. These treaties reveal the considerations that caused our allies to bind themselves to fight on to victory, to fight until the enemy was crushed, no matter how repentant *he* might become, no matter what the cost to their own people.

By the beginning of 1917 our enemies had repented, sufficiently, at least, to sue for a peace of equality. But our allies did not repent; they fought on for purely business considerations.

It is no accident that our peace settlement realizes for the bankers of London and Paris the ambitions with which they approached war, and upon which their patriotism rested, that it realizes the wildest dreams of Entente imperialists during the past decade. An efficient business competitor is now eliminated. The encirclement of Germany is now complete. The victors now divide the "places in the sun" that had been held by Germany, and the other "places in the sun" which the balance of power had saved from them. Wilson himself let the cat out of the bag in his speech at Helena (Sept. 11, 1919) when he said:

> The merchants and manufacturers and bankers of Germany were making conquest of the world. All they had to do was to wait a little while longer, and long German fingers would have been stretched all through that country which never could have been withdrawn. *The war spoiled the game.*

But one game of this sort only leads to another. Hence, all of us begin to prepare for a new conflict.

The final reason why wars for democracy are impracticable in the present day is that no existing government of the first class is pure enough to serve democracy in any war. Not one is as much a democracy as an autocracy. Not one is capable of fighting for democracy. Armed imperialism is not at an end. In the victorious treaties, it registered its greatest triumph.

The severity of the Treaty of Versailles has been defended on the ground that Germany, if able, would have imposed conditions quite as severe. That is no doubt true. But we professed to go to war to prevent that kind of a peace from being imposed by anybody; while, as a matter of fact, our intervention was the one thing that made such a peace possible.

Assertions of his distinguished apologists to the contrary notwithstanding, no part of "Wilson idealism" went into the League covenant or any other part of the settlement. The only impression that Wilson gave to that settlement was its stamp of Pharisaism. To the scheme of Imperial England, Imperial Japan, and imperialistic France was attached the phraseology of Pharisee Wilson. The ideal of a world peace league, in the hands of Wilson, became a blind for an alliance of victors for the purpose of guaranteeing the material fruits of victory and asserting a world supremacy for themselves. The Wilson-Clemenceau-Lloyd George league turned out to be an imperialistic trust, masquerading as a company of angels; a modern Holy Alliance for the suppression of democracy at home and abroad, and the prosecution of more wars for business.

For our own autocrat in the White House, American lives were not a consideration; international law was not a consideration; democracy was not a consideration; American honor was not a consideration. All were sacrificed. Why, then, did we fight?

OUR WAR AND BUSINESS

XXVII

PATRIOTISM OF THE PROFIT-MAKERS

To what extent was America's war a war for business?

Did Woodrow Wilson lead America into war in order to serve the selfish interests of the few?

The answer is determined by looking into the essential facts. In the first place, *Wall Street wanted war.*

Not a single recognized spokesman of our greatest financial and industrial interests, anywhere in public life, expressed opposition to war during the critical weeks of February and March, 1917. On the contrary, our leading financiers themselves, who up to that period had seldom been quoted on political questions, personally endorsed the proposition of belligerency.

April 4, the New York *Times* said: "Not since Woodrow Wilson became President has any utterance of his met with such instant and hearty approval by leaders in the financial district as his war address to Congress." This conclusion was backed by a column of quotations. "It [the war message] was . . . exactly right," said Judge Gary, head of the U. S. Steel Corporation. "It was 100 per cent. American," said Frank Vanderlip, moving genius of the American International Corporation and head of the National City Bank. "The President's address was magnificent," said James Wallace, head of the Guaranty Trust Company. "It was well worth waiting for," said A. Barton Hepburn, another of our leading bankers. "The speech breathes the true spirit of the American people,"

said Martin Carey, of the Standard Oil Company. These opinions of the President's address, said the *Times,* "were echoed in one form or another by bankers, brokers, and executives in large number."

Nor can this attitude on the eve of war be taken as an eleventh-hour move to "get on the right side"; for the spokesmen of our large business interests openly favored war at a time when to "stand behind the President," was supposed to mean not belligerency, but pacifism. During the "armed neutrality" period, the Wall Street correspondent of the Philadelphia *Public Ledger* diagnosed financial sentiment (Mar. 22) as follows:

> Briefly stated, Wall Street believes that war is just one move ahead. And Wall Street is glad that it is so. The financial district here is unqualifiedly for war as soon as it can be declared. 'It is a good thing for the country,' one trust president declared. . . . This is the way Wall Street feels about the prospects of war. Only a few of the men thus interviewed were willing to have their names mentioned; their enthusiasm for war, however, was too real to be misunderstood.

Going back to the breaking of diplomatic relations, within five minutes after the news reached the financial district, according to the *Times:* "Wall Street was bright with the Stars and Stripes floating from banks and brokerage offices. Figuratively, *the street gave a concerted sigh of relief.*" On the Produce Exchange, 300 brokers sang "The Star Spangled Banner."

February 20, the New York Merchants' Association held what the *Herald* declared was "the greatest demonstration in the history of that organization." The organization drank to the President. During this period, the State and local Councils of Defense, upon which business leaders everywhere shone, were constituted. Business organizations besieged the President and Congress with petitions

for vigorous action. The directors of the National Safety Council, claiming to represent 2,814 American corporations employing 3,000,000 workmen, adopted resolutions "pledging to the President of the United States the loyal support of this organization in whatever measures may be necessary to defend the national honor and to protect the lives and property of Americans."

As early as December, Mr. Schwab had offered his vast plants to the government, in case of war, "at the government's price." This example was followed in February and March by many great corporations.

March 26, at the solicitation of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States, J. P. Morgan & Co. loaned the government $1,000,000 without interest and without security, for the purchase of supplies immediately desired in anticipation of war.

During March, J. P. Morgan, Mrs. E. H. Harriman, George Baker, Jr., Vincent Astor, and others of their class offered their private yachts for service as submarine chasers in the event of war. At the same time, Wall Street was giving the President the fullest assurances that it was ready to coöperate also in the matter of loans. March 23, we find Thomas W. Lamont delivering a patriotic address entitled "America Financially Prepared," in which he promised: "If the Treasurer should decide to issue a government obligation to-morrow for a billion dollars, the whole sum would be waiting for it."

One of the most effective things that big business did, in those critical weeks, in working its will for war, was to demand naval guns and crews for its ships and to tie up transportation and commerce until that demand was satisfied.

Immediately after the breaking of diplomatic relations, the International Mercantile Marine Company—a Brit-

ish-controlled corporation, in which, however, America's most powerful financiers are interested—began holding its ships in port. February 12, its president made formal application for naval guns and crews. At the same time the railroads, which are under the control of the same American financiers who are interested in the International Mercantile Marine Company, began to refuse shipments because of alleged congestion due to the ships' being held in port. This tying up of American domestic commerce "by Germany" was played upon with great effect by the press. When, on February 26, President Wilson appeared before Congress asking for authority to arm merchant ships, he was able to offer the argument that "our own commerce has suffered, is suffering . . . rather because so many of our ships are timidly keeping to their home ports than because American ships have been sunk."

Had there been any good reason to believe that the means of "protection," which the International Mercantile Marine demanded, would in fact protect, its demand for such means might be taken as sincere. But for many months, ships flying the British flag had been trying precisely the same means of "protection," and it had been proven that these means did not protect. Five weeks later, the President himself admitted that such protective measures were futile, *although meanwhile no new incidents had happened to render that truth any clearer than before.* (See Chapter VI.)

We may well take the President's word for this, especially as no one—much less the officials of the International Mercantile Marine—disputed it. Since this truth was as clear on February 26 as on April 2, the tying up of American shipping by big business in February and March cannot be explained in any other way except as a conspiracy to promote war sentiment.

Not only was Wall Street enthusiastically for war between February 3 and the declaration, but big business was a most powerful influence within the country working toward war previously to that period. The organs of publicity that were loudest in their calls to "stand behind the President" after February 3 were the same that previously had been most insistent on an unyielding policy toward Germany, and most tolerant of concessions to the Entente. The National Security League, and the Navy League, which carried on the intensive preparedness agitation throughout 1916, enjoyed the financial support of our richest millionaires. In that year, the United States Chamber of Commerce held a referendum of the 750 Chambers of Commerce throughout the country on the question of preparedness; ninety-five per cent. of them voted in favor of preparedness. The staging of the great preparedness parades, also in 1916, involved the expenditure of huge sums of money. Aside from any consideration of mere expenses, however, those parades would have been impossible without the hearty coöperation of the largest employers of labor and the most outstanding business leaders.

In February, 1917, Representative Calloway, on the floor of Congress, charged the Morgan interests with having, in March, 1915, organized and financed a huge propaganda machine embracing twelve influential publishers and 179 selected newspapers, for the purpose of manufacturing sentiment favorable to American participation in the war. These charges were renewed in May, 1921, by Representative Michelson of Illinois. The latter called attention to the fact that, in his history of the war, Gabriel Hanotaux tells of a conference with the late Robert Bacon, then a member of the Morgan firm, in 1914, in which he and Bacon drew up plans and specifications for a great scare

campaign in this country. Hanotaux also suggests that France was ready to make peace in 1914, but was dissuaded by Bacon and other American politicians, who gave assurances that they could ultimately bring America into the war on the side of France.

These charges are worth recording, but they are important only when taken in connection with other evidence. As a means to establishing the wish of our great financial interests for war, at least for some time before it was declared, they do not need to be proven. For, aside from the circumstantial evidence here given, any one who has read the Pujo Committee report on the Money Trust, showing the concentration of credit in the hands of three great banks, and the control of small banks by the big ones—and any one who appreciates the dependence of the more powerful organs of the press upon the dominant business interests of the communities which they serve, and especially upon the banks—will understand that the propaganda storm of the months preceding our entrance into the war would have been impossible without the approval and instigation of Wall Street.

As Wall Street wanted war before it came, so, after it came, *Wall Street promoted the war.*

"The first vigorous and effectual response to the call to arms came precisely from Wall Street," said the *Saturday Evening Post* editorially, July 7. This journal then proceeded to prove the proposition in a series of articles.

It cannot be denied. While the Conscription Bill was pending, great industrial corporations, milling firms, and banks, spent huge sums of their own money in the campaign for recruits. Merchant princes offered their stores for recruiting depots, and their employees for any capacity in

which the government might wish to use them. Financiers went about the country making speeches on democracy. In opposing the Conscription Bill in Congress, Representative Huddleston offered a formidable list of multimillionaires who favored conscription. Among them was John D. Rockefeller, Jr., who came out for conscription as the one means of "substituting real democracy for existing class distinctions" in America.

Mr. Harding, governor of the Federal Reserve Board, predicted, in an address, May 7, that the European war would be won by American bankers. By the middle of May, John D. Rockefeller, Jr. and Daniel Guggenheim had their feet under the table with Sam Gompers, arranging for brotherly coöperation between capital and labor for the period of the war. No American corporations had been more violent or successful foes of organized labor than the corporations under the tutelage of these gentlemen.

Five days after war was declared, America's great railroads voluntarily combined under one board for the purpose of coöperating with the government. The first detachments of Americans to go to France included the best engineering talent of these roads, cheerfully loaned by the management to the government. "Never in the history of the world," said Carl Vrooman, Assistant Secretary of Agriculture, May 11, "have business men shown as much patriotism and unselfishness as have been manifested, since the war began, by the business men of America." Said Samuel G. Blythe in the *Saturday Evening Post* (Jan. 12, 1918):

> It is the mere truth to say that we could not fight this war a minute, if the men with money in the United States refused to loan that money to the government. We never could have begun it, to say nothing of continuing it as far as we have continued it. . . . No

system of taxation that could be devised would have secured enough money for the war, or a tenth of enough money for the war. No system of levy that could have been put in operation, save confiscation, could do this.

Very true. Our men with money not only loaned that money in huge sums, but they procured the money of their customers, their employees, and the general public. To this end they devoted their personal time and energy, without limit, loaned their clerks and salesmen, donated their office facilities, and expended millions of dollars of their own money in advertising.

A list of America's most conspicuous boosters for the Liberty Loans would coincide with a list of America's most prominent financiers. Just to get the first loan well started, aside from the far larger subscriptions made by their corporations, about fifty of America's richest men were reported as making personal subscriptions of from one to twenty million dollars each.

The war work of the Red Cross began with Henry P. Davison, of the Morgan firm, as its head, with the title of Chairman of the War Council. Robert S. Lovett, one of the world's greatest railroad directors, became Chairman of the Red Cross Coördinating Committee. When the President reorganized the Red Cross on a military basis, he honored Davison with the title of Major General, while five other Red Cross officials from the banking world were commissioned Brigadier Generals.

In the early days of the war, several of our first families, led by the W. K. Vanderbilts, offered their country villas for use as Red Cross hospitals. When New York, like other cities, was divided into districts for solicitation, the soliciting teams were led by members of America's richest families. Special dividends were declared by our largest

corporations, to be paid, not to the stockholders, but on behalf of the stockholders to the Red Cross. Contributions to the Red Cross, either direct or in the form of dividends, from such corporations or their heads, ranged from half a million to two million dollars, during 1917 alone. In the first ten months of the war the personal contributions of John D. Rockefeller to all war activities were reported as totaling $70,000,000.

In September it was announced that Frank A. Vanderlip had turned over his great affairs to subordinates, to devote his entire time, as chairman of the War Savings Certificate Commission, to floating the two billion dollar War Savings Certificate Issue authorized by Congress.

Of inestimable importance in the promotion of the war were the many unofficial patriotic organizations, to which the leading business men of every community gave their support, and particularly the work of the great newspapers, news associations, and magazines. From the declaration of war until the Germans quit, not one of the great vehicles of publicity breathed a suggestion that our war was a mistake, or that the official war propaganda was unsound, or that the government should attempt to arrange its differences with the enemy by agreement. In the demand for victory and a dictated peace, there was not a dissenting voice. Unlimited news space was devoted to the official propaganda. Millions of dollars' worth of advertising space was donated outright. It is almost literally true to say that, as a whole, the American press gave as loyal service as if it had been founded for the sole purpose of war promotion and had been edited by Mr. Creel himself. Anything like this would have been unthinkable, without an almost absolute unanimity for the war on the part of big business.

Not only did Wall Street promote the war, but *Wall Street directed the war,* in nearly all its phases outside the purely military and naval operations.

The President, of course, was supreme in every realm. But the details were attended to by officials of America's banks, railroads, manufacturing, mining, and shipping corporations, who, while acting for the government, were paid by these corporations.

Never in the history of America, probably never in the history of any country, had there been such open and direct control of governmental activities by the very rich. Theoretically and legally, the ultimate control rested in Congress. In practice, the power of a Senator or Representative was less than that of a doorkeeper in the office of any of the money kings whom the President appointed to direct the course of America, domestically, in the war "to make the world safe for democracy."

Two of the most important organizations to function as special war bodies were provided for by law, and even constituted before war was declared; indeed, at a time when the President was still promising to "keep us out of war." They were the Shipping Board and the Council of National Defense.

As originally constituted, the Shipping Board consisted of an attorney for large Pacific Coast lumber interests, a multimillionaire lumberman and exporter, a railroad manager, and two shipping magnates.

At the beginning of the war, the Council of National Defense, with its numerous subsidiary committees, emerged as the general clearing house of war activities, not only of those activities having to do with the "education" and repression of the public, but of those concerned with industry. The Council of National Defense, proper, is com-

posed of six members of the President's cabinet. The real working body of the Council turned out to be the Advisory Commission. The Advisory Commission, as originally appointed by the President, consisted of seven members, four of them conspicuous business men. The chairman was Daniel Willard, president of a great railroad. The other three business members were Bernard M. Baruch, a noted Wall Street speculator; Julius Rosenwald, president of America's greatest mail-order house and closely identified with large industrial corporations; and Howard E. Coffin, vice-president of the Hudson Motor Corporation. The minority consisted of a labor leader, a president of a college, and a medical man. It was these seven men who, secretly and illegally, according to Representative Graham, chairman of the Select Committee on Expenditures in the War Department (Report of July 7, 1919) worked out the details of the President's war programme months before the declaration of war.

So far as matters of business were concerned, the function of the Advisory Commission was to advise the Council proper what to buy for the war, where to buy, how much to pay, how to "encourage production," how, in a word, to deal with the business interests. In practice this gave the decision, in nearly every instance, to the Advisory Commission.

In practice it gave the decision, not to the Advisory Commission as a whole, but because of the allotment of work within that body, to the four business members thereof. They divided the field among them, and each in turn divided his special field into smaller fields to be handled by sub-committees under his control. A month before the declaration of war, the functionless nature of the Council proper was made more clear by the appointment of a director, to whom was turned over the details of such work as

the Council proper was supposed to do. This director was another official of a great corporation, W. S. Gifford, of the American Telephone & Telegraph Company. Mr. Gifford later became comptroller of the telephone monopoly when it was taken over by the government.

As the sub-committees of the four business members of the Advisory Commission were composed of men selected from corporations dominating the particular field in which it was appointed to function, we have the remarkable situation of the government's handing over to the corporations of the country the decision as to what the government should pay them for their products and how in general it should deal with them.

The Steel and Steel Products Committee was headed by Elbert H. Gary, chairman of the U. S. Steel Corporation; James A. Farrell, president of the same concern; and Charles M. Schwab, president of the Bethlehem Steel Company. The function of these gentlemen as government officials was to meet with the representatives of the steel industry—meaning their own immediate subordinates in their own private business—to make provision for "co-operation" in the procurement of supplies, and to arrange prices "by voluntary agreement"!

The Copper Committee was headed by John D. Ryan, president of the Anaconda Copper Company—the successor of the Amalgamated, of Thomas Lawson fame—and the presidents of the Calumet & Hecla and the Utah Copper companies.

The Locomotives Committee was headed by the vice-presidents of the Baldwin Locomotive Company and the American Locomotive Company. The Express Committee was composed of the vice-presidents of the four great express companies. A. C. Bedford, president of the Standard Oil Company, headed the Oil Committee. P. A. S.

Franklin, president of the International Mercantile Marine Company, headed the Shipping Committee.

The Brass Committee was headed by the president of the American Brass Company, the Nickel Committee by the president of the International Nickel Company, the Sulphur Committee by the president of the Union Sulphur Company, the Lumber Committee by the president of the National Lumbermen's Association, etc., etc., etc.—all government officials.

The function of these gentlemen was to divide up the government's business—among themselves; to recommend, practically to fix, a price to be paid by the government—to themselves.

As the months went by, this scheme underwent various alterations, usually with a view to concentrating vast decisions into fewer hands. On the whole, the alterations did not lessen the directing power of Wall Street, but only vested such power in the hands of fewer and more conspicuous personages.

The War Industries Board, at the beginning, was headed by a manufacturer of munitions, Frank A. Scott, who was also chairman of the General Munitions Board. The Central Purchasing Commission consisted of four millionaire business men: Mr. Baruch, of Wall Street; Judge Lovett, the railroad magnate; Robert S. Brookings, and Herbert Hoover. Later Daniel Willard, the railroad president, served as chairman of the War Industries Board, to be succeeded a little later by Mr. Baruch.

Meanwhile, the Food Administration was in the hands of the great corporations most conspicuous in the manufacture and distribution of foods. The headquarters of the Food Administration in New York were the offices of the American Sugar Refining Company, known as the Sugar Trust.

The president of the American Sugar Refining Company acted as chairman of the International Sugar Committee, while the manager of the California-Hawaii Sugar Refining Company acted as head of the sugar division of the Food Administration. The sugar division, almost throughout, was officered by men taken directly from the offices of the Sugar Trust, which paid their salaries, following the system in general practice elsewhere.

We find a similar situation in the meat and livestock, and other divisions, of the Food Administration. Joseph Cotton, an attorney for Wilson & Co., one of the Big Five packing firms, acted as head of the meat and livestock division. Other important positions in this division were held by employees of Swift & Co. and the other packers. Edward Chambers, vice-president of the Santa Fe Railroad, acted as head of the transportation division. F. S. Brooks, of Swift & Co. acted as Chambers' chief assistant. A. C. Loring, head of the great Minneapolis milling firm, the Pillsbury Flour Mills Company, acted as northwestern representative of the Food Administration in regard to flour and feed prices. To head the government's Grain Corporation the President selected a well-known speculator from the Chicago wheat pit.

In the Fuel Administration we find the same scheme as elsewhere. A coal operator in private life acted as the government's director of bituminous coal distribution. An oil operator in private life acted as the government's oil administrator. The subordinates of these and other Fuel Administration officials were selected from the large coal and oil corporations.

When the government formally took over the railroads, the details of administration were dictated and carried out by a group of railroad presidents headed by A. H. Smith, president of the New York Central, and Judge Lovett, head

of the Harriman lines. When Director General McAdoo resigned, he was succeeded by a railroad official, Walker D. Hines, chairman, general counsel, and director of the Santa Fe Company.

Eleven months after the declaration of war, the country was divided into ten munitions districts. Over each district was placed a district chief of the production division of the Ordnance Department, a government official. In every instance the district chief was a captain of industry. Overseeing the district chiefs generally, as head of the procurement division of the Ordnance Department, was Samuel McRoberts, vice-president of the National City Bank. Guy E. Tripp, president of the Westinghouse Electric Company, was chief of the production division of the same department. Mr. McRoberts and Mr. Tripp, like numerous others holding similar positions, were given military titles by the President.

Charles M. Schwab, the greatest steel maker in the world—and incidentally, at the same time, the greatest shipbuilder—became director general of the Emergency Fleet Corporation. The position of general manager of the Fleet Corporation was abolished in order to give Schwab "complete supervision and direction of the work of shipbuilding" —including that going on in his own yards. Edward N. Hurley, a millionaire captain of industry, remained chairman of the Shipping Board and president of the Fleet Corporation.

P. A. S. Franklin, president of the International Mercantile Marine Company, was given direct control of the routing of all merchant and passenger vessels leaving American ports. John D. Ryan, president of the Anaconda Copper Company, the world's greatest copper producer, owner of other copper-producing corporations, became director

of aircraft production, exercising powers analogous to those of Schwab in the field of ocean ships.

D. C. Jackling, another large copper producer, was placed in charge of the production of T. N. T., as well as of construction of government plants to increase the output of this explosive.

Edward R. Stettinius, one of the twelve Morgan partners, became director of purchases and supplies for the War Department, superseding the War Industries Board in the purchase of billions of dollars' worth of merchandise. Mr. Stettinius also became a member of the War Council, and when this body was abolished, he was named an Assistant Secretary of War, with the same functions as before.

Meanwhile, in Paris, Paul Cravath, chief counsel of Schwab's private steel company, was sitting upon the Interallied War Council, representative of the American democracy. A little later we find Thomas W. Lamont, one of the Morgan partners, acting as official representative of the Treasury Department in the peace conferences.

When the British Foreign Mission arrived in America in April, 1917, Mr. Balfour, its leader, received President Wilson, held a conference with J. P. Morgan, and dined with Mr. Stettinius, all in the same day. The incident is symbolic of the merging of Wall Street and the government for war purposes.

If unanimity for war, both before and after, and active voluntary service, without direct compensation, be the measure of patriotism, then the enthusiastic declaration of a Liberty Loan orator, that Wall Street is not only the centre of American finance, but is also the fount of American patriotism, will have to go down in history as gospel truth.

XXVIII

THE PROFITS OF PATRIOTISM

WHY the patriotism of Wall Street?

Can Wall Street, which had never before pretended to be the home of altruism, which had always acknowledged that its beginning and end was profit, be readily accepted in its war-time rôle of unselfish and resplendent champion of the common good?

If it appears that Wall Street expected to profit by our war, did profit, and stands to profit still more, what becomes of its professions of patriotism?

It is easy to understand how any one expecting to make money out of war, with all its horrors, would incline to caution in admitting the fact. The opponents of war, all along, had been charging that Wall Street wanted war because there would be money in it for Wall Street. Nevertheless, evidence of gleeful anticipation is not lacking.

An article by B. C. Forbes, printed in the May number of *Hearst's Magazine* (1917), and evidently written in March, was based on the question put to business leaders: "What will war do to America?" There were no pessimistic answers. C. A. Stone, of the firm of Stone & Webster, president of the American International Corporation, and head of the Water Power Trust, said that "on the whole, the new turn of events can be accepted with fortitude from the strictly business point of view." George M. Reynolds, president of the Continental and Commercial National Bank, pointed out that "it must be remembered that a rich nation at war, or preparing for war, spends enor-

mous sums of money, and sets all forms of industry in motion."

Reporting the receipt in Wall Street of the news of the breaking of diplomatic relations, the New York *Times* said, February 4:

> In many brokerage offices, the assembled customers stayed long after the half day's work was done, discussing market and banking prospects in a more optimistic frame of mind than in many weeks.

The financial columns of the *American,* referring to the same incident (Feb. 19), said that it had "converted some of the most obstinate pessimists to the view that better times are coming in the stock market." Looking forward to war, the National City Bank said, in its statement of March 1, that "there is no reason to anticipate that a declaration of war would have any effect upon the immediate business situation other than that resulting from added stimulus." One month later, this bank was able to say that its prophecy was already beginning to be fulfilled: "The whole industrial situation has tightened up, for besides the capacity taken up by government orders, the imminence of government orders has given a spur to other business."

Once war had been safely declared, we find Frank A. Vanderlip, president of the same great financial institution, in a patriotic speech, May 17, enthusiastically prophesying that, as a result of the war, *"a million new springs of wealth will be developed."*

In registering pleasant anticipation, as each new step was taken toward war, the voice of the Stock Exchange, which expresses the composite sentiment of the financial world, was less cautious than the voices of individual financiers.

Said the *Times,* February 4:

Stocks rebounded sharply yesterday on receipt of definite news from Washington that the break with Germany had occurred. . . . Bethlehem Steel rose 30 points, and the new Bethlehem B. shares gained 10¾ . . . So eager were buyers for certain steel and copper stocks that 2 points or more frequently existed between a purchase price and the next bid price.

Said the *Tribune,* March 6:

On Saturday it was generally believed that the bill providing for the arming of merchant ships would be passed, and stocks gained considerably as a result.

For the next period we quote the *American,* March 12:

Wall Street has accepted the arming of ships and the special session of Congress as the second step along the road that leads to war with Germany, and on that theory has bought stocks. . . . Stocks have been purchased on the theory that war means a boom for a time . . . Wall Street is proceeding on the assumption that war is inevitable.

Finally, the war message sent stocks soaring. "United States Steel was up 2⅛ points on first sales. . . . Bethlehem jumped up to 142, up 1¼. Marine preferred opened at 86, up 1⅛," etc.

Were these rosy anticipations fulfilled? They were.

To appreciate how much American intervention meant to the Wall Street pocketbook, one must first realize the unprecedented state of prosperity at the beginning of 1917, as well as the shaky conditions upon which it rested and the imminence of its decline.

The year 1916 had been by far the most prosperous in the history of American industry and finance. This prosperity was directly due to the European war. Between August, 1914, and February, 1917, more than 10,500,000,000

dollars' worth of goods were shipped out of America, an excess over imports of five and one-half billion dollars. In exchange for food, munitions, and other supplies, sold to the Entente countries, American capitalists had increased their stocks of gold by nearly a billion dollars, had bought back two billion dollars' worth of securities in American railways and other corporations owned in Europe, and had loaned something like two billion dollars to the Entente governments besides. They had also inherited a large share of the neutral trade of the belligerents, and out of the war gains had loaned several hundred millions to neutral countries in Latin America and elsewhere.

But the profits represented by such huge transactions were only a minor fraction of the immediate war profits. The greatest harvest was gathered in at home. The demand for supplies abroad made it possible to run up domestic prices to unprecedented levels. With all the inflation of foreign trade, for every dollar's worth of food and other supplies sold abroad, twenty-five dollars' worth was sold at home. The increase in domestic prices was only partially offset by increases in returns to the farmer and in wages. The American public in peace was paying greater war profits to Wall Street than were the warring nations themselves.

The total winnings in that hectic period, of the few men who control the banking, the shipping, the manufacturing, the mining, and the transportation of the country will probably never be revealed. It was frequently stated that the young J. P. Morgan made more money in two years than the senior Morgan had made in all the days of his life. There is evidence a-plenty that, whatever the ultimate figures, the war profits were such as to drive their possessors quite mad with the reality, and even more with the possibility of future winnings.

But there were certain flaws in this happy situation. In the first place, it could not go on indefinitely. In the second place, a part of what had been gained was not yet wholly secure.

The war profits could not go on indefinitely, first, because the war could not go on indefinitely. And by the beginning of 1917, it was evident that the war profits could not go on even if the war went on—in the same way in which the war was then going; also that a great part of what had been gained might be lost.

When the war trade was in its first phases, Wall Street was afraid of nothing more terrible than the cessation of the conflict. When the German government first began making peace overtures, before the end of 1915, American munitions shares fell from 5 to 40 per cent. This was simply an expression of a fear that peace would put an end to the boom. Later, the periodical German overtures depressed the stock market in each case in proportion to the probability that such overtures would bring results. As late as December, 1916, the peace parleys sent American stocks down 15 to 20 per cent. But by the beginning of 1917, Wall Street had come to fear, even more than the cessation of the conflict, the continuation of the war to an indecisive end.

Wall Street would have been still more afraid of a German victory, had a decisive German victory been at any time within the realm of probability. But Wall Street was really never afraid of a German victory.[1] Nevertheless, the beginning of 1917 found Wall Street facing a crisis.

That crisis was due to the approaching exhaustion of Entente credit in America, coupled with the inability of the

[1] We have the word of Alexander Dana Noyes, financial editor of the New York *Times*, in "Financial Chapters of the War," that Wall Street picked the Entente Allies to win at the beginning, and never wavered from this judgment during those early years.

Entente to deliver the knockout blow. The war trade was based on gold imports, security purchases, and credits. As the supply of gold and securities was drawn upon, the trade came to depend more and more upon credit. Some of the vast loans which Wall Street made to the Entente, to keep up the war trade, were secured, in part, by collateral which might not be greatly affected by the outcome of the war, such as American securities. But a fraction of the collateral, such as British securities, depended for its value upon the future stability of the British Empire. Some of the loans, indeed, were wholly unsecured, and the repayment rested solely upon the continued solvency of the Entente governments. Of this class were the original loan of $500,000,000, known as the Anglo-French loan, and the loans to French municipalities.

When Henry P. Davison returned from abroad about the first of November, 1916, he had announced that the next Allied loan would have to be unsecured. But American bankers were already so overloaded with Allied loans, unsecured or inadequately secured, that they were loth to take more.

In December, a marked decline in actual Entente purchases was reported. In the same month, England announced its decision to manufacture all its own shells as soon as existing contracts in America should expire. This would hit all the great steel and munitions companies. The decision was declared to be due to enlargement of Entente manufacturing facilities, but it is probable that the ability of England and France to fill their own munitions needs was purposely exaggerated, as a maneuver to persuade America to go on accepting their depreciated credit. In January, a British manufacturer spectacularly entered the American field and secured a contract to furnish shells for the American navy. This was no doubt another maneuver.

That future war orders depended, not upon enlarged Entente facilities but upon further extensions of credit, indeed, was admitted by Mr. Davison in a published interview, November 3: "For a time Europe was forced to place their orders in America, but now, *unless they make favorable terms,* France and England will make their own munitions." "Favorable terms" meant nothing more nor less than inadequately secured credits, which Mr. Davison and Mr. Morgan were finding more and more trouble in placing among their associates in America.

So, at the beginning of 1917, Wall Street was faced with two contingencies: first, the end of the war boom—due to the exhaustion of Allied credit; second, the possible loss of a large part of $2,000,000,000 in loans, principal and interest—due to the inability of the Entente to score a decisive victory.

While a German victory was out of the question—at least so far as England was concerned—no one could foresee the internal political results of an indecisive war, especially if the struggle went on for years to economic as well as military exhaustion. No one could guarantee that there would not be far-reaching social upheavals. Repudiation of debts was always possible. Repudiation aside, British and French bonds would be worth much less in the event of a compromise peace than in the event of victory. Each changing aspect of the military situation already affected the price of these bonds.

In a word, not only future war profits stood in jeopardy, but past war profits also. Wall Street had bet its money on the Entente horse. Wall Street had backed its choice so heavily that the interests of the Entente governments had become the interests of Wall Street. To the Wall Street pocketbook, a peace without victory was unthinkable. And it was becoming more and more apparent that a decisive

victory was possible only by means of American intervention on the side of the Entente.

At the beginning of 1917, war on the side of the Entente was the one thing that would solve all problems. First, it would insure another long period of war orders. Second, it would insure Allied credit. Third, it might be so manipulated as to serve in the attainment of certain other advantages of a permanent nature, toward which Wall Street had been hungrily looking. (See Chapter XXXI.) Considering any of these three advantages, American participation in the war against Germany would constitute the most tremendous and profitable coup in the history of American finance.

So it came to pass. The harvest upon American belligerency began to be gathered, even before the declaration of war, in what may be termed the profits of expectation. The crisis found our "big men" loaded heavily with stocks and profiting by the rise. Said the New York *Sun's* financial column, April 9:

> Sentiment among bankers is patriotic and it is bullish . . . To many persons, long on stocks, war apparently merely spells another long period of abnormal profits for our corporations . . . The big men hold stocks.

The declaration of war found the "big men" long on commodities, as well as stocks, and the profits of expectation include the returns from soaring prices of food and other articles. In May, wheat reached $3.25 a bushel. No farmer profited by this. The American farmer had long since parted with the last of his crop at around $1.30. In August, cotton touched its highest mark for 45 years. It meant nothing to the grower; the middleman had long since acquired his product. The same is true of other staples.

The food profiteers of the spring of 1917 were denounced as "food hogs," "sharks," "traitors." An effort was made to create the impression that only a few irresponsible, low persons had brought about the situation. We were told that representative American business men were too patriotic to boost prices in the face of war. But such a general rise in prices could result only from the concerted action of the rich and powerful combinations which control the distribution and price of American commodities. Although wholesalers and retailers took profits where they could, if the word "traitor" applies to the parties responsible for the food riots of 1917, it must fall first upon men who were so soon to become conspicuous government officials at one dollar a year, or who paid the salaries of employees who acted as government officials.

After the profits of expectation, followed the profits of realization. Allied credit was not only insured; it was guaranteed. Allied trade, which, in the words of a financial circular, had come to be looked upon as a "pinchbeck," again became "the genuine article." The boom was prolonged. It became possible to advance wholesale prices in April on an average of two per cent. over March, making the total since the beginning of the European war 57 per cent. This was only a beginning. By the middle of May, the *Times* was able to say: "Business is still feeling the momentum imparted by the vast buying demand opened up when the United States declared war." This momentum rose, instead of falling—rose steadily for eighteen months, until the German collapse.

Of the profits of realization, the statements of the great corporations themselves tell the least of the story. In its efforts to dispel suspicion that Wall Street provoked the war for business reasons, the daily, weekly and monthly press sought to lead the public to believe that profits were

less in 1917 than in 1916. The approved method was to flash the figures of one or two corporations, and to make all deductions from them. For reasons that have been made clear, even were all immediate profits of all American corporations less in 1917 than in 1916, that would not change the fact that Wall Street greatly profited from American belligerency.

But the profits of a very large number of the richest corporations show an increase, even by their own statements. In other cases, where net gains are reported as less, it is often evident that the reported decrease is not real. In its report on profiteering, and in other reports, the Federal Trade Commission exposed many tricks of bookkeeping resorted to by the great corporations to conceal the extent of their gains from war contracts. Costs were fictitiously enhanced by account juggling. Officers' salaries were increased. The item of depreciation was padded. Interest on investment was included in cost. Fictitious valuation of raw material was resorted to. Inventories were manipulated.

Such practices are not flattering to the patriotism of our great financiers, but they were general. Indeed, minimization of profits is often evident to the eye of the casual reader, in the abbreviated reports of corporation statements as printed in the newspapers.

The earnings of the U. S. Steel Corporation for 1917 exceeded, by many millions, the face value of its common stock, a greater part of which is water. The figures were $528,757,615, as against $333,574,178 for 1916. They exceeded by $70,000,000 the combined earnings of the three years 1911, 1912 and 1913. After the deduction of income and excess profits taxes, depreciation, etc., the sum set aside for dividends was smaller than in 1916 by about twenty per cent. But the capital outlay for new plants,

etc., was more than double, while the total cash in bank, in demand loans, Liberty Bonds, Treasury certificates, etc., was $446,369,597, or more than twice as great as at the end of 1916.

The Bethlehem Steel Corporation likewise reported a smaller total, after income and excess profit taxes, interest charges, and greatly increased sums for depreciation were set aside. But, as acknowledged, the final net income was equal to $44.20 per share on the liberally watered common stock, after providing for the preferred share dividends. Net earnings in 1916 had been almost three times as great as in 1915, and at the beginning of 1917 the company had indulged in a "melon cutting," in the form of a stock dividend of 200 per cent.

Midvale Steel and Ordnance Co., and Republic Iron and Steel both acknowledged net profits, after all tax and other deductions, as higher than in 1916. In its report on profiteering, the Federal Trade Commission gave a list of ten other steel companies whose 1917 profits ranged from 52 to 109 per cent. on the investment.

Some of the big copper companies reported smaller net earnings in 1917 than in 1916. But the U. S. Geological Survey reported that the 1917 production, although 38,000,000 less in pounds, sold for $35,000,000 more. Profits of 1916 had greatly exceeded all previous records. The Anaconda, Mr. Ryan's company, made three times as much in 1916 as in any previous year. In 1917, after all juggling was completed, the balance set aside for dividends by the American Smelting and Refining, Daniel Guggenheim's company, amounted to twenty-two and one-half per cent. of the common stock. After setting aside large sums for alterations, replacements, taxes, and other items, Utah Copper, Mr. Jackling's company, reported a balance for dividends of $28,695,495.

The American Sugar Refining Company reported 1917 as the best year in its history. The Big Five packing companies confessed to greater returns in 1917 than ever before. In 1916 they netted $60,759,000, more than three times as much as in 1913. But in 1917, after all tax deductions, they netted $95,639,000, or nearly 60 per cent. more than in 1916. Morris & Co.'s net profits were 267.7 per cent. of capital stock. Armour's would have been 135.5 per cent., were it not for a 400 per cent. stock dividend declared that year.

The Federal Trade Commission found that 48 leading lumber companies in the southern states netted more than three times as much in 1917 as in 1916.

In six years ending May, 1917, Standard Oil firms distributed dividends in excess of six times the par value of their capital stock, or $629,000,000. But Standard Oil profits continued to increase through 1917.

After war tax deductions, the Baldwin Locomotive Company reported net profits 500 per cent. greater than in 1916; the American Locomotive Company, 30 per cent. greater; the American Woolen Company 30 per cent. greater; the Railway Steel Spring Company, 175 per cent. greater; the American Can Company, 70 per cent. greater; Lackawanna Steel, 30 per cent. greater; U. S. Industrial Alcohol, 150 per cent. greater. The Corn Products Refining Company, another Standard Oil subsidiary, which had been running along happily on about $3,400,000 a year net, gathered in $16,852,793 in 1917, about 250 per cent. more than the previous year.

Between May 1 and June 20, 1917, the resources of the fifty National Banks in New York City increased $98,341,499. Between February 28 and June 20, of the same year, the resources of the trust companies of New York State increased more than three billion dollars. The

earnings of the National Banks of the country for the fiscal year were reported as $667,406,000, the greatest in their history, and 13½ per cent. greater than in the previous year. Net earnings on capital stock figured out as 18 per cent.

In 1915, a new high record in foreign trade had been established. In 1916 another high record had been established. But the figures of 1917 exceeded those of 1916 by $1,225,000,000.

These few figures will hardly convey an adequate conception of the immediate advantages accruing to Wall Street from American participation in the European war. They are set down only that there may be no doubt that there were great gains. Either the reports of the Federal Trade Commission or of the corporations themselves are sufficient proof of this, though they tell only a part of the story. Finally, the profits from financial transactions, as distinct from industrial, were greatest of all, and these were most successfully hidden. Even the figures of the U. S. Treasury Department (given to the public Apr. 18, 1920) show, in spite of all concealments and evasions, that the war created 21,000 new American millionaires, and that, during the war period, 69,000 men made more than three billion dollars over and above their normal income.

XXIX

PROFIT-SEEKER AND PROFIT-SERVER

It was universally assumed during the fighting, and countless times asserted, that it was the policy of the War Administration not merely that big business should not be permitted to make money out of the tragedy of war, but that it should be required to feel the burden equally with the common people. This idea no doubt received its impetus from a pronouncement on the incompatibility of war profits and patriotism found in President Wilson's "Appeal to the Business Interests," July 11, 1917:

> Patriotism leaves profits out of the question. In these days . . . when we are sending hundreds of thousands of our young men across the seas . . . no true patriot will permit himself to take toll of their heroism in money or seek to grow rich by the shedding of their blood.

How, then, did it come about that Wall Street profits walked so pleasantly hand in hand with Wall Street patriotism?

In the appeal of July 11, the President also set forth the actual course he intended to pursue, in the following words:

> A just price must, of course, be paid for everything the government buys. By a just price I mean a price which will sustain the industries concerned in a high state of efficiency, provide a living for those who conduct them, enable them to pay good wages, and make possible the expansion of their enterprises.

This statement of policy is, on its face, open to several interpretations. It might be interpreted as licensing our financial patriots to indulge in a profit orgy unparalleled in

the annals of civilization. Whether or not it was so interpreted by our War Administration and our financiers must be determined by the actual application of the policy. As has already been seen, the system of coöperation between government and business was one perfectly calculated to produce the highest possible profits consistent with safety and success.

Our great financiers, having advised, urged, and promoted the war, now advised as to its policies, directed, executed. The government accepted their advice, commissioned them to act, backed them with its authority—and footed the bills. Is it a coincidence that the result was extremely pleasing from a strictly financial point of view?

On the first of April, 1917, nothing could have been more financially delightful to our international bankers than that America not only should declare war against Germany, and so greatly strengthen Allied credit, *but that the government should absolutely guarantee that credit with its own treasure.*

We find the President emphasizing this very proposal in the war message.

The Bond Issue Bill, rushed from the White House to the Capitol, authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to purchase from the Entente governments three billion dollars' worth of paper promises to pay. It was brought out in the Congressional debates that this alone meant an item of $60,000,000 in commissions to one banking firm—owing to a contract under which the Entente governments agreed to pay, as a commission, two per cent. of all loans floated in America, whether negotiated through that firm or not.

Second, a condition of the loan was that the government of the United States should purchase the Allied paper, not at its market value, but at par. This was several per cent. more than Wall Street had ever paid for the best se-

cured Allied paper. It not only made Wall Street paper good, but it immediately gave that paper a higher value than it had ever had before.

The difference between what the United States government paid for Allied government bonds and the market rate previously prevailing, represented a clear gift, totaling many millions. This gift went to the Allied governments, *on future purchases only*. On all outstanding obligations, it was a direct gift to the holders of Allied credit paper—meaning our great banking and munitions firms.

The day following the war message, Anglo-French bonds, which had been rising in anticipation of war, jumped two points on the Stock Exchange, which meant a gain of $10,000,000 in a single day to the holders of these bonds. All other Allied paper registered advances. On the floor of Congress, April 13, 1917, it was brought out that the market value of one thousand ruble Russian bonds was $273, and that in paying $510, the par value, the government would make a donation of $237, giving almost two dollars for one.

Still another condition of the Allied loans was that the money should be expended in America, which simply meant that it should be used to liquidate the debts owed our international bankers and our captains of industry, and to transact future business with them.

As a result of the President's proposal to guarantee Allied credit, the Bank of England was able immediately to reduce its discount rate, which had become an obstacle to business in this country. The three billion dollar fund itself—like the billions later appropriated for the same purpose—was not shipped to Europe, any part of it, but was deposited in installments in the Federal Reserve Bank to the credit of the Allied governments, red-tape being cut to get the first installments there in a hurry. Allied agents then

drew checks upon it, and turned the checks directly over to the corporations of Mr. Schwab, Mr. Ryan, Judge Gary, Mr. Davison, Mr. Stettinius, Mr. Farrell, Mr. Vanderlip, Mr. Morgan, and other multimillionaires who were so soon to figure as shining patriots, all of whom were interested in Allied trade and involved in Allied credit operations.

In order to loan billions of dollars to the Entente governments, it was necessary to procure the money from the American public, and this was done through the so-called Liberty Loans, which were also the source of the major share of the money that the government itself spent with Morgan and his associates.

While acting as England's financial and munitions representative in America, J. P. Morgan also sat upon the advisory council of our Federal Reserve banking system. At the same time he was playing a third rôle of private business man, banker, munitions maker, railroad director, coal baron, etc. etc. The reader may conjecture for himself in which of these capacities it was that America's leading financier advised the Liberty Loan issues and the conditions thereof.

Three days after the declaration of war, following a conference with Secretary McAdoo in Washington, we were told that "Mr. Morgan expressed satisfaction with the plan to issue $5,000,000,000 in bonds, with the understanding that $3,000,000,000 of the amount thus raised should be employed to buy war bonds of the ally countries." (New York *Times.*)

As business men purely, our international bankers had cause for satisfaction not only in the features of the Bond Issue Law relating to Allied credit, but in many others. They had cause for several kinds of purely financial satis-

faction in every Liberty Loan dollar raised by the government. This satisfaction was not always concealed. Charles H. Sabin, president of the Guaranty Trust Company, the biggest institution of its class in America, exulted as follows:

> The proceeds from the sale of Liberty Bonds will be expended in this country by our government and by the Allied governments. . . . The money will remain in this country and will not involve any loss of gold or any loss of values. It is obvious that the more money that is spent in this country, the greater will be our prosperity. (New York *Times*, Sept. 25, 1917.)

Speaking the same kind of satisfaction for Wall Street in general, L. L. Winkleman & Co., specialists in Standard Oil, copper and steel stocks, and closely connected with some of the biggest mining and munitions firms, uttered the following shriek of ghoulish glee on the day war was declared:

> The Secretary of the Treasury, at the instigation of the President, has asked for an appropriation for the army and navy alone of $3,400,000,000, while simultaneously, members of the National Council of Defense, the Federal Reserve Banks, and Treasury officials, give assurance that $2,000,000,000 at an interest rate not to exceed three and one-half per cent. will be almost immediately available. This and many multiples more of wealth will find its way continuously and unsparingly into all the units of the country's many-sided industries. Any one viewing this formidable array of strength would be a pitiable pessimist indeed if he looked to the future with any feeling of trepidation or foreboding.
>
> If the record of the country's coming achievements carries a tinge of scarlet, the golden lustre will be undimmed. (Financial Circular.)

The New York *Times*, a first class barometer of big business sentiment, remarked editorially: "The loan is a means of making patriotism profitable." (May 4, 1917.)

And again: "The Liberty Loan is not only a means of making democracy safe. It is a means of benefiting the money market." (May 17)

In the early days of the first bond drive, Mr. McAdoo announced that "to avoid any disturbance of the money market," the government would not take away from the banks the sums subscribed by them or obtained from their customers, but would place such sums on deposit in the respective banks to the credit of the United States.

Still another source of Wall Street satisfaction in the Bond Issue Law was the tax exemption feature. Said the New York *Times* financial editor:

> The war-financing bill to authorize a total issue of $5,000,000,000 of bonds and $2,000,000,000 of Treasury certificates met with instant approval throughout the financial district. . . . Lawyers familiar with such matters were of the opinion that the conditions of issue and redemption were not such as to attract men of small means. They were termed rich men's bonds, because the bonds would be exempt from the income tax and the amount invested in them need not be reported. (Apr. 12)

Our multimillionaires went about the country telling what a sound and profitable investment the bonds were for anyone. The fact was not always hidden that the terms were especially calculated to please these particular patriots. Daniel Guggenheim confessed: "For millionaires they [Liberty Bonds] are an exceptional opportunity." (New York *Times*, Jan. 7, 1918.)

Comparing the advantages to rich and poor, the financial writer, Albert W. Atwood, explained:

> The first Liberty Loan paid only three and one-half per cent. interest, but it was made free from all taxes, including the enormous super-toll on large incomes. Thus it would come about that a very rich man . . . would be receiving the equivalent of perhaps ten per

cent. on an investment that pays the poor hardly more than one third as much. (*Saturday Evening Post*, Oct. 13, 1917.)

The *expenditure* of the proceeds of the Liberty Loans gave cause for even deeper thrills of satisfaction to our business leaders. We have already had a glimpse of the methods of disbursing these billions, and an inkling of the profit-taking that resulted. A correct appreciation of both the generosity of the War Administration and the patriotism of Wall Street requires that we have another glimpse.

Glance again at *steel.*

It is unnecessary to recall the frenzied profit-taking of 1915 and 1916. From pre-war values Bethlehem stock mounted more than twelve hundred per cent. in a little over a year. Nevertheless, America's appearance in the rôle of champion of world democracy was a signal for a higher boost in prices. By June, iron prices were above those of Civil War times. There was no expectation of placing large contracts at the highest figures reached on paper, but these paper prices served a wonderful purpose; when reduced slightly, patriotism could be claimed as the motive. Government and operators promptly and conveniently forgot the promises of the latter to forego war profits. The prices, when fixed by the government, evoked numerous expressions of pleasure. The Iron & Steel Institute met at Pittsburgh. After expressing satisfaction with the price of steel, the assemblage sang "The Star Spangled Banner." Judge Gary, chairman, made a speech:

> We have no reason to complain of the action and attitude of the government. To win the war the government must have steel and more steel. There is no room for disloyalty in America. (New York *Times*, Oct. 27.)

Notwithstanding the satisfaction of the steel operators,

the government raised the price of steel from time to time. In due course we find Judge Gary expressing further satisfaction. Here is an excerpt from his report at the annual meeting of the U. S. Steel Corporation:

> It is fortunate that the government has fixed prices which permit us to make fair profits and pay large dividends. We feel that we are living up to the policy outlined by the President of the United States, when he said that prices should be large enough to pay living wages to the workers, fair salaries to officials, and provide for necessary plant additions for war work. (Apr. 18, 1918.)

Two days after the armistice was signed, the War Industries Board met with the general committee of the Iron & Steel Institute. Among those representing the latter, were Judge Gary, Mr. Farrell, and Mr. Grace, acting head of the Schwab corporations. Among those representing the former, were associates and underlings of Gary, Farrell, and Grace in the steel industry. Mr. Gary, Mr. Farrell, and Mr. Grace were so satisfied with the "governmental supervision" of their business that they urged its continuation "for the present" as "highly desirable." (Official Report of Mr. Baruch, Nov. 14.)

Glance again at *copper*.

In March, 1917, the big producers, represented by Mr. Ryan and Mr. Guggenheim, agreed to furnish 45,510,000 pounds of copper during the next twelve months to the government for 16⅔ cents a pound. This figure, they said, was the average selling price of their product during the previous ten years, although elsewhere it was asserted that the figure was nearer twelve cents. But, however this may be, some of America's largest fortunes were built upon copper. In a report to its stockholders, quoted by Champ Clark (*Congressional Record,* May 24, 1917), the Utah Copper Company, of which Daniel C. Jackling was manag-

ing director, had recently declared that it could put copper free on board cars for 5⅛ cents per pound.

But Mr. Baruch, on behalf of the government, chose to heap fulsome praise on the copper magnates for their patriotism. Ryan, Jackling, Guggenheim, et al., also received unlimited press notices from the newspapers. The fact was overlooked that the government could have fixed the price at 16⅔ cents in spite of these gentlemen, and that if it had wished to follow a policy of taking the profit out of war, it would have seen that the price was far below that figure.

We were told that copper had "gone up" to thirty cents. The truth is that the copper operators had not been *selling* copper at thirty cents. They simply put the price up on paper, then to pose as shining patriots for "agreeing" to a reduction.

Furthermore, the copper magnates did not fulfill their contract to furnish the government at the "patriotic price" —nor did the government attempt to hold them to it. Thirty thousand pounds, not forty-five million, were reported as having been actually delivered at 16⅔ cents. Then, "by agreement," the price was fixed at 23½ cents.

On receipt of the news, copper stocks soared. Mr. Ryan announced:

> All the producers are satisfied. The price is fair and should be good both for the producers and the country. (New York *Times*, Sept. 25, 1917.)

How good it was for the producers was pointed out by the *Times*, in its review of the effects of the government policy upon business for the year 1917:

> The past year was prosperous for the copper miners [producers]. They kept their mines operating to capacity and enjoyed the highest prices for the metal which have ruled for 50 years. . . . The United

States and Great Britain fixed the price of copper at 23½ cents a pound, in order to prevent a runaway market. This measure has greatly benefited copper miners. Had the price not been fixed, there would have been price fluctuations, which would have led to irregular demands for the metal. The average production cost before the war was around eight cents a pound. Some mines produced at around 5½ cents. The cost now is about ten cents, with many of the larger mines producing at 7½ cents. (Jan. 6, 1918.)

From which it appears that the government was giving to Mr. Ryan, Mr. Jackling, Mr. Guggenheim, Mr. Rockefeller, Mr. Morgan, Mr. Bedford, Mr. Dodge, and others interested in copper, *three* perfectly good Liberty Loan dollars for every dollar's worth of goods passed over the counter.

Nevertheless, in the middle of 1918, the government price for copper was raised to 26 cents a pound.

Glance again at *railroads.*

When war was declared, the physical condition of the railroads was at its worst. The service both in freight and passenger traffic had become a national scandal. Unable decently to meet the requirements of peace, the great transportation systems practically collapsed in the face of the war emergency. The coal famine, at the end of 1917, which caused the loss of so many millions in wages and returns to capital, as well as so much actual suffering, was due chiefly to the railroad breakdown. High prices of stock feed, resulting in great losses to farmers, high living costs, and many other unfortunate circumstances, were attributed, in part, to the same cause.

For their delinquency the companies pleaded lack of money, and attempted to lay the blame upon the nation, for not having responded to their frantic appeals for higher rates. As a matter of record, the rates had been several

times raised under the Wilson régime, and, according to their own figures, in 1915 and 1916 the companies had collected higher earnings and netted greater profits than ever before. From the income of 1916, the railroads had disbursed more in dividends than in any previous year, besides financing the most expensive campaign of "public education" ever undertaken by a business coalition in American history. At the same time, their poverty was so terrible that they could afford hardly a dollar for repairs and improvements!

The explanation of the railroad spokesmen themselves was that dividends had to be paid, improvements or no improvements, that improvements could only be financed with new stock and bond issues, and that, owing to the gorgeous returns from munitions making, "investors" were unwilling to put their money in railroad issues, and would remain unwilling until such a time as railroading became as profitable as catering to the war monster.

So, in effect, the public was asked to pay a fine of a billion or more a year to the railroads because the munitions business was making money. This wonderful scheme had already been put into operation in other lines in which it was not necessary to ask government permission before boosting prices.

The "problem" of the railroads could have been solved by a government policy that would have taken excessive profits out of the war trade. But nobody thought of that. In any event, the problem was not one that had to be solved by higher rates. For the men who owned the controlling interest in the great transportation systems were the same men who owned the munitions business. These men had been making more money than ever before in their lives. They were at that very time conducting a vigorous campaign for preparedness, pressing upon the government for a more

uncompromising attitude toward Germany. They were aware that, with their approval and at their instigation, America was moving toward war. They knew that their railroads would be a vital factor in the prompt and efficient prosecution of the war when it came. But instead of putting their properties in a condition to meet the emergency, they brought them to the verge of collapse in a deliberate effort to coerce the country into consenting to a raise in rates.

Very well, the situation in 1917 had to be met by government control. But, instead of conscripting a part of the bloated fortunes of the railroad magnates, or taking dividends to pay for improvements that had to be made, the War Administration gave to the corporations everything that they had ever had the temerity to ask for—and a great deal more.

The President's announcement of policy in taking over the railroads is a reaffirmation and amplification of the original announcement of his war policy toward business. After a few well chosen words expressing solicitude for railroad earnings, declaring that the roads should not be required to suffer from war conditions, even acknowledging that a primary object in taking over the roads was to provide them with more money, the President uttered the following definite assurances:

> Investors in railway securities may rest assured that their rights and interests will be as scrupulously looked after by the government as they could be by the directors of the several railway systems.
>
> Immediately upon the reassembling of Congress, I shall recommend that these definite guarantees be given:
>
> First, of course, that the railway properties will be maintained during the period of Federal control in as good repair and as complete equipment as when taken over by the government, and

Second, that the roads shall receive a net operating income equal in each case to the average net income of the three years preceding June 30, 1917.

The President specified the three years ending June 30, instead of the three years ending December 31. Earnings had declined since June 30. The three years selected were the most prosperous thirty-six consecutive months in railroad history.

Ten days later the President pleaded the cause of the railroad kings to Congress, declaring:

One of the strong arguments for assuming control of the railroads at this time is the financial argument. . . . It is an obligation of public conscience and of public honor, that the private interests we disturb should be kept safe from unjust injury.

The President's recommendations, as more fully set forth in the Administration Railroad Bill, turned out to be even more generous than were the President's promises. The guaranteed net income figured out to be about $945,000,000. The law even permitted larger compensation in "abnormal cases," at the discretion of the President. Another favor was the payment to the railroads concurrently of their own estimates of depreciation of equipment, the sums to be charged off to operating expenses. The President was authorized to raise rates at his own discretion. He was also authorized to permit the companies to issue securities, and then to purchase the same from them with the people's money. Half a billion dollars were immediately provided as a "revolving fund" out of which to make improvements. Another provision obliged the government to return the roads to private hands within a definite period after the end of the war.

How did the railroad presidents take all this? They took it—patriotically. The interviews which appeared in

the newspapers the day following the President's proclamation show that they took it as a Christmas present. The present had, in fact, been solicited.

As to the little matter of financial satisfaction, the immediate effect upon the stock market was set forth as follows:

> The net recovery [of railroad securities] after this momentous event [the taking over of the roads] ran from seven to more than twenty points among the major railroad stocks. . . . The forward leap of many railroad bonds, along with the stocks, made manifest the relief which investors in railroad securities felt over the government's action. (New York *Times* financial review of 1917, Jan. 6, 1918.)

When the year was done the report was:

> After an auspicious beginning, with the railroad issues reflecting the relief occasioned at the end of 1917 by the government's assumption of transportation control, the price trend was consistently upward through the year, with the railroad shares providing a strength and a backbone of sufficient rigidity for the majority of the industrial issues to move higher on a restricted volume of business. (New York *Times*, Jan. 5, 1919.)

Glance again at *shipbuilding.*

Space does not permit mention of the many scandals, of great and small degree, that marked the Administration shipbuilding programme. For the financial compensations of shipbuilding for patriotic purposes, Hog Island alone furnishes sufficient illumination.

The Hog Island contract was obtained by the American International Corporation. A majority of the stock of this concern is owned by stockholders of the National City Bank, who, by stock ownership or control, or affiliation with other banks, exert a dominating influence upon every great field of business enterprise in America. Our richest and

most conspicuous "super-patriots" are discovered to be the very same who divided the Hog Island proceeds among themselves.

The whole truth of the Hog Island steal will probably never be known. The most astonishing stories have been told by apparently reputable persons. A public inquiry, begun in February, 1918, by the Senate Committee on Commerce, was opposed and finally throttled by the President, who substituted a private investigation by the Attorney-General. The statements herein are based upon the abortive Senate hearing, and to a lesser degree, upon the brief "whitewashing" report of the Attorney-General to the President.

The Hog Island contract was let by the Emergency Fleet Corporation, September 13, 1917. It required the government to furnish every dollar of expense, including salaries, office expenses, and every other outlay appertaining to the job—and every risk—except that required to purchase the land, which was to be used at an annual rental of six per cent. of the alleged cost, with the privilege of subsequent purchase by the government. The company was to build shipyards and ships with the people's money. Estimates of costs, figured by Stone & Webster, America's greatest engineering firm, and interlocked with the American International Corporation, were made and entered in the contracts, but no limit to costs was set. Compensation nominated in the bond was not patriotism, but a percentage of the money expended. Compensation was fixed at five per cent. of cost.

Stone & Webster's original estimate of the cost of the yard was $19,000,000. This was soon raised to $21,000,000. A little later it was $27,000,000. By March, 1918, it was between $35,000,000 and $40,000,000. In December, the yard was not yet completed. Fifty-eight

million dollars of the people's money had been spent on it, and (Dec. 18) general-manager Piez of the Fleet Corporation estimated that the cost would reach $63,500,000. It went far higher than that.

Contracts were let for 180 ships. The original estimate of the cost of these ships was $256,000,000. In December, 1918, Mr. Piez admitted that the cost would be as much as $225 a ton. By the time the armistice was signed, the contractors had contrived to involve the government in expenses on the Hog Island job to an amount exceeding the cost of the Panama Canal.

"Lieutenant-Colonel" Charles N. Black, one of the rich gentlemen whom the President honored with military titles, described as "a volunteer worker in the Ordnance Department," had been part owner of the 846 acres which the American International Terminal Corporation, a subsidiary, had "bought" for $2,000 an acre, and was renting to the government for $102,360 a year. Black appeared before the Senate committee in defense of the corporation.

"I sold the land because it was represented to me as a duty," testified "Colonel" Black.

But it was proven that the land had been a stretch of inaccessible swamp, assessed by the State at $100 an acre, and that the highest price ever paid anywhere for land in the vicinity was $500 an acre.

Dwight P. Robinson, president of the American International Shipbuilding Corporation, the subsidiary in direct charge of the work, testified: "We have undertaken the work as a patriotic duty."

But it was shown that the salary of Mr. Robinson's general manager of construction was more than doubled as soon as he went from the corporation payroll to the government payroll, and that salaries of the corporation ex-

perts and officials generally were more than doubled; even that more than one salary, thus bloated, was paid to one person, in some instances. The government not only paid these bloated salaries, but the corporation collected five per cent. of the amounts from the government as profit—in accordance with the contract.

George D. Baldwin, chairman of the American International Corporation, and a member of the firm of Stone & Webster, assured the committee:

> We are loyal American citizens, who cannot afford to have our loyalty questioned. . . . We have the incentive of patriotism. We are not in this for money.

But when Baldwin was asked why, then, he and his associates were accepting such large sums of money, he replied:

> A corporation cannot live on patriotism. . . . Our stockholders must have their dividends.

The "normal fee" for ship construction alone, based on the original estimates of cost, was $11,675,000. The chief official excuse for that item was the participation of the firm of Stone & Webster, which *"knew how"* to do the thing that was wanted. But it was brought out that, while the American International Corporation was being paid "know how" profits, Stone & Webster were being paid "sub-know how" profits—as were other corporations affiliated or subsidiary to the American International Corporation.

In other words, a group of patriotic financiers contracted to collect eleven million simply for passing contracts along to themselves—dividing them among themselves. The same men then collected a second fee based on costs. This pyramiding of contracts—and fees—was carried even farther.

The "sub-know how" fee was also five per cent.—on paper. Profits in hard cash were higher. It was shown that Stone & Webster cleared one-third of a million on one subcontract of less than a million.

H. D. Connick, vice-president of the corporation, was another who swore to the patriotic nature of the venture.

"You didn't propose to invest one penny of your own money, though," taunted a Senator.

"We were going to invest our reputations," answered Connick.

It developed that the precious reputations, once "invested," were handsomely defended with the people's money. One press agent was paid a salary of $20,000 a year. Press agents' salaries and other publicity costs—outlays to convince the public that Hog Island was what it was not—were charged to the government, which also paid an added charge of five per cent., as profit to the American International Corporation.

Throughout the Senate hearing, officials of the Fleet Corporation, and other government officials, shielded the grafters. Both government officials and officers of the American International Corporation were forced to admit extravagance, waste, and exorbitant costs. These things were defended on the ground of speed. But the only speed visible at Hog Island was the speed with which the contractors made away with the people's money. America had been at war sixteen months before the first ship was launched, and no Hog Island ship got into commission in time to be of service against Germany.

The Corporation's general defense, when investigated by the Department of Justice, was that officials of the Fleet Corporation knew and approved everything it did. It happens that the officials of the Fleet Corporation, in private life, were associates or employees of the men who

were profiting by the job. These officials did not satisfactorily explain why they permitted the contractors to adopt a system of bookkeeping perfectly calculated to conceal thievery; nor how it was that bills for material to the extent of over ten million dollars in value had been prepaid and no effort made to discover (in the words of the Department of Justice report) "whether the prepaid bills were in fact followed by the actual receipt of the material paid for."

On a number of occasions after the fighting was over, Mr. Schwab publicly declared that *"at least two billion of the three billion dollar cost"* of government shipbuilding *"ought to be charged off as war cost."* In other words, the two billion, or most of it, was stolen or wasted under cover of the war emergency. Albert D. Lasker, who became chairman of the Shipping Board under President Harding, went even farther. July 16, 1921, Lasker declared that the government's "loss" on the building, operation, and leasing of ships would total $4,000,000,000.

After a peep at Hog Island patriotism, one may perhaps appreciate, slightly, Mr. Vanderlip's enthusiastic prediction, made in an address to business men: *"A million new springs of wealth will be developed."*

Hog Island patriotism is not different from any other Wall Street patriotism, so soon as the latter is subject to scrutiny. Nor is the War Administration elsewhere less generous with its profits, less willing to satisfy, to the full, financial appetites already gorged with money. Everywhere we find captains of industry pleased with large returns—avidly seeking them. Everywhere we find the government seeking to satisfy them—satisfying them.

The average price for bituminous coal at the mine, for the entire United States, in 1915, was $1.13 a ton. Large

deliveries were made in 1916 at $1.25 a ton. The American Federation of Labor reported that labor costs had increased but 13 cents a ton in three years. Yet in August, 1917, the President fixed prices from $2 upward at the mine. Under this arrangement, according to the Federal Trade Commission, margins of profit were much higher than in previous years. Nevertheless, before the end of 1917 the President granted the coal corporations another increase of 45 cents a ton. Under this arrangement, coal profits ran as high as 7,856 per cent. (Senate Document, No. 259.)

Numerous official investigations established the fact that the unprecedented profits of the Big Five packers were due to the special care and protection of Hoover—that it was the policy of the Food Administration that such corporations should profit enormously at the expense of both the farmer and the public. The public was officially informed that packer profits were limited to five per cent. But Hoover gave his approval to an additional four per cent. profit, which was kept secret. On borrowed money—money "borrowed" from their own banks—the packers were allowed to collect an income not only to cover interest, but a profit also. When the Federal Trade Commission recommended to the President that this additional profit be abolished, Hoover opposed the plan, and through his influence the report of the Federal Trade Commission was withheld for nearly a year after the armistice.

The segregation of nearly a billion dollars' worth of stocks and bonds, industrial plants, and other business holdings, owned by Germans, might be defended as a war measure. But the sale of such properties, privately, as a rule, and at prices far below their real value, is difficult to understand except as a means of bearing gifts to Wall Street.

The government put an excess profits tax in the revenue

bill at the beginning. This is not an evidence that Wall Street did not make money out of the war, but only official acknowledgement that it did. Private profits from the blood of our young men and the privation of our people were an integral part of the war policy, acknowledged and defined in the war revenue bills.

In preparing the schedules, the government estimate of visible war profits to be harvested by American corporations in 1917—collectable net gains over and above estimated gains of peace times—was four billion.

In subjecting these billions to taxation, the Administration pretended that it was compelling big business to assume its proportionate share of the war burdens. But while the war taxes weighed heavily upon the middle classes, the tax laws were so framed, and their application so manipulated, that our money kings and our captains of industry went scot free.

Their influence caused the striking out of the retroactive tax, intended to take a part of the 1916 profits. In 1916 there had been a special tax on the manufacture of munitions; it was removed. Tariff schedules were revised upward, throwing a great weight upon the poor. Evasion was made easy by the Administration's policy of keeping tax statements secret, and its policy of combining profits taxes and income taxes in a single item. Corporations were permitted to make arbitrary deductions for war taxes to be subsequently paid, a procedure not contemplated by the law. They were even permitted to deduct stock dividends from statements of profit, and by this maneuver to wipe the item of war taxes completely from their books.

The Administration even adopted the policy of paying the war taxes of favored corporations, either by taking the taxes into consideration in figuring prices on government contracts, or by engaging to pay such taxes itself, whatever

they might come to. The government agreed, in writing, to pay all increases of taxation appertaining to the Hog Island job. The nine hundred million odd a year "rental" paid by the government to the Transportation Trust, was not subject to a dollar of war tax.

The upshot of the Administration's war policy toward business was that every dollar of taxes that seemed to be laid upon steel, copper, coal, and the other great industries of Morgan, Schwab, Vanderlip, Ryan, Lovett, et al., was passed along finally to the general public.

In his appeal to business interests (July 11, 1917), the President spoke of the contribution of our business men to the winning of the war as *"a contribution that costs you neither a drop of blood nor a tear."* He might have added: *"Nor a dollar."* For if the great corporations were given greater net profits, after all war tax payments, than they could have realized had the country remained at peace, it is obvious that they were permitted to escape absolutely any share whatever of the war burden.

When it was over, the Administration was not above boasting that big business had been protected, aided, and strengthened by the war policies. (1918 reports of Secretary of the Treasury and the Controller of the Currency.) The picture is well drawn in *Latrobe's Weekly Market Review,* May 16, 1918:

> The most remarkable situation that has ever existed in the United States since the prosperous days of President McKinley has developed as a result of the war. . . . The leaders of industry and finance are working hand in hand with the government, the steel companies are becoming partners of the government, and the railroads are obtaining favors of which they never dreamed, with guaranteed earnings and very high rates for transportation. The War Finance Corporation is attending to finance requirements. . . . There is every

indication that the shipbuilding plans of the government will be expanded and rushed at a great pace under Mr. Charles M. Schwab of Bethlehem Steel, and one of the first moves he made was to cancel the original Submarine Boat contract and arrange for a new one for 160 ships on terms which admit of much larger profits.

Finally, the Administration served as protector and press agent for the super-patriots while they got away with the people's money.

It was the policy of the President to prevent public investigations of profits, profiteering, and graft, by Congress, and, when the pressure for investigation was especially strong, to substitute therefor secret inquiries by the executive departments. Such inquiries never passed beyond the control of the President. The evidence was never published; reports could be framed to suit the policy of the President, and publication even of reports was delayed at the will of the President. The President opposed all investigations of the sort begun by either House, declared that "nothing helpful" was likely to come out of them, charged them with causing "delay and confusion," and in the end succeeded in suppressing all of them.

Yet had it not been for these abortive hearings, the public might never have heard of the Hog Island steal, the shoe and clothing grafts, or sugar profiteering. It would have heard less of packer thievery, still less of the aircraft scandal, and perhaps nothing at all of a hundred other things reflecting upon the patriotism and the common honesty not only of business patriots, but of army and navy officers, and even of members of the President's cabinet.

The policy of *hush* illustrates one of the uses of autocracy in war. The policy could not have been carried out successfully without far-reaching usurpations on the part of the Executive. The looting of the Treasury mentioned herein is only a hint of what actually occurred. Unless the

government should continue as completely under the control of high finance as during the war, we may expect to be regaled with scandals for years to come.[1]

As a part of the policy of *hush,* criminal prosecution of our financial leaders was taboo. The entire system of handling government contracts was in gross violation of the common law and of the statutes. Honest enforcement of the law would probably have required wholesale prosecutions not only of dollar-a-year men, but also of government officials who gave the system their sanction. When the criminal nature of these transactions was mentioned to the Attorney-General, he placed his stamp of approval upon them, declaring them "matters of national policy rather than a legal question." (Report of Chairman Graham, of the House Committee on War Department Expenditures, July 7, 1919.)

Federal police protection of captains of industry was carried so far as to require the postponement of prosecutions pending when war was declared. Newspapers of

[1] Although the Harding Administration attempted no general exposé of war-time thievery, the veil was lifted slightly, now and then, in response to political expediency. For example, in a letter boasting of the accomplishments of Republican rule, August 29, 1921, President Harding said in part: "Our government . . . expended between five and six billion dollars for the manufacture of aircraft, artillery and artillery ammunition. To show for this expenditure, it has been officially testified that less than 200 American-made airplanes or 200 American-made cannon ever went into action on the fighting front of the war, while not more than one per cent. of the ammunition expended by American artillery was, according to the same testimony, of American manufacture. Approximately $3,500,000,000 has been poured out under the direction of the Shipping Board, yet I have from the War Department the curious bit of information that only one vessel built by the Shipping Board ever carried any American troops to fight in Europe. This was a cargo boat, the 'Liberty,' which, according to War Department records, in October, 1917, carried approximately fifty soldiers to Europe. These were the only soldiers, according to the record, that were transported to Europe before the armistice in a vessel built by the Shipping Board. According to the most conservative estimate which has come to me, the Railroad Administration has cost the government between one and a quarter and one and a half billion dollars, and the end is not yet."

January 3, 1918, carried a dispatch from Washington reading, in part:

> Attorney-General Gregory to-day asked the Supreme Court to defer argument on the seven large anti-trust suits pending. This action, Solicitor-General Davis explained, was taken because the government wants coöperation from the business interests of the country. The suits postponed are those against the United Shoe Machinery Company, the American Can Company, the International Harvester Company, the U. S. Steel Corporation, the Eastman Kodak Company, the Quaker Oats Company, and the Corn Products Refining Company.

To this dispatch the *Times* appended a local news note saying that, upon the information's reaching Wall Street, U. S. Steel Common shot upward, closing the day with a net advance of five points, while industrial stocks generally were in increased demand.

Meanwhile, to the government press agency, embellishing the fame of the "super-patriots" as model citizens, were frequently added the voices of members of the President's official family, and at times the voice of the President. But this was not enough. Hand in hand with the policy of praise went the policy of repression. Mr. Burleson laid down, as a condition for the enjoyment of second-class mailing privileges, that "Papers must not say that the government is controlled by Wall Street." (Oct. 9, 1917.) At the same time, the Attorney-General was pleading for more repressive legislation, hinting that it was not sufficiently easy to imprison persons for calling attention to the peculiar relations between big business and the government.

It was the President's policy that it should be illegal to impugn the motives of the men among whom the government was distributing our billions. It was the President's policy that it should be illegal to say that ours was a busi-

ness man's war, *provided you were against the war.* At the same time it was the President's policy that it should be perfectly legal to make exactly the same statement, provided you *favored* the war. "The business plea to business men" was an approved and respectable part of the patriotic propaganda. It was voiced, at times, even by the President himself: *"And every man in every business must know by this time that his whole future fortune lies in the balance."* (Urbana, Jan. 31, 1918.)

XXX

SECRET OF THE WAR PROFITS

ALTHOUGH the announcement of President Wilson's war policy toward business was in practice construed as permitting the greatest profits in the history of the country, it was capable of being construed as permitting no profits at all. Had the generosity of the War Administration been, in fact, confined strictly to satisfying the four considerations mentioned,—wages, upkeep, management, and necessary expansions for war purposes—then its war policy toward business might not be open to criticism. But a very large share of the money abstracted from the Treasury was not devoted to any of these specified purposes, but was diverted into an entirely different channel.

Not one dollar of the nine hundred million odd net, which the government guaranteed the railroad corporations, was devoted, or intended to be devoted, either to sustaining the efficiency of the railroad industry, providing a living for those who conducted the railroads, paying wages, or expanding the railroad properties. Salaries and wages were paid out of the operating income, and were covered by rate increases to the public. Maintenance and expansion were attended to with the half billion dollar "revolving fund," and the funds of the War Finance Corporation, both appropriated by Congress. The $945,000,000 was an entirely different item, for an entirely different purpose. It was net profit. The part of this guaranteed net income over and above the sum that would have been available for dividends had America remained at peace—several hun-

dred million dollars—must be set down as riches coined by the shedding of America's young blood upon European battlefields.

What is said of the railroad industry applies with equal force to steel, copper, coal, oil, shipping, and every other like enterprise. In each instance, the War Administration provided the money not only for four items, salaries, wages, maintenance, and expansion, but for a fifth item, profit.

The necessity of satisfying the first four items, as a condition for the successful conduct of the military operations, may be cheerfully conceded—provided the fourth item, expansion, were satisfied by loans exclusively. But what is the secret of the fifth item?

"They are giving their lives; will you not give your money?" This famous appeal was shouted at us by the "super-patriots" themselves. But it is obvious that no American who possessed more money at the end of the war than at the beginning can be said to have contributed one penny to it. The fact cannot be evaded that our leaders of industry and finance were richer at the end of the war than at the beginning, and that they became so through the operation of a policy unswervingly followed by the War Administration—the policy of paying them prices that permitted them, *after every war exigency was met,* to add billions of dollars to their permanent fortunes.

Why was it the policy of President Wilson that Wall Street should make a lot of money out of the war? Huge profits in war time have apparently been accepted by a great many persons as a normal, necessary, and innocent phenomenon. But it would seem that if American finance and industry had been mobilized and utilized with a view to its most effective use in war no dividends whatever would have been allowed, no piling up of great fortunes, no in-

crease in *anybody's* wealth, least of all the wealth of those who already possessed the most.

It is true that the influence of our captains of industry was continually exerted in favor of higher prices—and of other special favors to themselves—and that the copper and coal producers particularly were accused of conspiring to limit production as a means to gouging more money out of the government.

But evidence of the power of these gentlemen to compel the Administration to meet their wishes is lacking. If the War Administration was physically powerful enough to conscript an army for the trenches, surely it was physically powerful enough to conscript industry and finance, including the personal services of managers and directors, and to pay to industry and finance—as to the men in the trenches—the money necessary to make them most efficient for war purposes, and no more.

The most plausible excuse for exorbitant profits paid to the large mining and industrial corporations was that, in order to attain the maximum production possible, it was necessary to bring every available plant into operation, high-cost plants as well as low-cost plants, and that prices paid by the government had, therefore, to be based on costs in the highest-cost plants. Thus the owners of the low-cost plants—who were none other than our richest citizens—came into huge profits as if by accident.

But why was this pretty scheme adopted? Would it not have been possible to put into effect, instead, a system placing all plants, whether of high or low cost, on a basis of all efficiency and no profit?

If every man conscripted for the trenches had been paid twenty dollars per day net for his services, he would still not have been treated relatively so well as the possessors of America's largest fortunes.

The secret of our magnificent generosity to Wall Street during the war—and the secret of the war itself—is to be found, not in any special war conditions, but in a governmental policy pursued from the beginning. *It had always been the policy of President Wilson to serve the special interests of Wall Street, regardless of the general welfare.*

No American President ever more frankly confessed himself a servant of business than Wilson. No American President ever more completely met the wishes of big business than Wilson.

Although Wilson went to the White House in the rôle of a radical, solemnly pledged to a great programme of reform and attack upon special privilege, he did not carry out that programme in any important particular. A part of the programme intended to protect the public against the extortions of monopoly, he repudiated; another part he put through in such form that it turned out to be a service to monopoly, instead of a check upon it.

Although the Baltimore platform, upon which Woodrow Wilson became President of the United States, pronounced for "the vigorous enforcement of the criminal as well as the civil law against trusts and trust officials," and "the enactment of such additional legislation as may be necessary to make it impossible for a private monopoly to exist"; and although Wilson endorsed this proposition both before and after election; neither his new "anti-trust" legislation nor his "enforcement" of the old, put an end to any monopoly. On the other hand, President Wilson, after prolonged efforts, procured the passage of laws, exempting corporations engaged in foreign commerce from all restrictions provided by the anti-trust laws.

Although the transportation monopoly was especially singled out for discipline by the Democratic party and its candidate, and although candidate Wilson pronounced in

favor of lower rates, from one year after taking office President Wilson was almost constantly working for, and openly urging, *higher* rates. After having been responsible for one rate increase, the President twice urged upon Congress "explicit approval, by the Congress, of the consideration of the Interstate Commerce Commission of an increase in freight rates." (Words of the message of Dec. 1916.) As early as November, 1914, the *Wall Street Journal* acknowledged: "So far as he properly could, he [President Wilson] has assisted the railroads."

Although, in the programme of reform upon which Wilson rode into office, the high Republican tariff was denounced as "the principal cause of the unequal distribution of wealth," and as "a system of taxation which makes the rich richer and the poor poorer"; and although an immediate revision downward, such as would reduce the cost of living, was promised; under Wilson the revision was accomplished in such a way as to reduce neither the cost of living nor the profits of protected industries. Moreover, guided by Wilson, the Democratic party enacted an "anti-dumping law," which, in effect, built a barbed wire fence around the top of the tariff wall; and under cover of the war emergency, it enacted, to employ the words of Congressman Kitchin, "the highest tariff ever written on the books."

Although the Baltimore platform carried a promise of currency reform guaranteeing "absolute security to the public" and "complete protection" from "the misuse of the power that wealth gives to those who possess it," the Wilson Federal Reserve Act only made more secure the monopolistic control of the country's credit that is so well described in the Pujo Committee report on the Money Trust. Currency inflation, made easy by the Federal Reserve scheme, greatly facilitated the war-time looting of the coun-

try, and became one of the causes of famine prices. The first claim for this law was that it would give us an "elastic currency." The Federal Reserve currency proved elastic enough in the stretching, but when the day arrived for deflation, the "unstretching" was not so easy a process.

Although the Baltimore platform pledged candidate Wilson to conservation, promising "such additional legislation as may be necessary" to prevent the country's natural resources from "being wasted or absorbed by special or privileged interests," under Wilson no bona fide conservation laws were enacted. On the other hand, President Wilson conducted a long fight for the so-called Shields and Water Power bills, and the oil and mineral lands-leasing bills, designed to open up the last of such resources to a raid of the great exploiting concerns, on terms violating every accepted principle of conservation.

It is not the purpose here to go far into President Wilson's peace-time record, nor even to enumerate all the pledges of the Baltimore platform that became "scraps of paper" in his hands. Passed over is the pledge not to stand for a second term, the pledge not to encroach upon either of the other two branches of government, the Panama Canal tolls reversal, the pledge to suppress gambling in agricultural products, the pledge for an adequate system of rural credits. Only enough of this record is recalled to make it quite clear that the war-time favors to Wall Street *embodied no new policy.*

Wilson's own testimony on this point may be of interest.

As early as January 20, 1914, President Wilson announced to his Congress: "The antagonism between business and government is over." On signing the Federal Reserve Act, he said:

> I myself have always felt, when the Democratic party was criticized, as not knowing how to serve the business interests of the

country, that there was no use in replying to that in words. The only satisfactory reply was in action. We have written the first chapter of that reply.

June 25, 1914, in a speech before the Virginia Editorial Association, the President sketched his entire legislative programme as one of "beneficence" to business, carried out "under the advice" of business men. "When the programme is finished," he promised, "there will be a boom in business in this country such as we have never witnessed in the United States. . . . Business can get and will get what it can get in no other way."

On the December 8 following, the President informed his Congress that the above promises had been fulfilled. "The road at last lies clear before business," said he. "It is the road to ungrudged, unclouded success."

Again, January 29, 1915, the President was voicing the following happy assurances: "Nobody is going to be afraid of or suspicious of any business merely because it is big." Accordingly, in the St. Louis platform appeared a number of strange paragraphs, the like of which had never before been seen in a Democratic platform. One such paragraph reads:

> We must now remove, so far as possible, every remaining element of unrest and uncertainty from the path of the business men of America, and secure for them a continued period of quiet, assured, and confident prosperity.

Promises of this character notwithstanding, Democratic spellbinders followed their time-worn practice of telling the people that Wall Street was lined up against their candidate. Evidence of this is lacking. Wall Street looked on with singular complacence. The reason was disclosed by the *Wall Street Investment and Mining News*, in its June issue:

The Presidential nominations are most satisfactory from a financial standpoint. No matter what a man's political preference may be, he should be satisfied with the choice as far as business is concerned. Wall Street responded nobly.

In the campaign, indeed, President Wilson repeatedly pointed to his record as an argument that the business vote should fall to him. In his speech of acceptance, for example:

The tariff has been revised, not on the principle of repelling foreign trade, but upon the principle of encouraging it. . . . The laws against trusts have been clarified by definition, with a view to making it plain that they were not directed against big business, . . . and a Trade Commission has been created with powers of guidance and accommodation, which have relieved business men of unfounded fears and set them upon the road of hopeful and confident enterprise. . . . Effective measures have been taken for the recreation of an American merchant marine. . . . So much have we done for business. What other party has understood the task so well or executed it so intelligently and energetically?

XXXI

WILSON IMPERIALISM

JUST as it is necessary, in seeking the true causes of the European quarrel, to go back a space in the history of the contending countries, so, in order to determine the real motives for our own participation, we must devote some attention to the nature of American governmental policies even before the European war began.

Attention has been drawn to governmental service to domestic business. We now turn to foreign business. All foreign business of American citizens has come to be spoken of as "foreign trade," especially by persons interested in promoting it—perhaps because the term has an innocent sound.

What has Wall Street wanted most of America, on behalf of its foreign "trade?"

First, a great merchant marine; second, a greater navy and army; third, legislation especially framed to "encourage" and "protect" foreign business; fourth, an Executive committed to aggressive support of foreign business; fifth, a "disciplined" nation.

These are what may well be termed the *permanent,* as distinct from the *immediate,* advantages accruing from American belligerency. They are the instrumentalities of imperialistic exploitation.

Agitation for government subsidies, as a means to creating a large merchant marine under the American flag, had been carried on for several decades without results. The Japanese peril had been raised annually, in an effort to

bring about substantial increases in the army and navy. In the year 1902, the Navy League was founded by a group of millionaires interested in contracts for armor plate, powder, munitions, and foreign financing. It carried on an unceasing propaganda for a huge navy and for a government policy of employing the navy to back up the undertakings of American financiers abroad. In the year of the European outbreak, the National Foreign Trades Council was organized by the heads of large banks and industrial corporations, many of whom were already prominent as founders of, directors of, or contributors to, the Navy League.

The "publicity" of such organizations found its way into the news and editorial columns of the newspapers, into the speeches of Senators and Congressmen, into university classrooms, into the pulpit, into the popular magazines, into the book world. Due to such influence, the Monroe Doctrine was given a more and more aggressive interpretation, inimical to the sovereignty of our Latin American neighbors.

The circumstances of the European war rendered these purposes a hundred times more desirable—as well as apparently capable of realization in the fullest measure. By the end of 1915, Wall Street had seized a goodly share of the foreign trade of belligerents, particularly of Germany. How was that trade to be retained and extended? New York was in a fair way to supplant London as the world's financial centre. How was that position to be secured and made permanent? The billions of war profits, dazzling in themselves, also opened up a dazzling future. To-day they were bursting American banks. What should be done with them to-morrow?

The answer came from the Navy League, from the Foreign Trade Council, from the American Manufacturers' Export Association, and the other organizations formed to

take advantage of the situation. The answer was that there are no profits equal to the profits of imperialism; that to-morrow American dollars must be competing abroad with sovereigns and francs; that to-morrow America would be sharing "places in the sun" with the great imperial powers—*provided political America would do its part.*

In announcing the launching of the American International Corporation, Chairman Vanderlip urged upon his associates the necessity of "arousing the interest and securing the coöperation of the entire country." It was necessary, explained Vanderlip, "to make it [the business of international finance] a national undertaking, and to appeal to the confidence, the enterprise, and the patriotism of the American people." President Farrell of the U. S. Steel Corporation seconded the motion. The public must be taught, he said, "that foreign trade is a vital element in domestic prosperity."

The European war, which brought inconceivable suffering to so many millions of human beings, presented itself to Wall Street as a *financial opportunity,* infinitely beyond its wildest dreams of former days. Said Mr. Vanderlip to a Chicago audience of bankers (Dec. 16, 1916)

> Never since the beginning of time was there such an opportunity. Never did a people have before them a choice of two roads that led to such different destinations. Never did a nation have flung at it so many gifts of opportunity—a flood tide of wealth, of opportunity, which, added to our resources, puts upon the people of this country a responsibility of trusteeship of the world. . . . We have suddenly by a world tragedy been made heir to the greatest estate of opportunity that imagination ever pictured. The last twenty years have seen a fivefold development. I would hesitate to suggest what the next twenty years may see, if we rightly manage this heritage.

"Our future for many years to come," said Vanderlip, in the same speech, "will be governed by the soundness of

the public mind and governmental actions in the next score of months."

This sort of propaganda raged throughout the year 1916, and reached its climax in the final weeks before America declared war. Following the Paris Economic Conference in June, 1916, the press was filled with horrible forebodings lest our rosy destiny might not be realized. The "war after the war" was presented as a peril hardly less sinister than the German invasion peril paraded before us a year later. Oh woe! What should be done?

Wall Street told us what should be done, not too impetuously at first, but feeling its way. Even the National Security League did not at once tell us that the solution was to declare war on Germany. At the luncheon discussions of the war after the war, held by bankers, manufacturers, and merchants, daily throughout the country, exhortations to prepare for our great opportunities overseas, advocacy of compulsory military training, the beauties of a merchant marine under the American flag, demands for sterner measures in Mexico, rhetorical flights upon American destiny, and praise of the Monroe Doctrine, were inextricably mixed—and equally applauded.

Finally, military alliance with the Entente came to be mentioned in the same breath with financial alliance. Evidence that our allies-to-be intended to wage commercial war on us, after the war, was used, more or less openly, as an argument to ally ourselves with them in order to get on the band-wagon. The last step was to bellow for the vindication of American honor, hoist the German peril, and call for war.

After war was safely declared, the purpose to obtain, through the circumstances of the war, the imperialistic advantages long sought by Wall Street, was frequently acknowledged. We find W. S. Kies, vice-president of the

National City Bank, and one of Vanderlip's right-hand propagandists, assuring friends (The *Americas,* Apr., 1917):

> The entry of the United States into the war, and our definite alignment with the Allies will undoubtedly be of influence in obtaining for us preferential treatment [in the economic struggle after the war].

We find such men as James A. Farrell, president of the U. S. Steel Corporation, saying:

> As we have willingly devoted our lives and our fortunes to the cause of the Allies . . . it would be a natural corollary to this joint enterprise that there should evolve at the end of the war a definite plan of international coöperation in the financing of foreign enterprises. (Foreign Trades Council Convention, Apr., 1918.)

Also, same speech:

> The gigantic task confronting the United States means not only that the Allies must be protected against defeat, . . . but that . . . our great resources should be fully utilized for the restoration of the decadent industry of shipbuilding.

Our war "for the right of nations, great and small, to choose their own way of life and obedience," did not see the end of the plot to choose Mexico's way of life and obedience for her, but only brought that plot nearer to maturity.

Now glance at the government's share in this business. From the beginning President Wilson was a propagandist for foreign trade. In his first inaugural address, we find the words: "Our domestic markets no longer suffice. We need foreign markets." And in his first message to Congress: "We must build up trade, especially foreign trade." His public advocacy of government aid, in the building of a huge merchant marine, dates from the first months of his tenure. His first shipping bill having failed,

we find him, the following year, urging a similar programme upon Congress. (Dec. 7, 1915.) Here is the plan and argument, in part:

The task of building up an adequate merchant marine for America, private capital must ultimately undertake . . . and it seems to me a manifest dictate of wisdom that we should promptly remove every legal obstacle that may stand in the way. . . . But . . . something must be done at once . . . and it is evident that only the government can undertake such beginnings and assume the initial risks. When the risk has passed . . . the government may withdraw. But it cannot omit to begin. It should take the first steps, and take them at once. . . . With a view to meeting these present necessities of our commerce, and availing ourselves at the earliest possible moment of the present unparalleled opportunity of linking the two Americas together in bonds of mutual interest and service—an opportunity which may never return if we miss it now—proposals will be made to the present Congress, for the purchase or construction of ships to be owned and directed by the government, similar to those made to the last Congress.

The President's bill, introduced forthwith, embodied the policy ultimately carried out, that the government should pay for the ships and afterwards turn them over to private enterprise, either through lease or sale.

The President succeeded finally in putting through his shipping legislation, but only as a part of the preparedness programme of 1916. The policy itself was realized only as a part of the war programme, when, in the words of Farrell, "our great resources" were, in fact, "fully utilized for the restoration of the decadent industry of shipbuilding."

In a speech before the U. S. Chamber of Commerce, February 3, 1915, President Wilson said:

The anti-trust laws of the United States apparently make it illegal for merchants in the United States to form combinations for

the purpose of strengthening themselves in taking advantage of the opportunities of foreign competition. That is a very serious matter. . . . I want to know how these coöperative methods can be adopted for the benefit of everybody who wants to use them, and I say frankly, if I can be shown that, I am for them.

The Webb Bill—exempting combinations engaged in foreign trade from the operation of the anti-trust laws—was accordingly introduced, and in every subsequent session of Congress it was personally urged by the President in messages or public statements. It failed repeatedly, due to opposition to it as class legislation for the very rich. The President was finally able to put it through only under cover of the war. Meanwhile, so impatient was the Executive in this matter that he put the provisions of the bill into operation by fiat, more than a year before it passed Congress.

Many other bits of legislation designed to promote foreign trade were enacted at the instigation of President Wilson, as we approached war, and during the fighting itself. In urging the Water Power Bill, one of the Administration's arguments, signed by Secretaries Baker, Lane, and Houston (Mar. 3, 1918), ran thus: "There is also need of legislation, in order that time may be given to prepare for the developments that must take place after the close of the war, if the United States is to maintain its proper place in world trade."

Under the guidance of Wilson, the Democratic party, in the 1916 platform, pledged itself to the essential principle of imperialism in the following words:

We favor . . . a fixed policy for the continuous development of a navy worthy to support the great naval traditions of the United States, and fully equal to the international tasks which the United States hopes and expects to take part in performing. . . . The circumstances of the last two years have revealed necessities for inter-

national action which no former generation can have foreseen. We hold it to be the duty of the United States to use its power, not only to make itself safe at home, but also to make secure its just interests throughout the world. . . . The American government should protect American citizens in their rights not only at home, but abroad, and any country having a government should be held to strict accountability for any wrongs done them, either to person or property.

In spite of this, during the campaign, President Wilson charged his opponents with desiring to get in control of the government in order *"to put the army and navy of the United States back of their financial enterprises in Mexico and throughout the world."* (Oct. 16, 1916.) During his preparedness-tour addresses, as has been seen, the President had made it *a question of national honor* to put the army and navy back of the business enterprises of American citizens abroad.

Said Wilson at Shadow Lawn, on the eve of the election (Nov. 4):

The United States will never again be what it has been. The United States was once in the enjoyment of what we used to call 'splendid isolation.' . . . Now . . . we have become not the debtors but the creditors of the world, and in what other nations used to play in promoting industries which extended as wide as the world itself, we are playing the leading part. We can determine to a large extent who is to be financed and who is not to be financed. . . . So it does not suffice to look back, as some gentlemen are looking, back over their shoulders . . . for now we are in the great drift of humanity which is to determine the politics of every country in the world. With this outlook, is it worth while to stop to think of party advantage?

Such quotations help to explain why our international bankers were not in the least alarmed, in 1916, when our pacifists and Liberals united to reëlect Wilson because "he kept us out of war."

Further explanation is found in the course which the President was then actually pursuing, not merely in the diplomatic disputes with belligerent countries, and in the matter of preparation for war, but in his dealings with our neighbors, near and far. The anti-imperialist can find a complete vindication of his position, in the speeches and state papers of Wilson, but the imperialist finds equal comfort for his views in the same quarter. The record of action will determine the real nature of his foreign policy. Imperialism is not imperialism unless it has teeth—the teeth of armed public forces behind the smile of diplomacy. Did Wilson's policy in action differ in any essential from the policy of Imperial England, Imperial Germany, and imperialistic France?

It differed on but two occasions, and in each of the two instances the action was later reversed.

The second of these two instances, relating to Wall Street loans to belligerent governments, has already been mentioned. (Chapter VII.) The first had to do with a loan to China. Soon after coming to power, President Wilson refused diplomatic support to the Wall Street end of a proposed "consortium" loan to the Chinese government, in which financiers of England, France, Germany, Russia, Japan, and the United States had arranged to participate. As a result of Wilson's declaration that the scheme "touches very nearly the sovereignty of China," the American bankers withdrew, and Wilson's name was hailed throughout the world as that of a genuine anti-imperialist. But in 1919, under the ægis of Wilson, the American bankers went into a reorganized China consortium, paralleling in every principle and purpose the old one.

The President, indeed, had reversed himself as early as 1916 on this particular question. November 16 of that year, a State Department letter pledging diplomatic sup-

port to a loan by American bankers, and the enterprises behind it, was given to the press. It read:

Gentlemen:

I have read the contract between yourselves and the republic of China with reference to a loan of $5,000,000 for a period of three years, and I have to say in reply to your oral request for a statement of the policy of this department, respecting such loans, that the Department of State is always gratified to see the republic of China receive financial assistance from citizens of the United States, and that it is the policy of this department, now as in the past, to give all proper support and protection to the legitimate enterprises abroad of American citizens.

I am, gentlemen, your obedient servant,

Robert Lansing.

That these words were not a mere polite "bon voyage" to the adventuring American dollars was soon made manifest. The particular loan, to which the published statement of the Secretary of State referred, was secured by a mortgage upon wine and tobacco taxes. Another loan, floated at about the same time, involved a contract for the construction of a railroad and the improvement of a canal by the Siems-Carey Railway & Canal Company, a subsidiary of the American International Corporation; in other words, it was tied to a government concession promising large profits.

In pursuance of its policy of establishing a modernized Monroe Doctrine for the benefit of Japanese capitalists in the Far East, the Japanese government promptly made representations to the Wilson Government, objecting to the first loan on the ground that it was political in its nature, and to the second on the ground that the enterprise came into conflict with concessions held by Japanese citizens.

The French, Russian, and British governments, at the instance of French, Russian, and British financiers, regis-

tered similar protests, but the sharpest issue was made by the Japanese. The diplomatic correspondence is still a secret, but the attitude of our government was sufficiently revealed to make it quite certain that Lansing's term, "all proper diplomatic support and protection," meant *conventional* support and protection, nothing less.

The crisis brought Viscount Ishii to America on his "special mission." How near the two governments came to an open break over a profiteering contract gouged out of the weak and needy Chinese, the American public may never know. The signed statement of Lansing, published coincidently with the so-called Lansing-Ishii Agreement (Nov. 7, 1917), suggests that actual hostilities were nearer than any one not on the inside could have suspected. The agreement dissipated that particular crisis, and the representatives of both governments expressed themselves as delighted. What the real understanding was remained a matter of speculation; for the published version, to any one familiar with the processes of secret diplomacy, is obviously a blind.

The published version appears, on its face, however, to record a victory for Japan, as it registers a recognition by the United States of Japanese special interests in China. It is self-evidently hypocritical; for, while professing to guarantee the integrity and sovereignty of China, it violates it, and was protested against for this reason by the Chinese government.

The Lansing-Ishii Agreement is a conventionally imperialistic document, arrived at by conventionally imperialistic paths. The character of the new consortium is the same. These things begin to show how far America has gone afield to exploit weaker countries and to risk future war through competition in such business with the Old World predatory powers.

XXXII

MEXICO

For the completed picture of our recent imperialism, it is necessary to look nearer home. In *words* we find President Wilson playing two rôles here, as elsewhere.

Before we injected ourselves into European affairs, President Wilson had promised equality to Latin America: "All the governments of America stand, so far as we are concerned, upon a footing of genuine equality and unquestioned independence." (Message to Congress, Dec. 7, 1915.) Yet the following month (Jan. 27, 1916), he was telling us: "What America has to fear, if she has anything to fear, are indirect, roundabout, flank movements upon her regnant position in the western hemisphere"—and suggested a willingness to fight to maintain such position. But how can a government claiming a "regnant position" among a group of nations also profess to stand for "genuine equality?"

In his Mobile speech (Oct. 27, 1913), President Wilson revealed a clear understanding of the conventional imperialistic devices through which weak countries nowadays are drawn under the dominion of the strong, and even promised the Latin American countries emancipation from such subjection:

> There is one peculiarity about the history of the Latin American states which I am sure they are keenly aware of. You hear of 'concessions' to foreign capitalists in Latin America. You do not hear of concessions to foreign capitalists in the United States, . . . and states that are obliged, because their territory does not lie within

the main field of modern enterprise and action, to grant concessions, are in this condition, that foreign interests are apt to dominate their domestic affairs, a condition of affairs always dangerous and apt to become intolerable. What these states are going to see, therefore, is an emancipation from the subordination, which has been inevitable, to foreign enterprise. . . . They have had harder bargains driven with them in the matter of loans than any other peoples in the world. Interest has been exacted of them that has not been exacted of anybody else, because the risk was said to be greater; and then securities were taken that destroyed that risk—an admirable arrangement for those who were forcing the terms! I rejoice in nothing so much as the prospect that they will now be emancipated from these conditions.

Pledges of this character were repeated periodically through the next five years. Yet when, in July, 1916, Senator LaFollette offered an amendment to the Naval Appropriation Bill providing that none of the ships authorized therein should be used *"in any manner to coerce or compel the collection of any pecuniary claim of any kind, class or nature, or to enforce any claim of right to any grant or concession for or on behalf of any private citizen, copartnership, or corporation, of the United States,"* the amendment did not meet with Presidential approval, and it was lost. Moreover, in opposing it, Senator Lewis, the Democratic "whip," told his colleagues that if they voted for it they voted *"to impeach the Administration of President Wilson."*

Where did the Senator get that?

From Wilson's record in Latin America, particularly in Santo Domingo, Haiti, Nicaragua, and Mexico.

Americans know, in a hazy way, that under "anti-imperialist" Wilson we undertook a military occupation of Santo Domingo and Haiti, maintained American forces permanently in Nicaragua, and perpetrated two notable invasions

of Mexico. Have they duly reflected that each of these four countries won its independence by means similar to those by which the American republic won its independence; that they were recognized as sovereign and independent powers by the United States; that war was not declared against any of them; that an act of invasion constitutes an act of war; that, in sending armed public forces into these countries, the President not only violated the letter and spirit of international law, and the letter and spirit of the Constitution of the United States, but that he made a mockery of every pretense of adherence to the principle of the equality of nations?

What was the nature and purpose of President Wilson's Mexican policy? The President himself gave answers irreconcilable one with another.

On the same day that he was giving to Congress the most solemn pledge of "scrupulous regard to the sovereignty and independence of Mexico," he was wiring our consuls to threaten the Mexicans with intervention. While assuring Mexico and the world that he was concerned *solely* for the interests of Mexico, he was telling Congress that the fortunes of Americans in that country would be well looked after. Although at one time he repudiated the big brother rôle for America, at other times he urged it as an excuse for his Mexican meddling. Time after time he told his audiences that Mexico had a right to take as long as she liked in settling her affairs; meanwhile he was telling Mexico she would better hurry or he would step in and do the settling. While pledging himself before the American people never to coerce Mexico, he was employing all forms of coercion, including verbal threats which contradicted his pledges. While promising the American people not to overwhelm Mexico with force, he was threatening to over-

whelm the strongest and most popular Mexican party with force. When, while professing to oppose Huerta, he placed an embargo on arms, causing greater embarrassment to Huerta's enemies than to Huerta, he defended the action as in accordance with "the best practice of nations in the matter of neutrality," but, when he raised the same embargo, he characterized it as "a departure from the accepted practices of neutrality." To the American people he pledged himself "eventually" to fight American concessionaires in Mexico; eventually he informed the Mexican government that he was willing to fight *for* American concessionaires, although over so insignificant a question as taxes. When he sent an army into Mexico "after Villa," he promised that it would not be used "in the interest of American owners of Mexican properties"; long after the Villa chase was ended, he virtually admitted, through a member of his cabinet, that the troops were still held in Mexico in the interest of American owners of Mexican properties.[1]

The varying points of view cannot be separated chronologically; the contradictions are not explainable on any theory of a change of policy. The conclusion is inevitable that President Wilson played the rôle of anti-imperialist in order to mask a course of imperialistic purpose.

True, our Chief Executive stopped short of a war of conquest upon Mexico. Did he refrain because of any question of principle? What principle could hold him back from war upon Mexico, while permitting him to make war upon Haiti and Santo Domingo?

It must have been a question of expediency. There were arresting circumstances in the case of Mexico that did not exist in the case of her weaker neighbors—circumstances which any other President, equally with Wilson, would have

[1] For quotations see Appendix, pp. 438–443.

had to consider. The theory that Mexico owed her safety, at any time, to the fact that one Woodrow Wilson happened to be President of the United States, is unsound.

An arresting circumstance of a most decisive nature was nothing more nor less than relative power. The Executive was in a position to make war on Haiti and Santo Domingo almost in secret, without even calling the matter to the attention of Congress, without asking for special appropriations for the purpose, without selling Liberty Bonds, without conscription, without a vast machine of "education" and terror to keep the American people under control. But Mexico he could not conquer personally and privately.

Does this mean that the efforts of our President to serve Wall Street in Mexico were a failure?

Not at all. The aim of imperialism is not conquest primarily, but control. Conquest is resorted to only as a *means* to the measure of political control essential to the "proper protection" of property "rights." If the desired political control can be procured without the expense and risk of war, so much the better.

Especially in countries having capacity for stubborn resistance, imperialism proceeds more or less cautiously, resorting to a series of well-tried tricks and maneuvers. Although Wilson did not see his way towards making an open effort at the conquest of Mexico, his efforts to control were unceasing, and the friction and agitation accompanying such efforts tended to prepare the way to conquer when the time is ripe. Intervention is intervention, even though it does not go beyond the field of diplomacy—and it is *successful* intervention exactly to the extent to which it succeeds, through threats or otherwise, in imposing the will of the stronger government upon the weaker. The threat to use an army, veiled as it may be in diplomatic language,

is hardly less grave an offense than the use of the army itself.

Almost from the day Woodrow Wilson took office, the threat of armed force was held over Mexico, with intent to mold Mexico's domestic affairs in accordance with the wishes of Wall Street. The Wilson threats cover every question remotely affecting the financial interests of foreigners. They touch every important item of the revolutionary programme, and have proven the greatest obstacle to Mexican reform since the time of Huerta.

Representations were almost invariably accompanied by some form of coercion. The refusal to recognize Huerta in the beginning was a form of coercion. Wilson's refusal to recognize Huerta was approved by anti-imperialists everywhere; it contributed greatly to his reputation as an enemy of imperialism; by this very fact it placed him in a position to serve imperialism more effectively than he would have been able to serve it otherwise.

But why did Wilson refuse to recognize Huerta? He sought to lead the world to believe it was because, as a democrat, he could not approve of any government "stained by blood or supported by anything but the consent of the governed." But what becomes of such pretensions when Wilson himself set up blood-stained governments in Haiti and Santo Domingo, and employed our armed forces to protect a blood-stained government set up by the previous administration in Nicaragua?

Wilson was in the beginning not unalterably opposed to the recognition of Huerta. I take the following Washington dispatch from the New York *World,* April 11, 1913:

> When asked about it this afternoon, President Wilson said the de facto government of Mexico would be recognized as the new provisional government when it had worked out the problem now before it—the establishment of peace,

In a speech, November, 1913, defending England's recognition of Huerta, Prime Minister Asquith told Parliament:

> We were informed by the government of the United States that, as regarded the recognition of Huerta, no definite answer could be given, except that they would wait some time longer before recognizing him.

It was evidently with ultimate recognition in view that Wilson retained, as ambassador to the court of Huerta, Henry Lane Wilson, who had assisted in setting up the Huerta régime and who, so long as he remained, was Huerta's most conspicuous apologist and support.

It was evidently with ultimate recognition in view, also, that for 176 days after his inauguration, Wilson permitted agents of Huerta to purchase arms in the United States and ship them without interference; while at the same time the enemies of Huerta, when caught trying to export arms, were thrown into jail and their shipments confiscated.

Wilson did turn definitely against Huerta in August. Why? The mission of John Lind is still shrouded in mystery, and it is impossible to state the full conditions demanded at that time by Wilson. Subsequent events make it quite certain that what Wilson sought was, literally, to "maintain the dignity and authority of the United States," as he told Congress when he took Vera Cruz—particularly to *impose the authority* of the United States upon Mexico; to procure from Mexico, if possible, an admission of the right of the United States to dictate in Mexican affairs, which would mark the end of Mexican sovereignty.

Wilson pretended to Congress that he had to employ the armed forces of the United States to compel Huerta to salute the flag. It was a matter of principle. Huerta had offered to salute the flag if Wilson would at the same time salute the Mexican flag. That did not satisfy Wil-

son. It looked too much like equality. The regnant position of America must be maintained. At Tampico some sailors had landed at a dock at which they had been warned not to land, the city being under siege by the Constitutionalist forces. These sailors were arrested, taken part way uptown, brought back, and an apology offered. There had been no violence. For this offense Huerta was commanded to salute the flag. In April, 1919, Japanese soldiers arrested an American officer who was leaving a theatre in China, handled him roughly and threatened him with the bayonet. Nobody asked the Japanese government to salute the American flag. There happened to be no occasion, at that time, to require Japan to bow to "the dignity and authority of the United States."

When Wilson occupied Vera Cruz, he sent a friendly note to Carranza, omitting to mention the dignity and authority of the United States, but hinting that the action was taken to serve the cause of Carranza. Had Carranza not protested against the invasion, he would have fallen into a trap evidently designed to catch him. Tacitly, at least, he would have recognized the dignity and authority of the United States—its authority to invade Mexico at pleasure.

It was not Wilson's first effort to trap Carranza. In November, 1913, the President dispatched a personal agent, one William Bayard Hale, to Carranza to lay down the conditions under which Carranza would be recognized by Wilson. Secret diplomacy also shrouds the Hale proposals. Their nature may be guessed from a statement issued by Carranza on breaking off the Hale interviews: *"We will accept no transactions, nor the interference of any nation to regulate Mexico's interior conditions."*

All that Carranza asked of the United States was equal rights with Huerta in the purchase and export of arms.

This right was not accorded him until Wilson had been President of the United States for eleven months. Recognition was withheld for nearly two years after the Hale interviews.

Once American forces were ensconced in Vera Cruz, Wilson forgot to renew his demand that Huerta salute the flag. Nor did he capture Huerta's shipload of arms—supposed to have been the immediate occasion of the invasion.

Wilson is credited with having caused the downfall of Huerta, but when the Vera Cruz assault occurred, the Constitutionalist armies had already won the series of victories which decided the assassin's end.

At least, the fall of Huerta is supposed to have been Wilson's *purpose* in occupying Vera Cruz, and incidentally killing some two hundred residents thereof. Why, then, did he forthwith renew the arms embargo against the Constitutionalists, who were also fighting to down Huerta? Why, then, did he stay in Vera Cruz *four months* after Huerta had fled?

Is it conceivable that Wilson did not go down to Vera Cruz either to get the flag saluted, to help the Constitutionalists, or even to hurry the fall of Huerta, but that the occupation was one maneuver in a scheme to dictate who should succeed Huerta—and under what conditions?

The facts that support this view seem to have been generally overlooked. Wilson accepted the mediation of the A-B-C governments *on the condition that the internal affairs of Mexico and the selection of a new provisional president should come into the discussion.* Wilson was as anxious to eliminate Carranza as Huerta. But Carranza declined mediation on such terms, and triumphed in spite of the opposition of Wilson. Our forces remained in Vera Cruz for four months after Huerta fled, and were

withdrawn *only after the announcement had been blazoned in Washington that the early triumph of Villa was assured.*

After the failure of his effort to arrive at the political control of Mexico through the mediation conference, Wilson simply decided to assert the dignity and authority of the United States through the medium of Pancho Villa. A Wilson consular agent became Villa's closest adviser. An American general carried to Villa Wilson's pledge that he would never, under any circumstances, recognize Carranza. The State Department was turned into a Villa press agency. American oil and mining interests looked with favor upon Villa. Villa gave to Wilson pledges of "proper protection" to Wall Street investments, and Wilson diplomacy assisted Villa and hindered Carranza in almost countless ways.

When Villa succeeded in capturing Mexico City, Wilson demanded that the city and the routes to it from Vera Cruz be "neutralized"—which would have made it impossible ever to oust Villa.

When the hemp kings gained the ascendency temporarily over the Carranza garrison in Yucatan, Wilson prohibited Carranza from blockading the port of Progreso, as a means to recovering the state, and dispatched a warship to make sure that there should be no blockade.

Even after Villa had been decisively beaten, Wilson continued to maintain an arms embargo against Carranza, rendering operations of the latter more difficult, and opening the way for the Columbus raid. Even after the Columbus raid, Wilson maintained his arms embargo, rendering it impossible for Carranza effectively to police the border—at the same time justifying his "punitive expedition" by the conditions for which the embargo was responsible.

During his entire administration, down to Carranza's downfall, Wilson employed his authority to embargo arms

as a powerful means of coercion to persuade the latter to come to the Wall Street-Wilson view as to the "dignity and authority of the United States."

When the Mexican-American joint commission met to arrange for the withdrawal of American troops, the Mexican delegates came prepared to enter into any reciprocal arrangements suggested, and to concur in any plan intended to prevent future raids. They discovered to their surprise, that the American delegates did not come to talk about protecting the border against raids, but to talk about oil taxes, mining decrees, and—in the words of Chairman Lane —other *"rights that are vested."*

Although Villa was not caught, the American forces had killed several hundred Mexicans, and in April, General Scott, representing the government of the United States, had signed a memorandum to the effect that the dispersion of the Villa bands had been completed and that, therefore, no reason remained why the troops should not be withdrawn.

Nevertheless, for nine long months after the Scott statement, the American army was held on Mexican soil while Woodrow Wilson, through Franklin K. Lane, and others, was attempting to browbeat Carranza into yielding to American capital in Mexico the guarantees desired by the Rockefellers, and Guggenheims, the Dodges and the Dohenys.

Wilson finally recognized Carranza only after being urged to do so by Argentine, Brazil, and Chili, and after repeated maneuvers to oust him in favor of reactionary elements had failed.

Wilson finally withdrew the American army from Mexico in February, 1917, only to prepare it for action against Germany.

The result of the Wilson policy is that the aims which

Wilson set out to realize have been partially realized, and stand in a fair way to be realized in full.

While all the Wilson maneuvers and aggressions did not succeed—due to the astuteness and patience of Carranza—in procuring from the latter an express recognition of the "dignity and authority of the United States"—an acceptance of the principle of inequality—a concession of the authority of the government of the United States to dictate in the affairs of Mexico—they tended to *defeat* every purpose that Wilson ever professed to serve—Mexican reform, pacification of the country, security for American lives, *except the one purpose of protecting vested interests.*

It is obvious that sweeping reforms cannot be applied to the portion of any given industry controlled by natives, without at the same time applying them to the portion of the industry controlled by foreigners.

It is easily understood how a government, say, in the United States, which essayed to lay war taxes upon corporations owned entirely by Americans, while remitting the taxes upon similar corporations having foreign stockholders, could not last.

Americans can figure out for themselves how long an American President would last who negotiated, say, over Japanese "rights" in California, while a Japanese army was encamped on American soil.

Although, in the end, the Carranza régime was a failure—although Carranza in the end succumbed to the forces against him—the greatest force against him was the big stick of "anti-imperialist" Wilson. Wilson made it impossible for Carranza to "deliver the goods" to the Mexican people. Wilson helped to make the Obregon revolution not only possible, but necessary. But towards Obregon Wilson pursued the same policy, in principle, as towards Carranza. As the condition for the recognition of

Obregon, he accepted the terms of Albert B. Fall, which were also the terms of the great financial and industrial interests. When Obregon rejected these terms, Wilson turned the new Mexican president over to the tender mercies of his Republican successors.

The Wilson policy *in action* was a consistent policy of intervention, the aim being to control Mexico politically for the benefit of American capital; a policy looking toward war should it become impossible to impose the desired control by less expensive means; meanwhile, to prepare the way for easy conquest when the time is ripe. This is precisely the Wall Street policy.

XXXIII

VIRGIN ISLANDS, HAITI, SANTO DOMINGO, AND NICARAGUA

There is not a foot of territory belonging to any nation which this nation covets or desires. (Woodrow Wilson, Jan. 29, 1916.)

ALTHOUGH the American public apparently swallowed the misleading reports of the press as to our acquisition of the Virgin Islands, the Danish public was not so gullible, and the Danish government was forced to reveal a little of its true inwardness. The Danish foreign minister had to admit that he favored the "sale" only because "retention of the islands might possibly involve Denmark in international complications." Edward Brandes, the finance minister, informed the Lower House (Aug. 10, 1916), that the Danish government *"had no alternative but to accede to the desire of the United States."* Brandes revealed the fact that Denmark had rejected an offer to purchase in 1913, as it "had no desire to lower the Danish flag without cogent reasons."

What can this mean except that little Denmark simply bowed to a threat of force by the great American "democracy?"

The one thing that we learned from our own government was that, in consideration of the yielding of Denmark, the United States would *"not object to the Danish government extending its political and economic interests to the whole of Greenland."*

Who gave us the right to say what should become of Greenland?

Finally, the Danish foreign minister disclosed the fact

that he had suggested leaving the question of the transfer to a referendum of the population of the islands, in accordance with the principle of self-determination, but that *"the United States refused to sanction it."*

More than one hundred years ago, after desperate fighting, now against France and now against England, the inhabitants of Haiti, like those of the American colonies, won their independence from European domination. Until the régime of Woodrow Wilson, the sovereign republic of the United States recognized the smaller republic of Haiti as equally sovereign.

Here are the salient facts of the Haitian conquest, as gleaned from the meagre news dispatches of that period:

1. That American forces invaded Haiti July 27, 1915, following a revolution in which President Guillame Sam was killed by a "mob."

2. That, previously to the revolution, the American State Department had been pressing upon Sam a "convention" signing away the sovereignty of Haiti; that Sam was on the point of yielding; that the revolution grew out of patriotic opposition to the treaty; that, therefore, our own government *caused* the very revolution which occasioned the intervention.

3. That, July 30, it was announced from Washington that "the armed forces of the United States would remain on Haitian soil pending negotiations of an arrangement whereby the United States would assume control over Haiti's financial affairs"—a confession that intervention was not to "restore order," but to cram the convention down the throat of Haiti, regardless of order or disorder.

4. That Admiral Caperton at once began to impose a military dictatorship over Haiti. August 4, he dispersed the government army, compelling its commander to resign.

He dissolved the Committee of Public Safety named by the opposition leader, Bobo, and attacked Bobo's forces, both in the capital and at Cape Haitien. August 6, he seized the government gunboat the "Pacifique," and disarmed the forces in charge of it.

5. That, August 24, the Haitian National Assembly was called together in the National Palace, surrounded by American bayonets, presented with a draft of a convention prepared by the American State Department, and was ordered to ratify the convention without discussion and within 24 hours; that the National Assembly was overwhelmingly opposed to the convention, and permission to discuss it was given, and the time extended, only after the members had threatened to resign in a body.

6. That the Wilson Government did not await the ratification of the convention, either by the Haitian National Assembly or by the United States Senate, but began at once putting its provisions into effect. August 27, Caperton began seizing customhouses, collecting the customs and disarming all Haitians. September 4, because of general opposition to the American invasion, Caperton proclaimed martial law in the entire territory occupied by his forces. Before the end of September, 2,000 American marines were operating against Haitian nationalists, thereafter termed "bandits."

7. That resistance to the American dictatorship, which began with the landing of American marines, did not cease with the enforced ratification of the convention; that the armed forces of the United States engaged in a prolonged war of conquest, in which thousands of patriotic Haitians and a few Americans lost their lives.

The Haitian National Assembly signed the convention under duress, September 16, 1915. Its text was secret. January 11, 1916, the President sent it secretly to the

Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate. The Committee ordered it printed *in confidence* for the use of the Senate only. Between January 11 and February 28, the Committee conducted secret hearings. Not a line of the hearings was ever printed, even for the confidential use of Senators. Finally, February 28, meeting in executive session, the Senate ratified the convention, after which the bare instrument was printed.

The brief convention itself reveals a few things.

Article 2 puts the financial affairs of the republic in the hands of the United States, through a general receiver and a financial adviser named by the President.

Article 10 puts the police power in the hands of the United States, through a constabulary, urban and rural, organized and officered by Americans named by the President.

Article 13 puts "the development of the natural resources" in the hands of the United States, through Americans named by the President.

Finance—police powers—public works. What remained of the sovereign republic of Haiti?

Even the foreign affairs were taken over by Americans, and in due course the "republic" of Haiti declared war upon Germany under the direction of the United States.

The independence of Santo Domingo was first impaired by an American receivership of customs, forced upon it by Theodore Roosevelt. Soon after Wilson became President, a Senatorial investigation revealed a scandalous situation in which American politicians, in league with American bankers and concessionaires, were preying upon Santo Domingo finances by virtue of political control exerted under the terms of the customs convention.

But the Sullivan scandal brought no change of policy.

Instead, "anti-imperialist" Wilson was soon pressing for greater control than had been attempted either by imperialist Roosevelt or imperialist Taft. The war of conquest began in May, 1916, following an ultimatum from President Wilson to President Jimenez, giving the latter seventy-two hours in which to resign.

Jimenez claims to have yielded, only on the understanding that his resignation would prevent intervention. However that may be, six days afterwards, 500 marines took possession of the capital, and a fortnight later Puerta Plata was occupied, after two hours' fighting.

We struck at the enemies of Jimenez as well as at Jimenez. In June, Admiral Caperton issued a proclamation stating that there was no intention of infringing on the sovereignty of Santo Domingo or subjugating its territory. At the same time he was seizing every vestige of the civil power wherever his forces went. There were many battles and some massacres. By November, 1800 marines were reported engaged in the pacification of Santo Domingo. On the twenty-ninth day of that month, Captain Knapp, on behalf of Wilson, issued a proclamation establishing martial law throughout the republic. All natives were prohibited from bearing or possessing arms, and a censorship of the press was instituted, prohibiting any criticism whatsoever of the government of the conquerors.

The proclamation of martial law assured the natives that "there is no intention on the part of the United States to destroy the independence of the republic," and that the only purpose of the occupation was "to assist the country to establish internal order and to enable it to comply with the provisions of its convention and to fulfill its obligations as a member of the family of nations."

Meanwhile, at Washington, had been drawn up a convention modeled after that applied to Haiti, placing Santo

Domingo under a civil dictatorship under the President of the United States.

By January, 1917, an American captain of marines was discovered to be holding the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs of the sovereign republic of Santo Domingo, ordering native diplomatic and consular officials abroad to hand in their resignations. February 11, 1919, Washington dispatches informed us that Rear Admiral Snowden had been "detailed for duty as military governor of Santo Domingo and the additional duty as representative of the United States in Haiti." In May, 1921, Snowden was superseded by Admiral Robinson, the military dictatorship continuing. [1]

Nicaragua completes the picture, because it gives the *why* of all such extraordinary happenings in the sworn testimony of the persons who furnished the why.

Among all of President Wilson's voluble speeches, there appears not a single word of explanation of our adventures in Nicaragua—or, for that matter, in Haiti or Santo Domingo. The fact that a portion of our naval force was enacting the rôle of an alien army of occupation in a Central American republic was briefly mentioned at long intervals in the press. At such times a phrase or two, such as "protecting American lives and property," or "a legation guard," was all the explanation deemed necessary. During Wilson's eight years in the Presidential chair, no serious criticism of our occupation of Nicaragua was seen in any of our leading newspapers or magazines. Nor did the national law-making body make any demand upon the Executive for an accounting of his acts. Of the so-called Canal Convention Senator Borah remarked: "If the Amer-

[1] The "withdrawal" from Santo Domingo promised by the Harding Administration in 1921 did not mean the removal of American control from Santo Domingo affairs, financial or political, but only a partial withdrawal of American forces similar to our "withdrawal" from Nicaragua after we had completed the "pacification" of that little country.

ican people had known all the circumstances of its making it would never have been made." That was about all. Evidently the press as a whole, and the leaders of both great political parties, approved of the Wilson policy in Nicaragua. When Wilson's successor continued it, no protest was heard. The policy had, in fact, been initiated by Wilson's predecessor in office.

For authentic details we may turn to the hearings on the Nicaraguan convention, conducted by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1914. These hearings were printed "in confidence," for the use of the committee only, one copy going to each member under an injunction of secrecy. The writer has had access to one of these committee copies.

An examination of this secret government document shows the hearings to have been in the nature of a "frame-up." That is to say, neither Nicaraguans nor Americans who opposed the convention were given an opportunity to testify. Only one witness was heard who was not either interested in putting the convention through, or in some way connected with the interested parties. In spite of the suppression of illuminating details inevitable from such an arrangement, the document discloses the following essential facts:

1. That the permanent occupation of Nicaragua was undertaken by the Taft Administration for the purpose of sustaining in power a "president" opposed by an overwhelming majority of the voters of the country.

2. That said president, Adolfo Diaz, was raised to power neither by the votes of Nicaraguans, nor the arms of Nicaraguans, but by the armed forces of the United States under the direction of the President of the United States.

3. That, as a means to raising Adolfo Diaz to the presidency and maintaining him there, we conducted a series of

unlawful military campaigns, killed scores of Nicaraguans, overturned three successive governments, seized public and private property, and prosecuted an actual war of conquest until in complete possession of the country.

4. That Adolfo Diaz, on becoming president, found that he could do nothing of his own volition, but was required to take orders like a butler.

5. That American domination of Nicaragua did not bring a single "American benefit" to the Nicaraguan people; that what liberties Nicaraguan citizens had were permanently taken away; that a free press, free speech and free suffrage are unknown; that the government of Nicaragua under the American protectorate is a pure autocracy, administered by aliens, which is forced to hold the Nicaraguan people under a reign of terror in order to perpetuate itself in power.

6. That the sole purpose of the American war on that little republic was to compel Nicaragua to submit to a general looting of her rich resources by American financiers.

7. That Woodrow Wilson carried out in every essential the purpose of the conquest begun under Taft; that the looting of Nicaragua under American guns was given a color of legality only under the Wilson régime, by the ratification of the Nicaraguan convention on the recommendation of Wilson.

8. That the feature of this convention, relating to the "purchase" of a canal concession and the "lease" of naval bases, was an after-thought, conceived and put through primarily as a blind, to hide the purely financial features of the protectorate.

9. That the actual arbiter of Nicaraguan destinies under the protectorate is none other than the local representative of the syndicate of New York bankers for whose benefit

the conquest was undertaken and the convention put through.

Our Nicaraguan adventure began in 1909. The first step was an effort to remove President Zelaya from power, through a revolution financed by Adolfo Diaz. Before the launching of this revolution, Diaz was a bookkeeper on a salary of about $1000 a year, in the employ of an American mining company owned in Pittsburgh. Diaz "loaned" the revolution $600,000 gold, the origin of which he was never able to explain. The hand of Washington began to be seen only when the anti-Zelaya movement, as a privately financed undertaking, was on the point of failure. December 1, 1909, Secretary of State Knox, in a singularly intemperate note, broke off relations with Zelaya and declared in favor of the revolution. His pretext was the execution of two American filibusters, Roy Cannon and Leonard Groce, who had been caught trying to dynamite a vessel loaded with Zelaya's troops. As these men had enlisted in the forces opposed to Zelaya, they had, of course, forfeited whatever rights they may have had to the good offices of their home government.

The action of Knox caused the resignation and flight of Zelaya. As his successor, the Nicaraguan Congress elected Dr. José Madriz, by all accounts a person of high character. Whatever domestic reasons there existed for a revolution disappeared with the passing of Zelaya, and the revolution would have been quickly dissipated had it not been saved by American intervention. Madriz's forces took possession of the entire country with the exception of Bluefields, and bottled up the remnant of the insurgents in that seaport. But our marines were landed, and the Madriz commander was prohibited from entering the city. Fili-

busters were imported from the United States, the revolution was reorganized and revictualed, and in time was able to take the offensive. Protected by our navy, and due wholly to our assistance, the Diaz movement finally came into possession of the Nicaraguan capital.

Immediately, there came from New York one Thomas C. Dawson, who was named by the banking syndicate and appointed by the Secretary of State. Dawson had previously acted in the same capacity for our bankers in Santo Domingo, and later performed a similar service for them in Honduras. A meeting with the revolutionary chiefs was held on board an American warship, and a bargain entered into, known as the Dawson Pact. Diaz was named vice-president, and Estrada, the military head of the revolution, was named president. In pursuance of the Dawson Pact, a farcical election was staged under the direction of American marines, the purpose being to frame a new constitution that would facilitate the bankers' programme. But the scandal became so great that the packed Congress refused to carry out its full share of the scheme. Whereupon Estrada dissolved it and ruled as a dictator, taking his orders, however, from the American minister. Estrada was soon given the command to leave—and he left. So Adolfo Diaz, late bookkeeper for an American corporation, became president of the sovereign state of Nicaragua.

Naturally, the people of Nicaragua were hardly pleased by the turn of affairs, and it was to be expected that we who had placed Adolfo Diaz in power should be called upon to defend him. The Taft Administration poured some 2,350 marines and bluejackets into the country and a general war of pacification was prosecuted. The "battle of Coyotepe" and the "battle of Leon"—both in October,

1912—ended the organized resistance on the part of Nicaraguan patriots.

All this was done without a shadow of legality. It was murder in the first degree, for which the then President of the United States ought to have been impeached and indicted. Had Woodrow Wilson, on becoming President, entertained any real regard for any of the democratic principles by which he professed to be guided in the European war, or even for his own oath of office, he would at once have recalled our forces from Nicaragua, and denounced and repudiated the purposes for which they were sent there. Instead, he kept our marines in that "sister republic," and proceeded to carry out the purposes for which they were sent there by Taft.

The "Canal" Convention ratified by the Senate, February 18, 1916, cedes to the United States the following things:

1. Exclusive proprietary rights to construct, operate, and maintain, forever free from all taxation and public charges, an inter-oceanic canal across Nicaragua.

2. Lease of the Corn Islands on the Atlantic side, 99 years, with option of renewal, for the purpose of a naval base.

3. Lease of territory on the Gulf of Fonseca, Pacific side, 99 years with option of renewal, for the purpose of a naval base.

In consideration whereof, Nicaragua purports to receive $3,000,000. Actually, the money gets no nearer Nicaragua than a bank in New York. The convention provides that it cannot be drawn out without authority from the American Secretary of State. In the working out of the scheme, the money remains in the hands of a New York banking syndicate, which never renders any adequate re-

turn for it, either to the United States, which paid it out, or to Nicaragua, which is supposed to receive the benefit of it.

On its face the "Canal" Convention looks like a simple purchase and lease. In the unpublished features lies its secret. The canal "purchase" and the "leases" of territory were not urged by the Naval Board, but by our "patriotic" bankers. Their real motive may be judged by the things that Nicaragua lost besides her canal route and the territory set aside for naval bases.

When Knox deposed Zelaya, Nicaragua was solvent; the bona fide foreign debt was only about $2,500,000; the railroads were owned by the government; the customs were collected and disbursed by native officials; the government administered its own funds; the laws were framed and put through by citizens of that republic. But when the conquest was completed, Nicaragua was permanently in the hands of a receiver, with a debt in the neighborhood of $15,000,000; the railroads were in the possession of American bankers; the same bankers collected and disbursed the customs, owned the National Bank and administered the public finances; legislation for the government of Nicaraguan citizens was framed in Wall Street, enacted at the direction of agents of Wall Street, and administered by Americans under control of an American banking syndicate.

The "Canal" Convention, ratified at the instance of President Wilson, established Nicaragua as a private financial preserve of a group of American bankers, and that was its primary purpose.

It may be supposed that our financiers got possession of the Nicaraguan railroads, the banks, the customs, etc., by loaning to Nicaragua large sums of money, which the latter

was unable to pay; that intervention was undertaken to enforce payment of such debts.

Nothing as innocent as that. Previously to the Diaz-Estrada plot, according to their own testimony, the bankers did not have a penny invested in Nicaragua. Their entire interest was based upon *the speculative opportunity* furnished by the defenseless condition of the little republic.

Wall Street went in for revolution, intervention, and political control in Nicaragua as a business proposition purely—prompted by the same motives which later caused it to go in for intervention in Europe. The scheme had been tried in Santo Domingo—and it worked. It had been tried in Honduras—and it worked. Later it was to be tried in Haiti. The ambition is ultimately to put the same system in operation in Mexico.

Very well, as soon as Adolfo Diaz was well on his way to the palace, we find our bankers acquiring bogus claims upon Nicaragua, and, at the same time, drafting, in their offices, a convention legalizing such claims, to be presented at Washington for solemn approval and ratification.

The first big claim acquired was known as "the Emery claim." For twenty years the George D. Emery Company had exploited a concession which had netted it $186,000 a year. Zelaya finally revoked the concession on the ground of gross violation of its terms. Emery then put in a claim based, not upon the investment, but upon the profits expected during a period of years to come. The claim was so preposterous that any honest court would have denied it forthwith. The bankers bought the Emery claim cheap—for less than $100,000, it was said. The bankers then tagged the claim with a valuation of $500,000, and at that price it was saddled upon Nicaragua, with the consent of both the Taft and the Wilson Administrations.

As originally written (in 1911), the Nicaraguan convention, known as the Knox-Castrillo Convention, purported to provide a loan of $15,000,000 to Nicaragua. But an examination of the document discloses the fact that Nicaragua was not to *receive* the money, that the bankers were to "expend" it. We discover, indeed, that the bankers were never to pay out any such sums as $15,000,000; that such sums as they paid out were to be paid chiefly *to themselves;* first, to liquidate the Emery and other claims, and, second, to "develop the country"—to establish a bank, which they themselves should own, and to improve the National Railway, which they themselves should control, operate, and later own. The bankers were also to receive a concession to build a new railroad, upon their own terms, at the expense of Nicaragua, the property to be controlled, operated, and owned by themselves.

Finally, the $15,000,000 was to be paid out, but—by Nicaragua. The bankers were to collect the customs, and disburse therefrom the sums needed to meet their "claims" and "improvements," after which they were to pay out of this national revenue $15,000,000 and interest to *themselves*—to liquidate a loan that they had never made except on paper.

But, by the election of 1910, Congress went Democratic. The Knox-Castrillo Convention was defeated by the Democrats, and there was some denunciation of it as dollar diplomacy. Nevertheless, its worst features went into operation under a protectorate formally entered into by the Wilson Administration.

Mr. Taft's honorable Secretary of State, and the banking syndicate, did not, indeed, permit their scheme to be greatly hampered by the Senate. Following the example of Roosevelt in the case of Santo Domingo, they proceeded to put the terms of their convention into operation without

indulging in the motions of legality. For the paper loan of $15,000,000, however, was substituted a "temporary loan" of $1,500,000, which, again, was not to be paid to Nicaragua, but expended by the bankers, who agreed to "reorganize" the National Bank, 51 per cent. of the stock to be owned by the bankers, 49 per cent. by the Nicaraguan government.

In "consideration" of this "loan," the bankers were given a mortgage on the government's share of the bank, a mortgage on the government's railway, a lease for the operation of the government's railway, a lien upon the customs, authority to negotiate a settlement of the Ethelburga "debt," a contract for the "reform" of the currency, and various other little things of solid financial value.

But first of all, the bankers were placed in possession of the customhouses, where they remained, protected in their private business by the public armed forces of the United States—collecting the customs, paying out the customs receipts to run their Nicaraguan enterprises, paying out the customs money to liquidate principal and interest on the "loans" that Nicaragua never received.

The settlement of the Ethelburga "debt" is worth a word. The bona fide foreign debt of Nicaragua was only $2,500,000. Two and a quarter million of this sum had been taken up in a refunding scheme, negotiated in England just before the expulsion of Zelaya, known as the Ethelburga Syndicate Bonds. Had this scheme gone through it would have made the foreign debt amount to $6,472,689. But Nicaragua had never received any money on this deal. Moreover, there were irregularities which placed the Ethelburga bonds in the fraudulent class. At least this was the contention of the bankers, who offered to submit the matter to the British courts. The Ethelburga Syndicate did not wish to fight, and a settlement was arranged, not between

the syndicate and the bankers acting for Nicaragua, but between the syndicate and the bankers *acting for themselves.*

In other words, the bankers acquired control of the Ethelburga business—cheap. The charge was made by Senator Smith of Michigan that they acquired the bonds for twenty-five cents on the dollar. These bonds were grafted upon the public debt of Nicaragua at par, $6,250,000, with the approval of both Taft and Wilson. The bankers proceeded to pay principal and interest to themselves out of the customs receipts of the republic.

Another item of interest is "our" "reform" of the Nicaraguan currency. The bankers drew upon their $1,500,000 "loan" to buy up for themselves, as private business men, the national paper at the existing market value, between 15 to one, and 20 to one. Then, as "fiscal agents of the Nicaraguan government," they put into effect an arbitrary exchange rate of 12½ to one, unloaded at this figure, and so turned over a cool profit of from 25 to 75 per cent. on every "reformed" Nicaraguan peso.

While the reforming was going on, the bankers "loaned" Nicaragua an additional half million dollars for sixty days, to facilitate the job. On this half million they collected a profit of $60,000, above interest, based upon the difference in the "value" of the Nicaraguan peso at the time that they "loaned" themselves the money and the time they "repaid" it.

In due course the bankers exercised their option to "purchase" a majority of the stock of the National Railway. Although it had been a paying investment, and although Zelaya had refused $4,000,000 for it, the bankers acquired control of the Nicaraguan National Railway for $1,000,000. Again, Nicaragua did not receive a cent.

The syndicate simply made a paper payment to one of its New York banks, announcing that the "money" would be held against the "debts" it was rolling up against Nicaragua.

The press informed us, from time to time, that the chief purpose of the intervention and the financial deals connected with it, including the canal "purchase," was a part of a big brotherly scheme to "assist Nicaragua to get on its feet financially." It is apparent, instead, that the deliberate purpose, from the start, was to bankrupt Nicaragua for the benefit of our international bankers.

Had President Wilson actually cared to "put Nicaragua on its feet"—and wanted the Canal route besides —he would have recommended that Nicaragua be paid in cash what the Canal route was worth, with the stipulation that Wall Street get its blood money and be kicked out of the country. But "business Presidents" do not do that sort of thing.

Instead, in October, 1916, Wilson permitted the bankers to take over the internal revenues, completing their control of Nicaragua's income and finances.

Finally, the terms of the Canal "purchase" and naval base "leases" were found to conflict with rights which Nicaragua's immediate neighbors shared with her on the Gulf of Fonseca, and the convention was ratified over the protests of Costa Rica, Salvador, and Honduras. Immediately afterwards, Costa Rica and Salvador brought suit against Nicaragua in the Central American Court of Justice, which had been set up in 1907 at the instance of the United States government to obviate future wars among the Central American republics. The decision was against Nicaragua, and required the latter to repudiate the convention. This Wilson would not permit Nicaragua to do. Thus our own government was the first to flout the judgments of an international peace court which it had assisted to set up,

and whose decisions, inferentially, at least, it had bound itself to respect.

In such circumstances lies the secret of the "necessity" of keeping an army of occupation permanently on the soil of a "sister republic." On page 511 of the Secret Senate Committee hearings appears the following colloquy:

Senator Smith of Michigan: Could the present government down there be maintained at all without the aid or presence of American marines?

Mr. Cole: I think the present government would last until the last coach of marines left Managua station, and I think President Diaz would be on that last coach.

This brief statement of Walter Bundy Cole, personal representative in Nicaragua of our bankers, explains the acceptance of the bankers' régime by the people of Nicaragua. Also, it partially explains the bankers' sure and perfect mastership over the native "government." Should the dummy in the palace become restive, he is quickly brought to terms by a simple threat to withdraw the protecting fence of foreign bayonets and leave him to the vengeance of his countrymen.

Another form of discipline applied by the bankers is to withhold salaries until their commands are fully complied with. The president of the sovereign republic of Nicaragua was at times found humbly begging his wages of American financiers. When the "sale" of the National Railway was being put through, the members of the hand-picked National Assembly were afraid to approve the deal—so violent was public opposition to it. It is recorded that one means of pressure brought to bear upon them by Bundy Cole was to withhold their salaries until the contracts were duly ratified.

In such incidents is revealed the importance of the bankers' possession of the customhouses. Once there, their grip is forever fixed upon the throat of Nicaragua. They set their own terms upon all future transactions. They keep the books. Nicaragua can never become solvent. Nicaragua can never choose another master. Nicaragua is in the position of a Mexican peon in the days of Diaz. The purpose of the convention, acknowledged in the contracts, is to furnish security to the bankers. That security is extended in the shape of young men, in the uniform of marines, carrying rifles paid for in taxes by the American people. We protect not only the bankers, their customhouses, their banks, their railroads, but also their dummy president who sits in the palace. So we grind the faces of the Nicaraguan people. For this the American people pay, in cash alone, more than the bankers receive—although cash is the least of what we pay.

The story of Nicaragua is Pan-Americanism as Pan-Americanism is. This is the Monroe Doctrine, not as it is written, but as it is applied. This is "protecting American lives and property." This is "encouraging American trade."

This is Wilson imperialism in action. It is American imperialism, as approved by the controlling element in both the Democratic and Republican parties. It is not different, *in any respect,* from the imperialism of England, France, Germany, Japan, or Italy, at their worst.

There is no reason to debate the question as to whether Wilson called America into the European war in the hope of putting an end to imperialism. It is enough to point out that Wilson himself was a conventional imperialist before the European war began.

XXXIV

STRICTLY BUSINESS

THE changing phases of the Wilson diplomacy—and of the Wilson domestic policy, as it bore upon the conflict overseas—unerringly followed the changing interests of Wall Street. When the war trade could be expanded only if the war-traders would undertake loans to the Entente governments, Wilson reversed himself on the propriety of such loans. When, due to the piling up of their loans, the integrity of Entente credit became of overshadowing importance to our international bankers, Wilson reversed himself on the law of the submarine, the law of the armed merchantman, and the question of equal treatment as an attribute to neutrality, swinging America into a position of hostility toward the Central Powers and benevolence toward their enemies. Looking ahead to a possible war on behalf of the dominant Wall Street interest, Wilson reversed himself on the question of preparedness, and put through the great preparedness programme of 1916. Casting about for a casus belli with Germany, Wilson made of his preparedness tour a popular educational course in the identification of the national honor with the private business of certain exporters and shippers.

Said Robert N. Page, North Carolina Congressman, in explaining his opposition to the President on the question of warning Americans against traveling as passengers upon armed belligerent ships, February, 1916:

> Jesus Christ never uttered a more profound truth than when He declared, 'where your treasure is, there will be your heart also.' The loan of $500,000,000 to England by American capitalists, to say

nothing of the profits of munitions manufacturers, has destroyed the semblance even of neutrality in the United States, and will probably lead us into war. . . . I will not stultify my conscience nor stain my hands with the blood of my countrymen.

Wall Street's heart was with the Entente. And Wilson's heart was with Wall Street. A day came when it was evident that the Entente could never score a decisive victory without the full assistance of America as a belligerent. The tightening of the submarine blockade furnished the pretext. So, guided by Wilson, America rushed into the war in a blaze of super-patriotism and profit-taking.

Coming down to the end of hostilities, both in reference to "reconstruction" at home, and in arranging the conditions of peace with our allies, it was our government's policy that Wall Street should retain every profit and advantage that it had already gained, as well as reap every available future benefit.

As soon as the armistice was signed, Secretary Baker and other department heads announced that the government's surplus supplies would be disposed of in such a way as "not to break the market"—meaning that the government would coöperate with the profit-makers to keep up the cost of living. Six months after the fighting was ended, it was discovered that government and packers were acting together to hoard vast quantities of food, in order to protect the interests of the latter.

The same policy was followed in steel, copper, and other industries. After the armistice was signed, the government generously continued taking all the copper output at the guaranteed figure, 26 cents a pound, until it had accumulated a surplus of 140,000,000 pounds. When copper had dropped to fifteen cents, it was announced that the government would dispose of its surplus, "in coöperation

with the producers," at the existing market price. The government sold its surplus back to the copper producers at from fifty to seventy-five per cent. of the rate they had received for it; the latter then immediately boosted the figure again above 20 cents a pound.

The armistice found the job of giving new railroads for old, with the people's money, far from finished. In resigning as Director General, McAdoo recommended an extension of government control as a part of the programme of rehabilitation. Hines, a private railroad executive, who succeeded McAdoo, seconded the scheme, while Wilson urged it upon Congress in his Railroad Bill, which was heavily weighted with new appropriations from the public treasury. When the President's Railroad Bill failed, the Stock Exchange registered a severe set-back in railroad securities. The President lost his temper, and in a public statement (Mar. 4, 1919) denounced the "group of men in the Senate" who had "chosen to imperil the financial interests of the railway system of the country." Pending further legislation, the coffers of the War Finance Corporation were opened to the roads.[1]

One reason acknowledged for the extension of government control was to give time for the enactment of "some

[1] In a report submitted May 9, 1921, James C. Davis, Director General of the Railroad Administration under President Harding, estimated that the net "loss" to the government, in operating the railroads during Federal control, would come to $1,200,000,000. In other words, not only do we yield enormous increases in freight and passenger rates, but we pay one and one-fifth billion dollars of cold cash out of the Treasury besides. By the political and journalistic henchmen of the railroads, this vast "loss" is attributed to the "failure" of Federal control. But if there was really a failure of Federal control, this, in turn, is attributable to the failure of the railroad executives themselves to function honestly as public servants. For, in general, these gentlemen retained, throughout the period of Federal control, the same positions of trust and of power which they had held when the railroads were running without a government guarantee. From 1918 on, the Railway Brotherhoods, or experts connected with them, made repeated charges tending to bear out this view.

new element of policy," which, the President urged, was "necessary for the protection of their security-holders." (Message to Congress, Dec. 2, 1918.) The "new element of policy," ultimately enacted, and approved by Wilson, was a definite guarantee of profits, the last word in government gifts to business, a benefaction to private persons unparalleled in the history of the world, an act of generosity to special privilege, so bounteous that the mere suggestion of it would not have been tolerated in former days. [2]

Government benevolence was again shown in the generous payments made for the cancellation of war contracts, and the losses cheerfully pocketed on the sale of war stocks.

After the Kaiser was gone and the German people were under our heel, the government loans to our allies did not cease. Taxes could have been reduced by stopping these huge loans. It was urged that our allies had to be sustained. Did the obligation to sustain the imperialistic governments of England, France, and Italy, with money taxed from the American public, have anything to do with the fact that the money was used in financial and commercial operations in which our international bankers were inter-

[2] When the Republican party came into power, it was as anxious to serve big business as any collection of politicians had ever been in the history of the world. It did not find the sailing easy, as the Wilson Administration had so satisfied the greed of capital that little more could be done without choking to death the goose that laid the golden egg. Railroad freight rates were higher than the traffic would bear, and the great railroads found it expedient, in certain instances, to effect voluntary reductions. Although the Republican party was willing enough to boost the protective tariff even higher, warning voices were heard from the seats of the mighty themselves that there was danger of the tariff's becoming a boomerang to the injury even of the "protected" interests. The new Administration was able to do little more than stand pat on the business policies of the old. One of the potent causes of the depression of 1921 was the margin that had prevailed during the years 1917-20 between the earnings of the working population and the prices of the necessaries of life. The public was unable to buy back the goods that it had produced and needed, and the business classes were slow to let go of those goods except on the basis of the profiteering war prices.

ested, and that every dollar of it represented a profit to these gentlemen? We even waived immediate payment of the huge sums, due as interest on these loans, making it easier for our allies to continue their traffic with our financing and exporting firms.

Millions of innocent persons had been led to believe that the merchant marine, built at such infamous cost with the people's money, was to belong to the people. But we soon find the Shipping Board offering the ships for sale, and on scandalous terms. Immediately after the armistice, the shipping interests had formed an association whose avowed purpose was to see that the government ships should be handed over to "private enterprise." The failure of the Shipping Board, during the Wilson régime, to sell more vessels than it did sell, was apparently due to an agreement of the shipping companies to hold out for lower prices than the government dared, for the time being, to accept. Meanwhile, many of the most extravagant hopes of the shipping interests were realized in the Jones Merchant Marine Act, enacted by a Republican Congress with the approval of a Democratic President.

Not only did we proceed to part with the government ships, but the funds of the War Finance Corporation were opened to the hastily formed export trusts. The acknowledged purpose was to "stimulate exports," and this was done regardless of the needs of the people at home. The government's tom-tom chase of the small profiteer was staged in such a way as only to protect and benefit the large. While feigning a campaign to reduce the cost of living, the Administration was doing everything possible to assist in getting the products of the country out of the country and away from the people. The sugar shortage and the oil shortage of 1920, the shortage of many other commodities, and the continued rise in the prices of common necessities,

were in part due to this policy. Had the Administration deliberately conspired with Wall Street to keep up the cost of living, for the benefit of a few at the expense of the many, it could not have chosen a better course. Notwithstanding the defeat of the Versailles Treaty, the 66th Congress, at the instigation of Wilson, both Republicans and Democrats concurring, enacted the most remarkable collection of special-privilege laws in American history.

Our illegal war in Russia was pleasing not only to Paris and London bankers, but to New York bankers as well. The price of the Czar's bonds rose and fell on the Stock Exchange, depending on the news of the military reverses or successes of the Bolsheviki. American financiers held some 50,000,000 rubles of the Czar's bonds. When it appeared that we would be unable to overthrow the Soviet Government, even with the sacrifice of American lives, money from the public treasury was used to pay the interest on these bonds, as well as to liquidate the accounts of the defunct Kerensky Government, and to promote the Kolchak revolution. More than fifty million dollars were paid out for such purposes. (Hearings of House Committee on Expenditures in the State Department, 1919.)

At Paris, two American financiers were closer in the confidence of the President, and had more to do in shaping the treaties, than the Senate, or any part or member of it. Senator Knox disclosed the fact (Mar. 3, 1920) that on file, in the office of a firm of New York lawyers, was the complete data of the Peace Conference, access to which the President had steadfastly refused the treaty-advising, treaty-ratifying body. Mr. Lamont, a partner of Morgan and at the same time a Peace Conference official, was permitted to send an advance copy of the peace conditions to his Wall Street associates. While acting

for the American people at Paris, Lamont participated in the organization of the China Consortium and the International Committee of Bankers on Mexico. So, along with the peace arrangements, we find the beginnings of the "definite plan of international coöperation in the financing of foreign enterprises," advocated by President Farrell of the U. S. Steel Corporation, a year before.

President Wilson procured from our allies an express recognition of the Monroe Doctrine, which means that "we" were promised a freer hand in the western hemisphere in "the protection of American lives and property." As a part of the Monroe Doctrine plan, it was reported that arrangements were under way for the United States to take over the British and French loans to Latin American republics. A characteristic Latin American interpretation of this action was voiced by a Brazilian journalist, Madeiros de Albuquerque, as follows:

> Brazil is considered by the United States only as a possible future colony. . . . The United States wants to obtain, as part of the payment of the debt of France and England, a bond for Brazil's debts to those powers. On the day this is realized, Brazil will be sold to the United States, which, on the first occasion, will do to us as she has done to Central American nations. . . . The United States is incontestably the Prussia of to-morrow. (New York *Times,* May 13, 1919.)

The statement was frequently made, sometimes self-righteously, sometimes complainingly, that "America gets nothing out of the peace." But in a speech in the Senate, September 3, 1919, Senator Hitchcock, the Administration's spokesman in the treaty debates, urged ratification, on the ground of the *"enormous benefits and advantages which the United States derives from this treaty, wrung from Germany at the cannon's mouth."* The Democratic

minority of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, in submitting its report, said:

> To adopt an amendment or to reject the treaty means that the United States will sacrifice all the concessions secured from Germany by a dictated peace. While these concessions are not as large as those which other nations associated with us secure in reparations, they are nevertheless of tremendous importance and could only be secured under a dictated peace.

The report then goes into detail, the American advantages from the treaty being arranged under twelve heads. Upon the twelfth point, which sets forth the financial and commercial advantages to be derived from our membership on the Reparations Commission, President Wilson himself enlarged somewhat in his speech at St. Louis (Sept. 5):

> Some of you gentlemen know we used to have trade with Germany. All of that trade is going to be in the hands and under the control of the Reparations Commission. I humbly begged leave to appoint a member to look after our interests, and I was rebuked for it. I am looking after the industrial interests of the United States. I would like to see the other men who are. They are forgetting the industrial interests of the United States, and they are doing things that will cut us off, and our trade off, from the normal channels, because the Reparations Commission can determine where Germany buys, what Germany buys, how much Germany buys. . . . It is going to stand at the centre of the financial operations of the world. . . . Under the League plan, the financial leadership will be ours, the industrial supremacy will be ours, the commercial advantage will be ours.

Although, in the beginning, the autocrat of our war policies had said: *"We look for no profit. We look for no advantage. We will accept no advantage out of this war"* (May 12, 1917), yet here we have a direct confession that he was moved by the same solicitude for business

after the war as during the war, before the war, and when getting into war; that at Paris he was a patron saint of the privileged class, just as were Lloyd George and Clemenceau.

The theories of a war of defense, a war for international law, a war for democracy, a war for permanent peace, all break down before examination. The theory of a war for business alone harmonizes with the facts.

XXXV

"THE ENEMY AT HOME"

In serving business, and acknowledging himself a servant of business, President Wilson never, of course, acknowledged serving big business at the expense of small business, or of the general public; but invariably held that his service to business was service to the nation. Said Wilson on one occasion:

> Nothing can be for the interest of capital that is not for the interest of labor; and nothing can be in the interest of labor that is not in the interest of capital. (Indianapolis, Oct. 12, 1916.)

This brilliant pronouncement, if true, would perhaps justify any course that any politician might wish to follow at any time. It is almost equal to saying that what is good for any given group of us is good for all the rest of us.

The proposition that the interests of business—meaning very *big* business—are identical with the interests of the nation, did not, of course, originate with Woodrow Wilson. It is upon this assumption that an important share of past governmental policies has been based. Our time-honored protective tariff is indefensible under any other theory—also our various currency systems—also a major share of the activities of our Departments of State and of Commerce. All agitation for government subsidy, or other aid to a privately owned merchant marine, has been based upon this theory. The doctrine of the protection of private enterprises abroad, with the public armed forces, necessarily rests upon the assumption that such enterprises are in some way bound up in the general welfare.

If the position can be maintained, that what is for the interest of big business is for the interest of the country, then the Wilson policies, in peace and in war, are possibly vindicated. But can it be maintained? The question is doubly important—and timely—because this is the position now taken by the dominant element in both the Democratic and Republican parties. It is, in the main, the position of Wilson's successor in office. The leaders of both the big political parties heartily approve of the general policy which Wilson pursued toward American business, in getting into war, in the conduct of war, in negotiating peace, and in "reconstruction." The Administration which succeeded Wilson's did not abate a single American business "benefit" which Wilson arranged for at Paris or elsewhere, no matter how questionable the means, and it did not wish to do so. It has to be said that *any* "business President" would have been willing to follow about the course that Wilson followed between 1915 and 1921—and if, as has been suggested, American history might have been different had Wilson's opponent been elected in 1916, it would have been due altogether to the circumstances mentioned.[1] Wilson as a statesman was singular only in his unusual ability to mislead the public as to his motives and intentions.

Very well, our captains of industry have long tried to convince their workmen that "nothing can be for the interest of capital that is not for the interest of labor," while our professional labor leaders have long tried to convince our captains of industry that "nothing can be in the interest of labor that is not in the interest of capital." Unhappily, employers have seldom succeeded in persuading employees that low wages are good for employees; while

[1] Mentioned in Chapter VII.

employees have seldom succeeded in convincing employers that high wages are good for employers.

True, it is in the interest of workmen that they shall have employment, but it is not in the interest of workmen that the employers shall take any more of the product than is economically necessary to maintain operations—although it is in the interest of the latter to do so.

Likewise, it is in the interest of the farmer that there shall be a market for his product, but it is not in the interest of the farmer that he should be forced to sell to a monopoly which skims the cream of the profit, nor that he should pay exorbitant rent for his land, or usurious interest on borrowed money, or excessive prices for supplies. Yet it is in the interest of some other social group that the farmer should be exploited in each of these various ways.

It is in the interest of the public that there shall be railroads, but it is not in the interest of the public that charges should be assessed to cover dividends on watered stock, or that rates should be higher than economically necessary to provide the desired service. [2]

It is in the interest of the public that food supplies should be well distributed and easy to obtain, but it is not in the interest of the public that the supply and distribution of food should rest in the hands of a monopoly which exacts prices in excess of those economically necessary.

It is in the interest of the public that manufactured goods should be obtainable, but it is not in the interest of the public that manufacturers should be protected by a tariff wall,

[2] In defense of government benevolence to the Transportation Trust, great stress has been laid upon the large number of small security-holders. But, unless a major share of the latter's income is from railroad profits, his interest is rather that of the public than that of the trust; he loses more by high rates than he gains. As the history of railroad financing is one long story of the robbery of the small investor by the big insider, the railroad kings' pretense of consideration for the small security-holder cannot be accepted as genuine.

enabling them to charge higher prices at home than those for which they can profitably sell abroad.

The proposition that "nothing can be for the interest of capital that is not for the interest of labor," or that what is good for any given group of us is good for all the rest of us, might possibly be true if taken in some far-fetched spiritual sense, but in no practical sense is it true. Dollars constitute the only accepted measure of interest in this material world, and the dollar interests of individuals and groups everywhere conflict.

Buyer and seller, employer and employee, farmer and middleman, carrier and consumer, packer and public, may have interests in common, but they have opposing interests also. It is the function of democratic government to serve only the common interests of the majority. The prosperity of the majority alone represents the prosperity of the country.

Officially, the country's prosperity is measured by corporation profits, the prices of commodities, banking statistics, and trade statistics. Such figures do not measure the prosperity of the majority. It has long since been proven that the profits of a corporation tell nothing of the standard of living of its employees; that industries protected by the tariff and yielding the greatest profits frequently pay the lowest wages. High prices usually mean that somebody is making a lot of money; they do not mean that everybody is making a lot of money. High food prices do not always mean, even, that the farmer is making a lot of money, but often the opposite.

On the other hand, large profits in any quarter signify a one-sided transaction, in which somebody suffers, usually a numerically large group. Wherever one party to a transaction becomes inordinately rich, it means that some

other party to the transaction is getting the worst of the deal. An economic structure, or a governmental policy, that makes millionaires of a few of us, necessarily sacrifices the interests of most of us. Prosperity of any numerically small group represents, not national prosperity, but national exploitation. In general, what is for the interest of big business, is *against* the interest of the country. Is it possible that the interest of big business in the war furnishes an exception to the rule?

We have seen how, while the war was being fought, Wall Street gathered in enormous profits, while the lot of the majority was unrelieved sacrifice. We have seen how the "American" commerce which Wilson essayed to protect, in approaching war, while a source of gain to Wall Street, was an injury to the public. We have seen how the President's reconstruction policy, while immediately protecting the Wall Street pocketbook, did so at the expense of the masses. The last possible justification for our war and our war policies, therefore, would have to lie in the proposition that what has herein been termed the *permanent advantages* accruing to Wall Street, from American belligerency, will ultimately enhance the well-being of the nation as a whole; that, as Mr. Vanderlip, Mr. Farrell, and Mr. Wilson maintained, the interest of Wall Street and the public in foreign trade, in a large merchant marine under the American flag, in foreign enterprise and government protection thereof, is identical—*that, in a word, imperialism is a wise, democratic, and nationally profitable policy.*

After the lessons that have been spread before the world in the past half-dozen years, it seems almost an insult to the intelligence of the reader to set aside any space, however brief, for an examination of this question. Yet, as

these lines are written, big business and the government are coöperating in a strenuous and intensive propaganda to convince the public that the answer should be affirmative.

Begin with the question of simple trade. The primary interest of the majority in foreign trade is in *imports,* and arises from a desire, first, for goods not produced in this country, and, second, for goods produced here, but obtainable only at prices higher than the cost of purchasing and importing similar goods from other countries. But the interest of the big business minority in the first class of imports is secondary, while it is not interested at all in the second class, but only desires its complete strangulation, by means of protective tariffs and "anti-dumping" laws.

The primary interest of the big business minority in foreign trade is in *exports.* But the interest of the majority in exports is limited to exporting sufficient goods to balance the desired imports. Nothing pleases Wall Street more than "a balance of trade in our favor"—meaning an excess of exports over imports. But the majority has no interest whatever in a "balance of trade in our favor." On the other hand, every dollar of such a balance represents an economic loss to the country as a whole. Where is the benefit in always giving a greater value than is received?

There is a benefit to the minority—collected chiefly at the expense of the majority. Why is the minority so pleased by a large "balance of trade in our favor?" One important reason is that it tends to limit the home supply of goods, and so facilitates the boosting of home prices. The profit on foreign sales themselves is small in comparison with the enhanced profit on domestic sales, which a large volume of export makes possible.

In his report to the Mayor of New York on the food situation, in the spring of 1917, Health Commissioner Emerson declared that *"the first cause of the rise in food prices is the increase in the exportation of staple articles."* The war trade was employed as a lever to boost domestic prices, with the result that, even before America became a belligerent, the American public was paying a larger cash tax to the war monster than some of the belligerent countries themselves.

Mr. Hoover himself told the Senate Committee on Agriculture that *"in the last five months, $250,000,000 has been extracted from the American consumer in excess of normal profits of manufacturers and distributors,"* and that the average prices to consumers of our own food in the fighting countries of Europe "are lower than those prevailing in the United States. *In England the price of bread is even 25 per cent. lower than the price we pay."* (June 18, 1917.)

In the year preceding our declaration of war, according to Department of Labor reports, average food prices advanced 32 per cent. The operation is the same, whether in war or peace, in any period of inflated exports. After the armistice had been signed, the cost of living did not fall, as had been predicted and promised, but continued to increase. Exports continued to increase. In a statement on the economic situation (Sept. 9, 1919), in which it urged speeding up in the factories and a reduced standard of living in the home, the Federal Reserve Board admitted:

> Looking at the matter from the point of view of the ordinary American consumer, however, the effect of such a 'favorable' balance of trade is far from favorable to him. . . . The immediate present effect of it . . . is to curtail the supplies available for the American consumer, and thereby to become a factor of considerable

importance in our price level. . . . Buying in competition with export demand undoubtedly has been a major cause of rising prices in the post-war period of the United States.

Which means that the government policy of promoting "our" foreign trade simply tends to establish high living costs on a permanent basis.

Of course, the foreign trade propagandists put forward a series of propositions intended to convince the majority that it shares in the benefits. Otherwise the minority would be unable to put through its programme.

The wage-worker is informed that a large volume of exports means that home industry will travel along at full blast, and so jobs will be available for all. This stock argument, lifted bodily from the propaganda of the protective tariff, may appear good and sufficient to anyone who holds, with the minority, that the interest of labor is adequately served so long as the working population is permitted to exist and work at any price.

So, also, might industry travel along at full blast if the goods representing the "balance of trade in our favor" were offered for sale at home, and the workers of the country were paid enough more for their labor to enable them to purchase these goods for themselves. The interests of labor would really be served by such an arrangement. But of course that would mean restricted profits to our captains of industry; the real incentive of business patriots would disappear; they would sabotage their beloved country by shutting down their plants, and panic would stalk through the land.

The bland assertion that labor is bound to benefit by a large export trade may, or may not, convince the employee working at a fixed salary which he is unable to raise, who only knows that the rising living cost is a terrible reality.

There is a suggestion, of course, that wages will be raised. Who will raise wages? Did any important fraction of the employing class *ever* consent to wage increases except in case of necessity, due to strikes, threats of strikes, or scarcity of labor arising from some unusual condition?

The wage increases in 1915 and 1916 were not due to war-trade prosperity, or the benevolence of employers, or even to higher living costs. They were due to a restricted labor market, arising from the stoppage of immigration, which made it possible for workmen to demand and get more money for their labor. After America entered the war, the draft was a prime factor in wage increases. But neither in 1915, 1916, 1917, 1918, 1919, nor 1920, did wage increases equal—on the average—increases in living costs. In February, 1920, the Department of Labor informed us that food prices had increased 105 per cent. in seven years. This estimate, based upon figures furnished by retail dealers on certain staple commodities, told only a part of the story.

As in April, 1917, the Department of Labor had informed us that the effect of the European war upon America had been to "force up prices faster than wages," so, again, in May 1920, another government agency, the Federal Reserve Board, admitted: "Wages have apparently fallen behind the advance in prices and cost of living."

Do our foreign trade propagandists mean to assert that the employing class will *voluntarily* share the proceeds with the workers? How can any workman be foolish enough to expect anything of the kind, especially when he hears the voices of millionaires warning the country that wages must be kept down, and strikes prevented as a part of the foreign trade programme itself—indeed, that the producing classes in general must work harder and consume less —"if we are to meet the competition of other countries?"

Again, the farmer is told in glowing terms of the expanded market for his products, and is told he can command higher prices. But how can he command higher prices as long as he remains subject to extortion by the middlemen's trusts?

Said Mr. Hoover, in a statement to the Associated Press, May 10, 1917:

> I am assured that the American farmer did not realize $1.30 per bushel for the 1916 wheat harvest. Yet the price of wheat in N. Y. to-day is $3.25 per bushel, and flour is $14 per barrel, with all its attendant hardships and dislocation of social and industrial life.

Of what value to the farmer is a government subsidized merchant marine, so long as grain exchange gamblers, packer monopolies, and other rings of middlemen determine the price he shall receive, without reference to the selling price abroad or the conditions of ocean carriage?

What evidence, indeed, is there that ships flying the American flag, operated for the private profit of a few men in Wall Street, backed by a government peculiarly devoted to the interests of big business, will charge lower rates than ships flying any other flag—or that a large number of ships under the American flag will tend to break either the private shipping monopoly, the transportation monopoly on land, or the middlemen's monopolies?

On the other hand, one of the first moves of the Shipping Board under the Jones Merchant Marine Act was taken with a deliberate purpose of producing the opposite effect. Early in August, 1920, it was disclosed that the Shipping Board was holding conferences with foreign shipping interests, in an effort to reach an understanding, and through the operation of a world monopoly, to establish as a permanent evil, the scandalous carriage charges reached during the war.

As to the small business man, he is assured that the proceeds of the export trade will find their way into all the channels of the country's business, and so, in some manner, he is certain to share in the benefits. But what becomes of this argument when our rich fellow-citizens are going in for the export trade, frankly with a view to reinvesting the proceeds not in America, but in foreign countries?

For another important reason why Wall Street is pleased with a "balance of trade in our favor" is that it makes practicable the export of capital. During the fiscal year ending June 30, 1919, the "balance of trade in our favor" was $4,129,200,000. The nation gave away a four billion greater value of goods than it received in return.

Wall Street invests its foreign trade profits in Mexico, Cuba, Central America, China, and other countries, not only in anticipation of greater profits from the exported money, *but also in order to enable the money remaining behind to collect greater profits here.*

Hand in hand with the export of goods, goes the export of capital. As the export of goods tends to increase the price of home goods, so the export of capital tends to increase the price of home capital—and, in the last analysis, of home goods also. So the majority pays—and pays. Financiers and captains of industry are enabled to demand a higher return on the investment. They refuse, for example, to reinvest in their own railroads any part of the profits, until the investment is made more attractive. So the public is forced to pay higher rates for poorer service. The small business man, whose enterprises require frequent borrowing, must pay more for borrowed money. The farmer does the same. Domestic enterprise, instead of being expanded, is restricted. The capital that was promised to give jobs to American workmen is found in foreign countries employing foreigners. The development of

constructive projects, recognized as essential to material progress at home, is pushed aside for the exploitation of China. The undeveloped western States, which have been begging for more capital for decades, are told to wait a while longer.

All this begins from an artificially stimulated export trade, and an artificially restricted import trade. Another result of an artificially stimulated export trade is the impoverishment of the natural resources of the country. An Associated Press dispatch from Washington, dated March 20, 1919, reads:

> Original supplies of pine in the south will be exhausted in ten years, and at least 3,000 mills will go out of existence within five years, according to Henry S. Graves, chief of the United States Forest Service. . . . 'Our country is progressively destroying its forests,' declared Colonel Graves. 'The consequences are very far-reaching. The exhaustion of the forest is followed by the closing of industries, the steady increase of waste lands, the abandonment of farms that depended for their market on the lumber communities, and the impoverishment of many regions.
>
> 'No section of the country can afford to have a large part of its land an unproductive waste, with the loss of taxation value, of industries, and of population, that would be supported if these lands were productive. No section can afford to be dependent for its supply of wood products on another section from 1,000 to 3,000 miles away.'

More or less the same story is told of oil, coal, and other natural resources. Viscount Cowdray, the British oil king, in a letter to the *Westminster Gazette,* (in 1917) remarked:

> According to American scientific estimates, there is only oil in sight in that great continent for another twenty-nine years. This situation is causing serious disquietude to the government of the United States.

Yet at the very time that Cowdray was uttering these words, the American government was using the money and authority of the American people to stimulate the export of such resources, and so hasten their exhaustion.

If the government policy of serving the minority's foreign business by building ships for it, loaning it money to stimulate exports, subsidizing trade routes, negotiating monopolistic rate agreements with foreign shippers, raising tariff walls, enacting anti-dumping laws, Webb laws, Edge laws, Jones laws, promoting the establishment of foreign banks, trade-spying, and other *peaceful* activities—all at the expense of the public—is of questionable value, what can be said of that policy when it is carried so far as to jeopardize the peace of the nation and the lives of its young men?

For, government assistance in the expansion of "our" merchant marine has its corollary in the building of a great navy to protect "our" ships "in their peaceful pursuits upon the high seas." Government encouragement of "our" foreign investments has its corollary in the protection of such investments against "confiscation" by the country in which the investment is made, as well as against the machinations of other powerful governments, committed to the protection of the investments of *their* nationals.

No part of the foreign trade programme is innocent. Business groups strong enough to command peaceful government service are also strong enough to command public diplomacy and public arms. Public officials who are won to the advocacy of reaching out for "our proper place in world trade" are also won to the advocacy of compelling countries like Mexico to "observe their international obligations," as well as compelling countries like Japan to respect the Morganized Monroe Doctrine—in other words, our

"right" to coerce Mexico as "we" see fit, and for "our" interests.

The United States is not in danger of invasion, and has not been for generations. It is not in danger of war except as it chooses to perpetrate aggressions upon the weak, or except as it arouses the animosity of other business governments by its aggressive pursuit of imperialistic spoils.

As government service to Wall Street's foreign business carried America into the war against Germany, so a continuation of that policy is certain to carry it into future wars. There is no course to imperialistic greatness except through seas of blood, and the American people have no interest whatever in imperialistic greatness, or in any part of the programme of imperialism.

During the decades when America was without a merchant marine or foreign investments, the American people were as prosperous as the people of the countries boasting the largest merchant marines and the most valuable foreign investments. Foreign ships have always been glad to carry American cargoes, and to charge no more for the service than American ships. Foreign trade, within certain limits, is desirable, and there is no objection to American ships as such.

The point is that subsidized trade and ships are not worth the price, and that the trade of the vessel that requires a warship to protect it is a national calamity. Had there not been a handful of ships flying the American flag between 1915 and 1917, it would have been more difficult to find a pretext for involving America in the world war on the side of the Entente governments. So long as the imperialistic madness lasts, America would be safer and

more prosperous without merchant ships than with them. [3]

As to foreign investments, every adventuring dollar that calls back to the United States government to protect it is a traitor dollar. It would be a saner economic policy for the nation to buy out the foreign investments of its citizens, paying them dollar for dollar, and paying them expected profits besides, to the end of time, than to continue in the policy of aiding, encouraging, and protecting such investments.

One stroke of government service to the minority leads on to another and bolder stroke. At each stroke the minority collects another profit, while the majority pays—the protective tariff—inflated export of goods—the export of capital—the building and operation of a merchant marine —army and navy contracts—war.

The "foreign trade" propaganda, like our "war for democracy," is a national swindle whose success can be explained only by the almost complete control by the minority of all the great opinion-forming agencies of the country, and especially of the press. Had this control been any less complete, the simple fact that the rich favored the war would have been sufficient in the beginning to make the public quite certain that it was not for democracy. For our millionaire class was created by the desecration of democracy, and can be perpetuated only by its continued desecration.

[3] Of the "American" ships for whose protection we quarreled with Germany, many—as those of the International Mercantile Marine—belonged to British-controlled corporations. An overwhelming number of the others became legally American only after the European war began. Previously, a majority of them had flown the British flag and had been built in England. Their owners changed them from British registry as a means to procuring the "protection" of the American government. The British government permitted these vessels to be changed to the American flag in order to furnish the American government a convenient excuse for getting into a quarrel with Germany.

The Congressional Library at Washington, and the archives of the Department of Justice, the records of courts and official bodies everywhere, are packed with sworn testimony proving that the accumulation of America's great private fortunes was accomplished by the corruption of government, national, State, and local, and the habitual commission of crimes of almost every known character; that these fortunes are to-day maintained and expanded by similar practices; that the lives of our rich super-patriots, and the corporations which they represent, are a standing offense against every democratic principle; even that many of these gentlemen were in the past personally involved in operations peculiarly unpatriotic.

There is nothing either about the recent war or any previous one to indicate that Wall Street has ever had any more concern for the national welfare in war time than in peace time. Our richest fellow-citizens have made money out of the blood of their countrymen in all our wars. Big business supported the recent war because the war was in support of big business, and only for that reason. The great financiers and their banks gave the same support to the Liberty Loans as they were in the habit of giving to a bond issue of a railroad owned by themselves; it meant the same kind of satisfaction to them; the proceeds were intended to go into their pockets. During the war, it was treason to denounce the great profit-makers. That was logical, for the war was for their sake. It would have been quite impossible for President Wilson to have begun a war really intended to "make the world safe for democracy" without facing the united opposition of Wall Street.

The real enemy of America is not autocracy abroad. It is not kings or kaisers or czars. The real enemy of America is our rich fellow-citizen who is willing to plunge our country into war for his own selfish purposes—his

political servant, without whose voluntary coöperation public war for private profit would be impossible—his intellectual henchman, of the press, the pulpit, and the college, whose function is to identify the national honor with the business ambitions of a small but powerful minority.

XXXVI

PROOF OF THE PUDDING

'But what good came of it at last?'
Quoth little Peterkin.
'Why, that I cannot tell,' said he;
'But 'twas a famous victory.'

DISILLUSIONMENT must be final when one faces the results. One hundred thousand young Americans died on European battlefields and in army camps. Nearly as many more are permanently insane from the shocks and horrors of war. Half a million are mutilated for life.[1] The direct money cost, disbursed by the government alone, was in excess of thirty billion dollars—and this was only a beginning. What have we to show for the price we pay, except our soaring living costs, our 21,000 new millionaires, our mutilated Constitution, our European entanglements, our permanently enlarged military and naval establishment, and a complete set of war laws ready to clap down upon the country, the moment it is decided that the thing shall be done again?

What *one* fine promise did the "noble democracies" fulfill? What *one* pernicious institution did they banish from the earth? What *one* thing did they do for democracy?

[1] "In all, more than 71,000 of our soldiers and sailors have been discharged as mentally disabled, and more than 38,000 as tubercular."—*American Legion Weekly,* January, 1921. In a letter to Senator Ashurst, during the same month, Surgeon-General Cummings estimated that the sick and insane men, whose afflictions can be charged to service in the war, were increasing at the rate of 1000 per month. According to a report of the National Disabled Soldiers' League, at the beginning of 1921, the number of disabled soldiers was 641,900.

Has America more or fewer friends abroad than it had in 1914 or 1916? Are we more "united," as we were informed that we would be? Is there less mutual fear and suspicion among us? Are our personal liberties more or less secure than they were? Is it easier for the masses to earn a living than before? Are the social poles nearer together, or wider apart? What *one* domestic evil has been corrected at home?

A year after the German autocracy fell, our diplomats and our armed forces were meddling in a dozen foreign countries, breaking strikes here, denying the right of free assembly there, suppressing newspapers, acting as spies and informers for counter-revolutionists, overturning popular governments, seeking to return to power the very minions of autocracy whom we had proclaimed it our mission to overthrow—at times, as at Archangel, driving citizens into the trenches to fight against their own people—everywhere making war upon every high principle for which we professed to fight.

At home, the Terror had been defended only as a war measure. But month after month passed, and no part of the repressive legislation had been repealed; the prisons remained crowded with objectors; the Postmaster-General continued to exercise his extraordinary powers. Although countless assurances had been given that Americans would get back their constitutional liberties, it became more and more evident that those who had set up the Terror intended to make it permanent.

The machinery created to make war on "pro-Germanism" was kept intact to make war on "Bolshevism." As the German peril was played out, a new peril had to be invented. Bolshevism was any criticism of existing political or financial leadership, any dissatisfaction with existing tyranny, any effort of workmen towards higher wages, any

movement among the masses for better conditions, any disposition towards reform, and especially any demand for a fulfillment of the war pledges. Bolshevism was painted as an even more horrible menace than Kaiserism, and in order to strike fear to the hearts of the people, Russian Bolshevism was lied about as recklessly as we had lied about Kaiserism.

So, unlawful arrests and imprisonments, and unlawful raids, did not come to an end. Espionage in the schools, colleges, and elsewhere, did not cease. We had our Federal, State, and local inquisitions into all forms of radicalism, and a flock of sedition laws for peace times. The Federal Secret Service was permanently enlarged. At the request of President Wilson, a peace-time Passport Law was enacted and, in conjunction with our allies, we established an international espionage system for the persecution of "Bolshevists" of every kind. The Attorney-General, while maneuvering for a Presidential nomination, proceeded periodically to "discover" and "frustrate" a series of bomb plots, just in time to "save the country from the horrors of Bolshevism," and to use the people's money to publish abroad his Don Quixote exploits—although he never succeeded in constructing a single plausible case, or bringing a single political bomb-thrower to justice. Never before in our history had the Federal government been so openly and militantly an ally of the employing class in industrial disputes. Never had it been so easy to procure the aid of the military to break a strike. The democracy which we enjoyed before the war was of purest ray serene, in comparison with the thing that faced us afterwards. The American people were given czarism and solemnly told it was Americanism.

To the official peace-time Terror was added an unofficial Terror, and the two worked in harmony. The same public

leaders who had been most vociferous in the "war for democracy" now led the marching hosts in the war on "Bolshevism." Patriotic organizations of every kind were kept intact to assist in the new war, and others were created for that purpose. The social, commercial, or religious organization that did not issue its diatribe against Bolshevism was not in good form. Men holding the highest positions in public life habitually gave voice to sentiments which could be interpreted only as an incitement to riot against any one dissenting from the blind, reactionary, brutal, and dangerous state of mind which the powerful were seeking to impose upon the nation under the name of patriotism.

As a direct consequence, in the year of its military triumph, America saw more civil strife, more domestic violence, more lawlessness, more intolerance of private opinion, more assaults upon common democracy, than in any other year within half a century. "One-hundred-per-cent Americans" went on a nation-wide, anti-Bolshevik shadow-hunt, conjuring up an enemy where there was none—breaking up peaceful meetings, burning "red literature," destroying property, sacking newspaper offices, maltreating defenseless and inoffensive persons. They ran no risk; for the Federal, State and local authorities gave them license and protection. The cowardice brewed in the fear propaganda of 1917 and 1918 was utilized in 1919, in the most dastardly series of attacks on civil liberties known in American history.

The excuse was that somebody wanted to overthrow the government by force. Since somebody wanted to overthrow the government by force, nobody must criticize the government or advocate change. Anybody who criticized the government must be put down by force. The government must put down the Constitution by force. An organ-

ization of ex-service men calling itself the American Legion assumed to set up a super-government in many communities, to censor public discussion, to break strikes, to abolish "American liberties" in the name of "Americanism," and to exert a nation-wide influence in favor of black reaction. The only wonder is that these things did not of themselves produce a series of bomb plots having a more tangible basis than the imagination of the Attorney-General.

When before was the American republic so steeped in sin that it dared not look itself in the face? While many sincere though thoughtless persons were drawn into this scheme of violence, there is no question whence the impulse for it emanated, nor what its motive. Its basic motive, undoubtedly, was to impose permanent restrictions upon expression, and so conceal the war swindles, to hold the public mind in subjection and prepare it again to accept military service on behalf of Wall Street's foreign ambitions, in the name of patriotism and the national honor.

The conservative reaction of 1919, like the "democratic" brain-storm of 1917, was artificially stimulated—by the same interests and for similar ends.

But, in spite of the peace-time Terror, the war swindle became more and more discernible to the naked eye. Abroad, it was impossible entirely to conceal the dangerous friction among our various allies, or the source of that friction—the hungry desire of righteous governments to "administer" new territories "for the benefit of the inhabitants." It was impossible to keep from us some knowledge of their sanctimonious atrocities, particularly the butcheries of England in India, Egypt, and Ireland; of Japan in Korea, as well as of our protégés, Rumania, Poland, Greece, and Finland, either within or without their own borders. It was also impossible to suppress the fresh evidence,

brought to light from time to time by the Bolsheviki and others, of Allied plotting for vast territorial grabs in a general European war, years before Serbian officers murdered an Austrian prince. It was impossible to hide from us the fact that Britons were beginning to mention America as the next world peril—according us the same position in the British scheme of things that Germany had held during the past generation, that Russia held for nearly a century, that France held before Russia, that Spain held before France. It was impossible to hide the fact that, even greater than the discrepancy between the Fourteen Points and the various peace treaties, was the discrepancy between the best promises written into these documents and the performances that we proceeded to stage.

Weak nations were "liberated," only to be used as pawns in the same old game. "Mandatories" were conquered with blood and iron, only to be fenced off for economic exploitation. Offensive and defensive alliances continued to be made. Diplomacy was never more secret nor sinister. Aggression was the order of the day. The new governments which we set up turned out to be, in notable instances, less restrained in autocracy and in egoistic madness than the great empires of which they had formerly been a part. The folly of championing with the sword the irredentism of any nation became increasingly evident. All of us proceeded to prepare to make use in the next war of all weapons, however frightful, developed by Germans as well as by our allies and ourselves. Never did the British imperialistic machine work at such high pressure, and the same may be said of the imperialistic machines of France, Japan, and even of ourselves.

In a twelvemonth we had sowed more seeds of new wars than Germany had sowed in all her history. The League of Nations was laughed to scorn by the Supreme Council,

which dwindled to two premiers, who happened to hold the strings of the greatest military establishments in Europe. The old international law was made a mockery, and in its place was set up the authority of two politicans. The "democratic" and "glorious" France, which we had idealized during the fighting, was revealed as being in the grip of the most aggressive militarism of modern times.

Not the least damning are the words of the "utter democrat" himself, in his efforts to "explain" to the Senate and the country the settlement which he brought back from the European mire. Although the purpose of these explanations was to assure the nation that the Versailles Treaty realized the President's peace pledges, and to reassure it of the validity of the entire body of the war propaganda, and although, in the effort to carry out this purpose, the President's explanations became a mass of misstatements as to what was contained in the treaty, yet within these explanations themselves appear a series of admissions and contradictions which are themselves a confession of the monumental imposture.

While assuring his audiences that his settlement provided for general disarmament and would end war, he was urging upon Congress a bill to create a standing army of 576,000 men—a standing army only 300,000 smaller than that of Germany at the beginning of the war.

While assuring his audiences that "when the treaty is accepted men in khaki will not have to cross the seas again," he was awaiting a politically favorable moment in which to ask Congress to approve an American mandatory in Turkey, which would require a new army to be sent immediately to Europe.

While solemnly declaring America incapable of violat-

ing the political independence of any other nation, he was announcing that American troops would remain indefinitely in Russia.

While informing the public that "the essential object of the treaty is to establish the independence of, and protect, the weak peoples of the world," he was threatening Mexico with "a radical change of policy," which could have meant nothing less than another invasion of that country.

While informing us that "only the free peoples of the world can join the League of Nations," he was confessing that a certain charter member (France) was under the control of its general staff at the Conference, that "they were dominated by the military machine that they had created, nominally for their own defense, but really, whether they willed it or not, for the provocation of war."

While protesting that the members of his league were drawn together by a common passion for the political independence and the territorial integrity of weak nations, he was admitting that at least one of the most important of the number had to be permitted to transgress the political independence and territorial integrity of a defenseless neighbor, as a bribe to induce it to enter his league.

In one speech we find him proclaiming that, "There can be cited no instance where these governments [the governments of England, France, Japan, etc.] have been dishonorable"; yet within the week we find him describing their aggressions upon China, and characterizing them as "a very serious impairment of the territorial integrity" and "a very serious interference with the political independence of that great political kingdom."

In one speech we find him asserting that the representatives of France and England had promised him to return to China "the exceptional rights" which they had extorted

from that country—giving pledges similar to the alleged pledge of Japan to return Shantung; three days later we find him saying that no such promise had been made. In one breath we find him acknowledging that his treaty would subject Germany to a punitive indemnity; in the next breath we find him denying it. On one day we find him suggesting that the German commercial classes wanted war for commercial reasons; on the following day we find him asserting that the German commercial classes wanted *to avoid* war for commercial reasons. To one audience he portrayed our proposed after-war union with our allies, as a "moral union"; to another audience he portrayed it as eminently a financial union. On one day he averred that he consented to participate upon the Reparations Commission only to assist our dear allies; on another day he acknowledged that his purpose was to serve what he termed "the industrial interests of the United States." At times he proclaimed in the most positive terms that his peace pledges had been completely realized at Paris; at other times he confessed that they had *not* been realized, and offered excuses of various kinds.[2]

While asserting that "the League of Nations makes every agreement of every kind invalid," he was confessing that one of its primary objects was to validate and enforce a peace based upon the multifarious agreements written into the secret treaties.

In admitting that in making peace he was guided by the secret treaties, he defended the action on the ground that the war was fought partly to vindicate the sacredness of treaties; pretending that his obligation to observe these secret robber bargains was greater than his obligation to insist upon the conditions of a permanent and democratic and just peace, which he had promised his own people and

[2] For more complete quotations see Appendix.

the world, and which the makers of the secret treaties had solemnly agreed to abide by.

Although, in his Memorial Day address at Paris (1919) he asserted: "Private counsels of statesmen cannot now and cannot hereafter determine the destinies of nations"; and although, at Oakland, California (Sept. 18, 1919) he declared: "From this time forth, all the world is going to know what all the agreements between nations are. It is going to know, not their general character merely, but their exact language and contents"; yet in the intervening period he refused the Senate information upon which his Paris decisions were based; mentioned the "intimacies" of the Peace Conference, and the "indiscretion" of talking about them, even to the treaty-ratifying body; declared it a mistake "to redebate here [with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee] the fundamental questions that we debated at Paris"; refused data on the ground that it was agreed at Paris that they should be "confidential"; acknowledged possession of "international secrets" which he declined to share even with the Senate; confessed to the view that his Paris secrets should *never* become public property (Conference with Senate Foreign Relations Committee, at White House, Aug. 19, 1919); brought out more and more clearly the facts that the treaty itself was but a skeleton of secret understandings known only to five old men who whispered together at Paris; that he was attempting to bind America to courses of action which would be revealed to the country only after they had become accomplished facts; that he had entered into far-reaching engagements with foreign governments to use the money and the blood of the American people in secret enterprises over which neither the American people nor their representatives in Congress would ever exercise choice or dominion; that his projected League of Nations was not intended to be under the control

of peoples or of national legislatures, but that it was to be an instrument of executives, as secret, irresponsible, and autocratic as the Peace Conference itself.

He asserted that he knew nothing of the secret treaties until after he arrived at Paris, although they had been published in Europe and in America, debated in the Parliaments of our allies and acknowledged by Allied statesmen. He asserted that he did not know, until we went to war, that "Germany was not the only country that maintained a secret service," although he himself maintained a secret service of precisely the same sort as Germany's. He asserted that Japan had promised to return the sovereignty of Shantung, "without qualification," although Japanese statesmen had already announced that there would be qualifications. "Japan has kept her engagements," he declared, although he could not be ignorant of the history of the strangling of Korea.

In declaring the unwisdom of defining the Monroe Doctrine in the covenant of the League "because I do not know how soon we may wish to extend it," he confessed himself capable of the trickery which "extending" the Monroe Doctrine would involve.

In conceding that "America was not directly attacked," he acknowledged as fraudulent the proposition upon which he had asked Congress to declare war, "that the recent course of the Imperial German Government is nothing less than war against the government and people of the United States."

In admitting that "America was not immediately in danger," he branded as a hoax the entire scare propaganda, for which he himself had struck the keynote. In confessing that "This was a commercial and industrial war, not a political war," he discarded in a word the theory of a German

world peril, upon which his own high professions of a war against "autocracy" were based.

In suggesting that he "waited on" the American people a long time before he asked Congress to declare war, he pleaded guilty to practicing deception upon the American people during the critical weeks of February and March, 1917.

In reiterating what he told us at the beginning of the war, that the German people did not choose war and did not want war, he condemned the punishment-for-wrong-done theory, upon which his settlement was based, and which elsewhere he sought to justify. In urging ratification on financial and commercial grounds, he confessed to charlatanry in all his pretenses of an unselfish war.

Mr. Walsh, do you think that any considerable number of people, when they read my declarations, thought that these settlements were to be made at some particular place, automatically, immediately? (President Wilson to Frank P. Walsh, Paris, June 11, 1919, as reported to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee by Messrs. Walsh and Dunne.)

What is this but an admission that the promises upon which 100,000 American youths gave up their lives were never intended to be carried out?

So, Wilson's own explanations of his settlement, as given to the Senate and in his treaty tour, become the final word against Wilson himself, against Wilson's war propaganda, against Wilson's treaties, against Wilson's war.

The wisest and best men honestly fail to reach their highest aims, honestly make mistakes, honestly change their minds, honestly reverse themselves. But the inconsistencies of Woodrow Wilson cannot be explained on any theory that includes an assumption of honesty. Apologists for the

individual may still argue that Wilson was "forced" to reverse himself, forced to break his promises, forced against his will to ask for a declaration of war, forced to consent to an imperialistic peace, forced by "the invisible government." Were there no other answer it would be enough to point to the fact that Wilson always had the alternative of resigning his office. The theory, indeed, reveals a woeful misunderstanding of the operations of the so-called invisible government. The great force of the latter is exerted before election, not afterwards. Had Wilson idealism been anything but verbal, he would not have been nominated and elected. The great myth of the world war was Wilson idealism. Our noble President was simply a one hundred per cent. American politician. The secret of Wilson is hypocrisy.

By the close of 1919, it had become more or less respectable to confess disillusionment as to Wilson, and especially as to Wilson's peace. We may have become disillusioned regarding Wilson, but how about ourselves? Why were we so long in finding out that Wilson and perfection are not synonymous terms? [3]

What happened from 1917 on would have been impossible had not the "leaders of the people" generally been of much the same character as Wilson, and willing to serve the same ends by similar means. Had the convictions of the majority of Senators and Representatives gone any deeper than regard for their own immediate political fortunes, they would not have yielded the day on so many important points, upon which in the beginning they were opposed to the President. Although the President was more

[3] "What matters the error or the incapacity of a single man compared with the incapacity and the error of the entire nation which glorified him?" I borrow these words from Martin Luis Guzman, who applied them not to Woodrow Wilson and the American people, but to Porfirio Diaz and Mexico, in a little book, "The Complaint of Mexico."

willing to plunge the country into war, readier to go against the peace spirit of the country, and bolder in duplicity and contempt for the laws of the land, the members of the national law-making body did, in the end—with a few honorable exceptions—swallow the Wilson programme, tolerate the Wilson usurpations, and connive at the Wilson duplicities. Every Wilson war lie was echoed with becoming sanctity by Wilson's leading political opponents.

Senatorial opposition to the Wilson settlement, insofar as it saved the country from financial, political, and military deals to which the President attempted to commit us, and insofar as it operated to explode the myth of Allied and Presidential perfection, was a real service. The service, however, was an incident of party politics. For it was almost universally conceded that, had the President's head not been turned by adulation, had he continued to employ ordinary political sagacity; once the Republican party had won the election of 1918, instead of piling up slights and insults, had he permitted it to go through the motions of participating in the drafting of the treaties, had he been willing to share the "honor," his work would have been promptly ratified, without the dotting of an "i" or the crossing of a "t."

Notwithstanding the iniquity, one cannot refrain from a passing regret that the Senate did not at once ratify the Wilson treaties, thus yielding the final item of his war programme, just as it had yielded every other item of importance from the beginning. For there will always remain some simple persons to contend that Senatorial perversity was the one thing that prevented the whole of the beautiful edifice of world peace and democracy, promised by Wilson, from being realized then and there.

Such persons really have little to complain of. Smart-

ing under a thousand indignities, and with an eye upon the 1920 election, the Republicans blocked ratification, pledged themselves to withdraw from European entanglements, promised immediate peace, won the election on such pledges —only to project the country again into the European mess as deeply as they dared.

The League of Nations under that name must forever remain anathema, but under other forms we join in the imperialistic schemes for which the League was set up. The Armenian mandate and the French-British-American special alliance are shelved; from that much the Republican party saved us—for the time being, at least. Otherwise, it did not right a single wrong, or, in any important particular, attempt to change the course of the country. The Wilson policy towards reparations, mandatories, territorial disputes, the China Consortium, Shantung, Russia, alien property, railroads, shipping, dye tariffs, the army and navy, passports, foreign trade, "anti-dumping," Haiti, Nicaragua, Cuba, Mexico, oil, Federal espionage, our European debtors, we take up where Wilson left off, and carry forward from there.[4] Even in his speeches, Wilson's successor can do little else than feebly echo Wilson. The result of "the great and solemn referendum" was that the public, while believing it was repudiating the Wilson policies, was only putting them into other hands quite as willing to carry them out. The election of 1920 was a fraud

[4] Under the name of a "Conference for the Limitation of Armaments," we stage at Washington a parley of governments reminiscent of the conferences of "the powers" of Europe so frequently held in the years before the outbreak of the world war. While China's finish is being duly arranged, we are positively assured that, as a result of the conference, armaments will be reduced all around. At the same time the still small voice of a cabinet member is informing us: *"Plans now initiated for preparation for national defense contemplate a more complete state of preparedness than at any previous period in the peace-time history of our country."* (Annual report of the Secretary of War, Dec., 1921.)

of the same character as that of 1916, though of lesser magnitude.

By the middle of 1920, it was no longer "Bolshevism" to criticize the Wilson peace; it was still "Bolshevism" to question the validity of the Wilson war. So the saviors of our country, in the Republican group in the Senate, continued to glorify the Wilson war while condemning the Wilson peace, and many of the rest of us, sheep-like, followed their example. But had the major premises of the war propaganda been valid—the perfection of Wilson and the purity of our allies—the settlement could not have been other than a pure and perfect one. It is impossible now to offer any criticism of the Wilson settlement, or of Wilson, or of any of the post-war conditions, without tearing down some essential part of the theory upon which the war was put through. But the invalidity of that theory was as demonstrable before the war as afterwards. There was no occasion for the experiment that we made. No one who joined in the "Stand-Behind-the-President!" cry, or participated in the purity-versus-depravity nonsense, has a right to cast a stone at Wilson. He got what he bargained for. The Liberal patriots who raised their hands in holy horror at the peace-time Terror got what they bargained for. The "now-that-we're-in" patriots got what they bargained for. The Labor patriots of the American Federation of Labor got what they bargained for. The anti-union drive of the Garys and the government, like the lawless war on "Bolshevism," was an almost certain aftermath of a war for the enrichment of the Garys, although that war would hardly have been possible without the voluntary coöperation of the Gomperses.

Certain "liberal" editors have sought to excuse our war lies on the ground that they were necessary for victory.

But had America's cause been just, there would have been no need to bolster it up with lies. Even had this argument been valid once, it would long ago have lost its force. Nevertheless, the movement to keep alive the memory of our dead in Europe also became a movement to keep alive the war lies, and forever hide the war swindles. Let us face the truth.

The truth is that there was not a particle of democracy about our war, either in the way it was achieved, in the way it was conducted, in the distribution of its burdens, in the fighting organization itself, in its real motives, in the manner of making peace, or in its fruits, either at home or abroad; that we quarreled with Germany, went to war, and negotiated peace, purely in the interest and at the direction of high finance, and at all stages to the prejudice of the general welfare; that no American died for his country in Europe in 1917, 1918, or 1919, since there was no occasion for any American to die for his country, either in Europe or elsewhere.

A great truth is that we have lied—we have indulged in an orgy of lying. We have not been honest even with our own allies. No American could honestly ask for freedom for Ireland on any ground of principle, and put the soft pedal on Haiti. No one could consistently criticize the Shantung award and keep still about Nicaragua. America has nothing to be afraid of except its own conscience, and has not had for a long time. The truth is that we have given the world a spectacle of white-livered hysteria that will require years of self-respecting conduct to live down.

For the mere money cost of our war, every person who works for a living in America, every bread-winner, every propertyless family, could have been provided with a modern and comfortable home, free of liability. Instead, we have what are called Liberty Bonds. We were informed

that they were a good investment, but that was not enough; they were forced upon us. We paid our good money for them. We were then taxed to pay for them again. Our government then proceeded to confiscate a large share of their value, by printing paper money in greatly increased quantities. At the end of the war we could sell our bonds for something less than half the goods the same money would have bought before. But whether we sell our bonds or whether we keep them, we shall continue paying for them—over and over again; in taxes and in swollen prices. By the simple trick of inflation, the government confiscates a part of the wages of every workman; and by its financial operations turns the money over to the multimillionaire owners of our "essential industries."

Instead of gaining, we have everywhere lost. Our Liberty Bonds turn out to be a gold brick from every point of view.

The case against the war is also the case against existing leaders of the people in every walk of life, against big business patriotism, against Wall Street democracy, against the press as it is, against a trust-in-the-President form of government, against a social system that could permit the great American swindle of 1916-1919.

There remains a single chance for America to derive a benefit from the war just past. It is to perceive the lesson and act upon it. It is for common folks to recognize the real character of past events, and so take measures to prevent a recurrence with probably more costly results.

XXXVII

"RECONSTRUCTION"

THE programme that would preserve the peace of America, promote its prosperity, and serve democracy at home and abroad, would have to include an honest application of principles by which President Wilson professed to be guided in sending American armies to European battlefields.

For international application, the cardinal principles are self-determination and equality of sovereignty. Before there could be any question of fighting to compel the observance of these fundamentals by others, we would first have to observe them ourselves, as well as to heal, as far as may be, the scars that we have cut in trampling upon them in the past. In other words, we would have to purge ourselves with a course of repudiation, withdrawal, and reparation.

1. *Repudiation.* Formal repudiation of every "American" and other policy in foreign affairs that conflicts with the principles of self-determination and equality of sovereignty.

Repudiation of the policy of employing diplomatic coercion or armed intervention on behalf of business investments in any country, whether under the name of "protecting American lives and property," "preserving order," or any other guise.

Repudiation of dollar diplomacy in any form.

Repudiation of the Platt Amendment, asserting a "right" to intervention in Cuba.

Repeal of the legislation empowering the President

to proclaim an arms embargo, as a means to assisting or hindering one side or another in an internal dispute in Latin America, or countries elsewhere.

Repudiation of the Lansing-Ishii Agreement, recognizing special interests of Japan in China for considerations kept secret.

Repudiation of the imperialistic "peace" treaties, and all special alliances with imperialistic governments.

Renunciation of the Nicaraguan Canal Convention, the Haitian and Santo Domingan conventions, and every other international "agreement" procured under duress from our neighbors.

Renunciation of the Monroe Doctrine, our time-honored excuse for a denial of full sovereignty to Latin American states. In practice we have not fully enforced observance of the Monroe Doctrine upon others. Much less have we observed it ourselves. We permitted England to take and keep Belize. *"With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European power we have not interfered and shall not interfere."* But in 1898, we stripped Spain of all her colonies in this part of the world, and in 1916 we coerced Denmark into selling us the Virgin Islands. *"Our policy with regard to Europe . . . is not to interfere in the internal concerns of any of its powers."* Yet we projected America into the middle of European affairs in 1917.

In abandoning the Monroe Doctrine, we would abandon a policy that long ago outlived whatever usefulness it ever had as a protector of the weak, or as a means for our own defense; which long ago became a *scrap of paper* in our hands, and whose only present use is as a cloak for aggression.

2. *Withdrawal.* Immediate and unconditional withdrawal of all American military and naval forces from all countries not a part of the United States.

Withdrawal from Nicaragua, Haiti, Santo Domingo, and Cuba.

Immediate withdrawal from all protectorates, official and unofficial. Withdrawal of American collectors from all foreign customhouses. Withdrawal of all support of Latin American dictators whom we have set up, or who owe their tenure to our favor. Abandonment of all measures inimical to popular movements in neighboring countries requiring revolution for their success.

Withdrawal of all military forces from Europe and Asia.

Immediate and complete independence to Filipinos, Porto Ricans, and Virgin Islanders.

3. *Reparation.* Full reparation to all countries, such as Nicaragua and Honduras, whom we have assisted into bankruptcy by compelling them to acknowledge exorbitant claims of our bankers, having no just foundation.

Restoration of Guantanamo to Cuba, and the Corn Islands and other territory taken from Nicaragua.

Restoration of full sovereignty to Cuba, Nicaragua, Haiti, Santo Domingo, and Honduras.

Adequate reparation to Haiti, Santo Domingo, and Nicaragua for injuries done to their citizens in our wars of conquest.

Restoration of all indemnities to our late enemies, including merchant ships appropriated in American harbors, and property confiscated on land.

Satisfactory reparation and apologies to all neutral nations against whom we committed injuries in violation of international law during the late war.

Having freed the subject peoples under our heel, having washed our hands of the blood of our weaker brethren, having righted every international wrong that we have committed, so far as that is possible; having taken the fear

from the hearts of our nearest neighbors, we may consider ourselves competent then—and only then—to offer proposals to other nations, looking toward the maintenance of the peace of the world, and the safety of democracy.

Governments which really cared nothing for democracy, or international justice, or peace, might not take kindly to our proposals; they would know that they were sincere. All governments care for peace of a sort; all wish to avoid great wars if they can have their way without them. But no government devoted to the interests of a minority which fattens upon the profits of aggression wishes to see established the bases of permanent world peace. They do not wish to be deprived of the "right" to make public war for private profit.

But every government not devoted to imperialism, or under the thumb of an imperialistic government, or in immediate terror of reprisals from imperialistic governments, would be interested in our proposals and willing to join a genuine peace league. They would have everything to gain and nothing to lose.

Such a league would have a larger charter membership than the spurious league which President Wilson brought back from Versailles. At the same time it would not at once be a league of all nations. For the "noble democracies," our late comrades at arms, would be conspicuous by their absence—unless our magnificent example should lead to the downfall of imperialism everywhere.

It is impossible to exaggerate the probable effect throughout the world of such an example. The downfall of Russian imperialism caused all imperialistic governments to tremble in their shoes. Either the restoration of Russian imperialism or the partition of that country among imperialistic governments was everywhere deemed essential to the safety of imperialistic "civilization." Yet the lesson

of America's renunciation would be infinitely clearer and more inspiring. Russian imperialism crumbled under the stress of war, under circumstances in which the issue was clouded, at a time when the new régime was subject to misinterpretation, hostile prejudice, and attack, from which we in America would be comparatively free.

We have talked much and we have not "delivered the goods." The world will never again credit our high pretensions, until they are proven by deeds. It is easy to believe that one magnificent act of renunciation would nerve a suffering world to deliver the death-blow to the cause of its travail.

And if it did not, what then? Would it mean danger or disaster for ourselves? Would we stand in peril of our noble allies, the only remaining governments in the world either interested in aggression or in a position to perpetrate aggressions?

These governments will have their hands overfull for years—and probably as long as they last—in enforcing the conditions of settlement upon their late enemies, in carrying out other schemes nearer home, and in keeping their own people in subjection at the same time. The withdrawal of our support would vastly limit their capabilities for aggression. If, with our support, a supreme effort to subjugate Russia was impracticable, as Entente statesmen admitted—Russia, impoverished by war, weakened by revolution and counter-revolution, disorganized, blockaded, geographically within easy reach, her ports in their possession and their armies upon her soil—how much more impracticable would it be for these governments to attempt to send any force across the Atlantic in an effort to dictate in our affairs!

Our imperialistic allies will continue to perpetrate aggressions in Europe, Asia, and Africa, in proportion to the

"practicability" of the undertakings. They are the world peril, they and their system, a far greater peril to the world than the Kaiser ever succeeded in becoming—only because they are stronger than he and his Junkers ever were or had a chance to be.

So long as these governments last, the world cannot be made "safe for democracy," especially that part of the world "practically" within their reach. Yet I do not advocate that we attack this peril as we attacked the Kaiser. The struggle against autocracy and imperialism is essentially an internal one. The autocracy, militarism, and imperialism of a given country can best be dealt with by the democratic forces within that country. Imperialistic governments may, on occasion, overthrow imperialistic governments, as in the present era. But the sum of the world's imperialism is not decreased thereby. Autocracy, militarism and imperialism thrive on external hostilities. So long as the democratic forces within imperialistic countries are not strong enough to deal with their own governments, the death-blow to imperialism cannot be delivered, and a part of the world will remain in danger.

I would not advocate an effort of America against this peril, even to the extent of attempting to save the next intended victims of European and Asiatic imperialism in Europe, Asia, or Africa. But in the western hemisphere something of the kind might wisely be done.

In the past, the independent states of the western hemisphere have owed their comparative immunity from European aggression more to distance and their own strength than to the protection of the Monroe Doctrine. They had been under European rule, and with their own strength had cast it off. The Monroe Doctrine pronounced against their reconquest, which was under consideration by the

Holy Alliance. Nevertheless, the credit for saving them from new wars at that time cannot be claimed for the Monroe Doctrine. For the withdrawal of England from the Holy Alliance, which happened before the Monroe Doctrine appeared, was sufficient to cause the abandonment of the scheme as impracticable.

No one can say that, if the Monroe Doctrine had not been promulgated, the whole of the Americas, outside of the United States, would have come into the possession of European powers. Nor can it be said that, had they come into the possession of European powers, such possession would now constitute a peril to the independence, the territorial integrity, or the institutions of the United States. Is Canada a peril to this country?

Although, in our national pride, we have greatly exaggerated the effect of the Monroe Doctrine upon the relations between Europe and the western hemisphere, it has not been wholly without influence. What would be the effect of its formal renunciation? Would our late allies —one or more of them—rush in and seize Mexico and other Latin American states?

Mexico is the issue upon which the policy of imperialism may next be tested in the western hemisphere. British gentlemen, like American millionaires, have properties, claims, and ambitions, which they are anxious shall be made good by the strong arm of the United States government. Let us suppose that America should refuse to use either its arms or its diplomacy on behalf of British interests—should unreservedly recognize the sovereignty of Mexico, as it has repeatedly promised to do—should concede the full right of Mexico to tax, or otherwise control, foreign property within her borders, in accordance with her own ideas of the public welfare—would Britain then

proceed to enforce her "rights" in Mexico with British arms?

I grant that England or any other imperialistic government is capable, morally, of entering upon a war of conquest upon Mexico. Every imperialistic government everywhere stands ready to perpetrate a war of conquest anywhere, the moment that it appears practicable to do so. But would it be practicable for England to invade Mexico?

Certainly not nearly as practicable for England as for the United States. That is a reason why England is quite willing for America to "attend to her interests" there. Why not wait and see if England would consider it practicable to enter upon a war of conquest upon Mexico, before entering upon such an enterprise on her behalf ourselves?

The Mexicans would rather have us do that, feeling that they would be safer without the "protection" of the Monroe Doctrine than with it. Latin Americans generally would be most happy to have us withdraw from them the "protection" of our Monroe Doctrine, and only because they have reason to consider it more of a menace than a protection. They know the history of American aggression—and understand its significance—better than do the American people themselves.

Should the United States formally renounce the Monroe Doctrine, and recognize, in its stead, what has sometimes been called the Carranza Doctrine—which places foreigners on the same level with citizens, denying to the former the "right" to call upon their home governments to intervene on behalf of their business enterprises—the action would be hailed with rejoicing throughout Latin America; the fear and hatred felt generally for Americans would disappear with the removal of its cause; and it is certain that the Carranza Doctrine would be adopted generally by Latin American countries. In which case it is probable

that the eastern hemisphere would be forced, by circumstances already mentioned, to accept the dictum of the western hemisphere, and refrain from pressing any imperialistic claims in this part of the world.

But supposing that it should not? The people of the United States would then have to determine how far they would go in standing with their near neighbors against European aggression.

There would be several courses open to us. First, we could give military assistance of a strictly defensive character, such as the original Monroe Doctrine contemplated, and such as was contemplated for all threatened states in Wilson's original scheme for a genuine League of Nations. If we must have a war over Mexico of some kind, why not fight to save Mexico from being grabbed by others, instead of grabbing Mexico ourselves?

Second, if we did not think it wise to fight, we could stand aside, selling our neighbors the arms with which to protect themselves—our right as a neutral nation—leaving the issue to be determined between them and their enemies.

A third possible course would be to use our good offices, and a small portion of our great wealth, if need be, to settle any immediate claims of a pressing nature that might seem to threaten the peace of the western hemisphere.

We paid out more money for our part in the European war than the combined investments of all Europeans in all the independent states of Latin America. One of our reasons for doing this, we said, was to save small states from the peril of aggression. We did not save small states from such peril. A far wiser policy, and a far less expensive one—at least, so far as the western hemisphere is concerned—would have been to guarantee, with the Treasury of the United States, the foreign debt of all our neighbors who happened to be in financial trouble, to adjust all Euro-

pean claims, and to put every state "on its feet" financially, even if we never received a penny of our money back.

An objection to this will be that some of these countries are in the hands of corrupt and inefficient governments, which would continue to contract European obligations and would soon be found again in financial difficulties. An answer is that, once an adjustment were made, coupled with the declaration that henceforth no debts were to be collected by governmental intervention, future risks would not be taken with the expectation of making them good by such means.

Another answer is that our present policy is largely responsible for the insolvency of Latin American governments, their inefficiency and corruption. In order to be in a position always to assert American supremacy for the sake of selfish interests, we have created the fiction that Latin Americans are unfit to look after their own affairs, and are incapable of self-government. At the same time we ourselves have forced Latin American states into bankruptcy. We have set up dictators who betrayed their own people. We have furnished Latin America with the foreign peril that everywhere plays into the hands of autocracy. We supported the counter-revolutions that have kept Mexico in turmoil. Our own citizens and our own government are responsible for the very danger to life and property that we are asked to end by intervention.

It is probable that Mexico, if left to herself, would ultimately pay all just claims of foreigners. But the demands of foreign capitalists, intent on getting away with Mexico's natural resources without adequate return to the country, ought not to be met. The great oil corporations would have the American people war upon the Mexican people in order to save the oil deposits from what they term confisca-

tion by the Mexican government. What an unterrified Mexican government would do with the remaining oil resources it is impossible to say. We will suppose that it would confiscate them. Then let it confiscate them. The interests of the American people are not the interests of the oil corporations in this matter. They are, rather, the interests of the Mexican people. Perhaps some American would really suffer. But the Americans who are interested in the exploitation of Mexican oil are, for the most part, millionaires with great holdings elsewhere. Were they dispossessed in Mexico, without a dollar of compensation, they would not forego any luxury, nor would their families starve. There may be foreign "rights" in Mexico, but how about the rights of Mexicans? Public undertakings on a large scale, serviceable to the Mexican nation, must wait until there are funds to prosecute them. Mexico has both the legal and the moral right to tax such funds from the rich holdings in her natural resources. The vested interests of a minority, whether native or foreign, cannot stand against the needs of the great majority.

America needs a new patriotism—a patriotism that is able to see our neighbor's viewpoint, as well as our own; that is willing to accord genuine "equality of rights," regardless of relative might; that dares to look our own faults in the face, in order that they may be rectified.

But we cannot make democracy safe abroad, not even from ourselves, until we have first made democracy safe at home. It is not within the scope of this book to offer any detailed suggestions for making democracy safe at home. When the eyes of the American masses are opened to the real motives of their war and the fruits of their peace, they will then begin to see what they must do. Circumstances will have to determine how rapidly progress

may be made, as well as what means may be most effectively employed to make it.

It may be suggested, however, that those Americans whose professions of love for their Constitution are genuine cannot do less than to press for its restoration, and the righting, so far as possible, of the domestic wrongs that have been accomplished by its profanation. They will at least insist that every imprisoned victim of any war law be set free, also all victims of army courts-martial. They will cast about for a means of defending their Constitution against the President and the Supreme Court. Since, in our foreign policy, we remain subject to a Stand-behind-the-President-trust-in-the-President system—to a scheme of things that holds us at the mercy of the secret whims, blunders, treacheries, and machinations of one man —they will seek to take from the President the power which, for that matter, the framers of the Constitution never intended that he should have, to make war practically at will; they will try to accomplish at home the thing that Woodrow Wilson declared to be a war aim of the United States: *"The destruction of every arbitrary power anywhere that can separately, secretly, and of its single choice, disturb the peace of the world."*

Again, all Americans, whose professions of love for democracy are sincere, will at least clamor for the immediate and absolute abolition of secret diplomacy, and of conscription, for the obliteration of existing class distinctions in the armed forces, for the abolition of the present barbarous system of military "justice"—"reformed" though it be. They will perhaps press for a prohibition of the use of the armed forces outside the territory or territorial waters, except after referendum. Certainly they will demand that the entire cost of the war be collected from the interests that profited by it and furnished the motive for it.

They will even seek to make an end of government service to the big business minority, whether in foreign or domestic affairs.

The majority will have to gain actual control of the public business in every department thereof. But to hope to gain such control and keep it will be futile so long as a minority retains possession of the means of information, and uses it to deceive the others for its own selfish and secret purposes. A simple observance of the Constitution would preclude the imprisonment of persons for expressing their views upon public affairs, but real freedom of speech and of the press cannot be restored without fundamental economic changes.

So long as a handful of men in Wall Street control the credit and industrial processes of the country, they will continue to control the press, the government, and, by deception, the people. They will not only compel the public to work for them in peace, but to fight for them in war.

Democracy is not a reality in America. America is a financial oligarchy, in which the President is the willing, though pretendedly reluctant, servant of the great financial powers.

The events of the past half-dozen years have demonstrated not only the moral bankruptcy of the political and intellectual leaders that capitalism has given the world, but the inability of capitalism to save the world from periodic disaster. Imperialism is simply a phase of capitalism. Big business government must go, but big business government will not go until big business goes. Only the institution of a new social order, based upon economic equality, will save the world from more and more wars for business.

APPENDIX

A FEW DEADLY PARALLELS OF WOODROW WILSON

Explaining the Victory and its Results

WHAT BECOMES OF THE GERMAN PERIL?

German Peril is Destroyed.

"The object of the war is attained. . . . Armed imperialism . . . is at an end. . . . The arbitrary power of the military caste of Germany . . . is discredited and destroyed."—Message to Congress announcing armistice terms, Nov. 11, 1918.

German Peril is not Destroyed.

"It [the world] knows that not only France must organize against this peril [the German peril] but that the world must organize against it."—Speech to French Senate, Jan. 20, 1919.

THE FUTURE OF ARMAMENTS

Heavy Armaments are no Longer Necessary.

"The nations of the world are about to consummate a brotherhood which will make it unnecessary in the future to maintain those crushing armaments which make the people suffer almost as much in peace as they suffered in war."—Speech to French Chamber of Deputies, Feb. 3, 1919.

But American Armament must be Increased.

"I take it for granted that Congress will carry out the naval programme. . . . These plans have been prepared . . . with the intention of adhering to a definite method of development for the navy. I earnestly recommend the uninterrupted pursuit of that policy."—Message to Congress, Dec. 2, 1918.

WHAT HAS BECOME OF MILITARISM?

It is Banished from the Earth.

"To-day the world stands freed from the threat of militarism." —Victory Loan message to American people, Apr. 19, 1919.

It is in the Saddle in France.

"Again and again, my fellow-citizens, in the conference at Paris, we were face to face with this situation: that in dealing with a particular civil government we found that they would not dare to promise what their general staff was not willing that they should promise; and that they were dominated by the military machine that they had created, nominally, for their own defense, but really—whether they willed it or not—for the provocation of war. And so, as long as you have a military class, it does not make any difference what your form of government is. If you are determined to be armed to the teeth, you must obey the orders and directions of the only men who can control the great machinery of war."—Kansas City, Sept. 6, 1919.

THE PRIVATE COUNSELS OF STATESMEN

They cannot Determine Destinies of Nations.

"Private counsels of statesmen cannot now and cannot hereafter determine the destinies of nations."—Memorial Day address at Paris, 1919.

They must Determine America's Destiny without Review by Treaty-making Body.

"No stenographic reports were taken of the debates on the League of Nations, and such memoranda as were taken it was agreed should be confidential. . . . The various data bearing upon or used in connection with the treaty of peace with Germany . . . would include many memoranda which it was agreed, on grounds of public policy, it would be unwise to make use of outside the conference."—Letter to Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Aug. 8, 1919, refusing data upon which Treaty of Versailles was formulated.

ON THE RESPONSIBILITY AND FOREKNOWLEDGE OF THE GERMAN PEOPLE

German People had neither Knowledge nor Choice.

"The German nation had no choice whatever as to whether it was to go into that war or not, did not know that it was going into it until its men were summoned to the colors."—Speech at Billings, Mont., Sept. 11, 1919.

German People had Knowledge and are Responsible.

"In the last analysis, my fellow-countrymen, as we in America would be the first to claim, a people are responsible for the acts of their government. . . . Germany was self-governed. Her rulers had not concealed the purposes they had in mind."—Columbus, Sept. 4, 1919.

THE QUESTION OF INDEMNITIES

Explains Indemnity Germany must Pay.

"In the first place, my fellow-countrymen, it [the treaty] seeks to punish one of the greatest wrongs ever done in history, the wrong which Germany sought to do to the world and to civilization, and there ought to be no weak purpose with regard to the application of the punishment. She attempted an intolerable thing, and she must be made to pay for the attempt."—Columbus, Sept. 4, 1919.

Says there is no Indemnity (Same Speech).

"There was no indemnity—no indemnity of any sort was claimed—merely reparation, merely paying for the destruction done, merely making good the losses. . . . There is no indemnity in this treaty."—Columbus, Sept. 4, 1919.

Justifies Collecting Damages as Punishment.

"My fellow-citizens, Germany tried to commit a crime against civilization and this treaty is justified as a memorandum to make Germany pay for the crime up to her full capacity for payment."—Billings, Sept. 11, 1919.

Pledge against Collection of such Damages.

"Punitive damages, . . . we deem inexpedient and in the end worse than futile, no proper basis for a peace of any kind, least of all for an enduring peace."—Reply to Pope, Aug. 27, 1917.

DID GERMAN COMMERCIAL CLASSES WANT WAR?

Evidently So.

"The real reason that the war we have just finished took place was that Germany was afraid her commercial rivals were going to get the better of her, and the reason why some nations went into the war against Germany was that they thought Germany would get the commercial advantage of them. The seed of the jealousy, the seed of the deep-seated hatred, was hot successful commercial and industrial rivalry."—St. Louis, Sept. 5, 1919.

Emphatically Not!

"The German bankers and the German merchants and the German manufacturers did not want this war. They were making conquest of the world without it, and they knew it would spoil their plans."—Speech at St. Paul, Sept. 9, 1919.

NATURE OF THE "UNION" WITH OUR ALLIES

A Moral Union.

"There is no way, which we ought to be willing to adopt, which separates us in dealing with Germany from those with whom we were associated during the war. . . . because I think it is a moral union which we are not at liberty to break."—Conference with Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Aug. 19, 1919.

A Financial Union.

"Under the League plan, the financial leadership will be ours, the industrial supremacy will be ours, the commercial advantage will be ours."—Speech at St. Louis, Sept. 5, 1919.

WHY DO WE WISH TO PARTICIPATE UPON REPARATIONS COMMISSION?

To Assist our dear Allies.

"Why, we were disinclined to join in that [the Reparations Commission], but yielded to the urgent request of the other nations that we should, because they wanted our advice and counsel."—White House conference with Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Aug. 19, 1919.

To Make Money for Ourselves.

"Some of you gentlemen know we used to have trade with Germany. All of that trade is going to be in the hands and under the control of the Reparations Commission. I humbly asked leave to appoint a member to look after our interests, and I was rebuked for it. I am looking after the industrial interests of the United States. I would like to see the other men who are. They are forgetting the industrial interests of the United States, and they are doing things that will cut us off, and our trade off, from the normal channels, because the Reparations Commission can determine where Germany buys, what Germany buys, how much Germany buys. . . . It is going to stand at the centre of the financial operations of the world."—Speech at St. Louis, Sept. 5, 1919.

AS TO THE CHARACTER OF OUR ALLIES

They have Never been Dishonorable.

"I challenge anybody to show where, in recent years, . . . there has been the repudiation of an international obligation by France or Italy or Great Britain or Japan. Japan has kept her engagements. . . . There can be cited no instance where these governments have been dishonorable."—Billings, Sept. 11, 1919.

Dishonorable Record is Cited.

"Let me remind you of some of the history of this business. It was in 1898 that China ceded these rights and concessions to Germany. The pretext was that some German missionaries had been

killed. . . . Two Christian missionaries are killed, and therefore one great nation robs another nation and does a thing which is fundamentally unChristian and heathen! . . . Then, what happened, my fellow-citizens? Then Russia came in and obliged China to cede to her Port Arthur and Talien Wan, not for quite so long a period, but upon substantially the same terms. Then England must needs have Wei-Hai-Wei as an equivalent concession to that which had been made to Germany; and presently certain ports, with the territory back of them, were ceded upon similar principles to France. Everybody got in, except the United States, and said: 'If Germany is going to get something, we will get something.' Why, none of them had any business in there on such terms. Then when the Japanese-Russian war came, Japan did what she has done in this war. She attacked Port Arthur and captured Port Arthur, and Port Arthur was ceded to her as a consequence of the war. . . . Just so we could trade with these stolen territories, we were willing to let them be stolen. . . . She [Japan] has it [Shantung] as spoils of war."—San Francisco, Sept. 17, 1919.

EUROPEAN SPHERES OF INFLUENCE IN CHINA

Governments Promised to Return Them.

"Sitting around our council board in Paris I put this question: 'May I expect that this will be the beginning of the retrocession to China of the exceptional rights which other governments have enjoyed here?' The responsible representatives of the other great governments said, 'Yes, you may expect it.' "—San Francisco, Sept. 17, 1919.

Governments did not Promise to Return Them.

"Back of this provision, with regard to Shantung, lies, as everybody knows or ought to know, a very honorable promise which was made by the government of Japan in my presence in Paris, namely, that, just as soon as possible after ratification of this treaty, they will return to China all sovereign rights in the province of Shantung. Great Britain has not promised to return Wei-Hai-Wei; France has not promised to return her part."—Los Angeles, Sept. 20, 1919.

OBLIGATION TO HOLD STRICTLY TO PEACE PROMISES

Pledge not to Compromise.

"They [the issues of the struggle] must be settled—by no arrangement or compromise or adjustment of interest, but definitely and once for all, and with a full and unequivocal acceptance of the principle that the interest of the weakest is as sacred as the interest of the strongest. That is what we mean when we speak of a permanent peace, if we speak sincerely, intelligently. . . . No peace shall be obtained by any kind of compromise or abatement of the principles we have avowed as the principles for which we are fighting."—Sept. 27, 1918.

Compromise is Admitted and Excused.

"Old entanglements of every kind stood in the way—promises which governments had made to one another in the days when might and right were confused, and the power of the victor was without restraint. Engagements which contemplated any dispositions of territory, any extensions of sovereignty that might seem to be to the interest of those who had the power to insist upon them, had been entered into without thought of what the peoples concerned might wish or profit by; and these could not always honorably be brushed aside."—Address to Senate, in presenting Treaty of Versailles, July 10, 1919.

The German Peril

WHO STARTED THE EUROPEAN WAR?

Germany Started It.

"The war was begun by the military masters of Germany."—Flag Day address, 1917.

Nobody in Particular Started It.

"Have you ever heard what started the present war? If you have, I wish you would publish it, because nobody else has. So far

as I can gather, nothing in particular started it, but everything in general."—Speech at Cincinnati, Oct. 26, 1916.

MOTIVE DOMINATING GERMAN WARFARE

A Desire to Impose Will upon the World.

"The power against which we are arrayed has sought to impose its will upon the world by force."—Proclamation to American people, May 18, 1917.

An Intense Conviction that it is Fighting for Justice.

"Every nation now engaged in the titanic struggle on the other side of the water believes, with an intensity of conviction that cannot be exaggerated, that it is fighting for its rights, and in most instances that it is fighting for its life, and we must not be too critical of the men who lead those nations."—Speech at Des Moines, Feb. 1, 1916.

REAL NATURE OF THE STRUGGLE

Political, not Commercial.

"The object of the war was to destroy autocratic power; that is to say, to make it impossible that there should be anywhere, as there was in Wilhelmstrasse, in Berlin, a little group of military men, who could brush aside the manufacturers, brush aside the Emperor himself, and say: 'We have perfected a machine with which we can conquer the world; now stand out of the way, we are going to conquer the world.' "—Minneapolis, Sept. 9, 1919.

Commercial, not Political.

"Why, my fellow-citizens, is there any man here, or any woman —let me say, is there any child here—who does not know that the seed of war in the modern world is industrial and commercial rivalry? . . . This war, in its inception, was a commercial and industrial war. It was not a political war."—St. Louis, Sept. 5, 1919.

WHAT SORT OF PEACE WAS GERMANY FIGHTING FOR?

The Very Opposite to a Democratic Peace.

"They [the Central Powers] are striking at the very existence of democracy and liberty."—Message to Congress, Dec. 4, 1917.

A Democratic Peace as Outlined by Wilson Himself.

"Each side desires to make the rights and privileges of weak peoples and small states as secure against aggression or denial, in the future, as the rights and privileges of the great and powerful states now at war."—Note to belligerent governments, Dec. 18, 1916.

"Wilson Principles," General

ON THE WISDOM OF CRUSHING ONE'S ENEMIES

Germany must be Crushed.

"The German power . . . must be crushed."—Dec. 4, 1917.

Neither Side should be Crushed.

"Fortunately . . . the statesmen of both of the groups of nations, now arrayed against one another, have said, in terms that could not be misinterpreted, that it was no part of the purpose they had in mind to crush their opponents."—Jan. 22, 1917.

FORCE AS A MEANS FOR ESTABLISHING INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE

Force is Acknowledged as a Policy of Action.

"Force, force to the utmost, force without stint or limit, the righteous and triumphant force that shall make right the law of the world."—Apr. 6, 1918.

Force Never Accomplished Anything Permanent.

"I have not read history without observing that the greatest forces in the world, and the only permanent forces, are the moral forces. We have the evidence of a very competent witness, namely, the

first Napoleon, who said that, as he looked back in the last days of his life upon so much as he knew of human history, he had to record the judgment that force had never accomplished anything that was permanent. Force will not accomplish anything that is permanent." —Speech before New York Press Club, June 30, 1916.

ON THE EFFICACY OF GOING TO WAR TO GET PEACE

The Way to get Peace is to make War.

"What I am opposed to is not the feeling of the pacifists, but their stupidity. My heart is with them, but my mind has a contempt for them. I want peace, but I know how to get it and they do not. You will notice that I sent a friend of mine, Colonel House, to Europe, who is as great a lover of peace as any man in the world; but I did not send him on a peace mission; I sent him to take part in a conference as to how the war is to be won, and he knows, as I know, that is the way to get peace if you want it for more than a few minutes."—Speech at Buffalo, Nov. 12, 1917.

Peace so Imposed would not Last.

"First of all it [the peace to be concluded] must be peace without victory. . . . Victory would mean peace forced upon the loser, a victor's *terms imposed* upon the vanquished. It would be accepted in humiliation, under duress, at an intolerable sacrifice, and would leave a sting, a bitter memory, upon which terms of peace would rest, not permanently, but only as upon quicksand. Only a peace between equals can last; only a peace the very principle of which is equality and a common participation in a common benefit."—Peace-without-victory speech, Jan. 22, 1917.

ON HANDING DOWN LIBERTY FROM ABOVE

We claim It as our Motive.

"We are to be an instrument in the hands of God to see that liberty is made secure for mankind."—Speech at Confederate veterans' reunion, June 5, 1917.

Yet It can't be Done.

"I challenge you to cite me an instance in all the history of the world where liberty was handed down from above. Liberty always is attained by the forces working below, underneath."—Blythe interview, *Saturday Evening Post,* May 23, 1914.

SHOULD THE PEOPLE OR THE GOVERNMENTS DECIDE WHEN PEACE MAY BE CONCLUDED?

War must not be Continued unless Public Approves Objectives.

"No statesman who has the least conception of his responsibility ought for a moment to permit himself to continue this tragical and appalling outpouring of blood and treasure unless he is sure beyond a peradventure that the objects of the vital sacrifice are part and parcel of the very life of society, *and that the people for whom he speaks think them right and imperative* as he does."—Message to Congress on war aims, Jan. 8, 1918.

Public Warned against Expressing either Approval or Disapproval.

"I earnestly request every patriotic American to *leave to the governments* of the United States and of the Allies the momentous discussions initiated by Germany, and to remember that for each man his duty is to strengthen the hands of these governments."—Statement to American people, Oct. 14, 1918.

ON DICTATORSHIPS IN WAR

They are Inconsistent with the Traditions of America.

"It is inconsistent with the traditions of the country that their [the people's] knowledge of arms should be used by a governmental organization which would make and organize a great army subject to orders to do what a particular group of men might at the time think it was best for them to do. That is the militarism of Europe, where a few persons can determine what an armed nation is to do."—Statement to committee from American Union against Militarism, White House, May 9, 1916.

Participation in Conduct of War is Denied even Congress.

"I should regard the passage of this resolution as a direct vote of want of confidence in the Administration. . . . Such activities [a Senate Committee investigation of the conduct of the war] would constitute nothing less than an attempt to take over the conduct of the war, or at least so superintend and direct and participate in the executive conduct of it as to interfere in the most serious way with the action of the constituted Executive."—Letter to Senator Martin, May 14, 1918.

THE TRUE BASIS OF FOREIGN POLICY

Material Interests Must not Determine Anything.

"It is a very perilous thing to determine the foreign policy of a nation in terms of material interest. It is not only unfair to those with whom you are dealing, but it is degrading as regards your own actions."—Speech at Mobile, Oct. 27, 1913.

Material Interests Justify War.

"There is a moral obligation laid upon us to keep free the courses of our commerce and our finance, and I believe that America stands ready to vindicate those rights."—Topeka speech, Feb. 2, 1916.

WHAT AMERICAN INTERESTS NEED PROTECTION?

Spiritual Interests Only.

"Therefore, what America is bound to fight for when the time comes is nothing more nor less than her self-respect. There is no immediate prospect that her material interests may be seriously affected, but there is constant danger every day of the week that her spiritual interests may suffer serious affront."—Speech at Chicago, Jan. 31, 1916.

Spiritual Indeed!

"It would depend upon the patriotic spirit of the employers of the country whether they made it possible for the younger men in

their employ to respond under favorable conditions or not. I, for one, do not doubt the patriotic devotion either of our young men or of those who give them employment—*those for whose benefit and protection they would in fact enlist.*"—Message to Congress, Dec. 7, 1915.

THE EMPLOYMENT OF ARMED FORCES TO FURTHER PRIVATE ENTERPRISE ABROAD

Repudiated as a Policy.

"A great many men . . . are complaining that the government of the United States has not the spirit of other governments, which is to put the force, the army and navy, of that government, behind investments in foreign countries. Just so certainly as you do that, you join this chaos of hostile and competing ambitions [the European war]."—Speech at Cincinnati, Oct. 26, 1916.

Endorsed as a Policy.

"Americans have gone to all quarters of the world. Americans are serving the business of the world . . . and every one of these men . . . is our ward and we must see to his rights and that they are respected."—Jan. 29, 1916.

THE COMPATIBILITY OF PATRIOTISM AND PROFITS

They are Incompatible.

"Patriotism leaves profits out of the question. In these days . . . when we are sending hundreds of thousands of our young men across the seas. . . . no true patriot will permit himself to take toll of their heroism in money, or seek to grow rich by the shedding of their blood."—Appeal to business interests, July 11, 1917.

They are not Incompatible.

"Of course somebody is going to make money out of the things privately manufactured, manufactured by private capital. There are men in the great belligerent countries making, I dare say, vast

sums of money out of the war, and I, for one, do not stand here to challenge or doubt their patriotism in the matter."—Speech at Des Moines, Feb. 1, 1916.

International Law and Policies Leading to Belligerency

The efficacy of armed neutrality for avoiding war

Armed Neutrality not a Step toward War.

"There may be no recourse but to armed neutrality, which we shall know how to maintain. . . . I am not now proposing or contemplating war, or any steps that lead to it."—Address to Congress, Feb. 26, 1917.

Armed Neutrality certain to Result in War.

"Armed neutrality . . . is worse than ineffectual. . . . It is practically certain to draw us into the war."—Address to Congress, Apr. 2, 1917.

International law and freedom of the seas.

Freedom of Seas is Provided by International Law and America is willing to Fight for Same.

"The government of the United States notes with satisfaction that the Imperial German Government recognizes without reservation . . . the principle that the high seas are free. . . . The rights of neutrals in time of war are based upon principle, not upon expediency, and the principles are immutable. . . . The government of the United States will continue to contend for that freedom [of the seas] from whatever quarter violated, without compromise, and at any cost."—Note to Germany, July 21, 1915.

Freedom of Seas is not Provided by International Law and Rules should be Altered by Agreement to Legalize It.

"No doubt a somewhat radical reconsideration of many of the

rules of international practice . . . may be necessary in order to make the seas indeed free and common in practically all circumstances for the use of mankind. . . . It need not be difficult to define or to secure the freedom of the seas if the governments of the world sincerely desire to come to an agreement concerning it."—Peace-without-victory speech, Jan. 22, 1917.

INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SUBMARINE

The Submarine a Lawful Weapon for Operations against Commerce.

"The events of the past two months have clearly indicated that it is possible and practicable to conduct such submarine operations as have characterized the activity of the Imperial German Navy within the so-called zone, in substantial accord with the accepted practices of regulated warfare."—Note of July 21, 1915, to Germany.

"I do not feel that a belligerent should be deprived of the proper use of submarines in the interruption of enemy commerce."—Letter of Secretary Lansing to British ambassador, Jan. 18, 1916.

The Submarine an Unlawful Weapon for Operations against Commerce.

"Manifestly, submarines cannot be used against merchantmen. . . . without an inevitable violation of many sacred principles of justice and humanity."—Note of May 13, 1915, to Germany.

"The use of submarines for the destruction of an enemy's commerce is . . . utterly incompatible with the principles of humanity, the long-established and incontrovertible rights of neutrals, and the sacred immunities of non-combatants."—Note of Apr. 18, 1916, to Germany.

INTERNATIONAL LAW OF ARMED MERCHANTMAN

Presence of Armament Creates Presumption of Offensive Purpose.

"The presence of an armament and ammunition on board a mer-

chant vessel creates *a presumption that the armament is for offensive purposes,* but the owners or agents may overcome this presumption by evidence showing that the vessel carries armament solely for defense. Evidence necessary to establish the fact that the armament is solely for defense . . . must be presented in each case independently at an official investigation. The result of the investigation must show conclusively that the armament is not intended for, and will not be used in, offensive operations."—American memorandum of Sept. 19, 1914.

Presence of Armament does not Create Presumption of Offensive Purpose.

"The determination of warlike character must rest in no case upon presumption but upon conclusive evidence. . . . The belligerent [submarine] should, in the absence of conclusive evidence, *act on the presumption that an armed merchantman is of peaceful character.* . . . Conclusive evidence of a purpose to use the armament for aggression is essential . . . in the absence of which it is to be presumed that the vessel has a private and peaceful character, and it should be so treated by an enemy warship."—American memorandum of Mar. 25, 1916.

ON THE RIGHT OF A SOVEREIGN GOVERNMENT TO CONTROL FOREIGN PROPERTY WITHIN ITS BORDERS

Confiscation Right for America.

"By exercising in this crisis our admitted right to control all property within our territory, we do no wrong to Holland."—Public statement, explaining confiscation of Dutch ships, Mar. 20, 1918.

Even Right of Taxation is Denied Mexico.

"The United States cannot acquiesce in any procedure ostensibly or nominally in the form of taxation or the exercise of eminent domain, but really resulting in confiscation of private property and arbitrary deprivation of vested rights."—Note of Apr. 2, 1918, threatening Mexico on account of oil tax decree.

ON THE POWER OF THE EXECUTIVE TO ARM MERCHANT SHIPS AGAINST WAR VESSELS OF A COUNTRY WITH WHICH AMERICA IS TECHNICALLY AT PEACE

President has not the Power.

"At the same time the President authorized the further statement that what rendered the situation even more grave than it had been supposed that it was, was the discovery that, while the President under his general constitutional powers could do much of what he had asked Congress to empower him to do, it had been found that there were certain old statutes, as yet unrepealed, which raised insuperable practical obstacles and virtually nullified his power."—Supplementary statement from White House, Mar. 4, 1917.

President has the Power.

"The President is convinced that he has the power to arm American merchant ships and is free to exercise it at once."—Statement from White House, Mar. 9, 1917.

Various

WAS AMERICA IN DANGER?

Very Much in Danger.

"We find ourselves fighting again for our national existence."—Independence Day, 1918.

Not in Danger.

"America was not immediately in danger. . . . America was not directly attacked."—Speech at Billings, Sept. 11, 1919.

DISINTERESTED OR INTERESTED?

Disinterested.

"It [our war] is absolutely a case of disinterested action."—Address to Mexican editors, June 7, 1918.

Very Interested.

"Every man in every business in the United States must know by

this time that his whole future fortune lies in the balance."—Address at Urbana, Jan. 31, 1918.

THE RULE OF THE KAISER OVER GERMANY

The Kaiser need not Go.

"It is no business of ours how that great people [the Germans] came under its [the German government's] control or submitted with temporary zest to the domination of its purpose."—Reply to Pope, Aug. 27, 1917.

"Neither do we presume to suggest to her [Germany] any alteration or modification of her institutions."—Message to Congress, Jan. 8, 1918.

The Kaiser must Go.

"Significant and important as the constitutional changes seem to be, which are spoken of by the German Foreign Secretary in his note of the 20th of October, it does not appear that the principle of a government responsible to the German people has yet been fully worked out. . . . It is evident . . . that the power of the King of Prussia to control the policy of the empire is unimpaired . . . The President deems it his duty to . . . point out that in concluding peace . . . the government of the United States cannot deal with any but veritable representatives of the German people who have been assured of a genuine constitutional standing as the real rulers of Germany."—Note of Oct. 23, 1918, replying to further concessions by Germany.

WAS BORGLUM OFFICIAL AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATOR?

Borglum's Appointment.

January 2, 1918

"My dear Mr. Borglum: . . . I have conferred with the Secretary of War, and at his request and with my hearty concurrence, I urge you to come at once to Washington . . . and by your own investigation discover the facts in this business. The Secretary of War assures me that he will be delighted to clothe you with full

authority to get at the bottom of every situation, and that he will . . . direct that every facility of inquiry be placed at your disposal. When you have thus investigated . . . I would be most happy to have a report from you personally. . . .

"Cordially yours,
"Woodrow Wilson."

Borglum's Disappointment. April 15, 1918

"My dear Mr. Borglum: I am afraid that you have for some time past been under a serious misapprehension. . . . I never at any time constituted you an official investigator. . . . We have at no time considered you as the official representative of the Administration in the investigation. If I had so regarded you I would, of course, have supplied you with such assistance as you feel that you have lacked.

"Cordially and sincerely yours,
"Woodrow Wilson."

WHAT IS PRO-GERMANISM?

This.

"They [certain Americans] declare this is a foreign war which can touch America with no danger either to her lands or her institutions . . . appeal to our ancient tradition of isolation in the policies of nations. . . . It is only friends and partisans of the German government whom we have already identified who utter these thinly disguised disloyalties."—Flag Day address, 1917.

But Woodrow Wilson Said the Same Things.

"A war [the European war] . . . whose causes cannot touch us."—Message to Congress, Dec. 8, 1914.

"Nobody seriously supposes, gentlemen, that the United States needs to fear an invasion of its own territory."—New York speech, Jan. 27, 1916.

"We need not and we should not form alliances with any nation in the world."—Address at unveiling of statue of Barry, May 16, 1914.

THEORY OF A PEOPLE'S WAR

Ours was a People's War.

"The great fact that stands out above all the rest is that this is a people's war."—Flag Day address, 1917.

There's no such thing as a People's War.

"No people ever went to war with another people. Governments have gone to war with one another. Peoples, so far as I can remember, have not, and this is a government of the people, and this people is not going to choose war."—Speech at Milwaukee, Jan. 31, 1916.

Mexican Policy

MOTIVE FOR MEXICAN MEDDLING

The Interest of Mexico Alone.

"We act in the interest of Mexico alone, and not in the interest of any person or body of persons who may have personal or property claims in Mexico which they feel that they have a right to press."—Message to Huerta, conveyed through John Lind, Aug. 1913.

The Fortunes of Americans.

"We should let every one who seems to exercise authority in any part of Mexico know, in the most unequivocal terms, that we shall watch the fortunes of those Americans who cannot get away, and shall hold those responsible for their sufferings and losses to a definite reckoning. That can and will be made plain, beyond the possibility of a misunderstanding."—Message to Congress, Aug. 27, 1913.

SOVEREIGNTY VERSUS INTERVENTION

Pledge to Respect Sovereignty.

"It is our purpose, *in whatever we do* . . . to pay the most scrupulous regard to the sovereignty and independence of Mexico. That we take as a matter of course, to which we are bound by every obligation of right and honor."—Message to Congress, Aug. 27, 1913.

Hint at Intervention. (Same Day)

"You will convey to the authorities the indication that any maltreatment of Americans would be likely to raise the question of intervention."—Instructions dictated by the President, and wired to all consuls in Mexico, Aug. 27, 1913.

TO COERCE OR NOT TO COERCE

Promise not to Coerce.

"We will aid and befriend Mexico, but we will not coerce her; and our course with regard to her ought to be sufficient proof to all America that we seek no political suzerainty or selfish control."—Annual message, Dec. 8, 1914.

What is This but Coercion?

"You will understand that if our messages are occasionally couched in terms of strong emphasis, it is only because they contain some matters *which touch the very safety of Mexico itself* and the whole process of its future history. . . . It is our duty to speak very plainly about *the grave danger which threatens them* [the Mexicans] *from without.* . . . To speak less plainly, or with less earnestness, would be to conceal from you *a terrible risk,* which no lover of Mexico should care to run."—President Wilson, in note to Carranza, Mar. 14, 1915.

WHO IS ENTITLED TO CHOOSE POLITICS OF MEXICO?

Only Mexicans may Choose.

"America stands, first of all, for the right of men to determine whom they will obey and whom they will serve; for the right of political freedom and of peoples' sovereignty. . . . She made up her mind long ago that she was going to stand up, so far as this western hemisphere is concerned, for the right of peoples to choose their own politics, *without foreign interference of any kind.*"—Pittsburgh speech, Jan. 29, 1916.

American Government May Choose.

"I feel it my duty to tell them [the leaders of Mexico] that if they cannot accommodate their differences and unite . . . within a very short time, this government will be constrained to decide what means should be employed by the United States in order to help Mexico save herself and serve her people."—June 2, 1915.

HOW LONG MAY MEXICO TAKE TO RECONSTRUCT HER GOVERNMENT?

As Long as she Pleases.

"Until this recent revolution in Mexico, eighty per cent. of the people never had a 'look in' in determining what their government should be. . . . It is none of my business and it is none of yours how long they take in determining it. It is none of my business and it is none of yours how they go about the business. The country is theirs. The government is theirs. Have not European nations taken as long as they wanted, and spilt as much blood as they pleased, in settling their affairs? And shall we deny that to Mexico because she is weak? No, I say!"—Indianapolis speech, Jan. 8, 1915.

This Long and No Longer.

"It is time, therefore, that the government of the United States should frankly state the policy which . . . it becomes its duty to adopt. It must presently . . . lend its active moral support to some man or group of men, if such may be found, who can . . . set up a government at Mexico City which the great powers of the world can recognize and deal with."—June 2, 1915.

THE RIGHT WAY TO HELP MEXICO

It is not to Overwhelm her with Force.

"I have heard some gentlemen say they want to help Mexico, and the way they propose to help her is to overwhelm her with force. . . . What makes Mexico suspicious of us is that she does not believe as yet that we want to serve her. She believes we want to possess her. And she has justification for the belief in the way in

which some of our fellow-citizens have tried to exploit her privileges and possessions. For my part, *I will not serve the ambitions of those gentlemen.*"—Address at Detroit, July 10, 1916.

Threat to Overwhelm Mexico with Force.

"The government of the United States . . . desires General Obregon and General Carranza to know that it has, after mature consideration, determined that if . . . Americans should suffer . . . because they fail to provide means of protection to life and property, it will hold General Obregon and General Carranza personally responsible [and] . . . *will take such measures as are expedient to bring to account those who are personally responsible.*"—Note to Carranza, Mar. 9, 1915.

WHY DID WE ATTACK VERA CRUZ?

To Maintain the Dignity and Authority of the United States.

"I, therefore, come to ask your approval that I should use the armed forces of the United States . . . to obtain . . . the fullest recognition of the rights and dignity of the United States. . . . We seek to maintain the dignity and authority of the United States."—Message to Congress, Apr. 20, 1914.

To Reëstablish Constitutional Government in Mexico.

"The feelings and intentions of the government in this matter . . . are based upon . . . a profound . . . interest in the reëstablishment of their [the Mexicans'] constitutional system."—Reply to Carranza's protest against Vera Cruz attack.

THE PUNITIVE EXPEDITION

Troops not to be Used in Interest of American Owners of Mexican Properties.

"It is my duty to warn the people of the United States that there are persons along the border who are actively engaged in originating and giving as wide currency as they can to rumors of the most

sensational and disturbing sort. . . . The object of this traffic in falsehood is obvious. It is to create intolerable friction between the government of the United States and the de facto government of Mexico, *for the purpose of bringing about intervention in the interest of certain American owners of Mexican properties.* This object cannot be attained so long as sane and honorable men are in control of the government."—Statement explaining object of expedition, Mar. 25, 1916.

Troops Remain in Interest of American Owners of Mexican Properties.

"The border troubles are only symptoms. Mexico needs *system* treatment, not symptom treatment. . . . The world has great respect for rights that are vested, and we shall go along with the world in protecting such rights. . . . Mexico will either do right without our help—or with it. *This is her choice.* . . . We do not wish to be forced into intervention *until this opportunity is exhausted.* To this end *we must pass from the border matters* to the conditions of Mexico which affect the lives and property of our nationals. *These must be made secure.*"—Franklin K. Lane, speaking for Wilson, explaining non-agreement with Mexico in negotiations for withdrawal of American forces, Nov. 1916.

AS TO THE CONSENT OF CARRANZA TO THE PUNITIVE EXPEDITION

Carranza Gave Consent.

"The expedition into Mexico was ordered under an agreement with the de facto government of Mexico."—President Wilson, in statement to the public, Mar. 25, 1916.

Carranza did not Give Consent.

"It is admitted that American troops have crossed the international boundary in hot pursuit of the Columbus raiders, and without notice to or the consent of your government."—American note to Carranza, June 20, 1916.

NEUTRALITY AND THE MUNITIONS TRADE

Neutrality Requires an Embargo.

"I shall follow the best practice of nations in the matter of neutrality, by forbidding the exportation of arms or munitions of war of any kind from the United States to any part of the republic of Mexico."—Message to Congress, Aug. 27, 1913.

Neutrality Forbids an Embargo.

"The Executive order, under which the exportation of arms and ammunition into Mexico is forbidden, *is a departure from* the accepted practices of neutrality. . . . The order is therefore rescinded."—Statement issued from White House, Feb. 3, 1914.

"EVENTUAL" ATTITUDE TOWARD CONCESSIONAIRES

"Eventually" he will Fight against Them.

"Eventually, I shall fight every one of these men who are now seeking to exploit Mexico for their own selfish ends. I shall do what I can to keep Mexico from their plundering. There shall be no individual exploitation of Mexico, if I can stop it."—Blythe interview, *Saturday Evening Post,* May 23, 1914.

Eventually he Threatens to Fight for Them.

"It becomes the function of the government of the United States . . . to call the attention of the Mexican government to the necessity which may arise to impel it *to protect the property of its citizens in Mexico.*"—Note of Apr. 2, 1918, threatening Mexico on account of oil taxes.

THE END

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